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Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is classified as an anxiety disorder 
characterized by distressing persistent unwanted ideas or impulses (obsessions) and urges 
and/or compulsion to do something to relieve the associated anxiety caused by the obsession. 
The thematic content of the obsessions are highly variable, ranging from symmetry, 
contamination to aggressive concerns. Compulsions tend to be linked to the obsessions, but 
can also be idiosyncratic to the intrusive thought. According to the cognitive model, 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is maintained by various belief factors such as an 
inflated sense of responsibility, overestimation of threat and the over-control of thoughts. 
Despite much support for this hypothesis, there is a lack of specificity. This series of studies 
sought to determine the relationship between a number of cognitive beliefs and appraisal 
processes and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
This thesis presents the results of three studies. The first study was designed to 
investigate the hypothesis that certain beliefs are more prevalent in OCD, compared with 
other anxiety disorders. The second study expands on earlier findings by examining whether 
the six metacognitive beliefs proposed by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group, (OCCWG; 1997, 2001, & 2003) correlate with specific symptom-based OCD 
subtypes. The final study addresses some of the methodological weaknesses inherent in 
retrospective self-report measures by replicating the study using experimental techniques. 
Most importantly, this research was conducted from within the theoretical framework of 
Rachman (1993) and Salkovskis (1989) models which emphasise the misinterpretation of 
significance of the intrusive thoughts.  
The first study explored the relationship between thought-action fusion (TAF) and 
inflated responsibility beliefs across individuals diagnosed with obsessive compulsive 
disorder (OCD), an anxiety disorder other than OCD (anxious controls; AC), and a non-




anxious control group (NAC). It was hypothesized that the OCD group would evidence 
significantly higher inflated responsibility and TAF scores, compared to the AC and NAC 
groups. In this study, non-clinical and clinical participants were recruited for research. The 
non-clinical group was comprised of undergraduate students (n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 
9.2). The clinical groups included 20 participants with OCD as their primary diagnosis (mean 
age = 32.1; SD = 11.9) and 21 individuals diagnosed with another anxiety disorder (mean age 
= 32.2; SD = 10.9).  
To measure inflated responsibility beliefs and thought action fusion, self-report 
questionnaires were administered to the participants. The results of this study demonstrated 
that inflated responsibility beliefs, while present in other anxiety disorders, were significantly 
higher in participants with OCD, even after controlling for depressed mood and TAF levels. 
No group differences emerged between the OCD and anxious groups on measures of TAF. 
Thus, it can be tentatively concluded that inflated responsibility beliefs may have a more 
robust relationship with OCD than TAF beliefs, which appear to act as a general vulnerability 
factor occurring along a continuum of anxiety disorders.  
The second study examined the associations between the six OCD-related beliefs: 
control of thoughts, importance of thoughts, responsibility, intolerance of uncertainty, 
overestimation of threat and perfectionism and five empirically derived OCD subgroups. 
Clinical participants with a primary diagnosis with OCD (n = 67: mean age = 38.0; SD = 
11.7) were recruited over a period of two years from the Anxiety Disorders Unit. Participant 
responses were cluster analysed to form five stable groups: aggressive obsessions–checking 
compulsions (n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 9.2); contamination obsessions–cleaning 
compulsions (n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 9.2); symmetry concerns–ordering/arranging 
compulsions (n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 9.2); hoarding obsessions-hoarding compulsions 




(n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 9.2);  and miscellaneous obsessions –miscellaneous 
compulsions (n = 22: mean age = 26.8; SD = 9.2). 
The second found that intolerance of uncertainty was significantly related to the 
contamination subgroup. While responsibility and threat estimation beliefs were higher in the 
aggressive-checking subgroup, these differences did not reach statistical significance.  No 
other significant results were found, however, there was a non-significant trend for 
perfectionism beliefs to be higher in symmetry-ordering and hoarding subgroup. Following 
the results of this study, questions remained about whether the lack of significant findings 
reflected the generality of these beliefs or were due to methodological differences. This led to 
the development of the final study presented in this thesis. 
The purpose of the final study was to investigate whether the second study was 
limited by the method of assessment (e.g. self-report questionnaires). This study was unique, 
as it was the first of its kind to experimentally manipulate all six beliefs in empirically 
derived OCD subtypes. Twenty participants (mean age = 45.0; SD = 11.0) were chosen from 
the second study to form the following priori groups: contamination (n = 4: mean age = 44.5; 
SD = 9.5); aggressive (n = 6: mean age = 46.5; SD = 7.2); hoarding (n = 4: mean age = 47.2; 
SD = 6.9); and symmetry (n = 6: mean age = 41.8; SD = 17.4). Six behavioural experiments 
designed to reflect one of the six OCCWG beliefs were specifically developed and 
administered to the groups. Baseline scores were obtained using self-report questionnaires.  
The study found strong support for the use of experimental paradigms over self-report 
measures, as several significant interactions between cognitive beliefs and OCD symptom-
based subtypes were found. Specifically, the hoarding subgroup evidenced significantly 
higher overall thought action fusion scores compared to those in the contamination group. 
The symmetry subgroup exhibited significantly higher anxiety than the aggressive group 
during the perfectionism task and demonstrated significantly higher scores on several items 




measuring perfectionism compared to the contamination group. Finally, over-estimation of 
threat beliefs was significantly higher in the contamination thoughts. No statistically 
significant group differences were found for controllability of thoughts, responsibility and 
intolerance of uncertainty. 
In conclusion, these studies collectively showed that in some cases of OCD certain 
beliefs appear highly applicable, whereas in others they are not. This finding may explain 
why some OCD patients have poor treatment outcomes as the beliefs and appraisals were 
highly variable across groups. These findings are of both theoretical and clinical significance 
because they add to the growing understanding that OCD may consist of distinct clusters of 
symptoms with different underlying motivations and beliefs. This finding is of clinical 
significance because treatment guidelines for OCD can become more specific, factoring into 
the therapy situation these underlying beliefs and appraisal processes. 
Lastly, the findings regarding inflated responsibility deserve special mention, given 
the significance of this construct in contemporary cognitive models. The results of the present 
studies were mixed with regard to responsibility as only the first study found a significant 
result. It appears that, like the other belief domains proposed by the OCCWG, responsibility 
may not be specific to all types of OCD and current cognitive models may benefit was 








 CHAPTER ONE 
1. CLINICAL PRESENTATION OF OCD 
 
Once considered one of the more rare anxiety disorders, Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder now has a lifetime prevalence rate of approximately 2.3 percent (Taylor, 2002). 
OCD is characterised by clinically significant repetitive intrusive thoughts and compulsive 
behaviour. Common obsessions include contamination fears, thoughts of harming others, 
and/or a preoccupation with symmetry and order. Compulsions can include repetitive 
checking of certain objects, incessant cleaning, and/or mental counting. Compulsions can be 
either observable behaviours or may include covert acts like repeating certain words. 
Compulsive behaviour is typically performed to reduce the anxiety caused by the occurrence 
of the obsessive thought.  
The typical age of onset of OCD has consistently been reported to be approximately 
19 to 25 years (Steketee, 1993). However, for males the modal age of onset tends to be 
between six and fifteen years, with females developing the disorder later between twenty to 
twenty-nine years (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, 
(APA, 2000). It is estimated that fewer than 15% of individuals with OCD develop the 
disorder after the age of 35 years (Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1984). OCD commonly occurs 
alongside other psychological disorders, including other anxiety disorders, mood disorders, 
eating disorders, substance use/abuse and some personality disorders (e.g., avoidant 
personality disorder, obsessive compulsive personality disorder). OCD tends to be a chronic 
condition, with the majority of individuals experiencing a waxing and waning of symptoms 
over time. These fluctuations are typically precipitated by significant stressful life events 
(Taylor, 2002). 
The perplexing nature of clinical obsessions is matched by a plethora of research 
regarding the etiological components involved in this illness. Whilst all theoretical models 




contribute to the overall understanding of the disorder, one of the most promising theoretical 
models is the cognitive model of OCD (Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1985). Under the 
umbrella of ‘cognitive models’, two distinct models are proposed. The first, ‘cognitive-
dysfunction model’ asserts that OCD arises because of a general dysfunction in cognitive 
processing. The second, termed ‘cognitive-appraisal model’ emphasizes the role of 
dysfunctional beliefs and assumptions.  
Cognitive–appraisal models of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) suggest that, as a result 
of prior experience, the individual develops particular assumptions (Salkovskis, Shafran, 
Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). The occurrence of a particular event or situation activates 
previously dormant beliefs. These belief systems affect the way in which the thoughts or 
intrusions are interpreted (Salkovskis et al., 1999). Obsessive compulsive symptoms arise 
because underlying beliefs fuel the misinterpretation and significance of the intrusive 
thoughts. In other words, these cognitive intrusions are interpreted as threatening and causing 
distress. This then manifests in compulsive behaviour, which is performed to decrease or 
remove the associated anxiety. Obsessive–compulsive symptoms continue because (a) 
compulsive behaviour is strengthened via the temporary reduction in distress; and (b) the 
individual fails to distinguish between the occurrence of the intrusive thought and the 
actuality of the obsessive thought occurring (e.g., thoughts of contaminating a loved one will 
not lead to acts of contamination). The cognitive-appraisal model will serve as the theoretical 
foundation for the studies contained in this thesis. 
The drive for more accurate assessment of OCD precipitated the formation of the 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005). The 
OCCWG consists of a large group of international researchers dedicated to the study of the 
cognitive aspects of OCD. The efforts of the OCCWG have resulted in; (a) psychometric 
scales designed to assess certain beliefs and appraisal processes thought to be important in 
OCD; (b) new knowledge regarding the cognitive aspects involved in OCD; (c) the 




development of operational definitions of what is believed to be the six most important 
beliefs and appraisal processes in OCD: inflated personal responsibility, tendency to 
overestimate threat, perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty, and over-importance and over-
control of thoughts (OCCWG., 2001) and (d) clear directions for future research.  
The advent of the OCCWG has led to an array of research opportunities. For example, 
although conceptual, the aforementioned beliefs are described as distinct. The typology is 
primarily maintained for research purposes, as considerable overlap exists. Because many of 
the beliefs are aimed at the prevention of harm or threat, there is some debate as to whether 
these beliefs are specific to OCD. For instance, the “do no harm” appraisal occurs in a range 
of psychological disorders (e.g., dependent personality). The over-importance of thoughts and 
beliefs about controlling one’s thoughts have been conceptualised as more general 
vulnerability factors for OCD, whilst the perception of responsibility is seen to contribute to 
the development of obsessive compulsive symptoms in more specific ways (Salkovskis, 
1985). 
Other areas for investigation include whether changes in dysfunctional beliefs and 
appraisals correspond to significant treatment outcome (Clark, 2002b), or further whether 
some beliefs act as precursors for others (Rassin, Muris, Schmidt, & Merckelbach, 2000). 
Another fruitful area for research involves the subtyping of OCD. Preliminary research 
suggests that a number of cognitive domains may be more applicable to certain types of 
OCD. For example, Rachman and Shafran (1998) have argued that checking compulsions are 
more closely associated with inflated responsibility beliefs than cleaning compulsions. 
Conversely, the tendency to inflate intrusive thoughts is regarded by some researchers to be 
more salient in aggressive obsessions (Thordarson & Shafran, 2002). To the author’s 
knowledge no study has attempted to evaluate whether the six metacognitive beliefs proposed 
by the (OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005) specifically correspond to symptom-based 




subtypes of OCD. The purpose of the present body of research is to examine this issue 
further. 
The following chapter presents the clinical presentation of OCD, including a review 
of the phenomenology, comorbidity, OCD in childhood as well as methods of assessment. 
Chapter 2 describes the most common etiological models of OCD, briefly discussing the 
psychodynamic, conditioning, cognitive and biological approaches to OCD. Chapter 2 
continues with a more detailed discussion of two specific cognitive-appraisal models: (a) 
Salkovskis (1985) model of OCD stressing the role of inflated responsibility beliefs; and (b) 
Rachman’s (1993) model emphasising the role of Thought-Action Fusion (TAF). Chapter 3 
reviews the current state of research into the subtyping of OCD and research conducted by 
the OCCWG. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the three empirical studies that form the basis of the 
current research and finally, chapter 7 discusses the theoretical and research implications of 
these studies. 
1.1 Phenomenology 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a psychological disorder characterised by 
repetitive cognitive intrusions, which cause such intense anxiety that the sufferer feels 
compelled to perform certain mental or behavioural actions/compulsions in order to reduce 
the associated distress. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR, APA, 2000) defines obsessions as “persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images that 
are experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress” 
(American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition, Text Revision. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 
p.457). Obsessions can involve repetitive thoughts concerning contamination, intense need 
for orderliness, aggressive or sexual intrusions, and religious preoccupations. Often the 
obsessions occur concurrently, with clients reporting a broad range of thoughts 




simultaneously. Obsessions and/or compulsions shift over time, often in response to 
developmental changes (Evans, Leckman, Carter, Reznick, & et al., 1997). 
Compulsions are defined as “repetitive behaviours (e.g., hand washing, ordering, 
checking) or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) the goal of which 
is to prevent or reduce anxiety or distress, not to provide pleasure or gratification” (DSM-IV-
TR, 2000 p.457). In contrast to earlier additions, the DSM-IV-TR modified the diagnostic 
criteria to include covert compulsions (mental counting), in response to growing research 
demonstrating the high use of mental acts to decrease anxiety in OCD (see DSM-IV field 
trials). Typical compulsions include cleaning (hand-washing), checking (doors), arranging, 
mental counting and reassurance seeking behaviours. Generally, the compulsive activity is 
not rationally connected to the obsession itself (Taylor, 2002); more the behaviour tends to be 
excessive and serves as an anxiety reducing mechanism.  
Although most individuals with OCD report both obsessions and compulsions 
(Noshirvani, Kasvikis, Marks, Tsakiris, & Monteiro, 1991), the presence of both is not 
required for the diagnosis of OCD. The previously prevailing view that all persons with OCD 
recognize the nonsensical nature of their obsessions and compulsions was also discounted 
with the advent of the DSM-IV. Growing research supporting the hypothesis that the degree 
of insight in OCD is better represented on a continuum  (Abramowitz, 1999; Bellino, Patria, 
Ziero, & Bogetto, 2005; Eisen et al., 2001; Matsunaga et al., 2002; Ravi Kishore, Samar, 
Janardhan Reddy, Chandrasekhar, & Thennarasu, 2004), has led to the diagnostic specifier of 
OCD “with poor insight”.  
It is estimated that intrusions of the types experienced by obsessional patients, also 
occur in 80-90 percent of the general population (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984). Studies evaluating normal intrusions and clinical obsessions have found that 
both types of intrusions are remarkably similar in terms of content e.g., (Rachman & de Silva, 
1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). However, it is reported that abnormal obsessions occur 




more frequently, are more intense, and are of longer duration (Muris, Merckelbach, & 
Clavan, 1997; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000). Taken together, these results suggest 
that although obsessional patients may experience cognitive intrusions more frequently and 
intensely, they are apparently indistinguishable in terms of content from the intrusions 
experienced by the general population (Wroe, Salkovskis, & Richards, 2000). 
1.1.1 Onset 
Typically, OCD begins in early adolescence or young adulthood (American 
Psychiatric Association (APA, 2000). The modal age of onset for males varies between 6 and 
15 years and for females between 20 to 29 years (APA, 2000). Overall, two-thirds of 
individuals with OCD experience onset of symptoms prior to 25 years  (Kaplan, Sadock, & 
Grebb, 1994; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1990), with fewer than 15% of individuals with OCD 
developing symptoms for the first time after 35 years of age (Kaplan et al., 1994; Rasmussen 
& Eisen, 1991). However, several findings suggest that ‘later-life’ OCD increases 3 to 5 
times when individuals are living in institutional as opposed to independent settings (Bland, 
Newman, & Orn, 1988; Calamari, Janeck, & Deer, 2002; Juninger, Phelan, Cherry, & Levy, 
1993). Whilst the disorder has been reported to occur less often in later in life, several 
researchers have questioned the accuracy of these estimates of OCD, because many of the 
measures used have not been validated in this age group (Calamari et al., 2002; Fuentes & 
Cox, 1997; Jones & Menzies, 1998; Juninger et al., 1993).  
Different symptom and neurological profiles have been identified by the onset of 
disorder, specifically concerning early-onset (EOD) versus late-onset OCD (Busatto et al., 
2001; Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, Marques, & Versiani, 2003;  Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, 
Marques, & Versiani, 2003; Rosario-Campos et al., 2001). Prepubertal onset of OCD is 
characterised by (a) male preponderance (Zohar, Pauls, Ratzoni, Apter, & et al., 1997); (b) 
higher rate of comorbid tic disorders (Hemmings et al., 2004; Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, 
Lenane, & et al., 1989); (c) higher frequency of compulsions not preceded by obsessions 




(Geller, Biederman, Jones, Park et al., 1998); (d) greater familial loading for OCD (Lenane, 
Swedo, Leonard, Pauls, & et al., 1990); (e) more aggressive clinical course (Sobin, Blundell, 
& Karayiorgou, 2000; Sobin, Blundell, Weiller et al., 2000). These onset-specific features 
have precipitated research examining whether these characteristics represent subtypes of 
OCD. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
1.1.2 Course 
OCD typically develops gradually, however acute onset has been observed in some 
cases. The disorder tends to be chronic, with the majority of individuals experiencing a 
waxing and waning of symptoms (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). The presence of depression, 
severity of illness, childhood-onset OCD and poor initial treatment response are associated 
with a poorer course (Steketee, Eisen, Dyck, Warshaw, & Rasmussen, 1999) and are seen as 
important predictors of later functioning (Stewart et al., 2004). Episodic and deteriorating 
courses have been observed in about 10 per cent of cases (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1989).  
Despite the majority of cases developing gradually, acute onset OCD has been 
observed in response to specific life stressors. During the last ten years, particular 
significance has been placed on the role of trauma (de Silva & Marks, 2001; Dinn, Harris, & 
Raynard, 1999; Ginsberg, 2004; Sasson et al., 2005; Scarciglia, 2003; Stavrakaki & Antochi, 
2004) and pregnancy in OCD (Abramowitz, Schwartz, & Moore, 2003a; Altemus, 2001; 
Lochner et al., 2004; Williams & Koran, 1997). Recently, de Silva and Marks (2001) 
presented a series of cases linking the expression and/or content of obsessions to the nature of 
trauma. In all cases, onset was aggressive and proceeded by trauma. For example, one of the 
cases involved sexual assault, which was followed by feelings of ‘being unclean’ and lead to 
thoughts about dirt and contamination. This was then followed by corresponding urges to 
neutralise these feelings.  
Obsessive-compulsive symptomotology has been reported to be sensitive to hormonal 
changes (Altemus, 2001; Altemus, Swedo, Leonard, Richter, & et al., 1994; Pigott, 1998; 




Weiss, Baerg, Wisebord, & Temple, 1995; Williams & Koran, 1997). Consistent with 
previous research, changes in obsessive compulsive symptoms have been observed during the 
premenstrual phase, (Williams & Koran, 1997), and menarche (Labad et al., 2005; Lochner et 
al., 2004), with an increased vulnerability towards OCD during pregnancy (Altemus, 2001; 
Diaz, Grush, Sichel, & Cohen, 1997) and menopause (Labad et al., 2005). It is thought the 
fluctuations in oestrogen and progesterone levels during pregnancy alter the serotonergic 
transmission, uptake, and binding. This in turn then precipitates or worsens obsessive the 
compulsive symptomotology (Stockert, 1985). 
Individuals who develop OCD as a result of hormonal changes or a traumatic event 
tend to differ from other individuals in the swiftness of symptom onset, the course, and 
content of obsession e.g., preoccupation of harming the infant (Buttolph & Holland, 1990). 
Taken together, these findings may provide an explanation regarding the acute-onset and 
non-typical episodic course observed in a subset of individuals with OCD. 
1.1.3 Prevalence 
Historically, OCD was considered a rare disorder affecting only .00005 percent of 
individuals (Rudin, 1953). Since the 1980s, the prevalence rate of OCD has seemingly soared 
with current estimates at 2-3 percent (Kolada, Bland, & Newman, 1994; Samuels & Nestadt, 
1997; Sasson et al., 1997). However, the discrepancy between figures is more likely the result 
of the enigmatic and embarrassing nature of OCD coupled with certain sampling practises, 
see (Nelson & Rice, 1997) rather than a substantial increase in the number of individuals with 
OCD. Some studies have reported a slight variation in lifelong prevalence rates of OCD 
between males, .5-2.5% and females, .9- 3.5% (Weissman, Bland, Canino, Greenwald et al., 
1994). While there is emerging support for this premise (Ginsberg, 2004), the majority of 
epidemiological studies in Europe, Asia and Africa support the contention that there are no 
sex differences in terms of prevalence of OCD (Cilli et al., 2004; Juang & Liu, 2001; Kaplan 
et al., 1994). 




1.1.4 Gender  
 In contrast with adult OCD, where no gender differences have been reported, most 
studies note a 3:2 male-female ratio during childhood (Geller, Biederman, Jones, Park et al., 
1998). Gender-related differences have been found in the course, development, presentation 
and prognosis of OCD (Bogetto, Venturello, Albert, Maina, & Ravizza, 1999; Fontenelle, 
Marques, & Versiani, 2002; Rosario-Campos et al., 2001; Zohar, 1999). The male profile 
with OCD tends to include: (a) earlier age of onset (Bogetto et al., 1999; Tukel, Polat, Genc, 
Bozkurt, & Atli, 2004); (b) associated tics (Chabane et al., 2005; Hemmings et al., 2004; 
Lochner et al., 2004); (c) more frequent history of predominant sexual, exactness and 
symmetry obsessions (Lensi, Cassano, Correddu, Ravagli, & Kunovac, 1996; Tukel et al., 
2005), checking, symmetry and bizarre compulsions (Lensi et al., 1996) differing Axis I 
comorbidity and worse prognosis (Lochner et al., 2004). Females with OCD experience: (a) 
more washing and contamination fears (Castle, Deale, & Marks, 1995; Minichiello, Baer, 
Jenike, & Holland, 1990); (b) are more likely to be married (Castle et al., 1995; Lensi et al., 
1996); (c) have increased comorbidity of depression (Lochner et al., 2004; Noshirvani et al., 
1991) and eating disorders (Bogetto et al., 1999; Lochner et al., 2004). 
This diversity in findings has provoked research into the role of gender in genetic 
studies of OCD (Bogetto et al., 1999; Fontenelle et al., 2002; Geller, Biederman, Jones, 
Shapiro et al., 1998; Lochner et al., 2004; Tukel et al., 2004). Initial studies of genes involved 
in the monoaminergic neurotransmitter systems have suggested a sexually dimorphic 
association between OCD and polymorphisms of the catechol-O-methyltransferase gene 
(COMT) and the monoamine oxidase A gene (MAO-A; (Hemmings et al., 2004). 
Specifically, males with OCD have been shown to have (a) low activity of the COMT gene 
(Karayiorgou et al., 1999); and (b) high activity variants of the MAO-A gene (Camarena et 
al., 2001). Unfortunately, studies investigating reports of gender-specific associations 




between OCD and COMT polymorphisms have not been consistent (Alsobrook, 2002; 
Karayiorgou et al., 1999). 
Whilst there is some research to suggest different OCD profiles based on gender, e.g., 
contamination fears are more likely to be associated with females than males (Castle, 1995; 
Castle et al., 1995; Kyrios, Sanavio, Bhar, & Liguori, 2001; Minichiello et al., 1990) there is 
also evidence to the contrary, e.g., contamination fears were higher among male subjects than 
females (Fischer, 1997). Clearly, further clinical and genetic research is required to fully 
elucidate the gender-related differences in OCD. 
1.1.5 Differential Diagnosis 
 OCD is not diagnosed if the content of the thoughts or the activities is exclusively 
related to another mental disorder e.g., Social or specific phobia (preoccupation with feared 
object or situation), Trichotillomania (hair pulling). OCD can be distinguished from Body 
Dysmorphic disorder (BDD; preoccupation with appearance) by examining for content 
specificity as individuals with BDD are singly obsessed, whereas most individuals with OCD 
have multiple sentience (APA; 2000). Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is distinguished 
from obsessions by the fact that the person experiences them as excessive concerns about 
real-life circumstances (APA, 2000). For example, an excessive concern that one may lose 
their job would constitute as worry, not an obsession. In contrast, the content of obsessions 
does not typically involve real-life problems, and the individual experiences the obsessions as 
inappropriate. Hypochondriasis should be diagnosed instead of OCD if the rituals such as 
excessive washing or checking are related to concerns about illness or about spreading it to 
other people (APA, 2000). 
 Delusional or Psychotic disorder: the ability of individuals to recognize that the 
obsessions are unreasonable occurs on a continuum. In some individuals with OCD, reality 
testing may be gone, and the obsession may reach delusional proportions (the belief that one 
has caused the death of another by having willed it). In such cases, the presence of psychotic 




features may be indicated by an additional diagnosis of delusional disorder or psychotic 
disorder NOS (APA, 2000). Schizophrenia: The ruminative delusional thoughts and bizarre 
stereotyped behaviours that occur in schizophrenia are distinguished from obsessions and 
compulsions by the fact that they are not ego-dystonic (separate) and not subject to reality 
testing. However, an individual can have both diagnoses (APA, 2000). 
 There is considerable overlap in symptomotology between Tourette's syndrome (TS) 
and obsessive–compulsive disorder (Anholt et al., in press; Coffey et al., 2000; Grados, 2001; 
Leonard, Lenane, Swedo, Rettew, & et al., 1992, 1993). Increased rates of tics are found in 
OCD and up to 60% of people with TS have obsessive–compulsive symptoms (Anholt et al., 
in press). Thirty to 50% of TS patients meet the diagnostic criteria for concurrent OCD 
(Pauls, Raymond, & Robertson, 1991). Furthermore, elevated rates of tics (10–30%), have 
been found in patients with OCD (Holzer, Goodman, McDougle, Baer, & et al., 1994; Zohar 
et al., 1997; Zohar, Ratzoni, Pauls, Apter, & et al., 1992). A wide range of OC symptoms 
may be seen in TS e.g. violent, sexual, & religious obsessions, checking behaviours, and 
hoarding behaviours, with obsessions of contamination less common. Compulsive behaviour 
in OCD differs from complex motor tics, in that compulsions tend to be more purposeful, 
more elaborate, & often occur in response to some obsession. Complex tics may be difficult 
to distinguish from compulsions, as in the compulsive need to touch a particular object again 
& again (Holzer et al., 1994).  
 Two studies (Miguel, Baer, Coffey, Rauch, & et al., 1997; Miguel, Coffey, Baer, 
Savage, & et al., 1995) have investigated the intentional repetitive behaviours between TS 
and OCD patients. The results found that the repetitive behaviours in TS patients were (a) 
often precipitated by sensory phenomena (Miguel et al., 2000); (b) less accompanied by 
cognitions (Anholt et al., in press), and (c) less anxiety-driven than in OCD with tics (Anholt 
et al., in press). Furthermore, the results showed participants with OCD and tics performed 
more impulse like, non anxiety-related behaviours, compared to the OCD without tic group 




(Anholt et al., in press ; Miguel et al., 1997; Zohar et al., 1997). These findings have led 
some researchers to postulate that OCD with comorbid tics constitutes a variant of TS, rather 
than a subtype of OCD (Cath, Spinhoven, Hoogduin et al., 2001; Cath, Spinhoven, Van 
Woerkom et al., 2001). Anholt et al. (in press) investigated this issue by comparing the 
differences in dysfunctional cognitions across groups: OCD group without tics, OCD with 
tics and TS (without OCD) to those of normal controls. The results showed that the OCD 
without tics exhibited higher dysfunctional beliefs than TS patients. However, no differences 
emerged between OCD with or without tics. These findings support the argument for OCD 
and TS as diagnostically distinct disorders.  
1.1.6 OCD In Childhood 
 OCD is reported to occur in 3% of children and adolescents (Zohar, 1999). The 
diagnostic criteria for OCD in children is identical to that of adults, with the exception that 
children do not have to recognise the senselessness of their obsessions or compulsions 
(Criterion B). The rationale for this exception is that children may lack sufficient cognitive 
awareness to make this judgement (DSM-IV-TR, p.457). Children with OCD tend to be 
described as ego-syntonic, as they are unable to make the distinction between the obsessive 
symptoms and the ‘self’. This finding is in contrast to adults, who perceive their symptoms as 
ego-dystonic, or separate from themselves (unless the adult receives the diagnostic specifier 
“with poor insight”). Whether the limited insight in some children who have OCD reflects 
immature cognitive development or diagnostic specific differences remains unknown.  
 There appears to be bimodal distribution in terms of age of onset of OCD. The 
literature suggests that childhood-onset tends to develop between 8 and 11 years (Geller, 
Biederman, Jones, Park et al., 1998; Geller, Biederman, Jones, Shapiro et al., 1998; Rosario-
Campos et al., 2001), whereas adult-onset develops between 19 to 25 years (Steketee, 1993). 
Given the evidence that males tend to develop the disorder earlier (6 -15 years) as opposed to 
than females (20-27 years; Sochting & March, 2002) it is not surprising that most cases of 




childhood-onset OCD are characterised by a male predominance, 3:2 male-female ratio 
(Flament, Whitaker, Rapoport, Davies, & et al., 1988; Geller, Biederman, Jones, Park et al., 
1998). As discussed, earlier onset cases are more likely to have stronger familial aggregation 
of OCD, and differ in symptom profile and comorbidity (Farrell, 2004). In terms of 
continuity, it is estimated that 50-70% of children with OCD continue to experience the 
disorder in adulthood (Bolton, Luckie, & Steinberg, 1995).  
 Childhood Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder (OCD), once considered as a rare 
disorder, has an estimated lifetime prevalence rate of 2–3% (Zohar, 1999). In community 
samples, prevalence rates range from 1.9% in the US (Flament et al., 1988) to 4.1-10% in a 
Danish sample (Thomsen, 1993). In clinical samples, estimates range from .2-1.2% in US 
samples (Hollingworth, 1980; Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak, & Foa, 2001) to 1.3 in a Dutch 
sample (Thomsen, 1991) and 5% in a Japanese sample (Honjo, Nishide, & Toki, 1998). The 
course of OCD varies greatly, and often has an episodic course. A recent study (Leonard, 
Swedo, Lenane, Rettew, & et al., 1993) showed that 43% - 68% of children diagnosed with 
OCD continue to meet diagnostic criteria 2 -14 years after initial presentation. 
 Like adults, the presentation of OCD in children is highly heterogeneous. The 
majority of children with OCD (90%) manifest both obsessions and compulsions, with the 
content of the child’s obsessive and/or compulsive behaviour varying over time (Farrell, 
2004; Foa & Kozak, 1995). The most prevalent obsession and/or compulsion in childhood 
OCD includes contamination – hand washing; and aggressive - avoidance obsessions and/or 
compulsions (Eichstedt & Arnold, 2001; Farrell, 2004; Riddle, 1990). However, for a large 
majority of children with OCD, the compulsive behaviour includes the repetition of certain 
actions or behaviours until the child feels “just right” (Swedo et al., 1989). This phenomenon 
termed “not just right experiences (NJRE)” (Coles, Heimberg, Frost, & Steketee, 2005) is 
often associated with perfectionism, and will be discussed in greater detail Chapter 2. 




 Some predisposing factors have been identified in childhood anxiety disorders and 
can include: (a) history of cautious, inhibited behaviour in early childhood (Biederman, 
1990); (b) parental anxiety disorder (Rosenbaum, 1991; Turner, Beidel, & Costello, 1987); 
(c) family dysfunction (Alonso et al., 2004; Messer, 1994); (d) high rates of neurological soft 
signs (Bolton, Raven, Madronal-Luque, & Marks, 2000); (e) increased school difficulties 
(Last & Strauss, 1990; Sukhodolsky et al., 2005); (f) poor social skills (Last & Strauss, 
1989); and (g) dependent or inflexible temperamental traits (Messer, 1994). However, it is 
important to note that these variables are correlates, not causal factors in OCD. It may be the 
case that a child with OCD develops poor social skills in response to obsessive behaviour, 
and not the other way. 
 The diagnosis of OCD in the absence of other psychological disorders is relatively 
rare (Swedo, Leonard, & Rapoport, 1992) with estimates ranging from 50-80% for comorbid 
clinical disorders in childhood (Zohar, 1999). Twenty-five to fifty per cent of children with 
OCD experience a current or past history of another anxiety disorder (Geller, Biederman, 
Griffin, & Jones, 1996; Swedo et al., 1989).Twenty to seventy-three per cent of children with 
OCD receive an additional diagnosis of depression (Flament et al., 1990; Geller et al., 1996). 
Other conditions of note include learning disorders, disruptive behavioural disorders (Geller, 
Biederman, Faraone, Agranat et al., 2001; Geller, Biederman, Faraone, Bellordre et al., 2001; 
Geller et al., 1996), and Tourette’s disorder (Geller, Biederman, Faraone, Bellordre et al., 
2001). The risk of developing other psychological disorders (e.g., anxiety, mood and/or 
personality disorders) is reportedly increased if the diagnosis of OCD is given in childhood 
(Thomsen, 1993).  
 Small subsets of children with OCD are classed as having a Paediatric Autoimmune 
Disease Associated with Streptococcal Infection or PANDAS (Swedo et al., 1998).  This type 
of OCD is thought to be etiologically distinct, developing in response to Group A -
haemolytic streptococcal infection (GABHS). It is thought that GABHS triggers the abrupt 




onset or exacerbation of tics/obsessive-compulsive behaviours (Singer & Loiselle, 2003). 
Pathophysiologically, it is proposed that antibodies produced against GABHS cross-react 
with neuronal cells, in a process involving molecular mimicry (Singer & Loiselle, 2003). 
Generally, this form of OCD is characterised by: (i) pre-pubertal onset; (ii) associated 
neurological abnormalities (motoric hyperactivity); and (iii) abrupt onset of symptoms or an 
episodic course in which exacerbations are temporally related to streptococcal infections. 
 For the most part, childhood OCD has been conceptualised within the adult cognitive 
models of OCD. Sochting and March’s (2002) single-case studies demonstrated consistencies 
between child-and-adult appraisal processes in OCD. For example, one case described a 13-
year old boy with repeated images of a dead animal his family had encountered once when 
driving in their car. Attempts to neutralise this image involved ‘mentally rewinding the 
image’. During the course of standard behavioural treatment, concerns regarding excessive 
responsibly emerged. The child reported feeling almost 50% responsible for the animal’s 
death, as he had failed to warn the driver of the car. This case supports the prevailing view 
that children with OCD, like adults engage in dysfunctional appraisals, which may not be 
readily apparent in the context of a particular obsession.  
 The trend to transpose adult models of OCD onto children with the disorder has 
recently been examined. There is currently some debate as to whether the appraisal processes 
underlying adult forms of OCD are the same in childhood. One hypothesis is that these 
cognitive biases operate within a developmental sequelae (Farrell, 2004). In a recent study, 
Lara Farrell (2004) investigated the developmental differences in cognitive processing of 
threat in a sample of individuals with OCD1. Using self-report questionnaires and an 
idiographic assessment approach, Farrell evaluated whether a sample of children (n = 34), 
adolescents (n = 39) and adults (n = 38) with OCD would respond to stimuli sourcing the 
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cognitive appraisals of responsibility, probability, severity, thought-action fusion (TAF), 
thought-suppression, self-doubt and cognitive control.   
 Farrell (2004) hypothesized that age-related differences would be apparent in reported 
responsibility for harm, probability of harm, severity of harm, thought suppression, TAF, 
self-doubt and cognitive control. Compared to adolescents and adults with OCD, Farrell 
(2004) demonstrated that children: (i) experience fewer intrusive thoughts; (ii) experience 
less distress and uncontrollability; (iii) were less likely to endorse responsibility attitudes, 
probability biases and thought suppression strategies; (iv) were comparable to adults and 
adolescents in cognitive processes of TAF, perceived severity of harm, self-doubt and 
cognitive control.  
 The finding that children with OCD were less likely to endorse statements reflecting 
inflated responsibility beliefs was extremely surprising given the central role of this belief in 
contemporary cognitive models. Whilst there appears to be some consistency within the 
literature regarding the role of dysfunctional beliefs in OCD, there are discrepancies between 
the developmental stage and the cognitive processing of certain beliefs (e.g., inflated 
responsibility beliefs). Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, this issue warrants 
further investigation given the implications for current cognitive models of OCD e.g 
(Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) 
1.2 Comorbidity 
1.2.1 Anxiety Disorders 
The comorbidity of OCD with other anxiety disorders has been widely investigated 
(Abramowitz & Foa, 1998; Black & Noyes, 1997; Crino & Andrews, 1996; Foa & Kozak, 
1995), with the majority of studies revealing the frequent co-occurrence of anxiety disorders. 
OCD is reported to be highly associated with phobic disorders (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1989), 
particularly social phobia (Angst et al., 2005). However, while OCD subjects tend to have 




relatively high rates of co-occurring lifetime anxiety disorders, this association appears to be 
one-sided, with other anxiety disorders, most notably panic disorder with agoraphobia, 
experiencing low rates of OCD (Crino & Andrews, 1996). 
Recently, the comorbidity of OCD and generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) has 
become of interest due to the resemblance between obsessional phenomena and worries. 
Abramowitz and Foa (1998) investigated this issue by dividing participants with OCD (n = 
381) into two groups based on the presence or absence of GAD. In line with other estimates, 
20% of the sample experienced both OCD and GAD (Brown, Moras, Zinbarg, & Barlow, 
1993). The results demonstrated (i) a higher preponderance of females than males in the 
comorbid group; (ii) the presence of GAD did not elevate the severity of OCD symptoms; 
and (iii) patients with comorbid GAD reported more worries about ‘every-day’ issues, 
compared to those without GAD. Thus, despite the similarities between disorders, the general 
consensus is that obsessions tend to be specific; whilst GAD involves the excessive worry 
about real, everyday life problems (Turner, Beidel, & Stanley, 1992) 
The high comorbidity of OCD and other anxiety disorders is thought to arise as many 
of the anxiety disorders share similar underlying themes e.g., desire to escape (Marks, 1987), 
persistent misinterpretations of particular stimuli as threatening (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
and the underestimation of one’s ability to cope effectively with the perceived threat (Beck, 
Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). For example, in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the 
person appraises intrusive recollections as indications of their mental instability, which 
causes a number of dysfunctional assumptions about their safety, which manifests in 
pathological anxiety (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Whilst the DSM-IV-TR anxiety disorders are 
diverse in presentation and precipitants, the underlying processes maintaining the anxiety 
(e.g., threat aversion) are quite similar. This may be one explanation as to the high rate of co-
occurring anxiety disorders. 




1.2.2 Negative Affect 
In the 1950s, psychiatric literature conceptualised depression and OCD as part of the 
spectrum of neurotic disorders (Clark, 2002a). These psychoneurotic disorders, as they were 
classed in the first editions of the DSM, reflected the predominant ethos that both disorders 
originated from dysfunctional anxiety states. It was not until the late 1980s and the DSM-III 
that depression and OCD were recognised as being diagnostically distinct mood and anxiety 
disorders. Whilst later DSM editions provided diagnostic clarification regarding OCD and 
depression, clinically the association between mood and OCD can be arbitrary, with evidence 
showing depression to be the most frequent complication of OCD (Black & Noyes, 1990). 
This finding may suggest a correlational relationship between OCD and mood disturbance, 
with either state serving as the precipitant. 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a most common comorbid axis I disorder for 
individuals with OCD. Across studies, MDD tends to be the most common additional 
diagnosis with prevalence rates ranging from 20.7% to 22% and from 54% to 66% for 
additional current and lifetime diagnoses, respectively. Current estimates range from 32% to 
71% (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001), with 52% of children 
experiencing major depressive disorder (Swedo et al., 1989) The presence of depression is 
reported to be equivocal across all anxiety disorder groups (Crino & Andrews, 1996) 
 Research by Denys and colleagues (Denys, de Geus, van Megen, & Westenberg, 
2004) has shown that onset of OCD tends to precede rather than follow depression. These 
findings have led some researchers to suggest that OCD may be an affective variant (Zohar & 
Insel, 1987). The majority of support for this viewpoint is derived from two main sources, 
including (i) favourable response to treatment of antidepressant medication (Hudson & Pope, 
1990); (ii) epidemiological data confirming the frequent co-occurrence of OCD and 
depression (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988). 




 Concurrent mood disturbance in OCD has been reported to impact treatment efficacy. 
Severe depression has been reported to impede the efficacy of behavioural treatment of OCD 
(Abramowitz & Foa, 2000; Abramowitz, Franklin, Street, Kozak, & Foa, 2000; Braun, 2005; 
Foa, 1979; Foa et al., 1983) affecting the frequency, controllability and severity of intrusive 
cognitions. Negative mood states are reported to increase the vulnerability for obsessions 
(Rachman, 1971; Rachman, 1981; Reynolds & Salkovskis, 1991; Ricciardi & McNally, 
1995) and prolong the duration of the intrusive thought, image or impulse (Rachman, 1981; 
Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Consequently, most psychological interventions focus on both 
depressive and obsessive symptomatology concurrently (Ricciardi & McNally, 1995). 
The considerable degree of comorbidity across the various anxiety and mood disorders 
has led some researchers to focus on the shared characteristics between these disorders rather 
than the difference (Barlow, Allen, Choate, 2004). This has led to the development of unified 
models of emotional disorders (e.g. see Clark and Watson, 1991 tripartite model of emotional 
disorders and Barlow, 1991, 2000, 2002 "triple vulnerabilities" model). These models 
conceptualise the heterogeneity in the expression of emotional disorder symptoms (e.g., 
individual differences in the prominence of social anxiety, panic attacks, anhedonia, etc.) as 
varied manifestations of a broader syndrome (Barlow, Allen & Choate, 2004). This type of 
approach suggests that anxiety and mood disorders emerge from shared psychosocial and 
biological/genetic diatheses in which with "negative affect syndrome" (NAS) plays a 
functional role. The evidence for this viewpoint is derived from studies demonstrating that 
psychological treatments for a given anxiety disorder produce significant improvement in 
additional comorbid anxiety or mood disorders that are not specifically addressed in 
treatment (Borkovec, Abel, & Newman, 1995; Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1995). These 
findings have led some researchers to question the clinical utility of making these conceptual 
distinctions between the anxiety and mood disorders. 




1.2.3 Personality Disorders 
 The nature and relationship of OCD to Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder 
(OCPD) has been the subject of considerable debate (Gibbs & Oltmans, 1995). However, the 
similarity between both disorders is in name only, as the clinical presentation is quite 
different. Whereas OCD is characterised by obsessions and compulsions, OCPD involves a 
persistent pattern of preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism, and control (APA, 2000). 
Several studies have supported this distinction by demonstrating that OCD patients (i) are not 
more likely to have OCPD than normal controls; and that (ii) OCPD is not the most frequent 
type of personality disorder found in these patients (Mancebo, Eisen, Grant, & Rasmussen, 
2005). 
The effect of personality pathology on treatment outcome of OCD has been met with 
mixed results. Some research suggests that the presence of any personality disorder, 
irrespective of type, is unrelated to treatment outcome (Baer, Jenike, Black, Treece, & et al., 
1992). Conversely, others have reported markedly lower rates of response to behavioural 
treatment for OCD patients with paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders (de 
Haan et al., 1997; Minichiello, Baer, & Jenike, 1987). Therefore, the true effect of comorbid 
personality disorders and OCD requires further analysis. 
1.2.4 Tourette’s Disorder 
There is also evidence of a strong link between OCD and Tourette’s Disorder in 
children and adults. Estimates of the comorbidity of Tourette’s and OCD range from 36% to 
52%  (Leckman & Chittenden, 1990; Pauls, Towbin, Leckman, Zahner, & et al., 1986). A 
further 20 to 30 percent of individuals with OCD have reported current or past tics (American 
Psychiatric Association, APA, 2000), with 5 to 7 percent of people with OCD experiencing 
Tourette’s Disorder (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1989). Childhood OCD has also been linked with 
learning disorders and disruptive behavioural disorders. To that end, some researchers have 




speculated that specific types of OCD exist according to comorbidity, specifically tic 
disorders. This issue will be addressed later in Chapter Three. 
1.2.5 Schizotypy  
It has been suggested that the magical or superstitious qualities observed in some 
individuals with OCD (e.g., touching the door handle five times to avoid something bad from 
occurring) reflects schizotypal traits (Lee, Cougle, & Telch, 2005) or a schizotypy subtype of 
OCD (Sobin, Blundell, Weiller et al., 2000). Schizotypy is conceptualised as a multi-factorial 
personality liability for schizophrenia (Korfine & Lenzenweger, 1995; Lenzenweger, 1999; 
Lenzenweger & Korfine, 1992). Schizotypal traits include (i) magical thinking or rituals (e.g., 
an airplane arriving early at its destination is the direct result of you thinking an hour earlier 
that it should); (ii) paranoid ideation (e.g., believing that your neighbours are trying to kill 
your dog); and (iii) unusual perceptual experiences (e.g., hearing voices, or seeing an imagery 
person).  
Magical Ideation (MI) in OCD refers to the belief that certain thoughts or behaviours 
exert a causal influence over outcomes (Evans, Milanak, Medeiros, & Ross, 2002). MI is 
reported to be an indicator of schizotypy (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Research by Einstein 
and Menzies (2004) examined the presence of MI in 60 individuals with OCD. The results 
suggested that MI was strongly related to OCD severity and content of intrusive thoughts. 
Individuals with predominantly aggressive and atypical symptoms were shown to be 
particularly prone to MI, whilst those with compulsive washing compulsions and 
contamination obsessions were not.  
Several lines of research support the above proposal2. A recent study (Moritz et al., 
2004) investigated whether positive schizotypal symptoms predicted treatment outcome in 
                                                 
 
2 The majority of support for this association lies in a shared cognitive bias termed Thought-Action Fusion 
(TAF). This bias will be discussed in greater detail towards the end of the Chapter. 
 




OCD. Fifty-three patients participated in cognitive behavioural therapy with and without 
medication. The results supported the contention that positive schizotypal symptoms were 
antecedents for treatment failure in OCD.  Further support for the link between schizotypal 
characteristics and OCD has been found by Lee et al. (2005) who demonstrated that in a 
sample of undergraduate students (n = 969), schizotypal traits emerged as a more potent 
predictor of OCD symptoms relative to depression or general anxiety. Another study (Sobin, 
Blundell, Weiller et al., 2000) used the Structured Interview of Schizotypy to assess 
schizotypal traits in 119 adults with OCD. Fifty per cent of the sample reported mild to 
severe positive schizotypal traits. The patients with OCD and schizotypy traits were 
distinguishable by: age of onset, greater number of comorbid diagnoses, increased rates of 
learning disability, aggressive and somatic obsession, and counting and arranging 
compulsions.  
As with other anxiety disorders and OCD, recent cognitive approaches investigating 
the similarities between schizophrenia and OCD place the emphasis on the misinterpretation 
of benign stimuli (Morrison, 1998). Morrison argues that auditory hallucinations can be 
understood as normal phenomena which are interpreted as threatening. According to this 
model, the associated distress produces safety seeking behaviours which serve to maintain the 
importance of the hallucinations. A common theme underlying most cognitive 
conceptualisations of psychosis is that the auditory hallucinations associated with the 
psychosis are an activating event, and the meaning attributed to these voices governs 
subsequent affective behaviour (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997). 
Whilst there is increasing interest in the similarities between OCD and schizophrenia 
(Poyurovsky & Koran, 2005), these findings should be interpreted within the context of the 
following limitations. Firstly, schizophrenia is known to be subject to considerable genetic 
(Bassett, Chow, Waterworth, & Brzustowicz, 2001; Moldin & Gottesman, 1997), 
neurological (Malla, Norman, Aguilar, & Cortese, 1997; Wong, Voruganti, Heslegrave, & 




Awad, 1997), and neurobiological (Egan & Weinberger, 1997; Voruganti, Heslegrave, & 
Awad, 1997) influences. Secondly, it is possible that the misinterpretation model applies to 
only positive (e.g., delusions, hallucinations), and not negative (affective flattening, alogia) 
symptoms, as there is substantial evidence supporting a positive–negative symptom 
distinction (Lenzenweger, 1999). Thirdly, it is possible that the observed rates of schizotypy 
in OCD are the result of criterion contamination (Salkovskis, 1996), rather than a ‘schizotypy 
subtype of OCD’.  Clearly, further research is required to fully elucidate the relationship 
between OCD and schizotypy traits. 
1.2.6 Obsessive Compulsive Spectrum Disorders (OCSD) 
The heterogeneous nature of OCD has prompted some debate regarding what is 
termed Obsessive-Compulsive Spectrum Disorders (OSCD; Hollander, 1993; Hollander & 
Evers, 2004; Hollander & Rosen, 2000; Hollander & Wong, 1995; Lochner et al., 2005; 
Lochner & Stein, in press). One of the most influential proponents of the OCSD is Eric 
Hollander. Hollander and colleagues have described three broad categories of OCSD; (i) 
disorders involving preoccupation with bodily appearance and sensations (e.g., Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD), eating disorders, hypochondriasis); (ii) impulse control 
disorders (pathological gambling, trichotillomania, sexual compulsions, kleptomania, 
compulsive shopping and self-injurious behaviours); and (iii) neurological disorders with 
compulsive features (e.g., Autism, Tourette’s’ disorder, and Sydenham’s chorea (see 
PANDAS). These disorders are reported to lie along a continuum of compulsivity vs. 
impulsivity (Oldham, Hollander, & Skodol, 1996; Dan J. Stein, Harvey, Seedat, & Hollander, 
2006). 
Hollander and colleagues’ suggest that disorders at the compulsive end, like OCD are 
characterised by an over-exaggerated estimation of harm, lead to avoidance, and anxiety 
reduction (Hollander, 1998; Hollander & Rosen, 2000). Conversely, disorders at the 
impulsive end, like pathological gambling are characterised by the underestimation of harm 




desire to obtain pleasure, arousal and gratification (Anholt et al., 2004). Serotonin appears to 
be the neurotransmitter system primarily implicated across the spectrum, with increased 
serotonergic sensitivity and frontal lobe activity in compulsive disorders and decreased 
serotonergic sensitivity and frontal lobe activity in impulsive disorders (Hollander & Evers, 
2004). 
Currently research suggests that inclusion as a OSCD should be based on five primary 
dimensions (Hollander & Rosen, 2000): (i) clinical symptoms (intrusive thoughts, repetitive 
behaviours); (ii) associated features (age of onset, demographic, family history, course 
comorbidity); (iii) neurobiology; (iv) response to treatment for OCD; and (v) etiology 
(genetics, environmental factors). The OCSD theory raises some interesting theoretical 
questions. Firstly, as this model is predominantly biological, very few studies have tested the 
psychological similarities within OCSD, like symptom structure and underlying 
dysfunctional cognitions (Anholt et al., 2004). Secondly, it is unclear whether some 
dimensions are more important than others, i.e., clinical features versus etiology, see 
(Antony, 2002) for review. Thirdly, it is unknown whether OCSD’s are uniquely related to 
OCD, or whether they are related to other forms of pathology. For example, Hollander (1998) 
has argued that disorders of bodily preoccupation like Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD) 
should be considered part of the OCSD. However, whilst BDD and OCD share similar 
clinical features (e.g., repetitive thoughts, rumination), BDD is more commonly seen in social 
phobia (12%) than OCD (7.7%) (Wilhelm & Neziroglu, 2002; Wilhelm, Otto, Zucker, & 
Pollack, 1997). 
In short, firmer guidelines are required when discussing which disorders should be 
considered OSCD. Whilst some disorders currently considered OCSD share remarkably 
similar symptom profiles, they often have etiologically distinct pathways (e.g., substance 
abuse and OCD). A promising line of investigation involves examining whether the disorders 
considered OCSD are characterised by elevated levels of perfectionism or other belief 




constructs. For example, Shafran (2002) has questioned whether the high levels of 
perfectionism observed in some individuals with OCD precipitate the development of other 
perfectionism-related disorders, like anorexia. Although in infancy, this proposition has 
support when the rates of comorbidity between OCD and other perfectionism–related 
disorders (e.g., social phobia, depression) are considered (Antony, Downie, & Swinson, 
1998). 
1.2.7 Impulse Control Disorders (ICD) 
Some researchers have suggested that Impulse Control Disorders (ICDs) are part of 
the obsessive-compulsive spectrum (Grant, Mancebo, Pinto, Eisen, & Rasmussen, in press). 
Like OCD, the ICDs are characterised by repetitive, compulsive and uncontrollable 
behaviours (Fontenelle, Mendlowicz, & Versiani, 2005) which reflect deficits in either 
reward-seeking and/or impulse regulation (Grant et al., in press) There is no consistency as to 
which disorders should be grouped as an ICD. However, some of the most common ICDs 
include pathological gambling, pyromania, kleptomania, and binge eating, trichotillomania, 
skin picking, and nail biting (Grant et al., in press ; Hollander & Stein, 2006) 
The prevalence of ICDs among individuals with OCD is unclear. However, a recent 
study by Grant et al. (in press) demonstrated a lifetime ICD prevalence of 16.4% and a 
current ICD prevalence of 11.6% in a sample of 48 individuals with OCD. In this sample, the 
most common ICDs were skin picking (lifetime, 10.4%; current, 7.8%) and nail biting 
(lifetime 4.8% and current 2.4%) were the most common ICDs. Interestingly, the results 
showed those individuals with predominantly hoarding and symmetry obsessions were more 
likely to have an ICD. Additionally, individuals with both OCD and ICDs reported 
significantly worse OCD symptoms and poorer functioning and quality of life (Grant et al., in 
press). Overall, the findings suggested a low prevalence of ICDs among individuals with 
OCD, although certain ICDs (e.g., skin picking) may be more common. 




However, the similarities between disorders are in appearance only, as stark 
differences emerge when evaluating the underlying motivation for the behaviour. Individuals 
with ICDs exhibit elevated scores on measures of risk-taking and sensation seeking 
(Moreyra, Ibanez, Saiz-Ruiz, & Blanco, 2004). In contrast, individuals with OCD are 
generally harm avoidant with a compulsive risk-aversive endpoint to their behaviours 
(Hollander, 1993 cited in Grant et al., in press).  
1.3 Assessment  
 The focus of assessment is often influenced by the discipline of the clinician. From a 
clinical psychological perspective, the assessment process should involve: a detailed clinical 
interview and psychological tests (e.g., self-report questionnaires), collateral information 
obtained via family and support people, as well as the referral to medical specialists if 
appropriate (e.g., if the symptoms are reflective of organic origins). The following sections 
will review the empirical approaches towards the assessment of OCD in adults. 
1.3.1 Structured And Semi-Structured Assessments 
 Diagnostic assessments can consist of a structured or semi-structured interview. 
Structured and semi-structured interviews were developed to increase the reliability of a 
diagnosis. In this type of assessment, confounding factors which may impede on reliable 
diagnosis are minimised, as the content, format and questions to be asked are standardised 
(Summerfeldt & Antony, 2002).The two most common validated interviews for diagnosing 
OCD in adults are the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-
Clinician Version (CV); (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997) and the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV;  ADIS-IV (Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). 
 The SCID is a semi-structured interview administered by the clinician to assists in the 
diagnosis of Axis I and II DSM-IV disorders. There are several versions: the SCID-clinician 
version (SCID-CV) and the SCID-research version (SCID-RV). Research has shown good 




reliability (.61) in patient samples using the SCID (Williams, Gibbon, First, & Spitzer, 1992), 
as well as a high concordance rate with the SCID and other standardised measures (First & 
Gibbon, 2004). The ADIS is also a semi-structured clinician administered interview focused 
specifically on the reliable diagnosis of the DSM-IV anxiety disorders. The ADIS-IV has two 
separate versions, one determining current diagnoses, and another assessing lifetime 
problems (includes current and past issues). Like the SCID, research has shown the ADIS to 
demonstrate good reliability (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001) and construct 
validity (Summerfeldt & Antony, 2002). 
 As there are a range of physical and psychological disorders which can mimic OCD, 
standardised measures like the ADIS and SCID become extremely helpful in facilitating a 
clear diagnostic picture. For example, individuals with physical disorders like temporal lobe 
epilepsy, traumatic head injuries, postencephalitic complications, and drug-induced 
conditions can often display obsessive-compulsive behaviour. Likewise, the diagnosis of 
OCD can often be difficult given the similarities with other psychological disorders, e.g., 
Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD; preoccupation with minor or imagined physical defects), 
Trichotillomania (compulsive hair pulling) and hypochondriasis (unfounded fear of series 
illness). Consequently, instruments like the ADIS and SCID are widely used because they 
decrease inconsistencies and assist in the reliability and accuracy of diagnosis. 
 After DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of OCD has been established, it is important to schedule 
another session with the client prior to therapy to explore other variables. These include (a) 
identifying specific threat cues that cause the client distress; (b) identify what the client 
believes will be the consequence of engaging in their rituals; (c) determine the strength of 
belief in the obsessional ideation (i.e. degree of insight); (d) gather information regarding 
particular avoidance behaviours and rituals; (e) collect as much information regarding onset, 
course of disorder, and outcome of previous treatments; (f) determine the extent of disruption 
in social functioning; (g) identify maintenance variables (e.g., safety-seeking behaviours); 




and (h) assess mood state and risk. Following a diagnostic and clinical interview, it is 
important to quantify the severity of OCD symptoms using several psychometric measures. 
1.3.2 Psychometric Scales 
 Several self-report measures have been developed to assess the content and severity of 
obsessive-compulsive symptomotology. These scales differ with respect to their 
psychometric properties and focus. The measures described below tend to assess symptom 
severity and/or content of obsessions and compulsions. These tests were developed to aid in 
the assessment of OCD, not to replace a clinical interview. The most widely used self-report 
measures for OCD include: the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive inventory; MOCI (Hodgson 
& Rachman, 1977), the revised Padua Inventory; PI-R (Burns, Keortge, Formea, & 
Sternberger, 1996) the Leyton Obsessional Inventory; LOI (Cooper, 1970); The Compulsive 
Activity Checklist; CAC (Freund, Steketee, & Foa, 1987); and The Yale Brown-Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale; YBOCS (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, & et al., 1989). 
 The MOCI is designed to assess specific symptoms of OCD. The 30-items in this 
scale are spread across four subscales: (a) washing; (b) checking; (c) obsessional 
slowness/repetition; and (d) excessive doubting. Each item is rated true or false and yields a 
total score of 30. Scores above 30 are indicative of OCD. The MOCI has been reported to 
have acceptable internal consistency for the subscales (Richter, Cox, & Direnfeld, 1994) test-
retest reliability (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977) and good convergent validity with a number of 
other OCD measures (Taylor, 1998). The PI-R consists of 39 items, with five subscales 
assessing: (a) obsessional thoughts about harm to oneself or others; (b) obsessional impulses 
to harm to oneself or others; (c) contamination obsessions and washing compulsions; (d) 
checking compulsion; and (e) dressing and grooming compulsions. The PI-R has good 
internal consistency (.77 to .88) and test-retest reliability (.61 to .84) over 6-7 months (Burns 
et al., 1996). 




  The LOI consist of 69 yes/no items, two subscales assessing: symptoms (46-items; 
(b) traits (23-items). The primary aim of the LOI is to differentiate between normal 
perfectionist obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  There are inconsistent findings regarding the 
reliability and validity of the LOI. However, the scale has shown good internal consistency 
(alphas = 0.75 to 0.90) in some studies (Richter et al., 1994), acceptable test-retest reliability 
(rs = .73 to .84; (Kim, Dysken, & Kuskowski, 1990) and good convergent validity with other 
measures of OCD (rs = .38 to .77; see (Taylor, 1995). Whilst the LOI is a good screening tool 
for OCD symptoms, it inadequately measures overall symptom severity and tends to be 
biased towards cleaning and contamination symptoms (Kim et al., 1990). 
 The CAC has several versions: clinician administered and self-report. The self-report 
version consists of 38-items and assesses OCD-related interference associated with a range of 
daily routines and activities. The self-report version of the CAC has demonstrated good 
internal consistency (alphas = .86 to .95) and test-retest reliability (r = .74; (Sternberger & 
Burns, 1990). The CAC is reported to be less acceptable with regard to discriminant validity, 
with large correlations between the CAC and other non-OCD measures (Taylor, 1995). 
Consequently, the CAC should be used in conjunction with other scales like the PI-R. 
 The YBOCS is generally considered to be the gold standard for measuring and 
assessing OCD symptoms (Taylor, 1998). There are several versions: clinician-administered 
interview, computer-assisted version (Baer, Brown-Beasley, Sorce, & Henriques, 1993) and a 
computerized version (Rosenfeld, Dar, Anderson, Kobak, & Greist, 1992). Research has 
shown both versions to demonstrate good psychometric properties (Steketee, Frost, & Bogart, 
1996). As Study I used the YBOCS self-report version, and Study II used the YBOCS 
clinician-administered interview, the administration and psychometric properties for both 
versions will be discussed in the methodology sections of the individual studies. 
 Other less commonly used scales include the Meta-Cognitive Beliefs Questionnaire, 
MCBQ (Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 2003); Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire, 




OCBQ (Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998); Responsibility Appraisal Scale, RAS (Salkovskis et 
al., 2000); Responsibility Interpretations Questionnaire, RIQ (Salkovskis et al., 2000); and 
Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire, TAF (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). These 
measures were designed to assess general and specific domains of beliefs considered 
important in OCD (Taylor, Kyrios, Thordarson, Steketee, & Frost, 2002). 
More than 15 scales have been developed to assess the role of cognition in OCD 
(Taylor et al., 2002). The plethora of instruments designed to measure essentially the same 
aspects of cognition led to a confusing picture as to the role of cognition was in OCD.  In an 
attempt to provide some consistency within research and clinical spheres, the Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005) developed two 
comprehensive scales: Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) and the Interpretation of 
Intrusions Questionnaire (III). Recent and research by the OCCWG (1997, 2001, 2003, 2005) 
in the cognitive assessment of OCD will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
1.4 Chapter Summary  
OCD is characterised by clinically significant repetitive intrusive thoughts and 
compulsive behaviour. OCD has a lifetime prevalence rate of approximately 2.3 percent, and 
typically occurs between the ages of 19 to 25 with an earlier onset reported in males. 
Presentation is diverse, but often includes:  (a) contamination fears and washing/cleaning 
compulsions; (b) thoughts of harming others and checking compulsions; (c) preoccupation 
with symmetry and arranging/ordering compulsions. Compulsive behaviour is conceptualised 
as a response to the anxiety elicited by the obsessive thought. It is estimated that intrusions of 
the types experienced by obsessional patients, also occur in 80-90 percent of the general 
population. 
Childhood OCD occurs in 3% of children and adolescents and is characterised by a 
3:2 male-female predominance. The diagnostic criteria for childhood OCD is identical to that 




of adults, except that children are not required to have insight into their symptoms. Children 
with OCD tend to have both obsessions and compulsions, with the content and course of the 
disorder intrinsically linked. A large majority of children (50-70%) continue to have OCD in 
adulthood. The risk of developing other psychological disorders later in life is also increased 
with childhood-onset-OCD. Etiologically, childhood OCD is generally conceptualised within 
adult models. Recently however, research (Farrell, 2004) has highlighted distinct differences 
in cognitive processing of certain beliefs between adults and children with OCD suggesting 
that the developmental sequelae may be an important variable in OCD.  
OCD commonly occurs alongside other psychological disorders, particularly other 
anxiety disorders. In childhood, research suggests: (a) 50-80% of children with OCD have 
comorbid disorders; (b) 25-50% of children with OCD experience a current or past history of 
another anxiety disorder; (c) 20-73% of children with OCD receiving an additional diagnosis 
of depression. In adults, OCD commonly co-occurs with Social Phobia (26%), Panic 
Disorder with Agoraphobia (15%), depression (current diagnosis 32%, lifetime diagnosis 
71%), some personality disorders and Tourette’s Disorder, particularly in children (36% to 
52%). The vast array of comorbid disorders led some researchers to suggest Obsessive-
Compulsive Spectrum Disorders (OCSD). Whilst in infancy, the recent evidence supports the 
proposal of OCSD. 
The assessment of OCD is multifaceted, usually involving structured and/or semi-
structured interview and psychometric testing (e.g., self-report measures or clinician-
administered). Two empirically supported diagnostic interview schedules include: the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-CV; First et al., 1997) and 
the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-CV; Di Nardo et al., 1994). 
Assessment of OCD is often complicated by the presence of one or more co-occurring 
disorders (e.g., anxiety, mood). 




There are many etiological models of OCD. One of the most popular approaches 
involves cognitive–appraisal models of OCD (see Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1996; Rachman, 
1993). These models suggest that, as a result of prior experience, the individual develops 
particular assumptions (Salkovskis et al., 1999). The occurrence of a particular event or 
situation activates previously dormant beliefs (Salkovskis et al., 1999). These belief systems 
affect the way in which the thoughts or intrusions are interpreted.  Obsessive compulsive 
symptoms arise because underlying beliefs fuel the misinterpretation of significance of the 
intrusive thoughts. The symptoms continue because the compulsive behaviour is strengthened 
by the temporary relief in anxiety, which prevents the individual from testing the accuracy of 
the obsessive thought.  
While much is known regarding the descriptive features of OCD, there are still many 
inconsistencies within the literature regarding the etiological pathways of this disorder. 
Chapter two provides a review of current literature pertaining to the different causal models 
of OCD.  





2. ETIOLOGICAL MODELS OF OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER 
The perplexing nature of clinical obsessions is matched by a paucity of research 
regarding the etiological components involved in this disorder. Etiological models of OCD 
differ in methodology, theoretical framework and formulation. Prior to discussing current 
psychological approaches to OCD, it is necessary to explore past models which evoked such 
perspectives. The following sections will outline the most empirically supported etiological 
theories of OCD, under the umbrella terms biological, neuropsychological and psychological 
models. Biological models include: (a) Genetic; (b) Autoimmune; (c) Neuroanatomical; (d) 
Neurochemical and Neuropsychological models. Psychological approaches include: (a) 
Psychodynamic; (b) Behavioural; (c) Cognitive-Behavioural; and (d) Cognitive approaches. 
The final section reviews two specific cognitive theories: (a) Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) 
Cognitive Model of OCD; and (b) Rachman’s (1993, 1997, 1998) Misinterpretation of 
Significance Theory. 
2.1  Biological Models 
 Accumulated data from clinical, electrophysiological, psychosurgical, 
pharmacological, and neuroimaging have led many researchers to conceptualise OCD as a 
neuropsychiatric disorder with an organic basis (Braun, 2005). The following sections detail 
the various models assumed under this category. 
2.1.1 Genetic Variables 
 The available evidence for a strong genetic component in OCD is sparse, and 
essentially results from family and twin studies  (Billiett, Richter, & Kennedy, 1998; 
Hettema, Neale, & Kendler, 2001; Pauls, Alsobrook, Goodman, Rasmussen, & et al., 1995). 
The concordance rate for monozygotic (MZ) is consistently reported to be higher than 
dizygotic (DZ) twins, at 67.5% and 31% respectively (Billiett et al., 1998). Some studies 




suggest that the familial risk for OCD may be higher in early-onset cases of OCD compared 
to later-onset cases (Bellodi, Sciuto, Diaferia, Ronchi, & Smeraldi, 1992). This hypothesis is 
supported by findings that approximately 25-30% of children and adolescents with severe 
primary OCD have a familial history of OCD (Lenane, Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, & et al., 
1992; Swedo et al., 1989). However, these findings are complicated by the high rate of 
comorbid Tourette’s and/or tics often observed in early onset cases, especially male cases 
(Swedo et al., 1989). 
 There are several inconsistencies within the genetic hypothesis of OCD. The evidence 
for a genetic component in the pathogenesis of OCD is complicated by the near impossible 
task of quantifying the effects one’s culture and behavioural repertoire (e.g., parental 
modelling) has on the subsequent development of OCD. For example, not all individuals with 
a genetic predisposition towards OCD develop symptoms, whilst others with no familial 
history produce symptoms. Perhaps research investigating gene candidates, primarily related 
to the serotonin (Mundo, Richter, Sam, Macciardi, & Kennedy, 2000) and dopamine systems 
may further clarify this see  (see McDougle et al., 1994 for review). 
2.1.2 Autoimmune 
  Early reports of an association between OCD and Sydenham’s chorea (SC) directed 
research towards the consideration of an autoimmune hypothesis of OCD. According to this 
hypothesis, some cases of OCD result from a disruption in autoimmune processes, 
specifically the cortico-striatal-thalamic-cortical circuits (Asbahr et al., 1998; Swedo et al., 
1993). Support for this hypothesis arose from studies demonstrating the relatively high 
incidence of acute-onset OCD following streptococcal infection. This type of OCD has been 
coined Paediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorders Associated with Streptococcal 
Infection, PANDAS (Swedo et al., 1998).  
 SC is a variant of rheumatic fever and follows streptococcal infection (Swedo, 
Leonard, Garvey, & Mittleman, 1996). SC, a movement disorder, arises as a result of an 




antineuronal antibody-mediated response to group A -haemolytic streptococcal (GABHS) 
infection, affecting portions of the basal ganglia. The GABHS infection is thought to trigger 
the abrupt onset or exacerbation of tics/obsessive-compulsive behaviours. Approximately 
75% of children with SC present with obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Swedo et al., 1993). 
 Swedo and colleagues criteria for children with PANDAS includes: (a) presence of 
tics and/or OCD, (b) pre-pubertal onset of symptoms; (c) episodic course of symptom 
severity; (d) abrupt onset and/or correlations with the exacerbation of symptoms and GABHS 
infection; (e) neurological abnormalities (e.g., movement disorders); (f) have abnormal 
striatal volume on brain imaging; and (g) respond to immunomodulatory interventions such 
as plasma exchange and intravenous immunoglobulin (Stein, 2002). However, as PANDAS is 
a relatively new hypothesis further research is required.  
 Several aspects of the autoimmune hypothesis of OCD remain ambiguous. Further 
study is required to determine the similarities and/or differences between children with OCD 
without SC or streptococcal infection, verses children with OCD-related PANDAS and other 
disorders (Singer & Loiselle, 2003). Secondly, a major challenge in this field is the absence 
of a prospective epidemiologic study confirming that an antecedent GABHS infection is 
associated with either the onset or exacerbation of tic disorders or OCD (Singer & Loiselle, 
2003). It is also important to establish the frequency of relationship of PANDAS to other 
factors, like genetic variables (Lougee, Perlmutter, Nicolson, Garvey, & Swedo, 2000).  
2.1.3 Neuroanatomical Perspectives 
Early neuroanatomical models of OCD conceptualised obsessive compulsive 
symptoms as arising from abnormalities in the caudate nucleus (see Schwartz, 1999 for 
review). Evidence in support of this hypothesis can be seen in PET studies demonstrating a 
correlation between metabolic rates in the caudate nucleus and obsessive compulsive 
symptom severity (Swedo, Leonard, Kruesi, Rettew, & et al., 1992). Later, neuroanatomical 
models emphasised dysfunction in the basal ganglia and/or striatum (Aigner et al., 2005; 




Hollander et al., 2005). However, improved neuroimaging techniques have implicated several 
other regions and sites of the brain (Sherlin & Congedo, 2005; Valente et al., 2005). 
Currently the majority of research is focused on the orbitofrontal-subcortical circuits (OFC; 
Saxena et al., 2001). 
The orbitofrontal-subcortical circuits (OFC) are thought to connect regions of the 
brain that process information involved in the initiation of behavioural responses that are 
implemented with little conscious awareness (Saxena et al., 2001). This circuitry consists of a 
direct and an indirect pathway. The direct pathway projects from the cerebral cortex to the 
striatum to the internal segment of the globus pallidus/substantial nigra, pars reticulata 
complex, then to the thalamus and back to the cortex (Whiteside, Port, & Abramowitz, 2004). 
The indirect pathway is similar but projects from the striatum to the external segment of the 
globus pallidus to the subthalamic nucleus before returning to the common pathway 
(Whiteside et al., 2004). Obsessions and compulsions are reported to arise because of an 
overactivity of the direct circuit. 
Research to support this hypothesis is derived from several sources, but mostly 
neuroimaging studies. As a full discussion of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the most important findings are reviewed. Firstly, PET studies have demonstrated 
increased glucose metabolism in the OFC, caudate, thalamus, prefrontal cortex among 
patients with OCD as compared to controls (Saxena et al., 2001). Secondly, disruption to the 
cortico-striatal-thalamic-cortical circuits via surgery has been shown to correspond with a 
reduction in obsessive compulsive symptoms (Savage, Deckersbach, Heckers et al., 2000) 
and decrease striatal volume (Rauch et al., 1998). Thirdly, functional abnormalities in the 
orbitofrontal cortex are positively correlated with the severity of symptoms (Lacerda, 
Dalgalarrondo, Caetano, Camargo et al., 2003; Lacerda, Dalgalarrondo, Caetano, Haas et al., 
2003; Rubin, Ananth, Villanueva-Meyer, Trajmar, & Mena, 1994) and are worsened by 
exposure to a “contaminating” object (Monaco et al., 2005). 




However, the existence of a neurobiological model of OCD should be interpreted in 
light of the following points. Firstly, evidence for most neurobiological models is derived 
from animal studies, specifically primates. Whilst there are similarities, the human brain is far 
more complex and has additional cortical areas (Saxena et al., 2001) which means these 
findings may not be applicable. Secondly, causation cannot be inferred as most of the data is 
correlational and it is unclear whether the alterations in functioning are caused by OCD, or a 
consequence of the disorder. Thirdly, it is possible that the differences found in neuroimaging 
studies represent different activation levels of normal, intact healthy neural systems (see 
Whiteside et al., 2004).  
2.1.4 Neurochemical Approach 
 The neurochemical model of OCD suggests that OCD is caused by an imbalance in 
certain neurotransmitters. Support for this theory is derived from clinical studies 
demonstrating that certain neurotransmitters correlate with a decrease in OCD 
symptomology. The neurotransmitters implicated include: (a) serotonin (5-
hydroxytryptamine) or 5-HT, which controls sleep, mood, some types of sensory perception, 
body temperature regulation, and appetite; (b) dopamine (DA) which helps control body 
movements, thought patterns and regulates hormone release; (c) norepinephrine, used by the 
CNS and the peripheral sympathetic nervous system to govern “fight or flight” responses. 
Whilst several neurotransmitters have been implicated in the development of OCD, the 
strongest findings have been found with serotonin, stimulating what is termed the 
“serotonergic hypothesis” (S-H) of OCD (Gross, Sasson, Chopra, & Zohar, 1998) 
 The strongest support for the S-H comes from the data about the selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). SSRI’s were developed for inhibition of the neuronal uptake 
pump for serotonin (5HT). The therapeutic mechanism of action of the SSRIs involves 
alteration in the 5-HT system. There are five clinically useful SSRI’s: Paroxetine, Sertraline, 
Fluoxetine, Citalopram and Fluvoxamine. The earliest evidence for the involvement of the 




serotonin system was the finding that clomipramine, a tricyclic antidepressant affecting 5-HT 
system was effective in the treatment of OCD  (Abramowitz, 1997) A body of literature 
supports the efficacy of antidepressant agents SSRIs for treating OCD (Flament, Bisserbe, 
Boyer, & Lecrubier, 1996) however there is contradictory evidence. 
 As discussed, the S-H has support from a number of sources (Gross et al., 1998; 
Zohar, Kennedy, Hollander, & Koran, 2004). However, certain limitations should be 
discussed. Firstly, as serotonin affects the production of other neurotransmitters like 
dopamine and norpinephrine, it is likely that the pathophysiology of OCD is based on a 
multiple neurotransmitter system (Stein, 2002). For example, a meta-analysis for four studies 
of potent serotonergic agents in OCD patients revealed that improvement in OCD symptoms 
was associated with less serotonergic selectivity (Kaplan & Sadock, 1998). Secondly, whilst 
it is likely that disrupted serotonergic function plays some role in the expression of OCD, the 
S-H hypothesis fails to explain why 40-60% of patients with OCD fail to respond adequately, 
with minimal to no change during treatment with SSRI’s alone (Goodman, McDougle, & 
Price, 1992). Thirdly, the serotonin and dopamine systems have been shown to play a role in 
a range of psychiatric disorders other than OCD (Lochner & Stein, in press). Lastly, a range 
of other neurochemical systems (including the opioids, steroids, oxytocin and vasopressin) 
have also been implicated in the mediation of OCD (Lochner & Stein, in press). 
2.1.5 Neuropsychological Approach 
 Neuropsychological models focus on impairments in general cognitive processing. 
The most consistent finding is that OCD may be characterised by a decline in executive 
functioning (i.e. poor organizational skills), and poor immediate recall of non-verbal material 
(cited in Clark, 2004). However, these results should be interpreted within the context of the 
following limitations: (a) small sample sizes; (b) absence of studies replicating significant test 
performance (Amir & Kozak, 2002); (c) poor performance on neuropsychological tests is not 
specific to OCD (Tallis, 1995); and (e) it is unclear what effect the clinical characteristics of 




OCD (e.g., indecision) have on test performance (Greisberg & McKay, 2003). These issues 
will be discussed further in section 2.3.1 (cognitive deficit theories). 
 In summary, the conceptualisation of OCD as a neuropsychiatric disorder was 
conceived from evidence demonstrating neurochemical dysfunction, neuroanatomical 
abnormalities, autoimmune dysfunction, genetic transmission and/or deficits in cognitive 
processing. However, these models tend to be speculative, and lack consistent empirical 
support. For example, these models do not account for the finding that (a) many patients 
improve without pharmacological treatment; (b) why combining behavioural and 
pharmacological treatments is no more efficient than behaviour therapy alone (O'Connar, 
Todorov, Robillard, Borgeat, & Brault, 1999); and (c) why 80% of the general population 
experience the same type of thoughts experienced by individuals with OCD (Rachman, 
1993). These anomalies have led to an increased focus of the role of psychological factors in 
the development and maintenance of OCD. 
2.2 Psychological Models 
Over the past 20 years, several psychological models have directed and enhanced our 
knowledge of the etiological processes involved in OCD. It is also important to acknowledge 
that most contemporary perspectives are based on a collection of these early models. For 
example, Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989, and 1996) cognitive theory of OCD was based on Beck’s 
(1976) cognitive model of emotion and Rachman and colleagues’ seminal research during the 
1970s. The remainder of this chapter reviews the most significant psychological models of 
OCD, beginning with early behavioural models, then cognitive behavioural approaches, and 
finally cognitive formulations of OCD. The remaining sections will present Salkovskis (1985, 
1989, 1996) cognitive theory of OCD and Rachman’s (1997, 1998) Misinterpretation of 
Significance Theory. The chapter will conclude with a summary of findings and directions 
for future research. 




2.2.1 Psychodynamic Models 
 The earliest psychological conceptualisations of OCD were psychoanalytic in nature. 
Classic psychoanalytic theories considered OCD a neurosis, caused by a regression of the 
oedipal phase to the anal psychosexual phase of development. The appearance of symptoms 
in OCD was attributed to a defensive regression of the psychic apparatus to earlier phases 
(e.g., pre-oedipal), with the consequent emergence of earlier modes of functioning of the ego, 
superego, and the id. Those factors along with the use of specific ego defences (isolation, 
undoing, and reaction formation) combine to produce the clinical symptoms of obsessions 
and compulsions. Thus the key to ‘neurotic anxiety’ is repression of underlying conflicts 
primarily related to the id impulse (Davison & Neale, 2001). 
 Contemporary etiological models of OCD tend not to include psychoanalytic 
approaches because (a) the central tenets of these theories have never been subject to 
empirical investigation; and (b) individuals with OCD tend to respond poorly to 
psychodynamic and/or psychoanalytic therapies (Steketee, 1993). Over the past three 
decades, research has shown behavioural, cognitive and pharmacological treatments to 
surpass psychoanalytically oriented therapies (Abramowitz, 1997). 
2.2.2 Behavioural Models 
 A philosophical shift in the late 60s early 70s, led to a refocus of the behavioural 
aspects of anxiety. Early behavioural theories and interventions focussed on the anxiety 
reduction of observable behaviours (e.g., overt compulsive behaviour). Obsessions were 
considered conditioned noxious stimuli  (Rachman, 1971) that acquire the ability to elicit 
anxiety or discomfort by an association with a prior traumatic or upsetting experience 
(Steketee, 1993). These early conditioning models (e.g. Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; 
Teasdale, 1974) were based on the notion that fears are acquired by classical conditioning 
and maintained by operant conditioning.  




 The most comprehensive behavioural formulation of the acquisition of fear is 
Mowrer’s (1960) two-factor model of fear. Mower’s (1960) theory encompasses two stages: 
(a) acquisition of anxiety and/or fear; and (b) maintenance of this anxiety and/or fear. In the 
first stage, Mowrer suggests that anxiety is acquired when a neutral event becomes associated 
with fear when paired with a stimulus that by its nature provokes distress. Through the 
conditioning process, objects as well as thoughts acquire the ability to produce discomfort. In 
the second stage, escape/avoidance behaviours are developed to reduce the anxiety evoked by 
the various conditioned stimuli and are maintained by their success in doing so (Riggs & Foa, 
1993). In contrast to the second stage of this theory (the maintenance of escape and/or 
avoidance behaviours) which is well supported, evidence for Mowrer’s conceptualisation of 
fear acquisition (stage one) is lacking. 
 There have been a number of applications of behavioural techniques, including 
systematic desensitization, modelling, operant reinforcement and aversion relief (Clark, 
2004). However the concept which has received the most attention and empirical support is 
Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP). Victor Meyer published the first case of ERP to 
treat OCD in 1966. The basic premise of ERP is to persuade the individual to remain in the 
feared situation, without performing any compulsive behaviour, so they can learn that the 
feared consequences of not performing the behaviour do not occur (Clark, 2004; Meyer, 
1966). The theoretical basis for ERP was provided by Mowrer’s two factor theory and 
experimental research by Rachman and colleagues in the 1970s. 
 During the 1970s, Rachman and colleagues applied Mowrer’s theory to OCD. In a 
series of hallmark studies, Rachman and Hodgson (1980) predicted that through conditioning, 
obsessional thoughts become paired with anxiety, and are maintained by escape and 
avoidance behaviours. Rachman and colleagues (see Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) supported 
this hypothesis by showing: (a) intrusive cognitions are initially neutral, but through the 
process of negative reinforcement become conditioned stimuli and elicit anxiety; (b) 




compulsive acts reduce anxiety temporarily, however in the long-term increase the likelihood 
and accessibility of the ritual (Hodgson & Rachman, 1972);  and (c) ‘spontaneous decay’, in 
which an effect occurs when compulsive behaviours are delayed post-exposure to an anxiety-
provoking situation, resulting in a reduction in anxiety (Rachman, De Silva, & Roper, 1976). 
This experimental work provided the theoretical support for Exposure and Response 
Prevention (ERP) in OCD. 
 There is considerable empirical support for certain aspects of the behavioural model. 
Most obsessional thoughts provoke anxiety or discomfort and compulsions most often cause 
a temporary reduction in anxiety (Clark, 2004). However, there is little evidence that 
obsessions are acquired via association with a traumatic experience (Steketee, 1993; 
Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Some research has shown compulsive rituals to increase 
anxiety, rather than decrease (Marks et al., 2000). Another criticism relates to the finding that 
many people present with multiple obsessions, which appear to fluctuate in content and form 
over time (Clark, 2004). The two-factor model has also been criticised for its lack of 
specificity to OCD as it equally applies to other anxiety disorders, like phobias (Salkovskis, 
1998) 
 In terms of behaviour therapy, the efficacy of ERP for OCD is well established 
(Clark, 2004). The Expert Consensus Guidelines (March, Frances, Carpenter, & Kahn, 1997) 
recommended Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT), which included a heavy component of 
ERP, as the first line treatment for mild cases of OCD (Clark, 2004).  In clinical outcome 
studies, rates of improvement at post-treatment ranged from 40 to 97 %, with a weighted 
average improvement of 83% (Foa & Kozak, 1996). ERP is reported to be at least as effective 
as pharmacology at post-treatment (Abramowitz, 1997; Foa & Kozak, 1996) and superior in 
some cases (see Stanley & Turner, 1995 for review) 
However, behavioural therapy has serious shortcomings. Approximately 25% of 
individuals refuse ERP, another 3-12% will not complete therapy (Foa et al., 1983) and 25% 




of those who complete a course of ERP fail to improve. Furthermore, research has also 
shown ERP to be less effective in treating certain subtypes of OCD, like hoarding  (Black et 
al., 1998; Frost & Steketee, 1999) and the cognitive aspects of OCD (Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980). These limitations have led many researchers to shift their focus to the cognitive 
components in OCD. 
2.3 Cognitive Models 
Over the past two decades there has been an increase in the number of cognitive 
models of OCD (Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1985; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). Despite 
the diversity of these models, most can be classed as either: (i) dysfunctions in general 
cognitive processing (deficiency in certain information processing functions); and/or (ii) 
dysfunction in cognitive appraisal and beliefs (specific dysfunctional beliefs). As a full 
discussion of all models is beyond the scope of this thesis, the following sections will review 
the most empirically-supported theories assumed under these categories.  
2.3.1 Cognitive Deficit Theories 
Cognitive deficit (information processing) models, assert that obsessional symptoms 
represent a generalised and involuntary disturbance of information processing, with 
compulsive behaviour conceptualised as secondary to the primary information processing 
deficit (Salkovskis, Westbrook, Davis, Jeavons, & et al., 1997). Research has demonstrated 
that individuals with OCD may display impairments in executive functioning (Reed, 1985; 
Schmidtke, Schorb, Winkelmann, & Hohagen, 1998), nonverbal memory, impaired reality 
monitoring and confidence in memory judgements. Evidence for the information processing 
hypothesis is derived from two different branches of psychology, namely neuropsychology 
and experimental research.  
Executive functioning describes higher-level control processes that modulate basic 
sensory, motor, cognitive, memory and affective functions (Clark, 2004). A number of 




cognitive tasks fall in this category, including the ability to shift mental sets, inhibit responses 
and engage in trial-and-error learning (Clark, 2004). The most common tests of executive 
functioning are the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and the Trail Making Tests (TMT). 
A number of studies have shown patients with OCD to evidence greater difficulty shifting to 
a new rule on the WSCT or switching between categories of the TMT (Greisberg & McKay, 
2003; Clark, 2004) as well as reduced response inhibition on semantic negative priming tasks 
(Enright & Beech, 1990). 
However, these findings are not consistent or specific to OCD. Research has found 
poor performance on tests such as the WCST and/or TMT in Panic Disorder (Lucas, Telch, & 
Bigler, 1991);  Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Beckham, Crawford, & Feldman, 1998) and 
depression (Moritz et al., 2001). Furthermore, executive functioning deficits are not found in 
all cases of OCD, and even when present they tend to be mild (Taylor, 2002). It is also 
unknown whether OCD precipitates poor performance on tests like the WCST, or is a 
consequence of OCD (Taylor, 2002). These findings suggest that it would be premature to 
conclude the presence of executive functioning difficulties in OCD. 
Some researchers have suggested that the presence of pathological doubt, indecision 
and uncertainty in OCD represents memory deficits in OCD (Amir & Kozak, 2002; Greisberg 
& McKay, 2003; Reed, 1985; Savage, Deckersbach, Wilhelm et al., 2000; Tallis, 1997). 
Evidence for this viewpoint arises from findings that some individuals with OCD appear to 
have non-verbal memory deficits (Savage, 1998; Tallis, 1995), impaired reality monitoring 
(McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), and reduced confidence in memory (Radomsky, Rachman, & 
Hammond, 2001).  Similar to the last section, the evidence for a specific memory deficit in 
OCD is mixed. While some studies show individuals with OCD to have poorer non-verbal 
memory (Tallis, Pratt, & Jamani, 1999), others have found contrary results (Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi et al., 2001). 




Reality monitoring is defined as “the process of distinguishing a past perception from 
a past act of imagination, both of which resulted in memories” (Johnson & Raye, 1981, p.67). 
This concept is thought to have particular relevance for compulsive checking as the 
individual is uncertain about whether they have performed the compulsive behaviour (Ecker 
& Englekamp, 1995; McNally, 2001). Unfortunately, most of the findings regarding impaired 
reality monitoring in OCD have been weak and inconsistent with the majority of studies 
finding no significant differences between clinical checkers, clinical non-checkers and non-
clinical samples  (Constans, Foa, Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; Hermans, Martens, De Cort, 
Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993). These findings tend to suggest that 
impaired reality monitoring may be best conceptualised as secondary to other causal 
mechanisms (e.g., cognitive distortions) in OCD. 
Radomsky et al. (2001) proposed that it was a lack of confidence in memory rather 
than memory dysfunction per se that underlies the clinical picture of OCD. Several studies 
have found individuals with OCD to report significantly lower confidence in their memory 
judgements than nonclinical individuals (Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995; McNally & Kohlbeck, 
1993; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi et al., 2001). Dar, Rish, Hermesh, Taub and Fux (2000) 
found that patients with compulsive checking were significantly less confident in their 
performance on a general knowledge questionnaire compared to non-clinical cohorts, even 
though there was no difference in their actual performance. These findings suggest that many 
individuals with OCD may experience a lack of confidence in their memory functions. This 
in turn begs the question of whether the lack of confidence in memory functions is due to 
organic deficits or affective changes associated with the illness (e.g., depression). 
At this point, the role of general cognitive deficits in the etiology of OCD can only be 
speculative. The findings regarding executive functioning and reality monitoring are 
inconsistent, with only strong evidence found for reduced confidence in memory functioning, 
especially checking compulsions (Clark, 2004). Neuropsychological research is also limited 




in that most have used small samples, fail to include a comparison group and use different 
test instruments or experimental methodologies (Clark, 2004).  Furthermore, as many of these 
studies do not control for (a) symptoms of other disorders (comorbidity); (b) the complexity 
of neuropsychological tests; (c) response style (e.g., excessive slowness see Greisberg & 
McKay, 2003 for a review), it is unclear whether these results are specific to OCD. Future 
research replicating studies showing significant test differences in clinical samples may help 
clarify this issue. 
2.3.2 Cognitive-Appraisal Model 
The second paradigm, cognitive-appraisal models, is rationalistic in approach and 
emphasises the role of dysfunctional beliefs or schemata (see Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; 
Rachman, 1993). Specifically, these approaches focus on specific beliefs and meanings that 
drive and/or motivate psychological factors in the maintenance of disorders (Salkovskis, 1996 
cited in Taylor, 2002). Most appraisal-based models of OCD are heavily influenced by 
Beck’s (1976) cognitive specificity hypothesis. Beck (1976) following Albert Ellis proposed 
that dysfunctional beliefs cause emotional disturbances because they affect the interpretation 
or appraisal of an event or situation. In other words, Beck (1976) hypothesized that it is the 
meaning of the event that triggers emotions rather than the event themselves. Further, the 
particular appraisal made will depend on the context in which an event occurs, the mood the 
person is in at the time it occurs, and the person’s past experiences. Prior to discussing these 
models it is necessary to define the concepts that constitute the cognitive basis of OCD. 
These definitions are provided by the OCCWG (1997): 
(a) Intrusions: Unwanted thoughts, images, or impulses that intrude into consciousness 
and are called obsessions when they attain clinical severity. 
(b) Appraisals: Expectations, interpretations, or evaluations of the meaning of particular 
phenomena such as unwanted intrusive thoughts. 




(c) Assumptions (beliefs): Relatively enduring ideas that are pan-situational and that may 
be specific to OCD or may be general assumptions about one’s self, that are relevant 
to other clinical disorders. 
The central tenet in early cognitive theories was that dysfunctional beliefs are 
intrinsically linked with the expression of disordered thinking and behaviour. However, early 
theories like Beck (1976) lacked specificity to OCD as many of these beliefs about danger 
were common across all anxiety disorders (Salkovskis, 1985). These limitations precipitated 
a myriad of disorder-specific psychological theories investigating the different types of 
dysfunctional beliefs underlying affective disorders, like Social Phobia (Clark & Wells, 
1995) and OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; Rachman, 1993). The remaining sections will 
briefly discuss two early cognitive models of OCD (Carr, 1974; McFall & Wollersheim, 
1979) before concentrating on the more contemporary models proposed by Salkovskis (1985, 
1989, 1996) and Rachman’s (1993, 1997, 1998). The latter models by Salkovskis and 
Rachman are currently considered the most comprehensive models of OCD and will form the 
theoretical basis for the subsequent three studies. 
2.3.3 Carr (1974) and Mcfall And Wollersheim (1979) 
 Carr (1974) proposed the first cognitive model of OCD. This theory implies that 
individuals with OCD over-estimate the probability that negative consequences will occur. 
Carr argued that any situation that potentially involved harm will result in heightened threat 
anxiety because the individual exaggerates the probability of the threat occurring (Clark, 
2004). Compulsive behaviours were conceptualised as ‘threat-reducing’ mechanisms. Similar 
to Mower’s conceptualisation, the compulsive behaviour becomes habitual because the 
individual perceives this to be the most effective means of reducing the anxiety associated 
with the negative consequences. However, this model was limited in that it did not explain 
why individuals with OCD exaggerate the probability of threat occurring in the first instance. 




 McFall and Wollersheim (1979) proposed a model based on the work by Lazarus 
(1966) and Carr (1974). According to this theory, OCD persists and is maintained by beliefs 
of perfectionism, punishment, uncertainty and control because they give rise to faulty 
primary and secondary appraisals of events. Like Carr, McFall and Wollersheim (1979) 
argued that individuals with OCD over-estimate the degree of threat of an event through 
primary appraisals. Individuals then overestimate the probability and the cost of the negative 
occurrence which evokes feelings of uncertainty. The individual then underestimates their 
ability to cope with the threat through faulty secondary appraisals which leads to anxiety. 
McFall and Wollersheim proposed that compulsive behaviour was an attempt to reduce 
feelings of uncertainty and anxiety caused by these primary and secondary appraisals (Clark, 
2004). The major criticism of this model is the lack of differentiation between the threat 
appraisals seen in OCD versus other anxiety disorders (Salkovskis, 1985). 
2.3.4 Salkovskis’ Cognitive Model Of OCD 
Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) theory is based on Beck (1976) cognitive specificity 
hypothesis and Rachman and colleagues’ spontaneous decay experiments. Salkovskis (1985, 
1989) inflated responsibility model proposes that obsessions represent the extreme end of a 
continuum of normal, unwanted intrusive cognitions (Rachman & de Silva, 1978). Salkovskis 
argues that as the content of normal intrusive thoughts and clinical obsessions is 
indistinguishable (Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), the distinctive feature between the two is 
the interpretation of the intrusion (Salkovskis, 1999). Intrusive thoughts develop into clinical 
obsessions when the individual interprets the intrusions as implying high personal 
responsibility and significance (Clark, 2004). Inflated responsibility beliefs are given a 
central role in this theory and are defined as:   
  “The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or  
  prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. These outcomes 
   may be actual, that is having consequences in the real world,  




  and/or at a moral level” (Salkovskis, 1996, p.110-111). 
 
Responsibility is conceptualised on two levels (Salkovskis 1985, 1989, 1996): 
responsibility beliefs and responsibility appraisals. Responsibility beliefs lead to a tendency 
to misinterpret mental activities as indicators of personal responsibility. These individuals 
then generate responsibility appraisals of their intrusive thoughts (Clark, 2004). Salkovskis 
argues that responsibility appraisals distinguish OCD from other affective disorders (e.g., 
appraisals of loss will be associated with depression; Salkovskis, 1999). Furthermore, these 
inflated responsibility beliefs are thought to be more related to prevention of perceived 
negative consequences that might occur because of the intrusive thought, rather than 
responsibility for the occurrence of the thought (Clark, 2004). 
Salkovskis argues that the assumption of personal responsibility for the prevention of 
harm to self or others results in anxiety and restlessness. The individual then deploys all 
attentional resources towards the removal of the cognitive intrusion. This overwhelming need 
to decrease the sense of responsibility and liability for harm results in the following 
outcomes: (a) increased discomfort, anxiety, and sometimes depression; (b) intrusive 
thoughts become highly accessible and significant; (c) attentional narrowing onto the 
intrusion;  and (d) the initiation of compulsive (neutralising) behaviours in an attempt to 
decrease the perceived sense of responsibility (Salkovskis, 1996).  
2.3.4.1 Neutralising or Compulsive Behaviour 
Salkovskis (1989) describes a neutralising response as the critical element in the 
development of obsessions and defines neutralising as “voluntarily initiated activity which is 
intended to have the effect of reducing perceived responsibility” (Salkovskis, 1989. p 678). 
The activity or compulsive behaviours can be either overt (behaviour) or covert (mental) and 
becomes repetitive because in the short term, these behaviours are very successful in reducing 




the anxiety. However, these behaviours are counter-productive as they prevent individuals 
from processing any evidence that would disconfirm their beliefs regarding personal 
responsibility. In addition to the neutralizing behaviours, Salkovskis (1998) argues another 
maintaining factor in OCD is that individuals with OCD “try too hard” to exert control over 
their intrusive thoughts.  
Salkovskis and Forrester (2002) have asserted that increased efforts to control both 
mental activity and perceived harmful events in the environment paradoxically serve to 
increase anxiety because (a) it increases preoccupation with the intrusion; (b) it will result in 
failure and possibly increase the frequency of the intrusions; (c) it increases the salience of 
these thoughts and beliefs regarding harm; and (d) it prevents discontinuation of the belief 
that these thoughts are harmful. In sum, this model proposes that OCD is caused by inflated 
responsibility beliefs, and is maintained by those affected individuals trying too hard to be 
certain they have not caused harm (Salkovskis, 1999; Salkovskis, Thorpe, Wahl, Wroe, & 
Forrester, 2003). 





Figure 1: Cognitive Analysis of OCD 
Figure.1 presents Salkovskis cognitive analysis of OCD (diagram sourced from Salkovskis, 
Wroe, Gledhill, Morrison, Forrester, Richards, Reynolds & Thorpe 2000, p 349).  
2.3.4.2 Cognitive Bias and Beliefs 
 Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) proposed that underlying beliefs are triggered by 
intrusive thoughts which give rise to certain cognitive biases (“thinking errors”) and 
appraisals of responsibility. These thinking errors refer to particular assumptions made 
because of pre-existing beliefs (Salkovskis, 1996). The assumptions or beliefs are long-
standing ideas which may be idiosyncratic or relate to a specific event (Salkovskis & 
Freeston, 2001; Salkovskis et al., 2003). The dysfunctional beliefs described by Salkovskis 
include: 




(a) Responsibility beliefs: failure to prevent harm to self or others is just as bad as deliberately 
causing harm. 
(b) Thought-action fusion beliefs: thoughts are equivalent to actions. 
(c) Thought control beliefs: one should have complete control over one’s thoughts. 
(d) Neutralisation beliefs: Neutralisation prevents possible harm from occurring. 
 
These beliefs give way to the following cognitive biases: 
(a) Responsibility bias: any personal influence over outcome = responsibility for outcome 
(Wroe et al., 2000) 
(b) Absence of omission bias (Wroe et al., 2000): Most individuals believe their responsibility 
for negative consequences is diminished when “failing to act” (omission) is involved, 
as opposed to situations where the commission of a specific act could bring about a 
negative outcome (Clark, 2004). Salkovskis (2002) found that individuals with OCD 
are less inclined to show an omission bias, as in just thinking of potentially harmful 
outcomes evokes the obsessional individual to feel responsible for the outcome unless 
they attempt to prevent it. 
(c) Misperceptions of personal agency: The belief that one can foresee possible harmful 
outcomes. Not acting when this premonition occurs equates with an inflated sense of 
responsibility because by not acting, the possibility of harm occurring is increased 
(Clark, 2004). 
(d) Thought-Action Fusion: thoughts are perceived as synonymous with actions. 
2.3.4.3 Origins of Inflated Responsibility Beliefs 
Salkovskis et al. (1999) hypothesised that the origins of dysfunctional responsibility 
beliefs are embedded within early life experiences. These researchers’ proposed five possible 
pathways for the development of inflated responsibility beliefs in individuals predisposed to 




OCD. These pathways, although not mutually exclusive, are reported to be crucial in the 
development of exaggerated responsibility beliefs in combination with other variables such as 
life events, prolonged stress, and depressed mood. These pathways are reviewed below: 
(a) Broad responsibility since childhood: A child or adolescent is deliberately or implicitly 
encouraged to assume responsibility for caring and protecting others from harm, by either 
having to assume actual responsibilities at an unusually early age (e.g., due to 
incompetent parenting or circumstances), or by negative communication styles between 
the child and significant other.  
Obsessive theme: ordering and arranging rituals. 
(b) Rigid and extreme codes of conduct and duty: Includes the environmental milieu where 
the primary carer or another authoritative source (e.g., school, or clergy) negatively 
reinforces strict behavioural codes regarding what is acceptable conduct. Consequently, 
the child or adolescent develops a set of attitudes concerning the need for personal 
responsibility.  
Obsessive theme: rumination, perfectionism and blasphemous obsessions.  
(c) Over-protective and critical parents: The environment is characterised by excessive 
parental anxiety, withholding of responsibility and overindulgence. In this type of 
environment, the child or adolescent is explicitly or implicitly taught that the world 
outside of the family home is unpredictable and dangerous. The child is sheltered from 
most normal responsibilities, reinforcing the belief that they probably are ill-equipped to 
deal with the hazards of the outside world. Obsessive theme:  Need to protect loved ones 
through specific checking rituals.  
(d) Actual incident affecting the heath and wellbeing of others:  After exposure to a traumatic 
incident, the individual assumes that (i) they played a crucial role in causing the 
catastrophe; (ii) they should have prevented the incident; and (iii) the “victim” was only 
saved by ‘good fortune’.  




Obsessive theme:  broad checking procedures to protect others from harm. 
(e) Incident which appears to bring about harm but is actually coincidental. An incident in 
which the individual assumes responsibility for the occurrence and/or consequence of the 
episode. Salkovskis et al. (1999) gives the example of an angry child who wishes that 
someone was dead, and by coincidence, shortly after that person dies.  
Obsessive theme:  checking behaviours associated with the need to protect others 
2.3.4.4 The Empirical Status of Salkovskis (1985, 1989) Model 
 The following sections outline the evidence for Salkovskis formulation that inflated 
responsibility beliefs drive obsessional thinking. Specifically, these sections are structured to 
address four key aspects in the Salkovskis (1985, 1989) model. Proposal 1: Inflated 
responsibility beliefs are a core construct in OCD (Clark, 2004). Proposal 2: Inflated 
responsibility is specific to obsessive compulsive symptoms (Clark, 2004). Proposal 3: 
Inflated responsibility beliefs result in increases in anxiety, compulsive behaviour and 
increased frequency of thoughts (Clark, 2004).  Proposal 4: Neutralization or compulsive 
behaviour increases the frequency and significance of the obsession (Clark, 2004). 
2.3.4.4.1 Inflated responsibility beliefs are a core construct in OCD. 
 Several studies have supported the proposal that inflated responsibility beliefs are a 
central construct in OCD. Studies have found significant correlations between responsibility 
and obsessive-compulsive behaviours in both clinical  (e.g., OCCWG, 2001, 2003; Bouchard, 
Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1999) and nonclinical participants (Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, 
& Gagnon, 1992; Menzies, Harris, Cumming, & Einstein, 2000; Rheaume, Ladouceur, 
Freeston, & Letarte, 1995). However, others have found responsibility to account for only a 
small amount of variance in specific obsessive compulsive symptoms (Emmelkamp & 
Aardema, 1999; Wilson & Chambless, 1999). 




 Several studies using questionnaire-based measures have supported the role of 
inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD. Freeston et al (1992) administered the cognitive 
intrusions questionnaire to college students and found responsibility, in conjunction with guilt 
and disapproval, to be a significant predictor of obsessive compulsive symptoms accounting 
for 5 percent of the variance in compulsive activity scores. The results suggest that patients 
with OCD report higher responsibility for outcomes related to their thoughts than matched 
non-clinical controls. 
 Rheaume et al. (1995) administered the Responsibility Questionnaire and Padua 
Inventory to a large sample of healthy adults (n = 397). The results indicated that 
responsibility accounted for up to 80 percent of the variance in obsessive compulsive 
symptoms. Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon and Thibodeau (1993) developed a questionnaire 
about responsibility beliefs and intrusive thoughts. A significant relationship was found 
between obsessive compulsive symptoms and beliefs about obsessions were found in 87 non-
clinical and 14 individuals with OCD (Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002). Bouchard, Harvard, 
Ladouceur and Cottraux (1997) also found responsibility beliefs as measured by the French 
translation of the Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS; Salkovskis, Wroe et al., 2000) to be 
important in the comparison between individuals with and without OCD (Salkovskis & 
Forrester, 2002). 
 Salkovskis et al (2000) proposed that two levels of responsibility-related cognitions 
(responsibility assumptions and responsibility appraisals) interact with other cognitive factors 
(e.g., threat appraisals) in obsessional problems. In order to test this proposal, the 
Responsibility Attitude Scale (RAS) and the Responsibility Interpretations Questionnaire 
(RIQ), were devised. These measures were then administered to a sample of individuals with 
OCD (n = 83), non-clinical (n = 218) and anxious controls (n = 48). The results showed that 
obsessional individuals reported significantly higher means scores on the RAS and RIQ 
(frequency and belief of high responsibility interpretations) compared to the other two 




groups. These findings were supported by Mancini, D’Olimpio and D’Ercole (2001) who 
found a significant relationship between responsibility and obsessive-compulsive behaviour 
in a non-clinical sample. Regression analysis using the RIQ and RAS as the dependent 
variables demonstrated that responsibility was a significant predictor of obsessive and 
compulsive behaviour, as measured by the Padua Inventory-Revised.  
 Additional support for Salkovskis proposition of responsibility beliefs can be found in 
the treatment literature (Van Oppen, de Haan, Van Balkom, Spinhoven, & et al., 1995). 
Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume and Dub (1996) evaluated the efficacy of a cognitive treatment 
for OCD specifically designed to target responsibility beliefs. Four participants with 
predominantly checking compulsions received cognitive correction for inflated responsibility 
without ERP twice weekly for a maximum of 32 sessions.  The authors’ reported that all 
participants demonstrated a clinically significant decrease in interference caused by rituals, a 
52-100 percent reduction in YBOCS scores, and a decrease in perceived responsibility. These 
gains were maintained at 6 and 12-month follow-up.  
2.3.4.4.2 Inflated responsibility is specific to obsessive compulsive symptoms.  
 Several studies have shown a specific relationship between responsibility and 
obsessive compulsive symptoms  (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Freeston & Ladouceur, 1993; 
Ladouceur, Rheaume, & Aublet, 1997; Steketee et al., 1998; Williams, Salkovskis, Forrester, 
& Allsopp, 2002; Wilson & Chambless, 1999). In a recent study, Mancini et al. (2001) used a 
non-clinical sample to test whether inflated responsibility was more prevalent in compulsive 
checking than in cleaning symptoms. Participants were required to complete five 
psychometric tests pertaining to either responsibility or obsessionality. The results showed a 
connection between specific factors of responsibility and certain kinds of obsessive-
compulsive behaviour, confirming the hypothesis that responsibility is more salient in 
checking than cleaning behaviours. 




 This finding was supported by Foa, Amir, Bogert, Molner and Prezworski (2001) who 
attempted to elucidate the relationship between inflated responsibility and obsessive 
compulsives with checking concerns (OC checkers), obsessive compulsive non-checkers 
(OC) and non-anxious controls (NAC). All participants were given written scenarios. The 
scenarios were divided into three groups representing differing levels of responsibility (e.g., 
high, low). The results showed the OCD sample to evidence significantly higher 
responsibility ratings for low risk and OC relevant hypothetical situations compared to the 
anxious and non-clinical group. However, in their follow-up study, Foa, Sacks, Tolin, 
Prezworski and Amir (2002) found that the heightened ratings of responsibility were 
associated with OC-checkers, but were not present in individuals with OCD without 
predominant checking concerns. These authors concluded that inflated responsibility beliefs 
may only be salient for compulsive checking. 
Bouchard, Rhéaume and Ladouceur (1999) examined the impact of perfectionism and 
excessive responsibility on checking behaviours and related variables. Fifty-one adults from a 
university setting were selected and allocated to one of two groups: the highly perfectionist 
group (HP) and the moderately perfectionist group (MP). These groups then participated in 
an individual 35 min session. The experimenter briefly explained the procedure which 
consisted of performing a classification task two times and completing a questionnaire. It was 
explained that the session would be recorded on video for research purposes. The task 
consisted of classifying 50 drug capsules (10 kinds, five of each) previously emptied of their 
active substances and filled with sugar into 12 semitransparent bottles. Participants had to 
pick one capsule at a time and put each type of capsule in a different bottle aligned in front of 
them. If they believed that they made a mistake, participants could check and move the 
capsules during the task. Participants were instructed to proceed as fast as possible while 
completing the task as best as they could.  




 In this situation, responsibility was manipulated by varying the instructions. In the 
low responsibility condition, participants were asked to do the task a first time as a simple 
practice. The experimenter explained to the participant that his personal results had no 
importance because it was only a practice trial. After receiving these low responsibility 
instructions the participant completed the task a first time while the experimenter was out of 
the room. The experimenter then explained to the participant that “the research group was 
specialized in the perception of colours and had been mandated by a pharmaceutical 
company for a project concerning the exportation of a medication for a virus which was 
presently very widespread in a Southeast Asian country” (HR). 
 Moreover, the participant was told that “as this region was very poor and its 
population poorly educated, there was a need for developing a system of colours that would 
make the distribution of medication safer for the inhabitants”. The participant was also told 
that he had great responsibility in the project, because his results in the classification of 
capsules could directly influence the manufacturing of the medication. Moreover, it was 
essential that he completed the task as seriously as possible in order to prevent serious harm 
and completed the task with the high responsibility instructions in mind. 
 After the task was completed, the experimenter counted the mistakes while the 
participant completed the retrospective questionnaire on the classification task. Finally, the 
experimenter debriefed the participant and explained the real goals of the study. The results 
showed (a) more checking behaviours (hesitations, checking) occurred in the high 
responsibility condition than in the low responsibility condition for participants of both 
groups; (b) after executing the task in the high responsibility condition, HP participants 
reported more influence over and responsibility for negative consequences than MP 
participants; (c) high perfectionist tendencies could predispose individuals to overestimate 
their perceived responsibility for negative events; and (d) perfectionism may serve as a 
catalyst in the perception of responsibility. 




 Rheaume and colleagues (1994) administered the Responsibility Questionnaire (RQ), 
a semi-idiographic measure of responsibility to a sample of college students (n = 397). The 
results indicated that responsibility was significantly related to obsessive compulsive 
symptoms, thought suppression, irrational beliefs and obsessive thoughts. In another non-
clinical study, Wilson and Chambless (1999) administered a series of psychometric measures 
tapping into responsibility beliefs. The results demonstrated that responsibility significantly 
predicted obsessive compulsive symptoms. These findings were further supported by Lee and 
Kwon (2003) who found Korean students to rate responsibility appraisals considerably higher 
for dirt/contamination obsessions than for aggressive intrusive thoughts. However, other 
studies have not found responsibility to be specific to obsessive compulsive symptoms 
(OCCWG, 2003; Rachman & Shafran, 1998). At this stage there is only limited support for 
the premise that inflated responsibility is specific to certain obsessive compulsive symptoms 
and further research is warranted (Clark, 2004). 
2.3.4.4.3 Responsibility beliefs lead to increases in anxiety  
Salkovskis (1985, 1989) model hypothesizes that inflated responsibility beliefs lead to 
an increased urge to neutralise and increased emotional intensity which increases the 
frequency and accessibility of the intrusive thought. This proposal is well supported (Clark, 
2004), primarily through experimental paradigms where the perceived levels of responsibility 
have been directly or indirectly manipulated. Typically, direct manipulations involve varying 
the degree of personal responsibility taken by the participant or experimenter during a 
personally threatening task (Riskind, Williams, & Kyrios, 2002). Conversely, indirect 
manipulations of personal responsibility would involve varying the absence or presence of 
the experimenter during the same personally threatening task.  
In an early study, Lopatka and Rachman (1995) directly varied levels of perceived 
responsibility for 30 obsessive compulsive checkers and ten obsessive compulsive cleaners. 




Participants were subject to both a control condition where cleaning or checking urges were 
provoked, and the experimental manipulation which involved either increasing or decreasing 
participants’ perceived responsibility for an anticipated negative event. In the high 
responsibility (HR) condition, participants were informed “you are responsible for anything 
that happens or anything that is not perfect as a result of not checking”. In the low 
responsibility (LR) condition, participants were told that the experimenter would take 
complete responsibility if anything terrible happened. 
Following the experimental manipulation, behavioural avoidance tests (BAT) were 
administered to all individuals. These involved exposing the individual to an object or 
situation that evoked cleaning or checking behaviours (e.g., “we would like you to lock the 
door and then walk away from it without checking it at all”). The results suggested that 
participants with OCD experienced a steep decline in compulsive checking urges when they 
transferred their sense of responsibility for the anticipated consequences of their actions to 
the experimenter (i.e., low responsibility condition). The results suggested that decreasing the 
level of perceived responsibility was followed by significant declines in discomfort and in the 
urge to carry out the compulsive checking. 
 Ladouceur, Rheaume, Freeston, Aublet, Jean, Lachance, Langlois and De 
Pokomandy-Morin (1995) conducted a study using non-clinical participants. Their responses 
on a manual classification task were compared under high and low perceived responsibility 
conditions. Participants in both responsibility conditions were given differing instructions 
designed to either increase or decrease the level of perceived responsibility. The results 
suggested that participants in the high responsibility condition hesitated and checked more, 
and reported more preoccupation with errors and anxiety during the task than participants 
from the low responsibility group.  
Mancini, D’Olimpio and Cieri (2004) sought to verify whether reduced coping 
abilities (e.g., an exaggerated expectation of failure) contributed to obsessive-like behaviours. 




Forty-seven non-clinical participants completed a visuo-spatial memory task (e.g., eight items 
were presented on a computer screen). They were assigned to three experimental groups: the 
personal influence group (PI), the personal influence plus expectation of failure group 
(PI+EF), and the control group (C). Levels of perceived personal influence and expectation of 
failure were manipulated by differing the instructions to participants’ about their 
performance.  
 While control participants were told that this study concerned visuo-spatial memory, 
participants assigned to the PI group were falsely informed that the examiner was a victim of 
unjust damage. The laboratory director had forced the examiner to test a lot of participants in 
a short time, since the laboratory would have an important grant only if the experiment was 
completed within a week and if the results were the expected ones. Furthermore, the 
examiner would be dismissed if he was not able to obtain results conforming to the 
experimental hypothesis within a week. Participants were informed that, if they wanted to 
help the examiner, they had to perform as best as they could, especially whenever the items to 
rearrange were the stars. It was explained that everything was up to the participant.  
 Participants assigned to the PI+EF group received the same instructions as the PI 
group, but were also falsely informed that they had obtained very low scores both in the 
training session and in attention tests, because they were inattentive. This kind of information 
was given to make participants expect they were not able to face the situation and to prevent 
damage to the examiner. After receiving instructions, participants completed 15 trials of the 
visuo-spatial memory task, then completed a 16-item self-report questionnaire (seven-point 
Likert scale), assessing discomfort perceived during the task (seven items), doubts (six 
items), and perceived performance (three items). The results showed that both PI+EF and PI 
participants perceived more responsibility, preoccupation with the outcomes of their errors 
than control participants. These results showed that participants from both PI and PI+EF 




groups understood and adhered to instructions, and accordingly perceived more responsibility 
and preoccupation for error outcomes. 
In a novel experiment, Shafran (1997) predicted that inflating the perceived level of 
responsibility would result in increased distress and urge to perform checking compulsions in 
a sample of individuals with OCD (n = 40). Shafran (1997) indirectly manipulated the level 
of perceived responsibility by varying the presence (low responsibility) or absence of 
experimenter (high responsibility) during a Behavioural Avoidance Test (BAT). A BAT 
involves exposure to a feared situation (e.g., contaminated object) without engaging in 
compulsions. The procedure of varying the experimenter was based on the clinical 
observations of Rachman (1976), who noted that obsessional clients were less compelled to 
check when in the presence of a trusted person (transfer of responsibility). In the high 
responsibility condition (HR), participants engaged in the BAT alone, while in the low 
responsibility condition (LR), the BAT was conducted in the presence of the experimenter. 
The results showed that participants in the HR condition reported greater distress and urges to 
perform compulsions compared to their counterparts in LR conditions. Contrary to earlier 
reports, the manipulation of responsibility affected the entire sample and was not confined to 
those with predominant checking behaviours.  
2.3.4.4.4 Neutralization increases the frequency and significance of obsessions.  
Salkovskis’s model predicts that neutralising responses increase the frequency and 
salience of the obsessive thought. There is partial support for this hypothesis. For example, 
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) found that both distress and urges to perform compulsions 
decreased when responsibility was reduced. Ladouceur et al (1996) found similar results 
when reductions in OCD symptomotology were observed following cognitive therapy 
targeting inflated responsibility. In a recent study, Salkovskis et al (1997) examined the 




effects of deliberately increasing (cognitive) neutralizing on the discomfort associated with 
naturally occurring and unacceptable intrusive thoughts in non-clinical participants.  
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions. Both groups listened 
to repeated recorded presentations of one of their intrusive thoughts and were then required 
either to (a) neutralize it (experimental group), or (b) distract themselves for a similar period 
(control group). The participants’ were told that the purpose of the experiment was to 
investigate intrusive, repetitive, unwanted and upsetting thoughts and images, and that the 
experiment would be fully explained at the end of the session. The results of this study 
showed: (a) those that neutralized experienced significantly more discomfort during 
subsequent presentations of their intrusion, and significantly stronger urges to neutralize and 
distract; and (b) engaging in neutralizing responses during the first presentation of their 
intrusions made it difficult to stop neutralizing during the second presentation of the same 
thoughts.  
2.3.4.4.5 Summary: Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) model. 
 Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) theory of inflated responsibility has received 
considerable attention over the past decade. Several aspects of this theory are well supported 
(e.g., perceived responsibility leads to increases in neutralising), with emerging support for 
the cognitive specificity hypothesis (e.g., inflated responsibility is specific to certain 
obsessive compulsive symptoms). The results regarding the central tenet in this theory, that 
inflated responsibility beliefs are characteristic of individuals with OCD are less clear, with 
support for (Rachman, 1993; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) and against this model 
(Emmelkamp & Aardema 1999).  
 It is possible that the inconsistent findings relate to definitional issues. Prior to 1992 
there was not an operational definition of inflated responsibility. Some studies assessed the 
social aspects of responsibility (see Frost, Steketee, Cohn, & Griess, 1994) whereas others 




focused on Salkovskis (1996a) operational definition3. It is important to note that Rheaume et 
al. (1995) found that when the broader definition was used, ‘pivotal influence’ was the best 
predictor of responsibility (see Wilson & Chambless, 1999). Consequently, the inconsistent 
findings regarding inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD may be attributable to differences in 
the conceptualization of ‘responsibility’, not the relevance of this construct in OCD.  
 In order to clarify the role of inflated responsibility in OCD, it is necessary to 
replicate studies using Salkovskis’s measures the RIQ and RAS in clinical samples. 
Secondly, there is a need for more experimental studies, manipulating inflated responsibility 
beliefs either directly or indirectly in clinical samples.  A final area for investigation is the 
role of other beliefs in precipitating dysfunctional assumptions that result in obsessional 
episodes. Salkovskis and Forrester (2002) suggests that within the cognitive analysis of OCD 
it is likely that beliefs (e.g., need to control ones thoughts’; Purdon & Clark, 2002) play a role 
in the development of obsessional thinking. One such belief to attract attention is ‘Thought-
Action Fusion’ (TAF; Rachman, 1993; 1997; 1998). The following sections will discuss 
Rachman’s (1993, 1997, 1998) model, the concept of TAF, and the connection between TAF, 
inflated responsibility and obsessive compulsive symptoms. 
2.3.5 Rachman (1993, 1997, 1998) Misinterpretation of Significance Theory 
Rachman (1993, 1997, 1998) proposed a cognitive theory of OCD based on Clark’s 
(1986) cognitive theory of panic disorder and Salkovskis’s (1985) model. Similar to 
Salkovskis, Rachman’s model asserts that obsessive intrusions have their origins in naturally 
occurring unwanted thoughts (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Rachman proposed that clinical 
obsessions are caused by “catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of one’s 
thoughts, images or impulses” (Rachman, 1997). These obsessions persist as long as these 
misinterpretations continue, and only diminish when these misinterpretations are weakened 
                                                 
 
3 “The belief that one possesses pivotal power to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes. 




(Rachman, 1997, 2003). Rachman (1997) reported five dimensions underlying the 
misinterpretations of significance: 
(a) Important: the intrusive thought is perceived as meaningful, important and revealing. 
(b) Ego-alien (dystonic): This thought is alien to me, it is unlike me. 
(c) Personalized: The intrusive thought is my own and especially important to me. 
(d) Potential consequences: This thought has potential consequences. 
(d) Serious consequences:  The possible consequences of the intrusion are likely to be 
serious, threatening and intolerable. 
The misinterpretation of significance is an important construct in this theory as the 
individual is presumed to make the assumption that their intrusive thoughts reveal something 
important about their moral character (Clark, 2002a). Rachman (1997) provides the following 
case example to elucidate this point. A 25-year old computer analyst was experiencing 
aggressive thoughts towards very young children. This person interpreted these thoughts as 
meaning he was a potential murderer, evil and a worthless human being. This in turn evoked 
the belief that the intrusive thought was important, highly significant and potentially 
threatening (Rachman, 1997).  
Rachman further postulates that neutral stimuli (intrusive thoughts) are only converted 
into threatening stimuli if the content of the intrusive thought has particular meaning to the 
person (e.g., moral values). For example, if a person has strong religious values, then the 
emergence of intrusive thoughts of blasphemy or acts against a religious icon would be 
particularly distressing. This distress would convert previously neutral religious cues (e.g., 
churches) to threat stimuli. Conversely, if the person did not hold these beliefs, then the 
intrusive thought, churches and religious icons would remain neutral (Rachman, 1998).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
The outdcomes may be actual (consequences in the real world) and/or at a Moral level” (Salkovskis, 1996). 




This model also suggests that the catastrophic misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts 
increases the frequency of obsessive thoughts as a wide range of neutral stimuli are converted 
into threatening stimuli (Clark, 2004). Previously indifferent stimuli become highly 
significant (Rachman, 1998). This conversion of neutral cues into potentially threatening 
ones increases the range of threats, and therefore increases the opportunities for the 
provocation of the obsession (Rachman, 1998). Rachman (1998) also argued that in addition 
to external cues (e.g., churches), there are internal provocations (e.g., bodily sensations) for 
obsessional thoughts (Clark, 1986; cited in Rachman, 1998).  
Internal provocations, like trembling, sweating and shallow breathing often occur in 
association with intrusive thoughts (Rachman, 1998). Rachman argued that these sensations 
are often misinterpreted as signs of danger which increase the personal significance of the 
unwanted thoughts. It is further proposed that the mere occurrence of an abhorrent thought 
may serve as an internal source of provocation e.g., “the fact I am having these thoughts must 
mean I am evil” (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997; Shafran, 1997). 
Lastly, this model asserts that clinical obsessions will persist until the thoughts or 
images are interpreted as not holding any personal significance (Rachman, 1998). Similarly 
to other models (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985), individuals attempt to reduce the internal or external 
sources of threat through avoidance or other neutralizing strategies. However, these strategies 
provide only temporary relief, because as soon as the individual is re-exposed to either an 
external (situational cue) or internal (e.g., sweating) reminder, the obsession returns 
(Rachman, 1998; Clark, 2004). Neutralizing prevents exposure to any disconfirming evidence 
regarding the personal significance of the intrusive thoughts (Rachman, 1998). This cycle 
remains until the catastrophic misinterpretation is changed or reduced and the internal or 
external stimuli are no longer interpreted as threatening (Rachman, 1998). 
Rachman also recognized a number of other cognitive processes that contribute to the 
catastrophic misinterpretation observed in OCD. Lopatka and Rachman (1995) found that 




individuals with OCD tended to think that the probability of a negative consequence 
occurring was increased when they were personally responsible. Rachman (1998) replicated 
this finding and suggested that people who are inclined to make catastrophic interpretations 
of intrusive thoughts may be vulnerable to exaggerated responsibility beliefs (ref. Salkovskis, 
1985). Rachman also emphasized a cognitive process whereby ones thoughts and actions 
become fused together. Rachman (1997, 2003) termed this phenomenon Thought-Action 
Fusion’ (TAF), and proposed that TAF in combination with inflated responsibility beliefs, 
served to increase the catastrophic misinterpretation of significance of the unwanted thoughts.  
 
2.3.5.1 Thought-Action Fusion Beliefs (TAF) 
Clinicians as early as 1934 observed TAF-like tendencies in obsessional patients (see 
Bleuler in 1934, Rachman, 1976 and Salkovskis, 1985). However, research has only just 
begun into this dysfunctional cognitive bias called TAF (e.g., Frost et al., 1993; Lopatka & 
Rachman, 1995; Rachman (1997); Rachman (1998); Shafran et al., 1996; Shafran, Watkins, 
& Charman, 1996). TAF is defined as the “cognitive process whereby obsessive compulsives 
experience thoughts and actions concerning harm as equivalent and see themselves as 
equally responsible for thinking as for acting” (Rachman, 1993). TAF is suggested to have 
two components; Moral-TAF (TAF-M) and Likelihood-TAF (TAF-L; Rachman, Thordarson, 
Shafran, & Woody, 1995; Shafran et al., 1996).  
The first, Moral-TAF (TAF-M) refers to the belief that having an unacceptable 
thought is almost the moral equivalent of carrying out that particular behaviour (Rachman & 
Shafran, 2004). For example, a religious woman, while praying, experienced intrusive images 
of having sexual relations with Jesus. She believed she had sinned against God by having 
such an image, and was therefore an immoral person (Shafran, 1999, p.591). The second, 
termed likelihood-TAF (TAF-L) refers to the belief that the occurrence of a thought will 




increase the likelihood that the specific negative event will occur (Thordarson & Shafran, 
2002). Rachman (1993) suggests two forms of Likelihood-TAF. The first, “Likelihood-Self” 
(TAF-LS) refers to the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding oneself (e.g., “If I think about 
being in a car accident, it makes it more likely that I will be in an accident”). The second, 
“Likelihood-For-Others” (TAF-LO) represents the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding 
others (e.g., “If I think about a friend in a car accident, it makes it more likely that they will 
be in an accident”).  
 Rachman (1997, 1998) hypothesized that TAF leads to the catastrophic 
misinterpretations that unwanted thoughts are personally significant. This misinterpretation 
precipitates anxiety and efforts to eliminate the distress, such as neutralizing behaviour to 
eradicate the thought and its possible consequences. The use of neutralizing and compulsive 
behaviours serves to increase the salience and frequency of intrusive thoughts. Rachman 
(2003) postulates that both forms of TAF are closely connected to inflated responsibility. 
Preliminary research supports the proposition that TAF appraisals may play a causal role in 
increasing responsibility beliefs (Shafran et al., 1996; Freeston et al., 1996). The following 
sections review the evidence for this viewpoint. 
2.3.5.2  The Development of the Thought-Action-Fusion Scale (TAFS) 
 The majority of the studies investigating TAF have relied on the Thought-Action 
Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996). Shafran et al. (1996) developed the TAFS and 
tested the psychometric properties in two separate studies. In the first study, a scale consisting 
of 34-items (13 morality; 11 likelihood-to-others including positive and negative events; 10 
Likelihood-to-oneself including positive and negative events) was administered to 
obsessional (n = 147) 4 and non-obsessional samples (n = 190). The results suggested that 
people in the obsessional group scored higher than the student group on the TAF-M and 




TAF-LO subscales; however, there was no significant difference between the groups on 
TAF-LS. The results also indicated that the division between positive and negative items in 
the Likelihood scales was not supported. No support for the division between positive and 
negative items, consequently the TAF-scale was revised in that the positive items were 
moved from the TAF-Likelihood subscales. 
 In the second study, Shafran et al revised version of TAS was used and consisted of 
19 items (12 Moral, 4 Likelihood-for-others and 3 Likelihood-for-self). This scale was 
administered to three groups: obsessionals5 (n = 118), community (n = 122), and student (n = 
272) samples. The results replicated findings from Study I with significant group differences 
between TAF-LO, but not between obsessional participants and students on TAF-LS or TAF-
M. This result suggests that obsessional participants did not make the distinction between the 
influence of their thoughts over their own, and others behaviour (e.g., when controlling for 
depression, the only correlation to remain significant was TAF-LO and checking).  
The TAFS has been shown to reliably discriminate between clinical and non-clinical 
samples (Rassin et al., 2001a; Shafran et al., 1996). However data regarding its convergent 
validity is not strong, as the TAFS does not always correlate with OCD related measures 
(Berle & Starcevic, 2005). For example, while there is consistent evidence for TAF-LO and 
OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Amir et al., 2001; Clark, Purdon & Byers 2000; Muris et al., 
2001; Rachman et al., 1996; Coles et al., 2001), the relationship between TAF-M and OCD is 
less clear (Shafran et al., 1996; Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2001b). The limitations 
associated with the TAFS has prompted some investigators to employ experimental 
paradigms (Rachman et al., 1996; Rassin et al., 2001a; van der Hout et al., 2001, 2002; 
Zucker et al., 2002; Shafran & Rachman, 2004) to assess TAF appraisals. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Inclusion in the obsessional sample (above 11 on the MOCI). 2/3 of the group had formal diagnosis. 
5 Approximately 20% of Ss had participated in the first study 




2.3.5.3  Empirical Support for TAF in OCD 
 Research is still in infancy, and only twenty-one studies have examined the role of 
TAF in OCD. Of these studies, only six have used samples with individuals diagnosed with a 
psychiatric disorder (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Barrett & Healey, 20036; Rassin et al., 2001a; 
Rassin et al., 2001b; Tallis, 1994; Shafran et al., 1996), with the remainder relying on 
undergraduate students (see Coles et al., 2001). One of the most pressing research questions 
is whether the TAF-bias leads to increased responsibility appraisals, which then leads to 
attempts to suppress the intrusions which precipitates obsessive thinking and behaviour. 
Researchers have attempted to address this question by investigating three main avenues: the 
specificity of TAF to OCD; TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs; and TAF and thought 
suppression. These findings are reviewed. 
2.3.5.4 Is TAF Specific To OCD? 
The majority of empirical studies find a moderate relationship between TAF and 
obsessional complaints as measured by scales like MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977), the 
Padua Inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988) or the Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (OCI; Foa, 
Huppert, Leiberg, Langner, Kichic, Hajcak & Salkovskis, 2002). In a series of studies, Amir, 
Freshman, Ramsey, Neary and Brigidi (2001) administered a modified version of the TAFS7  
to a large group of clinical analogue participants8. The results suggested that individuals with 
obsessive compulsive symptoms gave higher ratings to the likelihood of negative events 
happening as a result of their negative thoughts. However, this effect was only found in the 
second study. The results of Amir et al. studies also demonstrated no significant differences 
between OC participants and healthy controls on the TAF-M subscale. These findings were 
                                                 
 
6 This study used 28 children (7-13 years) diagnosed with OCD (DSM-IV-TR)  
7 The modified version of the TAF-scale included thoughts about positive events and thoughts involving 
prevention of harm. The scale was also adapted so that the extent of responsibility that the individual felt for the 
thought could be assessed 




replicated by Rassin et al. (2001a) who reported the weakest correlation between the 
Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) and the morality subscale. 
 TAF has been associated with other psychological disorders, most often depression 
(Hazlett-Stevens, Zucker & Craske, 2002; Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach & 
Campbell, 2001; Shafran et al., 1996; Abramowitz et al., 2003). Shafran et al. (1996) found 
significant group differences between obsessional and student samples on TAF-M but only 
when the sample experienced high levels of depression. Similar findings were found by 
Abramowitz, Whiteside, Lynam and Kalsy (2003) who compared TAF across clinical (n = 
95) and non-clinical participants (n = 25). Clinical participants included: OCD (n = 20); 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (n = 19); Panic Disorder (n = 17); Social Phobia (n = 20) and 
Major Depressive Disorder (n = 19). The results demonstrated that whereas anxiety was 
related to TAF-LO, TAF-M correlated with depression. 
This has prompted several researchers to suggest TAF likelihood, especially TAF-LO, 
has a closer and more specific relationship with obsessionality than TAF-M (Clark et al., 
2000; Clark, 2004; Shafran et al., 1996). Rassin et al. (2001b) investigated the psychometric 
properties of the TAFS by comparing scores across psychiatric groups. Significant 
correlations between Likelihood-TAF and obsessional symptoms were found, but not for 
TAF-M. Some researchers (e.g., Coles, Mennin & Heimberg, 2001) have suggested that 
TAF-M only becomes significantly when mediated through other comorbid conditions, like 
depression (Shafran et al., 1996) and religiosity (Rassin & Koster, 2003). 
2.3.5.5 Is TAF Specific to Obsessive Compulsive Symptoms? 
 TAF measures have shown a small but robust relationship with OCD symptoms 
(Clark et al., 2000; Rassin & Koster, 2003; Sica, Novara & Sanavio, 2002; Gwilliam, Wells 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 Both studies relied on undergraduate participants divided into groups by their scores on the OCI (Foa, Kozak, 
Salkovskis, Coles & Amir, 1998). 




& Cartwright-Hatton, 2004); Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmaz & Gencoz, 
2004). Clark et al. (2000) investigated the differences in the appraisal associated with the 
perceived control of unwanted sexual and non-sexual intrusive thoughts by administering a 
series of questionnaires, including the TAFS to a large group of undergraduate students. 
Consistent with other results, this study found Likelihood-TAF to be a significant predictor of 
the perceived controllability of participants’ most upsetting sexual and non sexual thoughts.  
 Some theorists have argued that religious insights are related to the TAF-M bias 
(Rassin & Koster, 2003; Sica, Novara & Sanavio, 2002). Rassin and Koster (2003) 
administered a series of questionnaires reflecting religion, TAF and OCD to undergraduate 
students (n = 100). Participants were grouped according to religious background (e.g., 
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or atheist). The results found the Protestant sample to report the 
strongest correlation between religiosity and TAF-M as well as the highest levels of 
religiosity. In the Catholic group, religiosity correlated moderately with TAF-M, but also 
with TAF-LO, and MOCI. Overall, the results found a strong association (r = 0.53, p <.01) 
between TAF-M and religiosity in undergraduate students, but not between Likelihood-TAF.  
In a related study, Yorulmaz, Yilmaz and Gencoz (2004) investigated the cross-
cultural utility of the TAFS in 251 Turkish undergraduate students. In contrast to most 
studies, Yorulmaz et al. found that the strongest correlations were between TAF-M and 
obsessive compulsive symptoms. These researchers’ explained this finding by proposing that 
the presence of religious obsessions may be over-represented in some cultures (e.g., Jewish, 
Middle Eastern) in comparison to the clinical populations of the West (Tek & Ulug, 2001). 
Consequently, some obsessions tapping religious connotations (e.g., morality) may be 
particularly salient in a Turkish sample. 
Shafran and Rachman (2004) hypothesize that the occurrence of TAF-M in 
combination with depression may be pathological and that this may be particularly the case in 
people who are religious. This raises the question of whether certain obsessive compulsive 




symptoms have different cognitive bias. For example, research has shown stronger 
correlations between TAF-LO and individuals with predominant checking compulsions 
(Shafran et al., 1996: Study 2). Alternatively, Purdon et al. (2000) showed that individuals 
with unwanted sexual thoughts tended to exhibit higher levels of responsibility than those 
without sexual thoughts. Investigations in this area are sparse, and additional research using 
large clinical samples is required. 
2.3.5.6 Does TAF Precipitate Inflated Responsibility Appraisals? 
 It has been suggested that engagement in TAF appraisals leads to an increased sense 
of responsibility (Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al., 1995; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris and 
Spaan, 1999; Shafran et al., 1996). In comparison to TAF-M, TAF-likelihood appears to be 
closely related to responsibility for preventing harm (Berle & Starcevic, 2004). To investigate 
the relationship between TAF, responsibility and obsessive thinking, Rassin et al. (1999) 
induced TAF-like responses in a group of students (n = 45).  In order to induce TAF, 
participants were assigned to either an experimental or control condition. Participants in the 
experimental group underwent a bogus EEG recording session, where they were told that the 
equipment was able to pick up the word “apple”, and that thoughts of the word “apple” could 
result in the administration of an electrical shock to another person.  
 Participants in the control condition were told that the machine could detect their 
thoughts, but they were not told that any specific thought would result in negative 
consequences. After spending 15 minutes in the EEG laboratory, participants completed a 
short questionnaire relating to TAF. The results found that participants in the experimental 
condition had more than three times as many intrusions, felt more than three times as much 
discomfort, and engaged in neutralising in about half of the intrusions. The results showed 
that experimentally induced TAF produced 50 percent more thought intrusions, increased 




discomfort and neutralization responses. Rassin et al. (1999) concluded that TAF does 
promote obsessive thinking in that it inflates the importance of intrusive thoughts.  
 In another study, Smari and Holmsteinsson (2001) evaluated the role of TAF, 
responsibility and thought suppression in obsessive thinking. A sample of undergraduate 
students (n = 211) were administered the Distressing Thoughts Questionnaire (DTQ; Clark & 
de Silva, 1985), the Responsibility Attitudes Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000), the TAFS 
(Shafran et al., 1996), Wegner and Zanakos’ (1994) White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(WBSI) and the MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). The results indicated that controlling 
for the mediating variables, thought suppression (WBSI) and responsibility (RAS), led to 
reductions in the relationship between intrusive thoughts (DTQ) and obsessive compulsive 
symptoms (MOCI). The findings also demonstrated that when the RAS was substituted with 
the TAFS, the results remained constant. These results suggest that TAF was highly 
associated with responsibility appraisals  
Clark et al. (2000) demonstrated that TAF serves to inflate responsibility, especially 
when the obsessions involve aggression, blasphemous or sexual themes. Likewise, Rachman 
(2002) argues that intrusive thoughts of a sexual or aggressive nature arise because of the 
interpretation that one is ‘mad, bad and dangerous’, lending support to the hypothesis that 
some individuals fuse their thoughts and actions (e.g., thoughts reveal ones ‘true 
disposition’). However, like the inflated responsibility hypothesis, it is unclear whether TAF 
acts as a general vulnerability factor across all anxiety disorders (see Rassin et al., 1999).  
2.3.5.7 TAF and Thought Suppression 
Thought suppression is one of the most common control strategies used to remove 
unwanted thoughts (Amir, Cashman, & Foa 1997a). Thought suppression refers to the 
conscious, intentional removal an idea, thought, image from attention, in an attempt to reduce 
(neutralise) any anxiety or discomfort associated with the idea (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes & 




Scott, 1999). There is an impressive amount of research on thought control strategies, 
particularly thought suppression (see Purdon, 1999 for review). Recent investigations suggest 
that TAF may lead normal intrusive thoughts to become clinical obsessions via thought 
suppression.  
Rassin, Muris, Schmidt and Merckelbach (2000a) investigated the relationship 
between TAF and thought suppression by administering a number of TAF, thought 
suppression and OCD measures to a sample of undergraduate students. The results suggested 
that (i) TAF leads to suppression attempts, while suppression results in more obsessive 
compulsive symptoms; (ii) thought suppression is an antecedent of symptoms, rather than a 
mere reaction to the intrusion; (iii) the likelihood bias appeared to increase OCD symptoms, 
while TAF-M only increased OCD symptoms via thought suppression; and (iv) TAF appears 
to be a more fundamental cause of obsessive compulsive symptoms, with thought 
suppression conceptualised as playing a more intermediate role between TAF and OC 
symptoms.  
In a subsequent study, Rassin et al. (2001a) sought to clarify whether TAF and 
thought suppression are susceptible to change. A number of self-report measures were 
administered to OCD-patients pre-and-post treatment. The rationale behind this study was 
that if TAF and thought suppression are important predictors of obsessional problems, then 
the pre-treatment scores on questionnaires tapping these phenomena should predict symptom 
severity. The results found that the TAF bias and the tendency to engage in thought 
suppression were unrelated, and that the TAF-bias occurs in other anxiety disorders. 
Secondly, it was found that high TAF and thought suppression pre-treatment scores did not 
influence treatment response across groups.  
 Although this study possesses some merit, one issue that deserves comment is its sole 
reliance on an inpatient sample. In line with Rachman’s (1993) observation, that in structured 
environments, and in the presence of another person, obsessive patients’ sense of 




responsibility diminishes, perhaps the same phenomenon occurs for TAF. Given that 
responsibility and TAF have been theoretically and empirically linked (Rachman, 1993; 
Rachman et al., 1995; Shafran et al., 1996), it is possible that when in unfamiliar and 
structured environments surrounded by people in authority, the fusion of thoughts and actions 
diminishes as responsibility is transferred to another. This explanation could account for the 
findings in Rassin et al. (2001a) study. 
 In another study, Zucker et al. (2002) sought to investigate whether or not a brief 
educational intervention delivered prior to engaging in an anxiety-provoking task would be 
effective in offsetting anxiety in college students identified has having a strong propensity to 
endorse statements of TAF. Participants were included in the study if they scored at least one 
standard deviation above the mean on the TAF scale and were without major psychological 
disturbance. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: 
(i) the experimental group, who were given information regarding intrusive thoughts and 
TAF; and (ii) the control group, who were given a placebo message about stress. Participants 
were given questionnaires both pre-and-post scenario to measure responses.  
 The results of Zucker et al. (2002) suggested that (i) the educational tape given to the 
experimental group did correspond with significant decreases in TAF scores; and (ii) 
compared to the control group, the experimental group tended to report less post-task anxiety 
and less urge to neutralise. The results of this study lend support for a TAF bias in OCD 
(Rachman, 1993; Shafran et al., 1996), as evidenced by the reduction of anxiety following an 
intervention targeting TAF distortions. Unfortunately this study was conducted in a non-
clinical population, and it is unclear whether these findings can be generalised to individuals 
with OCD. 




2.3.5.8 TAF Summary 
Based on these studies reviewed, the following conclusions can be drawn. Individuals 
with OCD score significantly higher than non clinical groups on measures of TAF-Likelihood 
(Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al. 1995; Shafran et al., 1996; Coles et al., 2001; Rassin et al., 
2001a). TAF also correlates with other anxiety disorders (Hazlett-Stevens et al. 2002). There 
are inconsistent findings for TAF-M (Shafran et al., 1996), however research suggests a 
strong relationship with religiosity (Rassin & Koster, 2003) and depression (Abramowitz et 
al., 2003). Lastly, TAF may correlate with some types of obsessive compulsive symptoms 
(Coles et al., 2001; Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999).  
There are both theoretical and empirical grounds to propose that the fusion of 
thoughts and actions (TAF) and inflated responsibility beliefs are important constructs in 
OCD. However, it is still unclear whether TAF or responsibility beliefs are specific to OCD. 
It may be the case that TAF-LO applies more to OCD, whereas TAF-M is more in-line with 
other psychological disorders, like depression. Only one study (e.g., Abramowitz et al., 2003) 
has directly compared TAF across homogenous groups of anxiety disorders. Due to the 
central role of TAF and responsibility in Rachman (1993) and Salkovskis (1985; 1989, 1996) 
cognitive models, further investigation using clinical samples is warranted. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
 Etiological models of OCD differ in ethos, methodology and focus. The earliest 
models were psychodynamic in nature conceptualising OCD as a neurosis. The lack of 
empirical support for these models led to an emphasis on more behavioural aspects of 
obsessionals and compulsions. Early behavioural theories (e.g., Mowrer) focussed on anxiety 
reduction of observable behaviours (e.g., overt compulsive behaviour). While achieving some 
success, these models lacked specificity to OCD and there was little evidence that obsessions 
were acquired via association with a traumatic experience (Steketee, 1993; Rachman & 




Hodgson, 1980). This led to cognitive deficit theories, which proposed that obsessional 
symptoms represent a generalised and involuntary disturbance of information processing. 
However these models were weakened by inconsistent findings and a lack of specificity to 
OCD (Taylor, 2002). 
 In recent years there has been a plethora of research on cognitive-appraisal processes 
in OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1996; Purdon & Clark, 2002; Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 
2002; Rachman, 1993, 1997). The two most current cognitive-appraisal models (e.g., 
Salkovskis, 1985, 1989, 1996; Rachman, 1993, 1997, 1998) propose that clinical obsessions 
are caused by the misinterpretation of significance of either the occurrence or content of the 
unwanted intrusion, image or impulse via inflated responsibility beliefs. The empirical basis 
for both models is strong, with support from a range of scientific modalities (e.g., self-report, 
interview-based, and experimental).  
 Based on the material reviewed, it can be concluded that the central tenets in these 
theories, namely inflated responsibility and TAF are highly relevant in OCD, but lack 
specificity. Moreover, while there is some evidence that TAF contributes to inflated 
responsibility beliefs in OCD, the empirical status of this relationship has not been firmly 
established. It also remains to be seen whether these appraisals are evident in certain types of 
OCD (e.g., religious-themed obsessions). Furthermore, the majority of studies investigating 
the association between TAF and responsibility have utilised either student samples and/or 
clinical analogue participants (based on high scores of psychopathology). This reliance on 
non-clinical samples means that certain findings may not be generalizable to individuals with 

























3.  OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER SUBTYPES 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder has been identified as a coherent constellation of 
symptoms for over a century (Berrios, 1989), and has been classed as a homogenous disorder 
since the first publication of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1952). The DSM system relies on identifying the 
‘defining features’ of a disorder (i.e., intrusive thoughts), and often neglects the heterogeneity 
of disorder. Like other mental disorders, the presentation of OCD is highly variable. 
Individuals with OCD may experience multiple symptoms reflecting many different themes 
across the course of the illness (Summerfeldt, Richter, Antony, & Swinson, 1999). For 
example, obsessions about physical illness, contamination, religion, abhorrent sexual 
thoughts and symmetry concerns are all common (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). 
Several studies have found a significant relationship between symptom-based subtype 
and response to treatment (McLean, Whittal, Thordarson, Taylor, Sochting, Koch et al., 
2001; Van Oppen et al., 1995; McKay, Abramowitz, Calamari, Kyrios, Radomsky, Sookman, 
Taylor & Wilhelm, 2004). Hoarding symptoms have shown a poor response to serotonergic 
medications, CBT (Mataix-Cols, Rauch, Manzo, Jenike, & Baer, 1999; Black et al., 1998) 




and behaviour therapy (Mataix-Cols, Rauch, Baer, Eisen, Shera, Goodman, et al., 2002). 
Other research has found that sexual and religious obsessions (Mataix-Cols et al., 2002) and 
obsessive thoughts without overt rituals (Alonso, Menchon, Pifarre, Mataix-Cols, Torres, 
Salgado, et al., 2001) tend to respond poorly to behaviour therapy.   
The enormous heterogeneity in OCD, coupled with the differential rates of responding 
to treatment, has led some researchers to suggest that OCD is composed of distinct subtypes 
(McKay et al., 2004; Calamari, Wiegartz, & Janeck, 1999). Recent studies have stressed the 
importance of evaluating the cognitive underpinnings of these symptom-based OCD 
subtypes.  For example, several studies have shown that compulsive checking behaviour was 
reduced by cognitive therapy targeting responsibility beliefs (Ladouceur et al., 1996; 
Williams et al., 2002). This Chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines 
efforts to subtype OCD. The second section discusses the most important beliefs in OCD and 
the work by the OCCWG. The final section introduces the issue of whether certain beliefs are 
more applicable to certain subtypes of OCD.   
3.1 Current Status of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes 
Currently, there is no agreed on framework for defining OCD subtypes (Calamari et 
al., 1999). In the past decade a number of different theoretical and empirical approaches have 
been employed to identify stable subgroups of OCD. These models tend to be conceptually 
very different and emphasise a number of variables. Researchers have used the following 
variables to subtype OCD: demographic and clinical characteristics, like age of onset 
(Cavallini, Albertazzi,  Bianchi & Bellodi, 2002; Millet, Kochman, Gallarda,  Krebs, 
Demonfaucon, Barrot et al., 2004; Rasmussen & Tsang, 1984), gender (Lensi et al., 1996), 
comorbidity (Hantouche, Angst, Demonfaucon, Perugi, Lancrenon, & Akiskal 2003; Nestadt, 
Addington, Samuels, Liang, Bienvenu, Riddle, et al., 2003; Sobin, Blundell, Weiller, 
Gavigan, Haiman & Karayiorgou, 2000b) particularly tic disorder (Holzer et al., 1994; Zohar 




et al., 1997) and the presence or absence of childhood diseases, like streptococci-related 
autoimmune disorders (Swedo et al., 1998). 
The models presented are by no means an exhaustive list of all subtype models. Given 
the time constraints, only the most empirically supported subtype models of OCD will be 
reviewed. This review is divided into three sections broadly defined as (a) subtyping by 
compulsive behaviour (principal compulsion, psychometrics); (b) subtyping through clinical 
descriptors (age-of-onset, gender, comorbidity); and (c) subtyping using multivariate 
statistical analysis (factor analysis, cluster analysis). The latter part of the section discusses 
current issues in subtyping and future directions, including the classification of underlying 
belief structures. 
3.2 Subtyping by Compulsive Behaviour. 
3.2.1 Subtyping by Principal Compulsive Behaviour 
 The traditional method for subtyping OCD has focussed specifically on composite 
severity ratings (e.g., functional interference, distress) and/or indirect measures of overt 
symptoms (e.g., Amir, Foa, & Coles 1997b; Fals-Stewart, 1992; McKay et al., 1995, 2004). 
This approach relies on the most observable compulsive behaviour (i.e., classifying washing, 
checking, cleaning). The first two attempts to classify OCD by their principal compulsive 
behaviour (i.e., most common compulsive behaviour) was conducted by Hoehn-Saric and 
Barksdale (1983) and Rasmussen and Eisen (1991) respectively. The first authors’ concluded 
that OCD should be divided into “impulsive” vs. “non-impulsive”, whereas Rasmussen and 
Eisen suggested a typology based on the presence of tic disorder. While only tentative 
conclusions can be drawn from these studies as they were not subject to empirical standards, 
they did provide a valuable template from which further research could be conducted.  




3.2.2 Identification Of OCD Schemas Using Psychometric Instruments 
 The advent of sound psychometric instruments in the 1970s led to several studies 
reporting distinct symptom subgroups of OCD. Hodgson and Rachman (1977) developed the 
MOCI which assesses the severity and type of obsessive compulsive symptoms. Factor 
analysis of the MOCI revealed three major symptom dimensions: washing, checking, and 
doubting-conscientiousness. Later, these symptom dimensions were found to exist in non-
clinical populations (Sanavio & Vidotto, 1985). This finding was substantiated by 
investigations by Freund, Steketee, and Foa (1987) on the Compulsive Activity Checklist 
(CAC) which showed that washing, cleanliness and checking were separate dimensions. 
 The PI (Sanavio, 1988) measures senseless, repugnant thoughts and unacceptable 
urges.  Factor analysis of the PI using non-patient sample (Sanavio, 1988) revealed four main 
symptom dimensions, three of which corresponded to MOCI and CAC: (a) contamination; 
(b) checking behaviour;  (c) impaired control over mental activities (corresponded to MOCI 
doubting-consciousness subscale): and (d) urges and loss of control over motor behaviour. 
These symptom dimensions were investigated in clinical groups by van Oppen, Hoekstra and 
Emmelkamp (1995b) who demonstrated five stable symptom dimensions: (a) washing; (b) 
checking; (c) rumination; (d) impulses, and (e) precision. Taken together, these results 
suggest three stable dimensions: washing, doubting-checking, and obsessional phenomena 
(McKay et al., 2004). 
 However, the abovementioned models tend to be limited in that often overtly similar 
behaviours have highly dissimilar causes and functions (e.g., childhood OCD vs. strep-
induced childhood OCD). Additionally, many have argued that the reliance on composite 
severity ratings results in the content of these measures being too restrictive and biased 
towards the more recognised symptoms (e.g., washing), with the more atypical symptoms 
(e.g., religious rituals) being ignored (Summerfeldt et al., 1999; McKay et al., 2004; Calamari 
et al., 1999).  




3.3  Subtyping by Clinical Descriptors   
3.3.1 Subtyping by age of onset: Early (EOCD) Vs Late Onset OCD (LOCD) 
Current estimates suggest that between one third and one half of all adult cases of 
OCD have their onset in childhood or adolescence (Kolada et al., 1994; Noshirvani et al., 
1991; Ristvedt, Mackenzie, & Christenson, 1993). Family studies of OCD seem to indicate 
that there is a stronger familial component in childhood-onset cases of OCD compared to 
adult-onset cases (Riddle et al., 1990; Pauls et al., 1995). However, surprisingly little research 
has been conducted into the differences between child-and adult-onset OCD. Primarily, this is 
a result of methodological differences and confusion regarding what constitutes “early-onset” 
versus “late-onset”. For example, Pauls et al. (1995) considered all cases with an onset prior 
to age 18 as early-onset, whereas Bellodi et al’s (1992) cut-off for early onset was 
development of symptoms prior to age 14 (Eichstedt & Arnold, 2001).  
However, of the studies conducted, when compared to a LOCD cohort, adult 
individuals with EOCD are characterised by (a) male gender predominance (Geller et al., 
2001b; Fontenelle et al., 2003; Bogetto et al., 1999); (b) a more aggressive clinical course, 
i.e., a shorter time between onset and clinical symptoms (Sobin et al., 2000a); (c) a greater 
number of obsessions and compulsions (Sobin et al., 2000a; Fontenelle et al., 2003); (d) a 
higher frequency of tic-like compulsions (Rosario-Campos et al., 2001; Bogetto et al., 1999) 
and (e) more ritual repetition (Fontenelle et al., 2003).  
 The differences in sex distribution, patterns of comorbidity, and familial loading in 
EOCD vs. LOCD have led some researchers to suggest that EOCD represents an etiologically 
distinct subtype of OCD (Eichstedt & Arnold, 2001; Fontenelle et al., 2003; Noshirvani et al., 
1991). One hypothesis receiving growing empirical support is that EOCD cases represent 
genetic variants of Tourette’s syndrome (TS) and other Tic Disorders (e.g., Leckman, 
Peterson, Pauls, & Cohen, 1997; Miguel et al., 1997). While these subtype models exhibit 




promise, the empirical evidence, to date, has been lacking or inconsistent (Summerfeldt et al., 
1999). 
3.3.2 Subtyping according to gender  
 The majority of studies investigating childhood OCD have found that there is a male 
predominance, often by as much as 1.5 to 2.5 times (Hanna, 1995; Last & Strauss, 1989; 
Swedo et al., 1989; Thomsen & Mikkelsen, 1991). This contrasts with studies in adults, 
which have generally found an equal distribution of men and women (Kolanda et al., 1994; 
Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). Eichstedt and Arnold (2001) have suggested that the 
overrepresentation of males among children and adolescents with OCD seems to reflect a 
tendency for males to have an earlier onset of the disorder than females (e.g., Rasmussen & 
Tsuang, 1986).  
3.3.3 Subtyping by means of comorbidity 
 Another investigative strategy which addresses some of the shortcomings of the above 
models is grouping by the structural characteristics of OCD symptoms like comorbidity. 
3.3.3.1 Tourette’s Syndrome (TS) and Tic Disorders. 
TS is a chronic, neurobiological disorder characterised by multiple, recurrent motor 
and vocal tics (APA, 1994). Tic disorders are more prevalent in males (Leckman et al., 1997; 
Jaisoorya, Reddy & Srinath, 2003), and thus a relationship between some forms of early 
onset OCD and tic disorders could account for the preponderance of males among child-cases 
of the disorder. There is a high degree of comorbidity between OCD and tics, specifically TS, 
among child-onset cases. Comorbidity rates range from 20 to 38 percent, and there is a 
lifetime history of Tic disorders in as many as 26 to 59 percent of child-onset cases (Eichstedt 
& Arnold, 2001).  
 Several studies have found elevated rates of both OCD and tic disorders among the 
first degree relatives of child-onset probands (Pauls et al., 1995; Bellodi, et al., 1992). 




Additionally, the high rate of tics and TS in the families of individuals with child-onset OCD, 
with or without comorbid tics, has lead some researchers (e.g., Leonard et al., 1992) to 
suggest that tic disorders and child-onset OCD are related and may even be alternative 
manifestations of the same underlying illness (Eichstedt & Arnold, 2001). 
Secondly, the exact nature of the relationship between tic disorders and child-onset 
OCD is unclear. The available evidence suggests that a high proportion of child-onset OCD is 
tic related (e.g., Leonard et al., 1992), in some cases, child-onset OCD may not be related to 
tic disorders. It is currently unknown whether “tic-related” OCD has a more neurological or 
familial basis when compared to early–onset OCD without tic disorder. Subsequently, it is 
also unknown whether cases of “tic-related” OCD may occur among individuals with adult-
onset OCD (Eichstedt & Arnold, 2001). 
Rates of tic disorders among children with OCD are estimated to exceed lifetime 
prevalence rates for tic disorders found in the general population, which are estimated to be 
between 0.01 percent and 0.40 percent for TS and 1 percent and 13 percent for tics (Apter, 
Pauls, Bleich, Zohar et al. 1993; Leckman et al., 1997; Leonard et al., 1992). Numerous other 
studies (e.g., Hanna, 1995; Riddle et al., 1990; Swedo et al., 1989; Zohar et al., 1992) have 
reported a high degree of comorbidity between OCD and Tic disorders and have also reported 
high rates of comorbid tics (TS, as well as transient or chronic tics) in children with OCD. 
Few studies have investigated the prevalence of tic disorders in adult onset cases; however, 
studies of adults with OCD, which include both child and adult onset cases, have generally 
found lower rates of tic disorders than in children with the disorder (Rasmussen & Eisen, 
1992; Swedo et al., 1992). 
3.3.3.2  Separate Case For Hoarding? 
Hoarding symptoms have emerged as a distinct symptom dimension or subgroup in 
most studies (Calamari, Wiegartz, Riemann, Cohen, Greer, Jacobi, et al., 2004; Frost & Hartl, 




1996; Frost & Steketee, 1999; Kyrios, Steketee, Frost & Oh, 2002). Hoarding behaviours 
occur in many clinical disorders, but are most commonly associated with OCD (Coles, Frost, 
Heimberg & Steketee, 2003). Clinical compulsive hoarding has been defined as (a) the 
acquisition of, and failure to discard a large number of possessions that appear to be useless 
or of limited value; (b) living spaces sufficiently cluttered so as to preclude activities for 
which those spaces were designed; and (c) significant distress or impairment in functioning 
caused by the hoarding (Frost & Hartl, 1996). It is estimated that 30% of individuals with 
OCD have hoarding behaviours (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; Samuels, Bienvenu, Riddle, 
Cullen, Grados, Liang, Hoehn-Saric & Nestadt, 2002). 
Individuals with OCD (Non-hoarders) and compulsive hoarding (Hoarders) differ in 
several characteristics: (a) Hoarding is twice as prevalent in men as women (Samuels et al., 
2002); (b) Hoarders have significantly higher levels of social disability than non-hoarders 
(Frost, Steketee, Williams, & Warren, 2000); (c) Hoarders tend to have more symmetry, 
ordering and counting obsessions compared to their non-hoarding counterparts (Samuels et 
al., 2002); (d) Hoarders tend to be younger at onset of OCD (Samuels et al., 2002); and (e) 
Hoarders are less likely than non-hoarders to get married (Frost & Gross, 1993; Samuels et 
al., 2002). 
One of the primary features of compulsive hoarding is an excessive emotional 
attachment to possessions. Frost and Hartl (1996) reported a case where an individual with 
OCD became distraught about the prospect of discarding an old bank envelope on which was 
written how the money in the envelope was spent. There was nothing of special importance 
about the list (groceries, chemist, etc) and nothing significant as a reminder of an important 
time. The note had gained an emotional significance far beyond its face value. The 
acquisition of ‘emotional significance’ has been reported to stem from a number of erroneous 
beliefs (Frost, Hartl, Christian & Williams, 1995; Frost & Hartl, 1996; Greenberg, 1987). 




Several beliefs about the role and meaning of possessions seem to distinguish 
hoarders from nonhoarders. Frost and Hartl (1996) suggested that three types of beliefs are 
central to compulsive hoarders; namely beliefs about the necessity of maintaining control 
over possessions, beliefs about responsibility for possessions, and beliefs about the necessity 
of perfectionism. In one study, Frost et al. (1995) found that hoarding among college and 
community samples was associated with an excessive desire for control over possessions. 
Specifically hoarders were less willing to share their possessions or have others touch or 
move them.  
Greenberg (1987) has suggested that the possession is equated to safety, in that if 
others are allowed to touch or move the possessions, they may no longer signal safety, but 
uncertainty, since the status of the possession may be changed. Frost and Hartl (1996) 
suggested that hoarders seem to have a very elaborate sense of responsibility associated with 
possessions. These researchers suggest that there are two ways in which hoarding is 
associated with inflated responsibility. The first is a sense of responsibility for being prepared 
to meet a future need, the second sense of responsibility relates to ‘harm’ coming to the 
possession itself.  
The cognitive behavioural model of compulsive hoarding (acquisition, saving, clutter) 
states that hoarding results from four basic deficits in (a) information processing, (b) 
difficulties in forming emotional attachments; (c) problems in emotional distress and 
avoidance behaviours; and (d) beliefs about the importance of their possessions (Frost & 
Hartl, 1996; Frost & Steketee, 1997; Hartl & Frost, 1999; Steketee, Frost, Wincze, Greene & 
Douglass 2000). Certain beliefs about possessions are hypothesized to lead some individuals 
to acquire, or save indiscriminately, to avoid emotional distress and/or prevent negative 
outcomes (Frost & Hartl, 1996; Frost & Steketee, 1998). As mentioned, these beliefs include: 
uncertainty (Frost & Shows, 1993); control and responsibility (Steketee, Frost & Kyrios, 
2001). 




Several studies have shown that hoarding behaviours strongly correlate with all types 
of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, except contamination (Frost, Kim, Morris, Bloss, 
Murray-Close, & Steketee, 1998). This finding has led some researchers to suggest that 
hoarding and contamination represent different factors (Baer, 1994; Coles et al., 2003) within 
OCD. Thus, there is a need for studies investigating these beliefs in individuals with OCD 
with and without hoarding behaviours. 
Research suggests that possessions seem to have human-like status for hoarders and 
therefore must be protected from harm (Frost et al., 1995). Whereas Frost et al. (1995) have 
conceptualised the need to protect possessions in case they are needed in the future as 
representing an inflated sense of responsibility, others have suggested that this aspect of 
compulsive hoarding reflects an ‘intolerance of uncertainty rather than inflated responsibility 
beliefs’ (Frost & Shows, 1993). Research investigating the beliefs underlying compulsive 
hoarding have found that hoarding is in large part a problem of indecision about future need 
and about the cost of discarding a possession which may be needed later (Frost & Shows, 
1993).  
Consequently, where some researchers have suggested that inflated responsibility 
beliefs underlie the need to ‘protect’ possessions, it is also likely that the ‘intolerance of 
uncertainty’ could precipitate the responsibility beliefs relating to protecting one’s 
possessions. This suggestion has been supported by high scores shown by compulsive 
hoarders on measures of indecisiveness, such as the Indecisiveness Scale (Frost & Shows, 
1993). This finding provides support for the hypothesis that specific cognitive beliefs may be 
more aligned with certain subtypes of OCD. 
Finally, some features of compulsive hoarding appear to reflect underlying beliefs 
about what is possible and what one should be expected to do. Frost and Hartl (1996) 
reported a case study in which an individual with OCD saved all her old newspapers because 
she had two specific concerns about throwing them away. Her first concern was that she had 




not read them all. The second, was that she was fearful she could not remember all she had 
read in sufficient detail to suit her. Frost and Hartl (1996) suggested that for this individual, 
keeping old newspapers reflected perfectionist beliefs because she felt that if she did not do 
this task (reading the paper) thoroughly, she had somehow failed. Keeping the papers was 
one way of simply postponing the recognition of that failure. Therefore, not allowing 
opportunities to go unscrutinized was suggested to reflect perfectionism beliefs. In summary, 
research supports the significance of (a) the importance of controlling one’s thoughts; (b) 
perfectionism; (c) responsibility; and (d) intolerance of uncertainty beliefs in compulsive 
hoarding. 
3.4 Subtyping using Multivariate Statistical Methods 
 The most common measure used to assess the underling structure of OCD symptoms 
is the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale – semi-structured interview (YBOCS-SC; 
Goodman et al., 1989). The YBOCS-SC is a semi-structured interview which includes a 
checklist of over 60 specific OCD symptoms, organised into eight obsession categories 
(aggressive, contamination, sexual, hoarding, symmetry, religious, somatic, and 
miscellaneous) and seven compulsive categories (washing, checking, counting, 
ordering/arranging, hoarding, repeating, and miscellaneous). Most often, factor and cluster 
analyses have been employed to ascertain the underlying dimensions of the YBOCS-SC. The 
following sections review all studies of OCD symptom subtypes with the YBOCS-SC using 
factor and cluster analytic techniques. 
3.4.1 Factor Analysis to Delineate Subtype Schemas 
To date, seven studies have used factor-analytic methods to examine the latent 
structure of OCD symptoms (Baer, 1994; Leckman, Grice, Boardman, Zhang, Vitale, Bondi, 
et al., 1997; Hantouche & Lancrenon, 1996; Mataix-Cols et al. 1999; Mataix-Cols et al., 
2002; Summerfeldt et al., 1999; Summerfeldt, Kloosterman, Antony, Richter & Swinson, 




2004). Two of the studies (Hontouche & Lancrenon, 1996; Baer, 1994) found almost 
identical results using the YBOCS. Individuals’ symptoms on each of the scale’s 15 symptom 
categories were coded as follows: 0 = individual did not endorse any specific statements 
under that heading; 1 = individual endorsed one symptom but the category was not 
considered a primary or principal symptom; 2 = at least one of the symptoms in the category 
was considered a primary obsession or compulsion. A score of 0, 1, or 2 was assigned to each 
of the seven obsession categories and each of the eight compulsion categories of the YBOCS-
SC. Results revealed three factors: symmetry and hoarding (common theme being a sense of 
imperfection and incompleteness); contamination and cleaning; and pure obsessions 
(included religious, sexual and aggressive obsessions with no compulsion category assigned 
as no compulsion category loaded onto these obsessions). 
Leckman et al. (1997) examined the correlational relationship of OCD symptoms by 
grouping the 13 categories of the YBOCS in two independent samples of clients with OCD. 
In contrast to Baer (1994), Leckman used a different strategy to quantify responses on the 
YBOCS-SC. Specifically, the symptoms endorsed within each category were summed to 
produce a category score. Both current and lifetime symptoms were quantified. Factor 
analysis revealed four factors which are outlined in Fig.2. These symptom dimensions 
accounted for more than 60 percent of the variance. These results were dissimilar to Baer’s 
(1994) who reported that all these factors were related, respectively, to contamination and 
symmetry related symptom clusters.  
Support for Leckman et al. (1997) findings was obtained in two studies by 
Summerfeldt et al., (1999) and Mataix-Cols et al. (1999). Whereas, Summerfeldt et al. (1999) 
found near identical results, Mataix-Cols et al. (1999) identified a fifth factor, namely sexual 
and religious obsessions, which was separate from aggressive obsessions and checking 
compulsions. In a later study, Mataix-Cols et al. (2002) found a factor structure similar to 
Leckman’s model: Religious obsessions loaded with aggressive obsessions and checking 




rituals. Taken together, these results of the above mentioned studies suggest a three and five 
factorial model, including: (a) symmetry and ordering; (b) contamination and cleaning; (c) 
obsessions and checking (potentially further divisible into harm-related obsessions and 











Figure 2: Pearson Correlations between Lifetime Scores on the Yale Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale Symptom Checklist Categories in Two Data Sets. 
Bold lines indicate correlations greater than or equal to 0.60 in both data sets. Solid lines indicate 
correlations between .4 and .6. Dashed lines indicate a correlation greater than or equal to 0.40 in one 
data set.  
It has been argued that many contemporary subtype models neglect the less common 
"miscellaneous" symptoms seen in OCD (Summerfeldt et al., 2004). Miscellaneous 
obsessions refer to compulsive touching and tapping, fear of saying certain things, blinking 
and staring and the need to know or remember details (Summerfeldt et al., 2004; Holzer et 
al., 1994; Leckman et al., 1997; Miguel et al., 1997; Cath et al., 2001a). Summerfeldt et al. 
(2004) investigated whether certain miscellaneous symptoms of OCD were associated with 
the more recognised symptoms of OCD (e.g., Leckman et al., 1997 model).  











In two independent groups of individuals with OCD (n = 381; n = 107), logistic 
regression analysis was used to determine the association of each of the 18 miscellaneous 
symptoms with the four symptom factors. Then a single confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted to test the model of associations in the smaller sample. Figure 3 displays the 
relationship between the three symptom factors (obsessions and checking, symmetry and 
ordering and hoarding) and miscellaneous OCD symptoms9. A robust association between 












Figure 3: Logistic regressions predicting miscellaneous Y-BOCS symptoms from symptom 
factors (n = 381) 
(Summerfeldt et al., 2004)  
3.4.2 Subgroups Derived Using Cluster Analysis 
 While factor analytic studies have provided interesting information on the structure of 
OCD symptoms, this technique has not been able to produce definite groupings of OCD 
                                                 
 
9 ascertained by the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale symptom checklist. 
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individuals (Calamari et al., 1999). For example, in Summerfeldt et al. (1999), it was also 
found that the discrete symptoms listed on the YBOCS-SC did not load well on the specific 
YBOCS dimensions they were supposed to measure (McKay et al., 2004). Subsequently, 
other methods of analysis have been proposed, one of these being cluster analysis. Cluster 
analysis is a technique for forming relatively homogenous subject groups within complex 
data sets (e.g., Borgen & Barnett, 1978), where cases are assigned to groups created by 
maximizing between-group differences and minimizing within-group variability on a set of 
measures (McKay et al., 2004). Lastly, it is also important to note that exploratory factor 
analysis cannot demonstrate the “correct” number of factors to describe a particular item 
domain. 
 Cluster analysis has been used in investigations of the relationship between OCD and 
comorbid conditions (Hasler, LaSalle-Ricci, Ronquillo, Crawley, Cochran, Kazuba, 
Greenberg & Murphy, 2005); schizophrenia (Lysaker , Lancaster, Nees & Davis, 2004); 
personality (Fals-Stewart & Lucente, 1993); OC spectrum disorders (Lochner et al., 2005) 
and symptom patterns in children (Ivarsson & Valderhaug, 2005). To date, five studies have 
used this type of analysis to identify OCD subgroups using the YBOCS-SC (Calamari, et al., 
1999; Abramowitz, Franklin, Schwartz & Furr, 2003a; Calamari et al., 2004; Taylor, 
Abramowitz, McKay, Calamari, Sookman, Kyrios, Wilhelm & Carmin, 2006; Calamari, 
Cohen, Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, Riemann & Norberg, 2005). 
One of the first studies to use cluster analysis to identify OCD subgroups using the 
YBOCS-SC was Calamari et al. (1999). In this study, the YBOCS symptom checklist was 
quantified, and the obsession and compulsion symptoms reported by am OCD sample (n = 
106) were used to form subgroups. The results were comparable with past studies (e.g., Baer, 
1994; Leckman et al., 1997) and showed a five cluster solution. The five subgroups were 
characterized by dominant symptom patterns but also reported significant secondary concerns 




and included: (a) harming (prominent harming obsessions and checking compulsions)10; (b) 
hoarding (prominent hoarding obsessions and compulsions and contamination concerns; (c) 
contamination (pronounced contamination obsessions and washing compulsions);  (d) 
certainty (obsession and compulsion characterised by a need to be absolutely certain 
regarding a broad range of situations); and (e) obsessionals (included miscellaneous 
obsessions including mental rituals,  lucky/unlucky numbers, superstitious fears, and need to 
know or remember). 
A later study using cluster analysis by Calamari et al. (2004) confirmed these 
findings. In this study, participants were administered a battery of psychometric tests, 
including the YBOCS.  The YBOCS symptom checklist scores11 were then subjected to 
hierarchical cluster analysis. The results showed a stable contamination subgroup in both a 
five and seven subgroup model, but sample stability for harming, obsessionals, symmetry, 
and certainty subgroups was not as strong (Calamari et al., 2004). Once the samples were 
combined (n = 220; Calamari et al., 1999 and the present sample) a reliable hoarding 
subgroup was found. The results of this study support a stable seven subgroup taxonomy: 
contamination, harming, symmetry, obsessionals, certainty, contamination and harming, and 
hoarding.  
Abramowitz et al. (2003a) derived OCD subtypes using a revised form of the 
YBOCS-SC which contained a separate category for assessing mental rituals12. The scores of 
132 individuals with OCD were subject to cluster analysis. The results showed the following 
five dimensions: (a) harming, (b) contamination, (c) hoarding (d) symmetry and (e) 
unacceptable thoughts. The last subgroup, the unacceptable thoughts domain, referred to 
                                                 
 
10Predominance of symmetry-exactness obsessions in the Harming category, with high scores compared to all 
other obsession category scores except aggression obsessions (Calamari et al., 1999). 
11 Responses on each of the symptom categories of the YBOCS were scored 0 (the patient did not report any 
symptoms), 1 (the patient reported at least one symptom but the category was not considered primary), or 2 
(symptoms were reported and the category was considered a principal problem). 




mental rituals, aggressive, religious and sexual obsessions (Abramowitz et al., 2003). This 
subgroup was proposed to be akin to Baer’s (1994) and Leckman et al’s (1997) ‘pure 
obsessionals’ and ‘obsessions and checking dimensions, respectively (McKay et al., 2004).  
Taylor et al (2006) suggested that dysfunctional beliefs play a role in only a subgroup 
of cases of OCD (e.g., different models might apply to different subtypes). Individuals with 
OCD (n= 244) completed measures of dysfunctional OC-related beliefs. There were three 
comparison groups; anxious (n = 103), student (n= 284), and community (n = 86) controls. 
Cluster analysis revealed two OCD clusters: low versus high scores on beliefs (OC-low, OC-
high). Belief scores for OC-low were in the range of scores for the comparison groups, which 
were all significantly lower than those of OC-high. Thus, a cluster of OCD individuals was 
identified who did not have elevated scores on measures of dysfunctional beliefs. OC-low 
and OC-high did not differ on some OC measures (contamination, checking, grooming), but 
OC-high had higher scores on measures of harming obsessions. These results are consistent 
with the view that dysfunctional beliefs may play a role in only some types of OCD.  
In a recent study, Calamari et al. (2005) used clustering methodologies to form OCD 
subgroups and test Taylor et al.'s (2006) findings. Individuals with OCD (n = 367) were 
administered the Obsessional-Beliefs Questionnaire. Individuals’ scores on the OBQ 
subscales were subjected to cluster analysis, but several methodological enhancements were 
employed. Multiple methods were used to determine if belief-based subgroups were present, 
and the number of such subgroups. Different clustering methods were employed to determine 
if Taylor et al.'s findings (i.e., a High Beliefs and Low Beliefs group) might have resulted 
from the specific clustering methodologies used. The results were very similar to the 
subgroups identified by Taylor et al. (2006), in that a high-belief group (HB) and low-beliefs 
(LB) group were found. The LB scores were comparable to anxious control group without 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 Mental rituals: mental neutralising, praying, counting, list-making, reviewing events or conversations in one’s 




OCD and a control group. The results of Taylor et al (2006) and Calamari et al (2005) studies 
suggests that dysfunctional beliefs do not play a role in the etiology or maintenance of all 
cases of OCD. 
Other methods to subtype OCD using cluster analysis have focussed on demographic 
(age, gender), and clinical variables (age of onset, obsessive–compulsive symptom severity 
and dimensions, level of insight, temperament/character, treatment response). Lochner et al. 
(2005) investigated the degree of comorbid obsessive–compulsive spectrum disorders 
(OCSDs) in individuals with OCD using cluster analysis. Three separate clusters were 
identified: (a) reward deficiency: associated with earlier age of onset and the presence of tics. 
Examples include pathological gambling, hypersexual disorder, and Tourette’s disorder; (b) 
impulsivity: associated with female gender and childhood emotional abuse. Examples include 
compulsive shopping, kleptomania, eating disorders, self-injury; and (c) somatic: associated 
with less insight, and somatic obsessions and compulsions. Examples: body dysmorphic 
disorder and hypochondriasis. These researchers concluded that it is likely that OCD 
symptoms and OCSD lie on a continuum.  
While studies using demographic and clinical characteristics are promising, the most 
recent support is for symptom-based models using cluster analysis. Table.1. displays the 
results of these studies. As seen, in the literature reviewed four factors or subgroups appear 
highly replicable: (a) contamination and washing dimension; (b) harming and checking 
dimension; (c) hoarding dimension and (d) symmetry and ordering subgroup. The consistent 
findings using different statistical procedures (e.g., cluster vs. factor analysis) suggest that 
this method of subtyping holds some merit.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
mind (McKay et al., 2004). 






Table 1:  OCD subgroups identified using clustering methodologies  
Model   Dimensions    Study13______________  
3-Factor  Symmetry-hoarding   Baer (1994) 
   Contamination-cleaning  Hantouche&  
   Pure obsessionals   Lancrenon (1996) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4-Factor  Aggressive-checking   Leckman (1997) 
   Symmetry-ordering   Summerfeldt et al. (1999) 
   Cleanliness-washing    
   Hoarding 
________________________ _     _______________ 
5-Factor  Contamination-washing  Calamari et al. (2004)a 
   Harming-checking    Abramowitz et al. (2003) 
   Hoarding      
   Symmetry-ordering       
   Pure obsessions    
a Identified 7 clusters in total, but 5 of these were consistent with Abramowitz et al. (2003) 
 
3.5 The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) 
The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) was formed 
following a symposium on OCD at the World Congress of Behavioural and Cognitive 
Therapies in Denmark in July 1995. The OCCWG consists of a large group (n = 46) of 
international researchers dedicated to the study of the cognitive aspects of OCD. The purpose 
of the OCCWG was twofold: (a) to identify the most important belief domains in OCD and 
(b) to develop measures of beliefs that distinguish OCD from other psychological disorders. 
In June 1996, the group issued a template of beliefs and operational definitions. These beliefs 
include14: Over-importance of Thoughts; Importance of Controlling One’s Thoughts; 
Perfectionism; Inflated Responsibility; Overestimation of Threat and Intolerance for 
Uncertainty. The first five beliefs were reported to be OCD-specific, whereas the final belief, 
                                                 
 
13 All studies used the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale to identify the subgroup categories.  
14 These beliefs selected were chosen from pool of 19 different domains of beliefs (refer OCCWG, 1997, p 669). 




perfectionism was thought to be relevant but not exclusive to OCD (OCCWG, 1997; Clark, 
2004). Based on these beliefs, the OCCWG (1997, 2001; 2003, 2005) generated two 
assessment measures: Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) and Interpretations of 
Intrusions Inventory (III-31). 
The remaining sections are structured as follows: (a) a review of research relating to 
each of the major belief domains. Two of the beliefs, Inflated Responsibility15 and the 
Thought-Action Fusion (variant of the over-importance of thoughts domain), were omitted 
from the review as they were discussed in Chapter 2; (b) the development of the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) and Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III-31); and (c) 
the specificity of these beliefs to obsessive compulsive symptoms. This chapter concludes 
with a summary of the most important aspects of the literature reviewed and future directions.  
3.5.1 Over-Importance of Thoughts 
“Beliefs indicating an exaggerated estimation of the probability or severity of harm” 
(OCCWG, 1997, p 678) 
This domain refers to the assumption that negative automatic thoughts are extremely 
important. The OCCWG (1997) stated that this domain reflects three central themes: (a) these 
negative thoughts are revealing and convey important information about me; (b) having 
negative thoughts increases the risk that they will come true (actuality); and (c) the mere 
occurrence of these thoughts means they are important. Embedded in this domain are beliefs 
that reflect Thought-Action Fusion. (OCCWG, 1997, p.678). These beliefs are reflected in 
statements like “thinking about something bad makes it more likely to happen” or “having a 
                                                 
 
15 “Belief that one is especially powerful in producing and preventing personally important negative outcomes. 
These outcomes are perceived as essential to prevent. They may be actual, that is, having consequences in the 
real world, and/or at a moral level. Such beliefs may pertain to responsibility for doing something to prevent or 
undo harm, and responsibility for errors of omission and commission.” 
 




bad thought means I really want to do it” and/or “I am more likely than other people to 
accidentally cause harm to myself or others” (OBQ-87 items).  
Dysfunctional appraisals of intrusive thoughts and beliefs about the importance of 
thoughts are central in contemporary cognitive models of OCD (e.g., Rachman, 1997, 1998; 
Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) and are empirically linked to OCD symptoms (Purdon & Clark, 
1994). Research has found that decreases in the strength about the importance of thoughts 
were associated with reductions in the frequency of obsessions (Freeston, Rheaume & 
Ladouceur, 1996). Purdon and Clark (1994) have suggested that beliefs about the importance 
and subjective meaning of the obsessional thoughts are the major predictors of both the 
development and persistence of obsessional thinking. This proposition has support from the 
OCCWG (2001) who demonstrated the importance of the thoughts domain to individuals 
diagnosed with OCD relative to anxious controls, community adults and students.  
Beliefs about the importance of one’s thoughts are hypothesised to act as a precursor 
to beliefs about responsibility and the need to control one’s thoughts (Thordarson & Shafran, 
2002). The OCCWG (2001) demonstrated that beliefs about the importance of one’s 
thoughts, control of thoughts and responsibility to be highly correlated in individuals with 
OCD and non-clinical controls. The relatedness of these constructs (e.g., importance of one’s 
thoughts, responsibility and the control of thoughts) can be seen in the following example. If 
an unwanted thought is appraised as more likely to happen (TAF), then an exaggerated sense 
of responsibility may be activated, which may lead to attempts to suppress thoughts, which 
appears to increase the frequency of the obsessive thoughts (Thordarson & Shafran, 2002). 
Research evidencing strong correlations between TAF and obsessive symptoms has 
strengthened the association between this domain and OCD (Clark et al., 2000; Rassin & 
Koster, 2003; Sica et al., 2002; Gwilliam et al., 2004; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001; 
Yorulmaz et al., 2004). As reviewed in Chapter 2, the majority of research examining TAF 
relies on the TAFS (Shafran et al., 1996), however, recently there has been interest in 




experimental paradigms (see Rachman et al., 1996). This type of research design has the 
potential to elucidate the cause-effect relationship between cognition and obsessive 
compulsive symptom. 
3.5.2 Importance of Controlling one’s Thoughts  
“Overvaluation of the importance of exerting complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and 
impulses, and the belief that this is both possible and desirable” (OCCWG, 1997, p.678)  
The importance of mental control is one of the key cognitive variables in OCD. 
Several dimensions of belief within this domain have been identified and include: (a) 
excessive monitoring and hypervigilance of specific mental events (Clark & Purdon, 1993); 
(b) beliefs about the psychological and behavioural consequences of failing to control 
thoughts (OCCWG, 1997) ; (c) belief that one is morally responsible for the consequences of 
not controlling the thought (Clark & Purdon, 1993); and (d) the belief that the control of 
thoughts is achievable, essential and effective (Clark, 2004). These beliefs are reflected in 
statements like “Having control over my thoughts is a sign of good character” or “If I don't 
control my unwanted thoughts, something bad is bound to happen” or  “If I exercise enough 
will-power, I should be able to gain complete control, over my mind”(OBQ-87 items). 
Clark and Purdon (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Purdon & Clark, 1999) propose a theory 
based on the assumption that faulty beliefs about the importance of thought control and 
negative misinterpretations of the anticipated consequences of failed control of intrusive 
thoughts is an important cognitive variable in the development of OCD (Clark, Purdon & 
Wang, 2003). In one of their first studies, Clark and Purdon (1994) reported on the appraisal 
and thought control responses of students (n = 270) to their most upsetting intrusive thoughts. 
The results showed that the two most important predictors of the frequency, persistence 
subjective distress of the intrusion were; (a) the belief that one could act on the intrusive 
thought; and (b) perceived uncontrollability of the thought. The results also suggested that 
individuals with high levels of obsessionality reported more intrusive thoughts and rated their 




thoughts as significantly more frequent and believable than those who observed low scores 
on measures of obsessionality. In sum, those participants with obsessive tendencies believed 
they have less control over their thoughts. 
In an attempt to assess beliefs about the importance of control and negative 
consequence of intrusive thoughts, Clark and Purdon (1995) developed a 67-item self-report 
psychometric scale called the Meta-Cognitive Questionnaire (MCBQ). In the validation 
study, Clark, Purdon and Wang (2003) administered the MCBQ alongside a battery of other 
tests measuring symptoms of mood, anxiety and obsessionality to a large group of university 
students (n = 560). The results demonstrated a significant relationship between obsessions 
and beliefs about the controllability of one’s thoughts and perceived negative consequences. 
The MCBQ also revealed three dimensions within this cognitive domain: (a) the possibility 
and importance of mental control; (b) perceived negative consequences resulting from a 
failure to control these thoughts; and (c) positive characteristics of unwanted intrusive 
thoughts.  Clark, Purdon and Wang (2003) investigated the relationship between maladaptive 
meta-cognitive control beliefs and obsessional symptoms in a large sample of students (n = 
560). Participants were administered the MCBQ and a battery of questionnaires that assessed 
symptoms and cognitions of worry, OCD, anxiety, and depression. The results showed beliefs 
about the control of thoughts and perceived negative consequences due to uncontrolled 
intrusive thoughts had a significant association with obsessions, and to a lesser extent, worry. 
Recently, the OCCWG (2001) have suggested that the control of thoughts domain 
correlates specifically with symptoms of obsessionality, and not just distress or anxiety 
(Purdon & Clark, 2002). Support for this premise is found in research by Clark et al. (2000), 
which examined the differences in the appraisal and thought control strategies associated with 
the perceived control of unwanted sexual and non-sexual intrusive thoughts in a sample of 
university students (n = 171). Participants were administered the Revised Obsessive 
Intrusions Inventory-Sex Version. The results found that unwanted intrusive thoughts of 




aggression, harm, dirt, contamination and disease were perceived as more difficult to control 
if individuals believed that they (a) could act on the thought (TAF-likelihood); (b) if they 
were concerned or worried that they could carry out the thought in real life (TAF-worry); and 
(c) if they tried very hard to suppress the thought (resistance). These researchers concluded 
that different appraisal processes may be associated with the control of non-sexual and sexual 
intrusive thoughts. 
Tolin, Abramowitz, Hamlin and Synodi (2002) have demonstrated that participants 
with OCD report more personal weakness about controlling their thoughts compared to 
anxious and non-clinical groups. In following, Freeston and Ladouceur (1997) and Ladouceur 
and colleagues (2000) found that attempts to control unwanted intrusive thoughts was higher 
in clinical samples than non-clinical samples. These studies also found that clinical 
participants reported less success than control subjects. Calamari and Janeck (1998) 
confirmed these findings, showing individuals with OCD (n = 31) to report less control over 
their thoughts, and an increase in emotional intensity when these thoughts occurred, 
compared to non-clinical (n = 35) controls. 
Recently, Clark (2004) posited a cognitive control theory. This model states that 
negative appraisals of intrusions result in significant distress which prompts efforts to control 
the thoughts, which paradoxically serve to increase the frequency of the thoughts and 
maintain the obsessional cycle. Specifically, beliefs about the control of thoughts refers to (a) 
conviction that particular intrusions must be controlled and kept out of conscious awareness; 
(b) strategies that are used to control unwanted intrusions (e.g., thought suppression) or 
mitigate the threat associated with them (e.g., mental checking, praying); and (c) perception 
about failure to control such intrusions (e.g., self-appraisals of oneself as a failure because of 
an inability to suppress unwanted thoughts). 
There is significantly more research on the role of specific thought control strategies 
in the development of obsessive concerns than there is on the role of beliefs about the need to 




control thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2002). Thought suppression is one of the most common 
control strategies used to exclude unwanted thoughts (Amir et al., 1998). There is an 
impressive amount of research on thought suppression (see Purdon, 1999 for review). 
However, research tends to be limited in that (a) the causal pathways by which suppression 
strategies specifically relate to OCD have not been examined; (b) there is little information 
about the relationship between specific thought control strategies and beliefs about thought 
control; and (c) the generalizability of these findings are questionable as they were conducted 
in non-clinical samples. 
The Thought Control Ability Questionnaire (TCAQ) is a self-report measure of 
individual differences in the perceived ability to control unwanted intrusive thoughts 
(Luciano, Algarabel, Tomas & Martinez, 2005). In the psychometric validation study, 
Luciano et al. (2005) administered the TCAQ as well as measures of anxiety, depression and 
obsessionality (MOCI) to a large sample of Spanish students. The results showed a 
significant correlation between the TCAQ and the checking subscale of the MOCI (r = .48), 
which remained significant when controlling for depression and anxiety.  
As mentioned earlier, beliefs about the importance of controlling one’s thoughts are 
hypothesised to overlap with beliefs about responsibility and the importance of one’s 
thoughts (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Thordarson & Shafran, 2002). Research conducted by the 
OCCWG in 2001 demonstrated that the control of thoughts subscale was correlated with the 
importance of thoughts subscale, but not perfectionism subscale. These findings remained 
constant when re-tested by the OCCWG in 2003. 
3.5.3 Perfectionism  
“Belief that (1) there is a perfect solution to every problem; (2) that doing something perfectly 
(mistake free) is possible and necessary; and (3) that even minor mistakes have serious 
consequences” (OCCWG, 1997, p 678) 




Perfectionism or “the tyranny of the shrouds” as described by Horney (1950) has long 
been associated with psychopathology. Perfectionism has played a major role in theories of 
OCD (McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; OCCWG, 1997) with excessive perfectionism linked to 
avoidance behaviour and failure expectancies (Jones & Menzies, 1997). Perfectionism has 
been characterised as an overly self-critical tendency to judge the self against excessively 
high standards (Riskland, Williams & Kyrios, 2002). Sample items of perfectionism include: 
“there is only one right way to do things” and/or “things should be perfect according to my 
own standards” and/or “if I fail at something, I am a failure as a person” (OBQ-87 items).
 Viewed historically as a one-dimensional construct (see Pacht, 1984), perfectionism 
has undergone substantial revision and is now considered a multidimensional construct (e.g., 
Frost, Marten, Lahart & Rosenblate, 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Antony, Purdon & Swinson, 
1999; Stober, 1998; Frost, Heimberg, Holt, Mattia & Neubauer, 1993). Slade and Owens 
(1998) have suggested a model based on the distinction between positive and negative 
perfectionism (see Terry-Short, Owen, Slade & Dewey, 1995). The model classes behaviours 
either positive or negative depending on the function of the perfectionist behaviour (Frost, 
Novara & Rheaume, 2002). 
Positive perfectionism is adaptive and reinforcing and refers to cognitions and 
behaviours designed to achieve goals and obtain positive reinforcement (Frost, Novara & 
Rheaume, 2002). Positive reinforcement correlates with self-oriented perfectionism (e.g., 
tendency to set excessively high standards and to worry about failure to meet those standards; 
Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). Positive perfectionists tend to cope with problems by 
actively and conscientiously engaging in their problems (Burns & Fedewa, 2005). Negative 
perfectionism includes concern over mistakes, parental expectations and criticism, socially 
prescribed perfectionism (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002) and includes poor constructive 
thinking (e.g., concrete thinking) and maladaptive coping (e.g., avoidance, rumination)  styles 
(Burns & Fedewa, 2005). Negative reinforcement involves cognitions and behaviours 




designed to achieve goals to avoid or escape failure (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). The 
dimensions of negative perfectionism are the ones of most interest in OCD (Frost, Novara & 
Rheaume, 2002). 
As seen above, the definition of perfectionism (OCCWG, 1997) emphasises the role 
of negative perfectionism16 in OCD (e.g., belief in perfect solutions and excessive concern 
over mistakes). Negative perfectionism (e.g., concern over mistakes) has been found to 
correlate with measures of obsessive compulsive symptoms in non-clinical (Frost et al., 1990; 
Frost et al., 1994; Rheaume et al., 1995) and clinical samples (Norman, Davies, Nicholson, 
Cortese & Malla, 1998; Antony, Purdon, Huta & Swinson, 1998; Ferrari, 1995; Frost & 
Steketee, 1997).  
The concern over mistakes (negative perfectionism) refers to the interpretation of 
mistakes as indicating personal failure (Frost et al., 1990). Several studies have found that a 
high level of concern over mistakes correlates with symptoms of obsessionality (Frost, 
Novara & Rheaume, 2002). Concern over mistakes has been associated with high scores on 
two obsessive compulsive measures, the MOCI and the PI (Frost et al., 1990; Rheaume et al., 
1995). There is also some evidence that concern over mistakes is associated with particular 
obsessive symptomotology. Frost and Gross (1993) found negative perfectionism (e.g., 
concern over mistakes and socially prescribed perfectionism) to correlate with hoarding 
symptoms in sample of adult students (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). 
Rheaume, Freeston, Ladouceur, Bouchard, Gallant, Talbot and Vallières (2000a) 
administered the Perfectionism Questionnaire (PQ) to a selected sample of participants’ 
classed as either functional perfectionists (FP) or dysfunctional perfectionists (DP). The FP 
reflects perfectionist tendencies with few negative consequences (positive perfectionism), 
whereas the DP group includes strong perfectionist tendencies with harsh consequences 




(negative perfectionism; Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002).  The results showed that 
compared to the FP, the DP group scored higher on measures of obsessionality (PI), required 
more time to complete a precision task and hurried their decision when faced with 
uncertainty. Consequently, the results showed the FP group required more certainty than the 
DP group on the precision task (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). Lastly, people in the DP 
participants also endorsed more beliefs about responsibility than those in the FP group. 
Rheaume, Ladouceur and Freeston (2000) explored the relationship of perceived 
danger, responsibility and perfectionism in the prediction of obsessive compulsive tendencies 
in a non-clinical sample (n = 182). Participants were administered the Responsibility 
Questionnaire (RQ), the Perfectionism Questionnaire (PQ) and the PI. The results 
demonstrated moderate correlations between all three measures suggesting that both 
responsibility and perfectionism are related to obsessive compulsive symptoms. 
Perfectionism was shown to explain a significant part of the variance of obsessive 
compulsive tendencies after controlling for responsibility. Responsibility had the same beta 
weight as perfectionism. 
To date only five studies have investigated the relationship between perfectionism and 
OCD in clinical samples (Norman et al., 1998; Antony et al., 1998; Ferrari, 1995; Frost & 
Steketee, 1997; Mavissakalian, Hamann, Haider & De Groot, 1993). Norman et al (1998) 
administered the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Frost et al., 1990) to 
psychiatric outpatients (n = 129). The results indicated that the concerns over mistakes 
(negative perfectionism) subscale of the MPS correlated with the MOCI and the PI, whereas 
few significant correlations were found with the subscales measuring positive perfectionism 
(Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 Doubt over one’s actions, was de-emphasized as it was believed to be more closely related to intolerance of 
uncertainty (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). 




This finding was supported by Frost and Steketee (1997) who examined perfectionist 
tendencies (e.g., MPS) in an OCD sample (n = 35), anxious groups (AC; panic disorder and 
agoraphobia; n = 14) and non-anxious controls (NAC; n = 35). Participants were 
administered Frost’s et al. (1990) MPS. The same pattern of results emerged, with the OCD 
and AC groups (panic disorder and social phobia) reporting significantly higher scores on the 
concern over mistakes (CM) subscale than the NAC group. However, no significant 
difference was found between the OCD and AC groups on the CM subscale. The doubts 
about actions (DA) subscale showed a different pattern. There was a significant main effect 
between groups, with post hoc analysis showing the OCD to have significantly higher DA 
scores than those with panic disorder. Frost et al. (1994) examined whether individuals with 
sub-clinical OCD were characterised by more risk aversion, perfectionism and guilt than non-
clinical controls.  Two large samples were administered a battery of self-report tests 
measuring the above mentioned cognitive variables. The results found that individuals with 
sub-clinical OCD reported greater risk aversion, guilt and perfectionism that the non-clinical 
group. 
Another aspect of negative perfectionism refers to socially prescribed perfectionism. 
Antony et al. (1998) explored the role of perfectionism across individuals (n = 175) with a 
variety of anxiety disorders (OCD, social phobia, panic disorder, specific phobia) and non-
clinical controls. Participants were administered Frost’s et al (1990) MPS and Hewitt and 
Flett, (1991) MPS. The results suggested that individuals with OCD scored higher than non-
clinical controls on the subscales concerns over mistakes (CM) and doubts over actions (DA), 
and higher scores than panic disorder on the DA scale. Those with social phobia appeared to 
have the greatest concern with CM and DA compared to the other groups. The anxiety groups 
could not be differentiated on socially prescribed perfectionism on the Hewitt and Flett 
(1991) MPS scale. The results suggest that socially prescribed perfectionism is a relevant 
construct in many anxiety disorders, but is not specific to OCD. 




Until recently, the conceptualisation of perfectionism lacked adequate definition and 
was plagued by inconsistent measures (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). However, as Frost, 
Novara and Rheaume (2002) suggest, a key theme in all definitions of perfectionism (e.g., 
Frost et al., 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991) is the avoidance of mistakes (negative 
perfectionism). The preoccupation with avoiding mistakes also explains the high degree of 
overlap observed on the OBQ uncertainty and control subscales (see OCCWG, 2001, 2003). 
Some theorists conceptualise perfectionism as an attempt to avoid uncertainty or establish 
control, whereas others propose that perfectionism produces uncertainty and the need control 
(Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). Clearly, these three beliefs are intertwined and warrant 
further investigation. 
The research reviewed thus far suggests global perfectionism is not specific to OCD; 
however negative perfectionism (e.g., concern over mistakes and doubts over actions) has 
correlated with some measures of obsessionality (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002) and other 
cognitive variables like guilt (Frost et al., 1990), compulsive hoarding (Frost & Gross, 1993) 
compulsive indecisiveness (Frost and Shows, 1993) and/or “just right feelings”. However, 
research has also shown that negative perfectionism (e.g., concern over mistakes) also occurs 
in other anxiety disorders (Antony et al., 1998; OCCWG, 2001, 2003). Clearly, research 
utilizing experimental methodologies (e.g., Frost, Turcotte, Heimberg, Mattia, Holt & Hope, 
1995a; Bouchard, Rheaume & Ladouceur, 1999) is required.  
3.5.4 Overestimation Of Threat  
“Beliefs indicating an exaggerated estimation of the probability or severity of harm.” (OCCWG, 
1997, p.678)  
 This belief refers to the extent to which individuals with OCD overestimate the 
amount and severity of threat in the environment and threat associated with noxious thoughts 
or obsessions (e.g., Beck, 1976; Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Rachman, 1998; 
Salkovskis, 1989, 1996 cited in Riskind, Williams & Kyrios, 2002). Representative beliefs 




included in this domain include: “bad things are more likely to happen to me than to other 
people” and/or “I often think things around me are unsafe” and/or “things that are minor 
annoyances for most people seem like disasters” (OBQ-87).  Early models (e.g., Carr, 1974; 
Lazarus, 1966; McFall & Wollersheim, 1979) of dysfunctional beliefs about threat 
emphasised individuals with OCD tendency to underestimate their capacity (e.g., skills) to 
cope with the threat.   It was hypothesised that the perception of inadequate coping resources 
lead to anxiety and precipitated repetitive behaviour which was conceptualised as attempts to 
reduce perceived danger (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). 
Contemporary research has retained these principles. For example, Frost and Steketee 
(1997) suggested that beliefs about harm/danger encompass two important components: (a) 
tendency to overestimate the likelihood of harm occurring; and (b) beliefs about the 
consequences and severity of threatening events (e.g., Carr, 1974; Freeston et al., 1996; 
Salkovskis, 1985; Yaryura-Tobias & Neziroglu, 1983). Seminal research by Menzies and 
colleagues (Jones & Menzies, 1997, 1998b; Menzies et al., 2000) examined these two 
components of ‘the overestimation of threat’ domain by investigating danger expectancies 
(i.e., inflated probability and severity of harm) in OCD. 
Menzies and Jones (1997) examined the role of various cognitive mediators (e.g., 
danger expectancies, responsibility, perfectionism and anticipated anxiety) in response to a 
contamination behavioural avoidance test (BAT) among individuals with OCD (n = 27) with 
predominantly washing compulsions. Ratings were obtained before and during the BAT17. 
The results demonstrated that of the cognitive variables examined, danger expectancies were 
the most likely mediator of washing concerns in OCD. This relationship remained even when 
the other mediators were held constant. This study supports earlier theories proposing that 
                                                 
 
17 The BAT involved a compound stimulus of potting soil, animal hair, food scraps and raw 
meat. 




danger expectancies may mediate anxiety and avoidance responses in individuals with OCD 
(e.g., Carr, 1974; McFall, & Wollersheim, 1979) 
  Simos, Vaiopoulos, Giouzepas and Paraschos (1995) cited in Sookman and Pinard 
(2002) investigated the perceived probability of threat associated with different types of 
dangerous events (e.g., fires, earthquakes). These researchers found that high estimations of 
threat did not correlate with measures of obsessionality (e.g., MOCI). This piece of research 
has important implications as it raises the question of whether obsessive compulsive 
symptoms are associated with overestimation of personal threat (e.g., exaggerated threat 
responses only if the stimuli is personally relevant), rather than more over-estimation of 
generalised threat (e.g., earthquakes; OCCWG, 1997).   
Preliminary research suggests that compared to mood and other anxiety disorders, 
individuals with OCD tend to produce the highest scores on overestimation of personal threat 
(Steketee, Chambless, Tran, Worden, H et al., 1996a; Riskind, Abreu, Strauss & Holt, 1997; 
OCCWG, 1997). Menzies et al. (2000) examined the association between responsibility for a 
negative outcome, perceived severity of the outcome and perceived likelihood of the outcome 
in a sample of university students (n = 70). The results demonstrated that there is a tendency 
for individuals to regard an outcome as more aversive if they believe they are personally 
responsible for that outcome, rather than someone else being responsible. These authors 
concluded that in addition to responsibility, excessive danger expectancies may be a crucial 
component in OCD. 
Woods, Frost and Steketee (2002) measured subjective probability and severity 
ratings for negative events (salient to the individual) and obsessive compulsive symptoms. It 
was hypothesized that as participants’ coping abilities decreased, the obsessive compulsive 
(OC) symptoms would increase. Using an idiographic approach, Woods et al. (2000) 
requested that the OCD participants (n = 18) rate how well they would cope with the 
occurrence of personably relevant negative events. The hypothesis was supported in that as 




OC symptoms increased, severity estimation increased and coping ability decreased. This 
finding suggests that individuals with OCD tend to underestimate their ability to cope with 
feared events compared to anxious controls (Woods et al., 2000; Freeston et al., 1996). 
 In line with this argument, Foa and Kozak (1986) denote that individuals with OCD 
appear to suffer from epistemological reasoning, whereby events are viewed as dangerous 
until proven safe (Sookman & Pinard, 2002; OCCWG, 1997). This proposal has support from 
research showing a correlation between OCD and exaggerated threat (Freeston et al., 1992; 
Steiner, 1972; Steketee et al., 1996a; Kozak, Foa & McCarthy, 1987). Some researchers have 
suggested that the occurrence of epistemological reasoning in OCD may be particularly 
relevant in certain types of OCD. Frost and Hartl (1996) argued that this concept might 
explain why compulsive hoarders attach such meaning to their possessions, as these 
possessions represent safety in an environment perceived as dangerous. 
The tendency to over-estimation of threat is proposed to overlap with TAF (Rachman, 
1993), perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty beliefs (particularly doubt over actions; 
Sookman & Pinard, 2002). As seen in Menzies et al., (2000), inflated responsibility beliefs 
appear to lead to severity estimates (e.g., threat), which in turn precipitates anxiety and 
avoidance-coping behaviours (e.g., compulsions). Most of the research into this domain has 
been conducted on non-clinical samples. Further clinical studies using experimental research 
are needed to explicate the causal relationship between cognition and OCD. 
3.5.5 Intolerance for Uncertainty  
“This domain encompasses three types of beliefs: (a) beliefs about the necessity for being certain; (b) 
beliefs that one has a poor capacity to cope with unpredictable change; (c) beliefs about the 
difficulty of adequate functioning in inherently ambiguous situations.” (OCCWG, 1997, 
p.678)  
For more than two decades, ‘doubting’ has been considered a hallmark symptom of 
OCD (“folie du doubt” or the “doubting disease” see Berrios, 1989; Ciarrocchi, 1995). In one 




of the first studies, Krohne (1993) proposed that intolerance of uncertainty and intolerance of 
emotional arousal were the main variables underlying anxiety disorders. According to this 
model, an elevated level of intolerance of uncertainty provokes reactions of hypervigilance 
when individuals are faced with uncertain or ambiguous problems. These elevations in 
intolerance were thought to stimulate cognitive avoidance reactions. Excessive anxiety was 
seen as the result from the constant shifting from a hypervigilant state (linked to the 
uncertainty of the situation) to a state of avoidance (linked to the anxious reactions felt by the 
individual). Sample items reflecting intolerance of uncertainty beliefs include: “if I’m not 
absolutely sure of something, I’m bound to make a mistake” and/or “I must be certain of my 
decisions” and/or “it is essential for everything to be clear cut, even in minor matters”. 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been linked to pathological worry, GAD (e.g Dugas, 
Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Ladouceur, Dugas, Freeston, Rheaume, Blais, Boisvert, et al. 
1999; and Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003), and OCD symptoms (Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003a;  Steketee et al., 1998; Antony et al., 1998; Frost & 
Steketee, 1997; Summerfeldt, Huta & Swinson, 1998). Recently, Holaway, Heimberg and 
Coles (2006) compared intolerance of uncertainty in individuals with analogue GAD and/or 
OCD. The results showed clinical participants (analogue GAD or OCD) to report more 
intolerance of uncertainty beliefs than controls, however, the clinical groups could not be 
significantly distinguished from each other. These authors concluded that intolerance of 
uncertainty is likely to be relevant to a number of the anxiety disorders. However, as this 
study used analogue samples, it is questionable whether the levels of intolerance of 
uncertainty were similar to those diagnosed with OCD or GAD. 
Sookman and colleagues (Sookman & Pinard, 2002; Sookman, Pinard, & Beck, 2001) 
proposed a treatment model of OCD involving dysfunctional vulnerability schema (e.g., 
beliefs). Sookman et al proposed that specific schemas provoke the perception of threat 
appraisals in OCD. Sookman and Pinard (1995) proposed four classes of dysfunctional 




schema in OCD: (a) perceived vulnerability; (b) perception of coping resources; (b) novelty 
and change; (c) view of strong affect; and (d) need for control (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). It 
was hypothesized that individuals with OCD demonstrated exaggerated threat responses 
when the situation or events involved unpredictability, newness and change that required 
flexible coping skills (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). Sookman et al. proposed that the 
misinterpretation of inadequate coping resources and inability to tolerate strong negative 
affect (e.g., anxiety) leads to the perception of vulnerability (Sookman & Pinard, 2002).  
Doubts about actions, long associated with maladaptive beliefs of perfectionism 
(Antony, Purdon, Huta & Swinson, 1998; Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002) reflect the level 
of confidence people have about their ability to complete tasks (Frost et al., 1990). Given this 
definition, the OCCWG (2001) concluded that doubting the quality of one’s actions (Frost, 
Novara & Rheaume, 2002) is more likely to be a characteristic of uncertainty (e.g., concerns 
about being certain). Frost and Shows (1993) demonstrated that compared to other clinical 
groups, individuals with OCD tend to display greater doubt about the correctness of their 
decisions (e.g., compulsive indecisiveness). In a recent study, Frost and Steketee (1997) 
found that doubt about one’s actions significantly differentiated individuals with OCD 
compared to panic disorder (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). 
Tolin et al. (2003a) administered the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, 
Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas & Ladouceur 1994) to an OCD sample (n = 55), some of which had 
predominately checking compulsions (n = 43) and non-anxious controls (n = 14). The results 
demonstrated the OCD checkers to evidence significantly higher scores on the IUS compared 
to the OCD non-checkers and non-anxious controls. These results remained significant when 
controlling for depression. However, while intolerance of uncertainty was higher in OCD-
checkers, the OCD sample in general, did not demonstrate significantly greater uncertainty 
beliefs compared to the non-anxious controls. This finding was supported by Rassin and 
Muris (2005) who found indecisiveness, as measured by the Indecisiveness Scale, to be 




positively correlated with sub-threshold obsessive compulsive symptoms (e.g., checking and 
rumination). 
In a related vein, Gallagher, South and Oltmanns (2003) tested the hypothesis that 
individuals with Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) exhibit intolerance of 
uncertainty. The Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4 (PDQ-4) was administered to a large 
group of undergraduate students to form the following groups: OCPD group (n = 60); NAC 
(n = 60) and an Avoidant Personality Disorder group (APD). Participants completed an 
attentional coping task (ACT)18 . Participants were told they were about to complete the 
ACT, which would provide an estimate of general cognitive ability. Participants were 
assigned to two conditions, where their level of uncertainty was manipulated. The results 
showed the OCPD group spent more time listening to information about the ACT prior to 
taking the test, and requested more information about their test scores during the ACT, 
compared to the other groups. Given the clinical similarities between OCPD and OCD, this 
study supports the hypothesis that intolerance uncertainty may be important in OCD. 
Recently, Ladouceur, Gosselin and Duglas (2000) refined the concept of uncertainty 
to include the subjective appraisal of uncertainty: “a predisposition to react negatively to an 
uncertain event or situation, independent of its probability of occurrence and of its associated 
consequences” (p.934). These authors suggest that anxiety is precipitated by the uncertainty 
about whether the intrusive thoughts are potentially dangerous (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). 
One of the key components in this domain is negative beliefs about coping.  Several 
researchers have shown that: (a) individuals with OCD endorse more negative beliefs about 
coping than non-clinical controls, but not anxious controls (Steketee et al., 1998); and (b) 
coping ability can predict obsessive compulsive symptoms and the perception of inadequate 
coping resources predates threat estimation (Woods et al., 2000).  
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Recently, van den Hout and Kindt (2004) investigated whether repetitive checking 
behaviour precipitates uncertainty. In five separate experiments, NAC participants were 
requested to repeatedly check virtual gas rings19 via an interactive computer animation 
programme. Participants were tested in a dimly lit and sound-attenuated laboratory room 
where they sat at a table with a PC. During the experimental task, the experimenter observed 
the participants through a one-way mirror. The results of the five separate studies suggested 
the following: (a) repeatedly checking the same class of items resulted in sharp decreases in 
detail and vividness of memory of the checked events while the accuracy of the memory 
remained intact; (b) the quality of the experienced memory distrust was similar to the 
ambivalence individuals with OCD report about their memory after checking; and (c) 
repeated checking tends to undermines trust in memory (e.g., confidence), but may also 
reduce the sense that one acted responsibly.  
While some researchers have maintained that doubt and uncertainty in OCD is caused 
by general memory deficit (e.g., Tallis, 1995), the majority of studies do not support this 
hypothesis (see Hermans et al., 2003 for review). As seen in the van den Hout and Kindt 
(2004) study, there has been increasing evidence for the concept of “reduced confidence” in 
memory abilities. Dar (2004) has suggested that individuals with OCD are characterised by 
doubt and uncertainty because they “distrust their own memory and judgement and engage in 
endless futile attempts to reconstruct events in their memory …..a lack of confidence in OCD 
is not restricted to memory judgement”. (p.154).  
There is some support for this assertion as research has shown individuals with OCD 
to report less confidence in their memory abilities compared to the non-clinical group (NAC), 
despite good performances which were equivalent to the NAC group (Dar, 2004; Brown, 
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Kosslyn, Breitler, Baer & Jenike, 1994; Constans et al., 1995; MacDonald, Anthony, 
MacLeod & Richter, 1997; McNally & Kohlberg, 1993). Frost, Lahart, Dugas and Sher 
(1988) demonstrated that individuals with OCD requested more information, appeared more 
cautious and required more time than non-clinical cohorts. Many researchers have speculated 
that these decision-making difficulties seen in OCD (Beech & Liddell, 1974; Guidano & 
Liotti, 1983; Kozak, Foa & McCarthy, 1987) stem from beliefs about the need for certainty 
(Sookman & Pinard, 1995; Sookman et al., 1997).  
Similar to the Foa and Kozak (1986) concept of epistemological reasoning, Dar 
(2004) asserted that individuals with OCD have a tendency to feel uncertain in situations that 
appear ambiguous. In a series of studies, Dar (2004) investigated reduced confidence in 
OCD. In the first study, Dar et al., (2000) tested the hypothesis that uncertainty is a general 
feature of OCD checking-type. The sample included an OCD group (OCD), Panic Disorder 
group (PD) and non-anxious control group (NAC). Participants were given a general 
knowledge test and asked how confident they felt about their answers. The results found that 
OCD participants reported less confidence than the PD compared to NAC. The second study 
replicated these findings. In the third study, Dar (2004) examined what happens to the levels 
of confidence in OCD checking-type (n = 6) and NAC (n = 6) participants when they are 
presented with the same question over and over again. A shortened version of the general 
knowledge test used in the first study (20-items) was administered to participants (three 
times). The results showed the OCD checkers confidence to decrease over presentations, 
compared to the NAC participants’ confidence which increased. 
In the literature, intolerance of uncertainty has usually been researched in GAD 
samples, with only recent attention paid to the relevance of this construct to OCD (Holaway 
et al., 2006). There is little empirical research on beliefs about uncertainty in clinical samples 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the mouse, participants could turn any particular gas ring on, after which a rather realistic gaslight occurred. The 




(Steketee et al., 1998; Antony et al., 1998). Research thus far has focussed on the symptoms 
of uncertainty, rather than on the underlying beliefs (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). Research has 
also been complicated by the multidimensionality of this belief domain (e.g., intolerance of 
uncertainty versus intolerance of emotional arousal; see Krohne 1993 for discussion). 
Likewise, the role of intolerance of uncertainty beliefs in disorders other than OCD (e.g., 
DPD; Dependent Personality Disorder) is also unclear, and additional studies are needed to 
examine the extent of contribution across the psychiatric disorders. Doubt over actions has 
shown the strongest association with OCD (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 2002). As such, an 
interesting area for future research would be to investigate the association between 
intolerance of uncertainty and negative perfectionism in OCD (see Frost et al., 1990). 
3.5.6 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) and Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory 
(III-31; OCCWG, 2001; 2003, 2005) 
 The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) measures the strength of belief 
related to inflated responsibility, overestimation of threat, importance of thoughts, and 
intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism and control of thoughts. The Interpretations of 
Intrusions Inventory (III-31; 1997, 2001) assesses appraisals regarding inflated responsibility, 
control of thoughts and importance of thoughts. In order to assess the psychometric properties 
of these measures the OCCWG conducted three large scale studies over a period of 5 years. 
The first study (OCCWG, 2001), referred to as Stage II data, included 101 individuals with a 
DSM-IV diagnosis of OCD (n = 101), undergraduate students (n = 374), and English-
speaking adult community controls (n = 76), non-OCD anxious controls (n = 12) and Greek-
speaking controls (n = 35). The study spanned ten different treatment sites in four different 
countries. Factor analysis resulted in a reduction of the item composition of the measures. 
The OBQ was reduced from 129 items to 87, and the III was reduced from 43 to a 31-item 
inventory. 
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The second study in 2003 (Stage III data), involved the OBQ-87 and the III-31 being 
administered to a large sample of individuals from 17 different sites (Australia, Canada, 
France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and the USA). The sample included 248 individuals with 
OCD (n = 248), non-obsessional anxious individuals (n = 105), non-clinical adults from the 
community (n = 87), and undergraduate students (n = 291). The results suggested that the 
OBQ and III appeared to assess various prominent features of OCD-related cognition. 
However, the various subscales of the OBQ and III remained highly correlated, and both 
measures evidenced low discriminant validity. The domains intolerance of uncertainty, 
overestimation of threat and perfectionism were highly correlated (r’s near 0.80). Likewise, 
the correlations between the subscales responsibility, overestimation of threat and importance 
and control of thoughts were elevated (r’s>0.7). Additionally, factor analyses demonstrated 
that the OBQ beliefs related to threat, uncertainty and perfectionism appear to be OCD-
relevant, but not OCD-specific.  
 In 2005, OCD participants (n = 244) were re-administered the OBQ-87 and III-31. 
These scores were then factor analysed with the result being a reduction in the number of 
OBQ subscales, from six to three. This new scale was called the OBQ-44 and included the 
following three empirically based subscales: (1) inflated personal responsibility and the 
tendency to overestimate threat (Responsibility/Threat), (2) perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty (Perfectionism/ Certainty), and (3) over-importance and over-control of thoughts 
(Importance/Control; OCCWG, 2005). The hypothesized domains of III-31 (importance and 
control of thoughts and responsibility) loaded together onto a single factor described as ‘the 
negative interpretation of thoughts’.  
The results indicated that even after controlling for general distress, two of the OBQ 
subscales and III predicted OC symptoms. The Responsibility/Threat Estimation subscale 
predicted Harming and Contamination thoughts on the PI-R; and Perfectionism/Certainty 
subscale predicted Grooming and checking behaviours on the PI-R scales. Unfortunately, the 




importance/Control of Thoughts subscale did not predict any specific symptomotology on the 
PI-R scale. The negative interpretation of thoughts domain predicted harming thoughts on the 
PI-R.  
Since its development, the OBQ has been used in several studies (Taylor, 
Abramowitz, McKay, 2005;  Aardema, O'Connor, Emmelkamp, Marchand, Todorov, 2005a; 
Faull, Joseph, Meaden, Lawrence, 2004; Sica, Coradeschi, Sanavio, Dorz,  Manchisi, Novara, 
2004). However, it is not currently known whether these beliefs are specific to OCD, and 
further still, to certain symptoms of OCD (Anholt et al., 2004; Clark, 2002a; Abramowitz, 
Deacon, Woods & Tolin, 2004).  
3.6 OCCWG Beliefs and Symptom Specificity  
Recent evidence demonstrates high correlations between dysfunctional beliefs and the 
content of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Clark, 2002a). For example, research has shown 
beliefs about perfectionism to correlate with compulsive checking (Gershunny & Sher, 1995), 
cleaning (Tallis, 1996), and hoarding (Frost & Gross, 1993). The following sections discuss 
the OCCWG beliefs in relation to the most empirically-based OCD subtypes (Abramowitz et 
al., 2003a; Calamari et al., 1999, 2004; Summerfeldt et al., 2004). 
3.6.1 Contamination Obsessions and Washing/Checking Compulsions 
Rachman (2004) defined contamination as “an intense and persisting feeling of 
having been polluted or infected or endangered as a result of contact, direct or indirect, with 
a person/place/object that is perceived to be soiled, impure, infectious or harmful” (p.1229).  
Rachman (2004) states that obsessions involving contamination revolve around four main 
themes: 
(a) Soiled substances: faecal matter, putrefying flesh, decaying vegetable matter 
(Rachman, 2004, p.1229).  




(b) Infectious contaminants: contact with items or people carrying germs, contact 
with bodily products such as blood/saliva, contact with people or places believed 
to be infected (e.g., blood, hospitals, places/people thought to be associated with 
sudden acute respiratory syndrome, AIDS; Rachman, 2004, p.1229). 
(c) Harmful material: chemicals, pesticides and certain foods (Rachman, 2004, 
p.1229).  
(d) Mental pollution: caused by associations with impurity, dirtiness (rupophobia), 
immorality, accusations, nasty memories, direct or remote contacts with people 
who are regarded as enemies or as untouchables (culturally or personally 
defined), and by aversive events such as a sexual assault (Rachman, 2004, 
p.1229).  
 
Contamination obsessions are perceived as highly threatening. The person believes 
that the ‘contaminated material’ acquires the ability to cause serious harm to self (e.g., spread 
to other parts of one’s body) or others (e.g., transmissible to other people, places or objects). 
However, research has shown that compulsive washing occurs in response to two distinct 
motivations: (group  a) those that wash to reduce discomfort without fears of harm ; and 
(group b) those that wash to prevent harm from occurring to self or others as a result of the 
contamination (Feinstein, Fallon, Petova & Liebowitz, 2003; McKay et al., 2004). 
Individuals with OCD in the first category, group (a), tend to reported fewer compulsions, a 
preoccupation with contamination and wash excessively to reduce the feeling of 
contamination (Feinstein et al., 2003).  
Those in the latter category, group (b), may demonstrate a preoccupation on 
threatening consequences associated with contamination. Feinstein et al. (2003) suggests that 
this group of washers may display washing or checking rituals to reduce/avoid the perceived 
threat. Research has shown compulsive washers to over-estimate the amount of threat in a 




situation (e.g., Lelliott et al., 1988; Jones & Menzies, 1997); however, it may be the case that 
this tendency is more applicable to the latter group. This suggestion has not been tested and 
warrants investigation. 
A final category has been proposed by Tallis (1996) who reported that some 
individuals with OCD wash not to remove contamination, but to achieve a state of cleanliness 
and is closely tied to perfectionism. Extending this research, Coles et al. (2005) suggested 
that individuals with obsessive–compulsive disorder perform compulsions to reduce feelings 
of something not being just right or sensations of incompleteness. Research using self-report 
questionnaires has demonstrated a link between not just right experiences (NJREs) and OCD 
symptoms, including washing concerns.  
The cognitive beliefs considered relevant in this subtype include: over-estimation of 
threat (e.g., Lelliott et al., 1988; Jones & Menzies, 1997); responsibility (Salkovskis, 1989); 
and perfectionism (Tallis, 1996). The beliefs thought less specific to contamination/ washing 
include TAF (Shafran et al., 1996) importance of thoughts (OCCWG, 2001); intolerance of 
uncertainty (Sookman & Pinard, 2002) and Magical thinking (MI; Einstein & Menzies, 
2004a)20. However, there is some discrepancy in research. For example, whereas Tallis 
(1996) found perfectionism to correlate with compulsive washing, other studies have found 
the opposite (Gershuny & Sher, 1995; Ferrari, 1995). It may be that these studies were 
measuring different groups of compulsive washers (e.g., group (a) or (b). Currently, there is a 
need for more research into the specific cognitive correlates of these subgroups of 
compulsive washers21. 
                                                 
 
20 Due to the time constraints, only the OCCWG beliefs have been covered. However, the author recognises that 
other beliefs such as disgust sensitivity (Olatunji & McKay, 2006; Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2006b; 
Olatunji et al., 2004) and sympathetic magic (tendency for disgust evoking stimuli to transfer that property to 
previously neutral stimuli; McKay, 2006; Tolin, Worhunsky & Maltby, 2004) are also important constructs in 
contamination fears. 
21 A more in-depth review of contamination obsessions can be obtained in Rachman (2004). 
 




3.6.2 Harming Obsessions and Checking Compulsions 
The content of ‘harming obsessions’ is wide ranging, but most often includes: 
situations (e.g., thoughts of fire, flood, theft), aggressive behaviour (e.g., “did I just run that 
person over?”) and/or sexual violation. Compulsive checking is conceptualised as an attempt 
to reduce the perceived likelihood of the event/behaviour occurring which reduced anxiety. 
However, like the previous subgroup, checking compulsions are performed in response to a 
range of obsessions (McKay et al., 2004). This finding is reflected in recent research which 
shows compulsive checking to correlate with all six cognitive domains (OCCWG, 2001, 
2003; McKay et al., 2004).  
Harming obsessions have been strongly related to responsibility (Rachman, 1997, 
1998; Salkovskis, 1985 Rachman & Shafran, 1998); threat estimation (Frost and Sher, 1989; 
Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003b); TAF-Likelihood (Shafran et al., 1996); importance of 
thoughts (OCCWG, 2001); intolerance of uncertainty (Reed, 1985; Tolin et al., 2001; Tolin et 
al., 2003a; Sookman & Pinard, 2002) including reduced confidence in memory and 
indecision (Dar, 2004; Rachman, 1998); negative perfectionism (Norman et al., 1998; 
Gershuny & Sher, 1995; Ferrari, 1995); Magical thinking22 (MI; Einstein & Menzies, 2004) 
3.6.3 Symmetry Obsessions and Ordering Compulsions 
Symmetry, ordering and arranging compulsions refer to the need to ensure that their 
belongings, clothes or appliances are “just right”. Individuals with this type of OCD will 
often feel unable to move on with their day until these objects are arranged “exactly the right 
way” and may spend several hours repositioning objects until their anxiety dissipates 
(Radomsky & Rachman, 2004a).  This subtype of OCD is one of the more common 
presentations (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004a; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992; Sasson et al., 
Leckman et al., 1997), however surprising little research has been conducted in this area. 
                                                 
 
22 Magical thinking (MI)  in the context of OCD refers to “the belief that certain thoughts or behaviours exert a 
causal influence over outcomes” (Evans et al., 2002 cited in Einstein & Menzies 2004, p. 540). 




Radomsky and Rachman (2004a) conducted three studies in this area. In the first 
study, participants (n = 211 undergraduate students) were administered the Symmetry, 
Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ). In the second study, participants (n = 74) 
were asked to sort 60 photographs into one of six piles, indicating how comfortable/uneasy 
they would feel if they were in the environment depicted in each of the pictures. In the third 
study, participants (n = 48) who had scored highly in study II were invited back and told to 
prepare a 5-minute speech on a topic of their choice, which would be presented to three 
faculty members. Participants were informed that their speech was to be graded on both its 
content and style. They were told that because this task often produces some anxiety, they 
would be given a few minutes and a space in which to prepare their speech. Participants were 
then randomly assigned to one of two workspace conditions: (condition 1; n = 24) a 
standardized orderly and arranged room; or (condition 2; n = 24) a standardized disorderly 
room. 
After 3 minutes, an experimenter asked participants to provide another (post-
provocation) SUDS rating to indicate how anxious they were after preparing their speech. 
Participants were not given instructions about whether or not to alter their workspace, 
although they were free to do so. Participants in the condition 1 were then given a very brief 
interview to assess their cognitions and beliefs about disorderly objects, environments, etc., 
and about why it was important for them to order and arrange their surroundings. Following 
this, participants were told that there was no speech to be given and were debriefed from the 
study. 
The results demonstrated that individuals with ordering and arranging behaviour 
experience anxiety in disorderly or disorganized environments. However, there appeared to 
be a discrepancy between the beliefs and cognitions associated with ordering and arranging 
and other OCD subtypes. In most manifestations of OCD (e.g., checkers and washers), the 
person engages in compulsive activity to prevent something terrible from occurring 




(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980 cited in Radomsky & Rachman, 2004a). However, this study 
showed the symmetry group to engage in compulsive ordering to reduce anxiety, but not 
threat. Radomsky and Rachman (2004a) further found that none of the participants in the 
condition 1 (high symmetry) were able to state a negative consequence should they be unable 
to perform their compulsive ordering.  These findings imply that the function of ordering and 
arranging compulsions may be to promote and maintain certainty and/or ‘just right’ feelings, 
as opposed the prevention of harm. 
The Radomsky and Rachman (2004a) investigation is a very important study as it 
shows clear cognitive differences between the subtypes of OCD. Given these results, 
combined with the OCCWG (2001), it is likely that the two beliefs of most importance to the 
symmetry, ordering and arranging group is perfectionism and uncertainty (OCCWG, 2005; 
Tolin et al., 2003b). The beliefs less relevant with symmetry obsessions and ordering 
compulsions may include TAF (Shafran et al, 1996) importance of thoughts (OCCWG, 
2001). As this is the only study of its kind, further research is required to validate any distinct 
cognitive profiles.  
3.6.4 Hoarding Obsessions And Compulsions 
Hoarding concerns are present in approximately 18-35% of cases with OCD (Frost, 
Krause & Steketee, 1996; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1989; Samuels et al., 2002). Hoarding has 
been characterised as a symptom of OCD (Frost et al., 2000; Stein et al., 1999 cited in Wu & 
Watson, 2005), a manifestation of OCD (Shafran & Tallis, 1996 cited in Wu & Watson, 
2005) and a subtype of OCD (Saxena, Maidment, Vapnik, Golden, Rishwain, Rosen, et al. 
2002; Christensen & Greist, 2001).  Since the DSM-III-R, hoarding has constituted a core 
diagnostic marker of OCPD. Hoarding is one of eight symptoms of OCPD (DSM-IV-TR). 
Interestingly, few studies have evaluated the relationship between OCPD and hoarding 
(Stein, et al., 1999), and of the studies conducted, hoarding was not correlated with measures 
of OCPD (Frost & gross, 1993).  However as discussed earlier in the chapter (refer section 




3.3.3.2), hoarding behaviours have consistently emerged as separate from obsessive 
symptoms (Leckman et al., 1997; Summerfeldt et al., 1999; Calamari et al., 1999, 2004), 
leading some theorists to postulate that hoarding represents a fundamentally distinct disorder 
(Grisham, Brown, Liverant, Campbell-Sills, 2005; Wu & Watson, 2005; Black et al., 1998). 
This finding is further supported by the fact that the DSM-IV-TR has not included hoarding 
as a diagnostic criteria of OCD (Wu & Watson, 2005). 
In a series of studies, Wu and Watson (2005) examined two issues: (a) the strength of 
correlations among OCD symptoms and hoarding; and (b) group-level differences on OCD 
and hoarding symptoms among samples of students, mixed psychiatric outpatients, and OCD 
patients. The association between OCD and hoarding with negative affectivity was also 
evaluated. The results of this study suggested that in contrast to the other types of OCD (e.g 
checking, cleaning, and ordering) which correlated strongly, hoarding was only moderately 
correlated with these symptoms. Further, classic OCD symptoms distinguished individuals 
with OCD from other individuals with a psychiatric diagnosis other than OCD and non-
clinical controls, but not hoarding. In sum, OCD patients in general did not endorse hoarding 
concerns more than other psychiatric populations. These results suggest that while hoarding 
correlates with some aspects of OCD, it does not show a strong or specific link to OCD.  
Differences between compulsive hoarders and other types of OCD include the degree 
of insight (Frost & Gross, 1993). Compulsive hoarders have been shown to view their 
behaviour as ego-syntonic (consistent with self/identify, reasonable and socially desirable) as 
opposed to the other type of OCD which are typically ego-dystonic (separate from the self, 
unreasonable). Some research has found clinical hoarding to be associated with increased 
levels of anxiety, depression (Frost et al., 1996; Frost et al., 2000) and personality disorders 
(Frost et al., 2000; Samuels et al., 2002; Grisham et al., 2005) compared to non-hoarding 
OCD. However, other studies have reported hoarding to be associated with significantly less 
anxiety and negative affect because of the ego-syntonic nature of the concerns (Grisham et 




al., 2005; Wu & Watson, 2005). Furthermore, treatments demonstrated to be effective for 
other OCD subtypes have produced little or no effect on hoarding symptoms (Black et al., 
1998, Mataix-Cols et al., 1999, Mataix-Cols et al., 2002, Saxena et al., 2002). Clearly the 
clinical differences between non-hoarding OCD and hoarding warrants further investigation. 
While the standing of hoarding in OCD is currently being debated, there is consistent 
evidence that individuals with hoarding concerns experience the following dysfunctional 
beliefs: negative perfectionism (Frost & Gross, 1993; Frost & Hartl, 1996; Frost, Novara & 
Rheaume, 2002; Steketee, Frost & Kyrios, 2003); importance of controlling one’s thoughts 
(Coles et al., 2003); responsibility (Frost et al., 1995); magical thinking (Einstein & Menzies, 
2004a); over-estimation of threat (e.g., negative consequence of forgetting; Hartl, Frost, 
Allen, Deckersbach, Steketee, Duffany et al., 2004) and intolerance of uncertainty (e.g., 
indecisiveness; Frost & Hartl, 1996). 
The association between intolerance of uncertainty and hoarding is complicated, in 
that some researchers have suggested that memory deficits (see Hartl et al., 2004) are 
responsible for the excessive doubting, rather than uncertainty or indecisiveness. Individuals 
with predominantly hoarding behaviours have been shown to (a) report less confidence in 
their memory; (b) tend to overestimate the value of remembering information and 
possessions; (c) exaggerate the consequences of forgetting (e.g., negative cost); and (d) 
distrust memory, preferring to keep possessions in sight to serve as visual cues (Frost & Hartl 
cited in Hartl et al., 2004). However, whether the excessive doubting observed in compulsive 
hoarding reflects memory difficulties or erroneous beliefs relating to the intolerance of 
uncertainty remains unknown (see Hartl et al., 2004 for review). Likewise, there is debate as 
to whether the need to protect possessions relates to inflated responsibility rather than 
intolerance of uncertainty. 




3.6.5 Miscellaneous Obsessions and Compulsions 
This category refers to (a) obsessions without overt compulsions23, mental rituals, and 
atypical obsessions and compulsions. The obsessional content often revolves around religious 
and sexual images (repugnant images). The compulsions can include mental rituals (e.g., 
counting, repeating phrases), praying, tapping, touching and posturing. Religious obsessions 
have received the most attention (see Rassin & Koster, 2003). Common religious obsessions 
include the fear that one has or will commit sin (e.g., eating on a fasting day), sacrilegious 
images or blasphemous thoughts and/or fear of being sent to hell by God (Abramowitz, 
Huppert, Cohen, Tolin & Cahill, 2002; Olantunji, Tolin, Huppert & Lohr, 2005). Religious 
obsessions have been shown to correlate with TAF (Rassin & Koster, 2003); magical 
thinking (Tolin et al., 2001; Einstein & Menzies, 2004b); control of thoughts (Abramowitz, 
Deacon, Woods & Tolin, 2004) and responsibility (Abramowitz et al., 2004). 
Repugnant obsessions refer to thoughts or images that are a “profound violation of the 
individual’s morality and values” (Purdon, 2004, p 1169). Examples of repugnant obsessions 
include: (a) harming or injuring a vulnerable person (e.g., hitting a baby or elderly person; 
Purdon, 2004); (b) sexual obsessions (acts of sexual molestation against someone without 
his/her permission; Purdon, 2004); (c) religious obsessions; Purdon, 2004); and (d) obsessive 
doubt (e.g., “What if I am gay but have not realised it?” or “did I run someone over without 
realising it?”; Purdon, 2004). The cognitive domains implicated in repugnant obsessions 
include TAF24 (Rachman, 1997, 1998; Purdon, 2004); importance of one’s thoughts 
(OCCWG, 2001; Thordarson & Shafran, 2002); importance of thought control (OCCWG, 
2001; Purdon & Clark, 1999; Purdon, 2004) and responsibility (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 
1989, 1999; Purdon, 2004). Rachman (1997) suggests that TAF plays a central role in 
obsessions involving sexual, aggressive or blasphemous images or thoughts because they are 
                                                 
 
23 Approximately 25 percent of individuals with OCD report obsessions without over compulsions (McKay et 
al., 2004). 




important themes of all moral systems and thus serve to inflate responsibility beliefs about 
one’s duty to protect or prevent possible harm occurring to self or others. The harm may be 
real (e.g., have consequences in the real world) and/or occur at a moral level.  
3.7 Chapter Summary  
 Extending the theoretical work of Rachman (1997), Salkovskis (1996), and others, the 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG, 1997; 2005) proposed six 
domains of dysfunctional beliefs considered to underlie OCD symptoms: over-importance of 
thoughts; importance of controlling one’s thoughts; perfectionism; inflated responsibility; 
overestimation of threat and intolerance of uncertainty. The first five beliefs were reported to 
be OCD-specific, whereas the final belief, perfectionism was thought to be relevant but not 
exclusive to OCD (OCCWG, 1997; Clark, 2004). The investigations by OCCWG have 
provided a template regarding the most important beliefs involved in OCD. However, much 
testing is required to validate the specificity of these cognitive beliefs to OCD. In addition, 
current research still assumes that the cognitive beliefs and appraisal processes do not vary 
across the diverse range of obsessive symptomotology or subtypes. As seen in the literature 
reviewed, this assumption may be premature. The hypothesized relationship between the five 
OCD subtypes and the six cognitive beliefs can be seen in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
24 TAF-Likelihood is particularly important in sexual intrusive thoughts (Clark, Purdon & Byers, 2000) 






Hypothesized Relationships between OCD Subgroup and Cognitive Domain  
Subgroup   Cognitive domain  Research_____________ 
Contamination-washing Over-estimation of threat  Emmelkamp (1987) 
    Perfectionism   Lelliott et al (1988)   
    Responsibility   Jones & Menzies (1997) 
        Tallis, (1996) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Harming-checking  Over-estimation of threat  Rachman (1997, 1998) 
    Perfectionism    Frost and Sher (1989) 
   Importance of thoughts Salkovskis (1985) 
    Importance of control  OCCWG (2001) 
    Intolerance of uncertainty  Sookman & Pinard (2002) 
    Inflated responsibility  Norman et al (1998) 
        Shafran et al. (1996)    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Symmetry-ordering  Perfectionism   OCCWG (2005) 
    Intolerance of Uncertainty Tolin et al (2003) 
         
_____________________________________________________________________  
Hoarding   Perfectionism   Frost & Gross (1993) 
   Intolerance of uncertainty Frost & Hartl (1996) 
   Importance of control  Steketee et al. (2001) 
   Responsibility   Frost et al. (1995) 
________________________ _     _______________ 
Miscellaneous 
Religious  TAF    Rassin & Koster (2003) 
   Magical thinking             Einstein et al (2004) 
   Importance of control  Abramowitz et al (2004) 
   Responsibility_ ________________________________ 
Repugnant  TAF     Purdon (2004) 
    Importance of thoughts Rachman (1997) 
   Importance of control  Thordarson et al (2002) 
    Responsibility   OCCWG (2001) 
        Purdon & Clark (1999) 
 
    
 
The identification of stable groups of OCD has relied on many classification 
variables, including: patterns of comorbid conditions, variability in age at onset, absence 
versus presence of neurological features, and PANDAS. However, the most common 
approach has been to focus on the primary obsessional complaint. However, there is a need 
for research to establish empirically based subtypes of OCD which reflects the diverse 




heterogeneity of the disorder. Currently, the most efficacious method of identifying the latent 
dimensions of OCD appears to be multivariate analyses (e.g., factor or cluster analysis). 
Researchers using statistical procedures have reliably shown the following symptom 
dimensions: contamination and washing, harming and checking, hoarding, covert 
obsessionals with no overt compulsions (Calamari et al., 2004; McKay et al., 2004).  
However, while the empirical standing of these subgroups has improved, there is a 
need to validate these subtypes, as subgroup classifications according to similar symptoms 
have the potential to overlook important underlying meanings (Summerfeldt, 2004). As 
Summerfeldt (2004) states, often highly similar symptoms may have very dissimilar 
motivations. For example, someone may clean to “eradicate germs and prevent harm or to 
preserve the perfect pristine state of belongings and regain a sense of satisfaction or inner 
completeness, with little sense of threat” (Tallis, 1996; Summerfeldt, 2004). However, based 
on the early model all behaviours would be collapsed into the “cleaning category” 
(Summerfeldt, 2004). This drive for diagnostic clarification of OCD subgroups has led to 
resurgence in experimental paradigms.  
The OCCWG (1997, 2003) have suggested that self-report methods may be less well 
suited to assessment of intrusive thoughts or images than experimental methods (e.g., 
laboratory tasks).  This is surprising given that the majority of research on the cognitive 
domains has been correlational and relied on retrospective self-report questionnaires (Clark, 
2002a). While this type of research provides valuable information, it does not allow for any 
causal inferences regarding cognitions and symptoms. Coupled with the issues surrounding 
self-report questionnaires (e.g., response bias), and the finding that the most comprehensive 
cognitive psychometrics, the OBQ and III are highly inter-correlated, experimental paradigms 
are becoming increasing more attractive in cognitive research (e.g., Rheaume et al., 2000a; 
Riskind et al., 2002; Rheaume et al., 2000; Mancini et al., Coles et al., 2005).  




Several key researchers (see Rheaume et al., 2000a; Riskind et al., 2002; Mancini, et 
al., 2004; Coles et al., 2005) have started to employ experimental paradigms with promising 
results. Several studies (e.g., Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Mancini et al., 2004; Shafran, 1997) 
have shown that direct and indirect manipulation of the OCCWG beliefs corresponds to 
changes in OCD symptomotology. Currently, there is a need for more experimental research 
in the subtyping arena to dissect the motivational underpinnings symptom clusters. However 
to date, no study has experimentally manipulated all six beliefs in empirically derived OCD 
subtypes. Thus, it would appear that one of the key issues in obtaining support for the 
cognitive model of OCD is one of research design. This issue will be addressed in the final 
study of this thesis. 
Studies I, II and III 
This thesis aims to establish connections between cognitive beliefs, appraisal 
processes and obsessive themes. Specifically, whether the different cognitive beliefs outlined 
by the OCCWG are associated with the different types or themes (e.g., symmetry, somatic, 
religious) in OCD (Clark & Purdon, 2002; Leckman et al., 1997; Rachman, 2002). The terms 
cognitive symptoms and cognitive characteristics appear synonymous, however, they are 
conceptually distinct. Cognitive symptoms refer to intrusive thoughts, while cognitive 
characteristics relate to dysfunctional cognitions. Clarification of the research question has 
both theoretical and clinical implications as if specific cognitive beliefs are identified in 
certain themes of obsessional problems then more effective treatment may be developed.  
The first study addresses one of the critical issues in the cognitive-appraisal research, 
namely whether certain beliefs act as a precursor to others (Clark, 2002a). Thordarson and 
Shafran (2002) have suggested that beliefs in the importance of thoughts precipitate beliefs 
about the control of thoughts and responsibility appraisals. Given the role of the two 
domains: importance of thoughts and responsibility in contemporary models of OCD (e.g 
Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1985), these constructs will be addressed first. This study 




provides the theoretical basis for the second study which investigates all six OCCWG beliefs. 
Using the subtype models described earlier in the Chapter (e.g., Calamari et al., 1999), the 
second study will address whether some beliefs appear to show a relationship to OCD 
symptoms or “subtypes”. As many have questioned whether self report questionnaires can 
reliably distinguish between appraisals and belief (OCCWG, 1997), the final study of this 
dissertation employs experimental methodologies to investigate whether specific kinds of 
dysfunctional beliefs characterise obsessive–compulsive symptomotology. This type of study 








































4. THOUGHT-ACTION FUSION & RESPONSIBILITY BELIEFS IN ADULTS WITH OCD 
STUDY I 
4.1 Introduction 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is a multifaceted condition, which is as varied in 
presentation as in its supposed etiology. In the last two decades, increasing interest in the 
cognitive theory of OCD has resulted in a myriad of studies, with results both for and against 
the cognitive hypothesis of OCD. Whilst there is a consensus among cognitive theorists that 
underlying threat cognitions serve to both exacerbate and maintain the disorder, there is 
disparity as to which beliefs are central in OCD. For example, Purdon and Clark (2002) have 
suggested that individuals with OCD tend to over-evaluate the importance of exerting 
complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses. Others have argued the case 
for perfectionism (Shafran, Teachman, Kerry & Rachman, 1999). Whilst it is recognised that 
these beliefs are not mutually exclusive, there is a clear need for clarification as to the role of 
these cognitive biases  in OCD. 
Prior to investigating which beliefs are most prevalent in OCD, it is necessary to first 
establish empirical support for the cognitive models of OCD outlined in Chapter 2 within a 
New Zealand context. As reviewed earlier, the most prominent cognitive theories of OCD are 
those of Salkovskis (1985, 1989, 1996) Rachman (1993, 1997, 1998). Collectively, these 
models posit that it is the interpretation of the intrusive thoughts, images or impulses that is 
crucial in the acquisition and maintenance of OCD. There is strong empirical support for 
Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989) hypothesis that individuals with OCD interpret intrusive thoughts 
as indicating personal responsibility for harm to self or others, however, evidence is lacking 
for the hypothesized link between TAF, inflated responsibility and obsessive compulsive 




symptoms. Consequently, Rachman’s proposal that TAF may serve a mediating role between 
inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD clients requires further investigation. 
The importance of this issue can be seen if placed within a therapeutic context. 
Previous research has demonstrated the limited effectiveness of traditional behaviour therapy 
in the treatment of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). Research by Foa et al. (1983) has 
demonstrated that 25 percent of patients refuse this type of therapy and approximately 25 
percent do not benefit from it. These findings are comparable to NZ, with recovery rates for 
individuals with OCD estimated at 50% after a 12 months follow-up (Oakley-Browne, Joyce, 
Wells, Bushnell & Hornblow, 1989). Coupled with the limited effectiveness of behaviourally 
based treatments, research has also found substantial relapse rates, with many individuals 
with OCD reporting residual symptoms following treatment (Whittal & McLean, 2002).  
Despite research suggesting that cognitive therapy should be considered an alternative 
to traditional behaviour therapy (Bouchard et al., 1999; Zucker et al., 2002), behaviour 
therapy, particularly ERP is still considered the most effective therapy for OCD (Salkovskis 
& Kirk, 1989). The finding that traditional behaviour therapy and/or psychopharmacological 
interventions are effective in only 50 per cent of cases has not dented the reliance on a 
behavioural ethos to guide treatment of anxiety disorders in NZ.  In order to increase the 
efficacy of psychological interventions, a more comprehensive understanding of the cognitive 
biases associated with OCD is required. 
4.1.1 New Zealand Context 
The Christchurch Psychiatric Epidemiological Study (1989) showed the prevalence 
rates of mental disorders in NZ to be comparable to those in European and North American 
countries (Oakley-Browne, Joyce, Wells, Bushnell, & Hornblow, 1989; Wells, Robins, 
Bushnell, Jarosz, & Oakley-Browne, 1994). In NZ, primary mental heath care is in part 
reliant on community-based services under the umbrella of the Canterbury District Health 
Board. (Oakley-Brown et al., 1989) There are two outpatient units that specialise in anxiety 




disorders, however only one of these is accessible to individuals in the South Island, namely 
the Anxiety Disorders Unit (ADU). Acceptance into this service is contingent on the 
individual being between the ages 18-64 and having a primary diagnosis of a DSM-IV-TR 
anxiety disorder. As current prevalence rates of OCD in NZ are unavailable, the following 
sections are based on unpublished reports collected from the ADU over a three year period 
(2002-2005)25.  
Fourteen percent of the 592 individuals assessed by the ADU were diagnosed with 
OCD. This result means that OCD was the third most commonly diagnosed anxiety disorder, 
trailing Social Phobia at 34 percent. Consistent with research suggesting that OCD is among 
the most intractable of disorders (see Mayerovitch, du Fort, Kakuma, Bland, Newman, & 
Pinard, 2003), the past three years has seen an increasing number of people in NZ diagnosed 
with OCD. In 2002, 11 percent of those assessed at ADU were diagnosed with OCD. This 
percentage has steadily increased over the years, with an estimated 19 per cent of 600 
individuals assessed by the ADU in 2005 fulfilling DSM-IV-TR criteria for OCD. Based on 
the information, 5.8 percent of the 33, 0000 individuals living within the Canterbury region 
would meet DSM-IV criteria for OCD (lifetime prevalence of 2.5 percent).  
These figures stress the importance of relying on empirically supported psychological 
theories to guide treatment and maintain recovery. Currently, the treatment of choice for 
OCD among most NZ services includes individualised format, time-limited Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT), supplemented with pharmacotherapy if required. While the 
efficacy of CBT for OCD is well documented, an increasing number of researchers are 
incorporating Salkovskis’ (1985, 1989) and Rachman’s (1993) cognitive models in the 
treatment protocol for OCD. The need for efficiency coupled with a shortage of services 
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specialising in anxiety disorders in NZ necessitates further investigation into these cognitive 
models in NZ samples.  
The majority of mental health studies tend to focus on either the prevalence (Wells et 
al., 1989; Oakley-Browne et al., 1989), and/or accessibility of services (MaGPIE, 2001 
study), often neglecting the clinical characteristics of many psychiatric disorders. This fact is 
rather surprising given that the level of disability associated with a mental disorder is reported 
to be equivalent to those of chronic physical conditions (Wells et al., 1989). While our 
conceptual understanding of OCD has grown through the efforts of international research, the 
clinical picture of OCD in NZ remains ambiguous.  
Similarly, the lack of NZ research may impact internationally as significant cultural 
differences associated with OCD may be obscured (see Trujilo, 2000 for review). For 
example, Okasha and colleagues (1994) assert that the strong emphasis of religious rituals in 
Egyptian cultures explains why the most common symptoms of Egyptian individuals with 
OCD are religious obsessions and repeating rituals, whereas the predominance of aggressive 
obsessions in Brazilian samples are explained by Petribu and Bastos (1997) in terms of 
accelerated rates of urbanisation. These studies demonstrate the dynamic relationship 
between one’s culture and beliefs (e.g., stronger associations between TAF and religious 
rituals, (Rachman 1997) and support the conceptualisation of OCD as an extremely 
heterogeneous disorder.  
Given these issues, the current study addressed several key issues. Firstly, the 
cognitive theories of Salkovskis et al (1985) and Rachman (1996) were investigated to assess 
applicability of these models to individuals diagnosed with OCD in a NZ context. Secondly, 
the specificity of TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs to OCD was questioned. The last 
objective of this study was to provide preliminary support for a larger follow-up study 
examining the interaction between several cognitive biases associated with OCD.  




4.2 Study I 
The central question in the current study is whether TAF and inflated responsibility 
beliefs are higher in a group of adults diagnosed with OCD (DSM-IV-TR) compared to other 
anxiety disorders. Consequently, the degree, level, and strength of association between TAF 
and responsibility were assessed by administering a series of specific psychometric measures 
to three different samples: (a) adults diagnosed with OCD (OCD); (b) adults diagnosed with 
another anxiety disorder, other than OCD (AC); (c) non-clinical controls (NAC). The 
hypotheses were: 
(i) The OCD group will evidence higher TAF scores compared to the comparison anxious 
group (AC) and the non-anxious control group (NAC).  
(ii) The OCD group will demonstrate significantly higher inflated responsibility scores 
relative to both the comparison anxious group (AC) and the non-anxious control group 
(NAC).  
(iii) Significant correlation between TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs  
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1 Participants  
Clinical participants were recruited from the ADU (n = 41). Non-clinical participants 
were recruited through presentations given by the primary investigator inviting those with no 
known current or past psychiatric history to be involved in the current study. Participants in 
the latter category were primarily recruited from student populations (n = 22). Based on 
diagnosis, participants were divided into three groups: OCD group (OCD; n = 20) 
individuals’ fulfilling DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of OCD; Anxious group (AC; n = 21) 
individuals’ fulfilling DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, other than OCD; and 
Non-clinical control group (NAC; n = 22) individuals’ with no known current or past 
psychiatric disorder. All participants received a ten-dollar food voucher for participation.  




4.2.1.1.1 Inclusion-exclusion criteria  
Clinical Participants  
Inclusion in the clinical groups (OCD; AC) was based on whether the individual met 
DSM-IV-TR criteria for an anxiety disorder(s). All assessments were conducted by 
experienced clinicians at the ADU. Inter-rater reliability was ensured as all diagnoses were 
discussed in a multidisciplinary meeting following the assessment. Participants were included 
in the study providing they were post-assessment and pre-treatment. Participants were 
excluded if they were actively psychotic and/or had experienced a head injury resulting in 
cognitive impairment. Three participants were excluded as the obsessive symptoms were best 
explained within the confines of Anorexia Nervosa. 
Non-clinical Subjects 
The non-clinical control group (NAC) were interviewed by the primary examiner and 
given a paper-an-pencil form assessing current or past psychiatric diagnosis prior to 
inclusion.  
4.2.2  Materials  
4.2.2.1  Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale-checklist (Y-BLOCS Goodman et al., 1989). 
 The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale-checklist (Y-BOCS) is a 10-item self-
report scale that assesses OCD on two dimensions, namely obsessions and compulsions, 
independently of each other (Goodman & Price, 1992). Each item is rated on a five point 
scale ranging from 0-4, with a 0 reflecting no symptoms and a 4 associated with greater 
pathology. Subscale scores are obtained for obsessions (sum of items 1-5) and compulsions 
(sum of items 1-6). The subscale items each assess the same dimensions for obsessions and 
compulsions as follows: frequency, interference, distress, resistance and control. A total score 
on the Y-BOCS is obtained by calculating the sum of items 1-10. The total Y-BOCS score 
can range from 0-40 and the total subscale scores can range from 0-20. The Y-BOCS requires 
15 minutes to administer.  




 Internal consistency is reported to be high for the total Y-BOCS scale, with 
Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .88 to .91 (Goodman et al., 1989). The Y-BOCS is 
reportedly sensitive to change following cognitive-behavioural and pharmacological 
treatments for OCD (Goodman et al., 1989; van Oppen, et al., 1995), and has excellent test-
retest reliability (Kim et al., 1990). The total and subscale scores on the Y-BOCS have 
generally been found to correlate significantly with other measures of OCD symptomotology, 
but also with anxiety and depression (Goodman, et al., 1989; Richter et al., 1994; Woody, 
Steketee, & Chambless, 1995). The Y-BOCS is generally considered the gold standard for 
measuring symptom improvement in OCD treatment studies (Steketee, Frost & Bogart, 
1996). 
4.2.2.1.1 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck Steer, & Garbin, 1998).  
 The BDI-II is a widely used 21-item self-report inventory that measures the presence 
and severity of affective, cognitive, and motivational aspects of depression. Participants are 
required to answer each item based on the ‘past two weeks, including today’. Each item 
includes a list of four self-evaluative statements, which describe a single catagorical symptom 
or attitude related to depression. The statements are displayed in order of increasing severity 
and numerical values ranging from 0 (no symptoms) to 3 (maximum severity). The total BDI-
II score is obtained by calculating the sum of items 1-21. The total BDI-II score can range 
from 0-63, with suggested cut-offs being: 10 = no depressive disorder; 10-18 = mild to 
moderate depressive symptomotology26; 19-29 = moderate to severe; 30 plus = severe 
depression. Internal consistency for the BDI-II is high (alpha = .92) and test-retest reliability 
= .93 (Beck,, Steer & Brown, 1996).  Widespread support for the BDI-II’s validity and 
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reliability has been demonstrated with samples from various populations, including non-
clinical, psychiatric and medical settings (McDowell & Newell, 1996). 
4.2.2.2 Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996). 
The TAFS is a 19-item self-report scale that measures three types of TAF: (1) 
Morality bias (TAF-Moral): 12 items probing the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding 
issues of morality (e.g., “Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a 
blasphemous action”); (2) Likelihood-TAF for events happening to other people (TAF-
Others): 4 items assessing the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding causing harm to others 
(e.g., “If I think of a friend/relative being in a car accident then this increases the likelihood 
that he/she will have a car accident”); and (3) Likelihood-TAF for events happening to 
oneself (TAF-Self): 3 items investigating the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding 
causing harm to oneself (e.g., “If I think of myself being in a car accident then this increases 
the risk that I will have a car accident”). Each item is scored on a 5-point scale, ranging from 
0 (strongly disagrees), to 4 ( strongly agree). Total TAF scores are obtained by adding up the 
items in each of the three subscales. Total scores can range from 0 to 76, with higher scores 
indicating stronger TAF. No items are reverse scored. 
The internal consistency for the TAF subscales is reported to range from good to 
excellent, with Cronbach alpha ranging from 0.85 to 0.96 across obsessional and non-
obsessional groups (Shafran et al., 1996). There are contradictory findings regarding the 
relationship of TAF to OCD (Rassin et al., 2001a; Rassin et al., 2001b) however, numerous 
studies have demonstrated the TAFS to reliably discriminate between OCD subjects and 
other groups, particularly on the TAF-Others subscale (Shafran et al., 1996; Taylor et al., 
2002). For example, in a study comparing individiuals with OCD and students without 
mental health diagnosis, all three TAF subscales were significantly correlated with measures 




of OCD checking (rs ranged from .31 to .38) and depression (rs ranged from .33 to .42; 
Shafran et al., 1996).  
Furthermore, the TAF scale is reported to correlate with other measures of 
obsessional problems (e.g., Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory) and depressive 
symptoms (BDI-II) in both clinical, and non-clinical samples (Shafran et al., 1996). 
Additionally, the TAF concept has also been adapted for use with clients with eating 
difficulties (e.g., thought-shape fusion; Shafran et al., 1999). Unfortunately, test-retest 
reliability is not available for the TAFS. 
4.2.2.2.1 Responsibility Appraisal Scale (RAS; Salkovskis et al., 2000) 
 The RAS is a 26-item questionnaire designed to assess general attitudes, beliefs, and 
predisposing characteristics of responsibility and harm concerns in OCD (Salkovskis et al., 
2000). Participants are required to rate how much they either agree or disagree with specific 
statements (e.g., “To me, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility is as bad as making 
that disaster happen”) using a 7- point scale, with 1 (totally agree) to 7 (totally disagree). A 
total score for this measure is obtained by reverse scoring all items, summing all 26 items, 
and then obtaining a mean score ranging from 1 (no responsibility appraisals) to 7 (very high 
responsibility appraisals). Test-retest reliability(r = .94) and internal consistency (Cronbach 
alpha of .92) for the RAS is reported to be excellent (Salkovskis et al 2000). 
 The RAS has demonstrated adequate concurrent validity with other measures of 
obsessionality, with Pearson correlations ranging from (r = 0.57) with the Maudsley 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI), and (r = 0.54) for the Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (OCI; Salkovskis et al., 2000). Research has demonstrated that individuals with 
OCD score significantly higher on the RAS compared to anxious controls (Steketee et al., 
1998) even when controlling for comorbid depression and anxiety (Salkovskis et al., 2000). 




4.2.2.2.2  Responsibility Interpretation Questionnaire (RIQ)                                 
(Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
 The RIQ is a 22-item self-report scale designed to assess the frequency and strength 
of interpretations of recently occurring intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses about 
responsibility (including TAF, importance and control of thoughts; Taylor, 2002).  Prior to 
beginning the questionnaire, participants are given written instructions intended to prime 
negative interpretations to intrusive thoughts. For example, participants are given written 
definitions of intrusive thoughts, impulses, and images (e.g., “repeated urge to attack or 
harm somebody, even though you would never do this”). Following this, participants are 
requested to "write down the intrusions that you have had in the last two weeks", and then 
answer the following items with that intrusion in mind (e.g., "Think of times when you were 
bothered by intrusive thoughts, impulses and images in the last two weeks and answer the 
following questions" (original emphasis).   
 The RIQ assesses the frequency and degree of belief in clinical intrusions, thus the 
scale is divided into two sections: Frequency (F) and Belief (B). In the frequency sections, 
individuals rate the frequency with which they experienced 22 specific responsibility-related 
ideas during periods when they were bothered by intrusive thoughts, impulses, or images in 
the previous two weeks. Items are divided into two sections: (HR-F) consists of 16-high 
responsibility statements (e.g., “If I don’t act now then something terrible will happen and it 
will be my fault”); and (LR-F) comprises 6-low responsibility statements (e.g., “this is just a 
thought so it does not matter”). Each item is rated using a five-point scale, ranging from 0 
(idea never occurred) through to 4 (always occurred when I had worrying intrusive 
thoughts).  
 Having rated the frequency for each of the items, participants rate the degree of belief 
in each of the 22 responsibility-related ideas over the past two weeks. Again, items are 
divided into two sections: (HR-B) comprises 16 high responsibility ideas; alternatively, (LR-




B) contains 6 low responsibility statements. In the belief subscales, each item is rated on a 
scale ranging from 0 (‘I did not believe this idea at all) to 100% (I was completely convinced 
this idea was true’). The RIQ generates four subscales. An HR-F score is computed by 
calculating the means of the 16 items in section HR-F. An LR-F score is computed by 
calculating the means of the six items in section LR-F. A HR-B score is computed by 
calculating the means of the 16 items in HR-B. A LR-B score is computed by calculating the 
means of the six items in LR-B. Scores for the TAF subscales range from 0-4 for the 
frequency scales (HR-F and LR-F) and 0 to 100 for the belief scales (HR-B and LR-B).  
 Like its companion measure, the RAS, this instrument has performed well in studies 
of reliability and validity, with the exception of the low-responsibility interpretations 
(Salkovskis et al., 2000). In a mixed sample of anxious and non-anxious participants, test-
retest reliability coefficients were .90 for the frequency of high responsibility interpretation, 
.80 for the belief in high responsibility interpretations, but .22 for the belief in the low 
responsibility interpretations (Salkovskis et al., 2000). Internal consistency for all four 
subscales of the RIQ is reported to be excellent with Cronbach alphas ranging from .86 to .93 
(Salkovskis et al., 2000). The high responsibility subscales have been shown to discriminate 
between individuals with OCD, other anxiety disorders and non-clinical controls (Salkovskis 
et al., 2000). The RIQ subscales are reported to be significantly correlated with other OCD-
measures, but not with anxiety or depression (Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
4.2.2.3 Procedure  
Prior to recruitment, clinicians at the Anxiety Disorders Unit were asked to inform 
any client who met DSM-IV-TR criteria for an anxiety disorder of the current study. Those 
who expressed interest were then introduced to the primary examiner by the assessing 
clinician, and a time was arranged for testing. Upon arrival, the purposes and procedures of 
the study were explained to participants, and they were given a written description of the 




study (see Appendix A) and requisite consent forms were completed (see Appendix B). 
Participants were shown into a secure room and given the five questionnaires in a randomised 
order to complete. The session lasted between twenty to forty minutes; however no time limit 
was enforced. 
Non-clinical participants were recruited following presentations by the primary 
examiner to several undergraduate university courses. Prospective participants were given 
instructions regarding time requirements and expectations. If agreed, participants were then 
given a screening form to complete in order to determine inclusion/exclusion criteria (see 
Appendix C). Successful participants were then invited to a secure room to complete the 
questionnaires. Participants unable to complete the questionnaires following the presentation 
were given alternative times for testing. NAC were given identical questionnaires to clinical 
participants. All participants completed the questionnaires in one session varying from twenty 
to forty minutes.  
4.2.2.4 Statistical Analysis  
 Results were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences-Windows 
version 12. Group differences were examined using multivariate and univariate analyses of 
variance (MANOVA and ANOVA). Three MANOVAs were conducted to account for the 
subscales of two of the measures (TAF, RIQ). Wilks’ lambda was used as the overall test of 
significance and if the overall group F was significant (p<.05), the subsequent univariate 
analyses were interpreted. Group differences on all five measures were examined with post-
hoc Tukey tests using a p value of .05. Multiple correlations were computed on the TAF and 
RIQ subscales to investigate the degree of association between the two variables. A 
multivariate analysis of covariate (MANCOVA) with depression as the covariate was 
performed on the two clinical groups (OCD, AC) to assess whether depression had any 




impact on results. Based on observed group differences, regression analysis was performed to 
establish which variables best predicted high obsessive-compulsive symptomotology. 
4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Statistical analysis 
 Between group differences in demographic variables were examined first (Table 1), 
with the level of comorbidity across anxious samples shown in Table. 4. Following this, the 
self-report measures of OCD, depression and inflated responsibility of all three groups were 
analyzed. As there were a priori reasons to consider the possibility of links between 
responsibility, TAF and obsessive compulsive symptoms (Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1989, 
1996), each of these measures (including the subscales of the RIQ and TAF) were analysed 
using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA): AC (comparison anxious group); 
OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder group); and NAC (non-anxious controls). Effect sizes 
were calculated according to Cohen’s d (1988) correlation. Post hoc tests were Tukey’s HSD. 
Statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS package (version 12.0). 
4.2.3.2 Sample Characteristics  
 Mean current age and standard deviations for each group are shown in Table.3. 
Analysis of variance revealed no statistically significant differences in age across groups (F 
(2, 61) = 1.8, p < .17). The proportion of males was 40 percent in the OCD group (OCD), 29 
percent in the anxious group (AC) and 35 percent in the non-anxious control groups (NAC). 
Chi-squared analyses showed no significant differences in gender distribution across the three 
groups (x2 [2] = .62, p = .73). Ethnicity was reported in 97% of cases with the majority of the 
sample being New Zealand European (88%), with the remainder being of mixed origin 
(Malaysian; Western Samoan; Australian; Romanian; French; Maori). Of participants with 
OCD, 17 (85%) reported being on medication, compared to 16 (76%) in the anxious group 
(see Table 3).  






Sample Characteristics: Means and Standard Deviation 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  OCD (n = 20)       AC (n = 21)      NAC (n = 23) 
Variable   Mean SD   Mean SD  Mean SD 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Age   32.1  11.9   32.2  10.9  26.8  9.2 
% Male  40%    29%   35% 
% Female  60%    71%   65% 
Medication 
Fluoxetine  17%    25% 
Citalopram  18%    25% 
Paroxetine  47%    31% 
Clomipramine  6%    6% 
Clonazepram  12%    6% 
Other: (amytriptylene/tegratol)   13% 
 




 In terms of comorbidity, both clinical groups (OCD; AC) exhibited a high degree of 
overlap with both anxiety and mood disorders. Comparable rates of depressive 
symptomotology was observed in both the OCD and AC groups, with 50 percent of all 
clinical participants reporting a current or past major depressive episode in the past six 













Percentage Comorbidity with DSM-IV-TR Anxiety Disorders Across Clinical Groups 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
OCD Group (n = 20): 
 N % 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
OCD alone (OCD) 3 15% 
Comorbid Panic Disorder (PD) 2 10%  
Comorbid Social Phobia (SP) 6 30% (n = 3, 15 % comorbid MDD) 
Comorbid Generalised Anxiety (GAD) 4  20% (n = 2, 10% comorbid MDD)  
Comorbid Depressive Disorder (MDD) 5  25%  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
AC Group (n = 21): 
 N % 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Generalised Anxiety (GAD)  3 14%   
Panic Disorder (PD)  4 19% (n = 2, 10 % comorbid MDD) 
Social Phobia (SP) 10 48% (n = 4, 19 % comorbid MDD) 




4.2.3.4 Clinical Variables 
 The means and standard deviations of study measures across groups are presented in 
Table 3. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the BDI, TAF, 
RAS, RIQ and YBOCS and indicated significant group difference (F (6, 61) = 18.9, p <.001). 
Subsequently, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the results 
discussed below.  
 






Means (standard deviation), F and p-values of OCD, AC and NAC Groups 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                OCD ___             AC                  NAC                       Effect Size__ 
Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  F (2,61)  Contrastsa  G1b G2c 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
YBOCS 20.6 4.5  6.5 6.2  2.8 3.4  78.8*** OCD>AC>NAC 2.6 4.5  
BDI-II  20.1 11.4  18.9 10.8  3.2 3.7  21.2*** OCD, AC>NAC .1 2.0 
RAS  81.0 25.5  103.2 21.2  122.8 19.8  19.1*** OCD>AC>OCD -.9 -1.8 
 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05. b Effect size OCD + AC. c Effect size OCD + NAC. YBOCS = Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale, BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory-II, RAS = Responsibility Attitudes Scale. OCD = Obsessive Compulsive group; AC = Anxious group; NAC = Control group, *** significance level p<o.oo1 
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4.2.3.5 Symptoms of Obsessionality 
 As expected, a one-way ANOVA of the YBOCS scores revealed group 
differences, (F (2, 61) = 78.8, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests (p’s < 0.05) 
revealed that the OCD group evidenced significantly higher scores on the YBOCS (m 
= 20.6; SD = 4.5) compared to the AC (m = 6.5; SD = 6.2) and NAC (m = 2.8; SD = 
3.4) groups. The AC group had higher scores on the YBOCS than the NAC group, but 
did not reach clinical criteria for OCD (see Table 5). 
4.2.3.6 Symptoms of Depression 
 A one-way ANOVA of the BDI-II scores revealed group differences, (F (2, 61) 
= 21.2, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests (p’s < 0.05) indicated that participants 
with OCD had higher BDI scores (m = 20.1; SD = 11.4) compared to the control 
group (m = 3.2; SD = 3.7), but not the anxious group (m = 18.9; SD = 10.8). The BDI-
II positively correlated with the YBOCS (r = .51, p <.01), but was non-significant 
when the control group was excluded from analysis (r = .25, ns). These findings are 
expected given that both groups’ mean scores represented moderate levels of 
depressive symptomotology and the literature demonstrating the high comorbidity 
between anxiety and mood disorders. Participants in the AC group evidenced 
significantly higher scores than the NAC group.  
4.2.3.7 Responsibility Attitudes and Ideas 
Consistent with earlier reports, one-way ANOVA’s of the RAS and RIQ total 
scores revealed significant group differences, (F (2, 61) = 19.1, p < .001) and (F (2, 
61) = 9.9, p < .001) respectively. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests (p’s < 0.05) indicated that 
participants with OCD (m = 4.9; SD .97) endorsed significantly more items on the 
RAS compared to their anxious counterparts (m = 4.0; SD = .81) Post hoc tests 
revealed that the NAC group could be significantly differentiated from the clinical 
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groups with much lower RAS scores (m = 3.3; SD = .76). Regarding the RIQ, post 
hoc analyses revealed the OCD group (m = 107.5; SD = 16.3) reported significantly 
more responsibility interpretations than the AC (m = 78.8; SD = 27.2) and NAC 
groups (m = 91.4; SD = 16.9), but no significant differences were found between the 
AC and NAC groups (refer Table 6). This result is best understood by examining the 
NAC group’s responses to the LR-B subscale. As the NAC group (m = 76.1; SD = 
21.3) agreed that they were not personally responsible for their thoughts, they 
received significantly higher scores on this scale compared to the AC (m = 52.4; SD = 
22.2) and OCD (m = 49.1; SD = 23.9) groups. These subscale score then contributed 
to the total score. 
Based on the pattern of responding, it is likely that the RIQ total score is 
misleading as considerable variability exists across subscales. MANOVA on the 
subscales of the RIQ revealed significant group difference, F (8, 61) = 10.9, p < .001. 
Subsequently, ANOVA’s were conducted with the results seen in Table 6. In 
comparison to the AC group, participants with OCD were more likely to report 
statements reflecting high responsibility beliefs (HR-F; m = 1.9; SD = .51) and believe 
more strongly in these ideas (HR-B; m = 54.9; SD = 17.6). While the AC group 
demonstrated significantly stronger frequency of high responsibility statements (HR-
F; m = .92; SD = .71) than the NAC group (HR-F; m = .39; SD = .47), the difference 
between the AC (HR-B; m = 23.7; SD = 20.0) and NAC (HR-B; m = 13.1; SD = 16.8) 
groups’ degree of belief in these statements was not significant. This result suggests 
that while high responsibility beliefs may underlie several anxiety disorders, these 
ideas seems specific to individuals with OCD.  





Means (Standard Deviation), F and P-Values for the RIQ Subscales 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                OCD ___             AC                  NAC                       Effect Size__ 
Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  F(2, 61)  Contrastsa  G1b G2c 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
HR-F  1.9 .51  .92 .71  .39 .47  41.6*** OCD>AC>NAC 1.9 3.1 
LR-F  1.5 .72  1.8 1.0  1.8 1.4  .40  ns   -.3 -.3 
HR-B  54.9 17.6  23.7 20.0  13.1 16.8  30.0*** OCD>AC, NAC 1.7  2.4 
LR-B  49.1 23.9  52.4 22.2  76.1 21.3  9.5***  OCD, AC>NAC -.1 -1.2 
RIQ Total 107.5 16.3  78.8 27.2  91.4 16.9  9.9***  OCD>AC, NAC 1.3 1.0 
 
 (HR-F) assesses the frequency of high-responsibility statements; (LR-F); assesses the frequency of low-responsibility statements; (HR-B) assesses the 









Means (Standard Deviation), F and P-Values for the TAF Subscales 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                OCD ___             AC                  NAC                       Effect Size__ 
Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  F (2, 61)  Contrastsa  G1b G2c 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TAF-M 24.5 12.0  19.0 12.5  12.6 8.5  6.3**  OCD, AC>NAC .4 1.1 
TAF-LO 4.5 4.8  2.3 3.5  1.4 2.1  4.0*  OCD, AC>NAC .5 .8 
TAF-LS 4.4 3.6  4.0 3.9  1.7 2.2  4.1*  OCD, AC>NAC .1 .9 
TAF Total 33.3 14.7  25.2 15.7  15.7 11.1  8.7***  OCD, AC<NAC .5 1.4 
 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05. b Effect size OCD + AC. c Effect size OCD + NAC. TAF-M = (fusion of thoughts and actions regarding issues of 
morality), TAF-LO = (fusion of thoughts and actions regarding causing harm to others), TAF-LS = (fusion of thoughts and actions regarding causing 
harm to self). OCD = Obsessive Compulsive group; AC = Anxious group; NAC = Control group, *significance level p<o.o5, ** significance; level 




 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
153
4.2.3.8 Thought-Action Fusion 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the TAF 
scales and indicated significant group difference (F (8, 61) = 3.5, p < .05). 
Subsequently, ANOVAs were conducted with the results presented in Table 7. 
Contrary to the prediction, TAF was not significantly higher in the OCD group 
compared to the AC group, F (3, 61) = 8.7, ns. However, the OCD group did evidence 
considerably higher TAF scores, especially TAF-Moral compared to the NAC. No 
significant correlations were found between the TAF subscales and the BDI (r =.17, 
ns). These results tend to support the argument that TAF-bias is relevant to OCD, but 
not specific. The following sections elucidate the indirect role of TAF in OCD.   
4.2.3.9 Correlations between TAF and responsibility 
Correlational analysis was conducted to test for the predicted positive 
relationship between TAF and inflated responsibility variables. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 8. Consistent with the hypothesis, high responsibility 
beliefs were positively associated TAF scores (r = .38, p < .01), with the strongest 
correlation being Moral-TAF (r = .33, p < .01). The RAS was strongly correlated in a 
positive direction with moral and likelihood-other TAF, and moderately correlated 
with likelihood-self TAF. This result suggests that participants who endorsed 
statements like “If I don’t act now then something terrible will happen and it will be 
my fault” (HR-F) were also likely to believe that “Thinking about making a critical 
remark to a friend is almost as bad as actually saying it” (Moral-TAF). These results 
imply that individuals, who have a strong propensity to TAF, may also have a 
tendency to believe they are personally responsible for the occurrence of intrusive 
thoughts.  
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As expected, the correlation between TAF subscales and LR-F scale 
(frequency of low responsibility) statements were not significant. Given that items on 
the LR-F subscale essentially tap into ‘every-day statements’, a negative correlation is 
expected.  Consistent with this finding, a negative correlation was observed between 
the degree of belief in LR statements and Moral (r = -.32, p = < .01) and Self-TAF (r 
= -.28, p <.05). This finding supports the viewpoint that individuals who tend to 
discount their thoughts and actions as being synonymous (TAF-M) are less inclined to 
report strong responsibility beliefs (LR-B). 
Given the research on the relationship between TAF and depression 
(Abramowitz et al., 2003), partial correlations were computed to determine whether 
scores on the BDI-II accounted for correlations between TAF subscales and the RIQ 
and RAS. When levels of depression were controlled, the correlation between TAF 
and RIQ (r = -.59, p < .001) and the RAS remained significant (r = .59, p < .001).  
 
Table 8 
Pearson correlations between subscales of the RIQ, RAS and TAF Subscales  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Subscales 
  ___________________________ ________ ________________________ 
  TAF RIQ RAS M LO LS HR-F LR-F HR-B LR-B 
____________________________________________________________ 
TAF  - .09 .596** .91** .67** .59** .38** -.09 .44** -.36**  
RIQ  - - .232* .04 .20 .06 .45** .29* .45**  .44** 
RAS  - - - .54** .48** .28* .49** -.16 .54** -33** 
TAF-M - - - - .35** .26* .33** -.06  .35** -32*  
TAF-LO - - - - - .70** .28* -.11 .40** -.22 
TAF-LS - - - - - - .28* -.10 .34** -.28* 
HR-F  - - - - - - - -.08 .85** -.47** 
LR-F  - - - - - - - - -.27* .50** 
HR-B  - - - - - - - - - -.59** 
LR-B  - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Note. N = 64. TAF-M (fusion of thoughts and actions regarding issues of morality); TAF-LO 
(assessing the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding causing harm to others); TAF-LS 
(investigating the fusion of thoughts and actions regarding causing harm to self). (HR-F) 
frequency of high responsibility statements; (LR-F) frequency of low responsibility 
statements; (HR-B) strength of belief in high responsibility ideas; (LR-B) strength of belief in 
low responsibility statements.  *p<.05, **p<.01 
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4.2.3.10 The Relationship between TAF, Inflated Responsibility and OCD? 
Correlations were conducted to test for the hypothesised positive relationship 
between OCD, TAF and responsibility.  The results of these analyses showed the 
YBOCS was positively correlated with TAF total (r = .28, p < .05), but disappeared 
when the influence of depression was controlled (r = .23, ns). Likewise, when the 
responsibility measures were held constant, the correlation between TAF and the 
YBOCS was not significant (r = -.02, p = .86, ns). Contrary to past research, analyses 
by subscale revealed that Moral-TAF was positively correlated with the YBOCS (r = 
.24, p < .05, 1-tailed), but that the likelihood scales were not (r = .20, p < .056, 1-
tailed). Further analysis demonstrated that TAF was strongly correlated with high 
responsibility scale of the RIQ (r = .38, p < .01), but again lost significance when 
depression was controlled for (r = .35, ns). Consistent with previous research, the 
relationship between TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs appears dependant on the 
presence of negative affect. 
Correlational analyses between the responsibility measures and the YBOCS 
demonstrated a strong positive association, RAS (r = .52, p < .01) and the RIQ (r = 
.41, p < .01). This relationship remained significant when controlling for levels of 
TAF (r = .40, p<.001). The most robust finding was seen on RIQ scale HR-F (r = .77, 
p < .01) and HR-B (r = .74, p < .01). These results indicate that a strong sense of 
personal responsibility for protecting against harm is associated with high levels of 
obsessionality. This result is supported by the negative correlation observed between 
high YBOCS scores and the LR-B scale (r = -.38, p < .01). This pattern of responding 
(high responsibility-high obsessionality) held when the control group was excluded 
from analysis (HR-F; r = .66, p < .01 and HR-B; r = .65, p < .01), with the exception 
of the LR-B scale (r = -.14, ns). Partial correlations between the high responsibility 
subscales (HR-F; HR-B) and obsessive compulsive symptoms (YBOCS) while 
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controlling for the effects of depression (BDI-II) had no effect (HR-F; r = .70, p < .01 
and HR-B; r = .68, p < .01). Altogether, these results support Salkovskis’ hypothesis 
regarding the role of inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD. 
As correlational analysis does not inform on the sequential relationship 
between variables, multiple regression analyses were performed to assess the 
relationship among TAF, OCD and responsibility beliefs. A series of multiple 
regression analyses were performed with TAF, RIQ and RAS as the predictor 
variables and the YBOCS as the dependent variable. All three groups were included 
in analyses with the results presented in Table 9. The overall result was significant, R2 
= .36, F (3, 60) = 11.0, p < .001). The RIQ (β = .30, t = 2.8, p < .01) and RAS (β = 
.46, t = .35, p < .001) emerged as the best predictors of obsessionality. Regression 
analysis of the RIQ by subscale revealed the HR-F (high occurrence of ideas 
reflecting personal responsibility) subscale to be the only significant predictor of 
obsessive compulsive symptoms (β = .50, t = 3.2, p < .001). Thought-Action Fusion 
did not emerge as a significant predictor of obsessionality in analyses, (β = -.02, t = -
.18, ns).  
 
Table 9 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Obsessive Compulsive Symptoms  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Means  SD  B  SE B  β t  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RIQ  92.3  23.4  .12  .04  .30 2.8**  
RAS  4.0  1.1  3.9  1.1  .46 3.5*** 
TAF  24.3  15.5  -0.1  .08  -.02 -.18 ns 
 
R2 = .36, Adjusted R2 = .32, R = .60 
Note. N = 64. TAF (Thought-Action Fusion Scale); RIQ (Responsibility Interpretations 
Questionnaire); RAS (Responsibility Attitudes Scale) *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-
tailed), *p< .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001;  





The current study examined TAF and inflated responsibility in a small sample 
of adults (n = 63) with and without OCD (DSM-IV-TR). This study was unique 
because it was the first to examine these cognitive variables within a New Zealand 
context. Secondly, it was different to most international research in this area, as 
clinical samples were employed. The main results can be catalogued as follows. 
Firstly, the hypothesis that inflated responsibility beliefs are involved in the 
acquisition and maintenance of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) was supported. 
Secondly, the hypothesis that TAF is specific to OCD was not supported. The third 
hypothesis that TAF serves as an internal source for inflated responsibility beliefs was 
partially supported. The following sections discuss these findings and where possible 
compare with comparable research studies. The chapter concludes with the limitations 
and clinical implications of the current study.  
Consistent with previous research (Steketee et al., 1998; Bouchard et al., 1999) 
inflated responsibility beliefs were notably higher in participants with OCD, even 
after controlling for depressed mood and TAF levels. Further, regression analyses 
showed the responsibility measures to be predictive of obsessive compulsive 
symptoms (Freeston et al., 1992; Rheaume et al., 1995). However, in line with 
previous research (e.g., Foa et al., 2001) inflated responsibility beliefs were also 
present in anxious individuals without OCD and were significantly differentiated from 
control participants. As evident from the results, inflated responsibility seems to 
operate across the spectrum of anxiety disorders, but appears particularly elevated in 
OCD. Contrary to other research (e.g., Tolin et al., 2006a), the current study supports 
the hypothesis that inflated responsibility beliefs fuel the (mis)interpretation of 
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intrusive thoughts as being threatening and contribute to the development of clinical 
obsessions.  
The (within group) variability observed in the OCD sample on measures of 
responsibility suggests there may be substantial variation across different types of 
OCD.  This hypothesis has support from several lines of investigation (Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Freeston et al., 1996; van Oppen et al., 
1995) and particularly the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group 
(OCCWG; 1997, 2001) who have demonstrated strong links between responsibility, 
harming and contamination thoughts. Recently, Farrell (2004) demonstrated that 
inflated responsibility beliefs in OCD emerged late adolescence and/or adulthood. 
Given the predominance of aggressive obsessions during this time, it is possible that 
responsibility beliefs correlate with specific obsessive compulsive symptoms outside 
of these age-related differences.  
Contrary to expectation, no group differences were observed between the 
OCD and anxious group on measures of TAF. Consistent with past research 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1999) a significant group difference was found between those 
with and without an anxiety disorder, supporting the premise that TAF is an easily 
activated cognitive bias in all anxiety disorders (Rassin et al., 2001c). Consistent with 
previous studies the correlation between TAF and obsessionality appeared dependant 
on negative affect (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Muris et al., 2001). These findings 
support the hypothesis that TAF is best conceptualised as a general vulnerability 
factor occurring along a continuum of anxiety disorders (Rassin et al., 1999; Ferrier & 
Brewin, 2005), rather than specific to OCD (Rachman et al., 1995).  
It may also be the case that like different aspects of TAF are related to 
different types of pathology (Abramowitz et al., 2003). Clark, Purdon and Byers 
(2000) lend support for this argument demonstrating that obsessional clients with 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
159
predominantly aggressive obsessions experience high levels of TAF, while 
Emmelkamp and Aardema (1999) argue the case for TAF in washing and checking. 
Similarly, Rachman (1993) reported that TAF might be more closely associated with 
impulses rather than with intrusive thoughts or images, because in obsessional 
impulses, the form of action and often the victim are more vivid than in ruminative 
intrusive thoughts. 
Consistent with research done by Rachman et al. (1995) and Shafran et al. 
(1996), the results partially supported the hypothesis that TAF serves to inflate 
responsibility appraisals, which in turn leads to obsessive compulsive symptoms. 
However, in contrast to Smari and Holmsteinsson’s (2001) study, the current 
investigation found this relationship between variables to be predominantly due to 
differences in negative affect. The results suggested that depression mediates the 
relationship between TAF and responsibility, with both variables independently 
correlated with measures of obsessionality. It can be concluded that TAF plays some 
role in the inflated responsibility but does not appear to be crucial for the development 
of such beliefs.  
In contrast to Shafran et al. (1996), and Rassin et al. (2001a) who showed 
stronger correlations for likelihood TAF and obsessionality than TAF-morality, the 
current study found TAF-morality scores to be more strongly associated with 
obsessive compulsive symptoms and high inflated responsibility beliefs.  It may be 
the case that the OCD sample had high levels of magical ideation which research 
suggests is a central construct underlying the relationship between TAF-moral and 
obsessive compulsive symptoms (Einstein & Menzies, 2004). Alternatively, it is also 
likely that the discrepancy in findings is due to the trans-cultural aspects of OCD. For 
example, research has shown TAF-morality to correlate strongly with religiosity 
(Rassin & Koster, 2003), urbanisation (Petribu & Bastos, 1997), and aggressive 
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obsessions (Rachman, 1993). Based on this review, it is possible that TAF-morality 
bias is related to some factors embedded in the New Zealand culture. This issue 
deserves further study and attention.  
Lastly, while the current findings supported Salkovskis (1985) model, they are 
also in line with more general models of emotional disorders (Clark and Watson, 
1991; Barlow, 1991, 2000, 2002) as responsibility beliefs were also present in other 
anxiety disorders.  Likewise, the finding that negative affect mediated the relationship 
between TAF and obsessionality, supported the hypothesis that anxiety and mood 
disorders may be minor variations of broader underlying syndromes (Clark, Allen & 
Choate, 2004). However, whether this result is a reflection of the shared 
characteristics across the anxiety disorders, or suggests distinct relationships between 
disorder and dysfunctional cognitions remains to be seen.  
Limitations 
The findings of this study are limited by a number of methodological 
weaknesses. The most significant shortcoming relates to the small sample size of the 
study which may impact on the generalizability of findings and may account for the 
fact that group differences in feelings of TAF failed to reach significance. 
Consequently, the results should be interpreted with caution as they may reflect 
methodological problems inherent in a small sample size. This being said, the data 
found is largely consistent with the body of literature on the cognitive processes 
associated with OCD.  
The use of a student sample as a comparison group should also be considered 
a limitation as the level of educational attainment was higher than the patient groups. 
Likewise it could also be argued that this group is not representative of the general 
population. 
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Another limitation may relate to the measures themselves. The pattern of data 
observed for TAF was not that different from the responsibility measures, in that 
scores were highest in the OCD group and intermediate in the AC group. This raises 
the possibility that this measure was simply a less reliable indicator of its intended 
construct, rather than the conclusion drawn which was that TAF is not specific to 
OCD. Coupled with this, self-report measures also have the potential for social 
desirability response biases. Research by Newth and Rachman (2001) has shown that 
many individuals with OCD are reluctant to disclose information or endorse specific 
items to either a therapist or investigator due to the sensitive nature of some obsessive 
thoughts (i.e., perverse repugnant sexual obsessions).  
Another limitation relates to the correlational nature of the study which does 
inflate the chances of Type I error. While a stringent level of significance was 
selected, it would have been beneficial to include the Bonferroni procedure to correct 
for the inflated alpha level. The design of the study also precluded the examination of 
the causal role of TAF in the pathogenesis of OCD. A prospective design examining 
the participants’ TAF and inflated responsibility levels over time as a predictor of 
obsessive compulsive symptoms may help illuminate the relationship between TAF, 
responsibility and OCD. 
Clinical Implications 
The results suggest that whereas inflated responsibility appears to be a core 
cognitive belief in OCD, TAF may be best conceptualized as a non-specific cognitive 
bias in most anxiety disorders. Based on the variable rates of responding across 
groups, it is highly likely that several cognitive constructs are involved in the 
development and maintenance of obsessions and compulsions. For example, Coles et 
al., (2005) have suggested that feelings of incompleteness or “not just right” 
experiences play a role in OCD, while Tolin et al (2006a) have argued the case for 
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beliefs regarding the ‘need to control one’s thoughts’. Recently, the Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; 1997) have identified six key 
belief domains that should be included in the cognitive conceptualisation of OCD. 
Another issue relates to whether these cognitive processes (e.g., beliefs and/or 
appraisals) are equally relevant in all types of obsessive-compulsive behaviour (e.g., 
symptom-based subtypes). Previous research has demonstrated that OCD symptom 
subtypes differ with regard to treatment response (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Mataix-
Cols et al., 2002), relapse rates (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Mataix-Cols et al., 2002) 
and developmental differences (Geller et al., 2001a; Barrett & Healey, 2003; Farrell, 
2004). One explanation for these variable rates may be that the types of obsessive 
compulsive symptoms have different underlying cognitive processes. The 
identification of subtype specific dysfunctional beliefs has the potential to increase the 
efficacy of cognitive therapy, as more specific treatment protocols using the relevant 
beliefs can be developed. The subsequent study investigates whether the OCCWG 




























5. Cognitive Processing Characteristics in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD): 




5.1  Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that certain dysfunctional beliefs contribute to the 
clinical presentation and maintenance of OCD. However less understood is whether 
different “subtypes” of OCD are associated with a specific constellation of cognitive 
distortions. Individuals with OCD describe obsessive compulsive symptoms 
belonging to a number of different subtypes (e.g., contamination, sexual, symmetry, 
hoarding; e.g., Calamari et al., 1999; Leckman et al., 1997; Abramowitz, 2004). As 
seen in Chapter 3, preliminary research has shown correlations between several 
cognitive domains and obsessive symptoms (e.g., threat estimation to contamination 
obsessions; Tolin et al., 2006a; OCCWG, 2001); however, a comparison between 
empirically based-subgroups of OCD and cognitive variables is required. 
5.1.1 OCD Subtypes 
Research to identify specific subtypes of OCD has been diverse and wide 
ranging from (a) symptom theme (Calamari et al., 1999); (b) age of onset (Geller et 
al., 1998); (c) comorbidity (Nestadt et al., 2003); and (d) neuropsychological features 
and performance (Mataix-Cols et al., 2003). The methods used to document different 
subtypes vary greatly and often reflect a certain discipline. Whilst research employing 
symptom, theme-based subtypes has been criticised for methodological 
inconsistencies across studies (e.g., factor versus cluster analysis) and number of 
symptoms assessed (e.g., 10 versus 8 symptom items), it appears to be the most 
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empirically supported method for establishing subgroups of OCD. As a result, in 
order to identify the latent dimensions of symptoms and form subgroups, the present 
study will rely on multivariate statistical methods (e.g., cluster analysis) which allow 
for the complex patterns and symptom overlap often seen in OCD.  
5.1.2 Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; 1997, 2001, 2003, 
2005) 
Following a symposium on OCD-related beliefs at the World Congress of 
Behavioural and Cognitive Therapies in 1995, a small group of researchers met to 
discuss the cognitive assessment of OCD. Later, a working group was formed 
(OCCWG; 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005) with the goal being to develop measures of 
beliefs that distinguished OCD from other disorders. The OCCWG was divided into 
subcommittees and asked to review belief domains that appear most relevant to OCD 
as well as assessment methods (e.g., idiographic versus self-report). Ten years later, 
this group has made substantial progress with scale development and a template of 
the dysfunctional beliefs underlying OCD.  
The OCCWG (1997) define appraisals as ways in which meaning is attributed 
to specific events such as the occurrence of an intrusion. Particular expectations, 
interpretations and judgements are also considered part of the appraisal process. 
Beliefs on the other hand, refer to enduring patterns of responding or assumptions. 
These assumptions are non-specific and tend to be generalised to most situations 
(e.g., dysfunctional attitudes and irrational beliefs). Prior to discussing recent 
methods of assessment, it is necessary to briefly review the specific domains thought 
important in obsessive compulsive beliefs (see Chapter 3 for full discussion). 
Six belief domains are considered important, but not necessary exclusive to 
OCD. The first, inflated responsibility, the cornerstone of Salkovskis (1985, 1989) 
cognitive model refers to appraisals of personal responsibility for the occurrence and 
consequences associated with intrusive thoughts. Second is the belief that the mere 
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presence of a thought is significant (over-importance of thoughts). Thought-Action 
Fusion (TAF) is a subcategory of this belief. The third belief relates to the importance 
of controlling one’s thoughts. The tendency for individuals with OCD to over-
estimate threat (e.g., the probability and cost of aversive events) forms the fourth 
domain. The fifth belief coined intolerance of uncertainty taps into the great doubt, 
indecision and cautiousness observed in OCD. Perfectionism, defined as the 
excessive concern over mistakes is the final belief domain. 
To facilitate research into the cognitive mechanisms of OCD, the OCCWG 
(1997, 2001) developed the 87-item Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) and the 
31-item Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III). Together, these measures 
represent the abovementioned beliefs which are thought to characterise OCD. The 
OBQ measures beliefs related to inflated responsibility, overestimation of threat, 
importance of thoughts, intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism and control of 
thoughts. The III assesses appraisals regarding inflated responsibility, control of 
thoughts and importance of thoughts. However, recent studies using factor analytic 
techniques on non-clinical (Woods, Tolin & Abramowitz, 2004) and clinical samples 
(OCCWG, 2005) has shown the OBQ-87 and the III to be highly inter-correlated. 
In the first of two studies, the OCCWG (2001) demonstrated that participants 
with OCD scored significantly higher than non-clinical participants on every OBQ 
subscale, and scored higher than anxious controls on three (Responsibility, Control 
and Importance of Thoughts) of the six OBQ subscales (see Taylor et al., 2002). 
Regarding the III, participants with OCD scored higher on two (Responsibility, 
Control of Thoughts) of the three III subscales, but not appraisals related to 
Importance of Thoughts.  Consequently, many questioned the specificity of beliefs 
related to Tolerance for Uncertainty, Over-estimation of Threat and Perfectionism to 
OCD (Taylor et al., 2002).  
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 In the second study, the OCCWG (2005) used exploratory factor analysis  to 
reduce the six theoretically derived subscales (OBQ-87; OCCWG, 2001) to three 
empirically based subscales (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2003): (a) Responsibility/Threat 
Estimation (RT: a perceived need to prevent harm from happening to oneself or 
others, fears of the consequences of inaction, and responsibility for bad things 
happening); (b) Perfectionism/Certainty (PC: high, absolute standards of completion, 
rigidity, concern over mistakes and feelings of uncertainty); and (c) 
Importance/Control of Thoughts (ICT: fears of the consequences of having intrusive 
and/or distressing thoughts or images, thought-action fusion, and the need to rid 
oneself of intrusive thoughts). The hypothesized domains of the III (importance and 
control of thoughts and responsibility) loaded together onto a single factor described 
as ‘the negative interpretation of thoughts’.   
The OCCWG (in press) has shown the III total score and the 44-item version 
of the OBQ to be predictive of obsessive compulsive symptomotology. However, as 
the focus of the present investigation is on the specific content of individual belief 
domains to specific manifestations of OCD (e.g., subgroups), the current study 
compared the subgroups across the six individual belief domains of the OBQ-87, and 
then the three pooled subscales of the 44-item version. This method was employed to 
assess the degree of contribution of belief domain in each subgroup. 
5.2  Study II 
Recent theoretical and empirical work on OCD emphasises the importance of 
cognitive beliefs and appraisals in the etiology and maintenance of OCD (Freeston et 
al., 1996; Frost & Steketee, 2002; Purdon, 2001; OCCWG, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005). 
However at this time, there is no consensus about the extent to which maladaptive 
beliefs underlie the different symptom-based subtypes of OCD. The present 
investigation addressed this question by examining whether the six OBQ-87 scales 
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and the three OBQ-44 scales were significantly associated with one or more 
empirically derived OCD subtypes.  In line with previous research, it was predicted 
that the relationship between cognitive variables and OCD subtypes would be 
characterised by specificity and congruence: 
 (i) The OCD subgroups will endorse different OBQ domains (specificity). 
(ii) Different obsessive beliefs relate to the different OCD subtypes in a 
meaningful way (congruence). 
5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1 Participants  
Participants (n = 67) were recruited from one out-patient unit, the Anxiety 
Disorders Unit (ADU) in Christchurch over a period of one year (24-11-03 to 04-10-
04). All participants met DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
diagnostic criteria for OCD as assessed by a senior clinician at ADU. Comorbid 
diagnoses were allowed, providing OCD was the primary diagnosis. For those 
individuals meeting DSM-IV-TR criteria, diagnoses were confirmed using the 
anxiety disorders module of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
Disorders: Clinician Version (SCID-CV; First et al., 1997) by the principal 
researcher.  
Participants’ educational and occupational levels were obtained using a self-
report checklist (refer Appendix D). Most of the participants were receiving 
medication for OCD and related disorders but remained symptomatic. Likewise, 
those participants involved in treatment at the time of testing were not excluded 
provided they remained symptomatic. Participants were excluded if they had a 
diagnosis of current substance abuse or a lifetime history of developmental or 
psychotic disorders and/or had experienced a head injury resulting in cognitive 
impairment. Participants received a ten dollar food voucher for participation. 
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5.2.1.2 Materials  
5.2.1.2.1  Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders: 
Clinician Version (SCID-CV; First et al., 1997)  
The SCID was administered by the principal investigator to assess DSM-IV-
TR Axis I psychological disorders. It is a widely used instrument with acceptable 
psychometric properties (First et al., 2004). The SCID was developed for use in 
research and incorporates: (a) obligatory questions; (b) operational criteria from the 
DSM-IV; (c) a categorical system for rating symptoms; and (d) and an algorithm for 
arriving at a final diagnosis (Ventura, Liberman, Green, Shaner & Mintz, 1998). The 
SCID is routinely used in research because it minimises inconsistencies in the 
application of criteria and increases diagnostic accuracy. The principal investigator 
was trained in the use of the SCID by a senior clinical psychologist. In the present 
study, the reliability of diagnoses was assessed by audiotaping one in every five of 
these interviews and giving it to a clinical psychologist to document the percent 
diagnostic agreement for each diagnosis. 
5.2.1.2.2 Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al., 
1989).  
 
The YBOCS consists of three parts: (a) definitions and examples of 
obsessions and compulsions; (b) symptom checklist, containing over 40 obsessions 
and 29 compulsions; (c) severity checklist of symptoms independent of symptom 
content. The YBOCS has acceptable-to-good internal consistency with coefficients 
ranging from .69 to .91 (Goodman, et al., 1989).  
Interview Schedule: The YBOCS-SC (symptom checklist) requires an average 
of 40 minutes per person from a trained interviewer (Taylor, 1995). The YBOCS 
interview allows clinicians to rate the current presence, or absence, of obsessive 
compulsive symptoms. The full checklist comprises 74 items. Each item represents 
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one discrete obsessive or compulsive symptom, which corresponds to one of fifteen 
rationally derived categories of obsessions or compulsions. In a similar vein to Baer 
(1994) and Calamari et al. (1999; 2004), responses on each on the 15 symptom 
categories of the YBOCS were assigned a numerical value: 0 (the participant did not 
endorse any symptoms), 1 (the participant endorsed at least one symptom but the 
category was not considered primary) or 2 (symptoms were endorsed and the 
category was considered a principal problem). In contrast to previous studies (e.g., 
Mataix-Cols et al., 1999; 2002), the miscellaneous obsession and compulsion 
categories were also scored and included for analyses. The scoring procedure 
described by Calamari et al. (1999; 2003) was selected over others (see Leckman et 
al., 1997), because the participants’ major obsessional concern is distinguished from 
the most endorsed symptom category (see Calamari et al., 2003 for discussion of this 
issue).  
 Severity checklist: YBOCS-severity checklist consists of 10 core items 
assessing five parameters of obsessions (items 1-5) and compulsions (items 6-10): (i) 
duration/frequency; (ii) interference in social and occupational functioning; (iii) 
associated distress; (iv) degree of resistance; and (v) perceived control over 
obsessions or compulsions. Each core item is rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 0 
(none) to 4 (extreme). Participants are required to answer these questions based on 
the severity over the past week. Scores on the 10-core items are summed to yield 
scores for the obsessions subscale, the compulsions subscale, and the total (10-item) 
YBOCS severity score. A cut-off of 16 or higher is generally required to determine 
eligibility in clinical studies (Shear, Feske, Brown, Mammen and Scotti, 2000). 
5.2.1.2.3 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1998).  
The BDI-II is a self-report measure of depression. The psychometric 
properties of the BDI-II have been described in earlier sections (refer section 5.3).  
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5.2.1.2.4 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  
The psychological and physiological symptoms of anxiety were assessed 
using the Beck Anxiety Inventory.  The BAI is a 21-item self-report measure which 
instructs participants to rate each item as to how much the symptom has bothered 
them in the past week. Ratings are made on a scale from 0 = not at all to 3 = severely. 
The BAI has been shown to have high short term test/retest reliability and internal 
consistency as well as strong convergent and discriminant validity (Fydrich, Dowdall, 
& Chambless, 1992).  
5.2.1.2.5 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-87 (OBQ-87; OCCWG, 1997)  
 The OCCWG developed the OBQ-87 and the III in order to assess specific 
cognitive characteristics of obsessional thinking. The OBQ consists of 87-items 
reflecting certain belief statements which form six rationally derived subscales (see 
Woods et al., 2004 for review of beliefs): (a) control of thoughts (14 items); (b) 
importance of thoughts (14 items); (c) responsibility (16 items); (d) intolerance of 
uncertainty (13 items); (e) overestimation of threat (14 items); and (f) perfectionism 
(16 items). On each item, participants are required to indicate their general level of 
agreement with each statement (‘what you are like most of the time’) on a 7-point 
rating scale that ranges from (1) ‘disagree very much’ to (4) ‘neutral’ to (7) ‘agree 
very much’. Subscale scores are calculated by summing across their respective items. 
Internal consistency and test-retest reliability estimates are good to excellent for all 
subscales (0.93-0.82) and (0.83 – 0.48) respectively (OCCWG, 2003). 
5.2.1.2.6 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44; 2003)  
The revised OBQ consists is a subset of the OBQ-87 and consists of 44 belief 
items which form three factor analytically distinguishable subscales: (a) Inflated 
personal responsibility and the tendency to over-estimate threat (perceived need to 
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prevent harm from happening to oneself or others, fears of the consequences of 
inaction, and responsibility for bad things happening); (b) perfectionism and 
intolerance of uncertainty (high, absolute standards of completion, rigidity, concern 
over mistakes and feelings of uncertainty); and (c) over-importance and over-control 
of thoughts (fears of the consequences of having intrusive and/or distressing thoughts 
or images, thought-action fusion, and the need to rid oneself of intrusive thoughts). 
The scoring procedure is the same as the OBQ-87 and the OBQ-44 does not contain 
any new items.  
5.2.1.2.7 Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III; OCCWG, 1997).  
The aim of the Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III; (OBQ; Obsessive 
Compulsives Cognitions Working Group, 1997, 2001, 2003) is composed of 31 items 
reflecting three appraisal domains: (a) importance of thoughts (10 items); (b) control 
of thoughts (11 items); and (c) responsibility (10 items).  Participants are given a 
verbal definition of unwanted ego-dystonic mental intrusions, as well as examples of 
obsessive themes and content. Participants are required to write in the space provided 
two intrusive thoughts, images or impulses they have recently experienced. 
Participants then complete single-item ratings of the recency, frequency, and distress 
of the intrusions.  
Participants rate their level of belief within the past two weeks for each of the 
31 statements as they relate to the two intrusive thoughts they recorded on the 
questionnaire. Strength of belief in the appraisals is then assessed from 0 ‘I did not 
believe this idea at all’ to 100 ‘I was completely convinced this idea was true’. To 
facilitate interpretation, the 100-point scale was transformed arithmetically by 
dividing the total score by 10 so that the III total score ranged from 0 to 310. Subscale 
scores are calculated by summing over their respective items. The III has been 
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reported to have high internal consistency across subscales (0.93-0.79), and test/retest 
reliability ranging from 0.77 to 0.64 (OCCWG, 2003). 
5.2.1.3 Procedure 
Prior to recruitment, clinicians at the Anxiety Disorders Unit were asked to 
inform any client who met DSM-IV-TR criteria for OCD of the current study. Those 
who expressed interest were assessed for eligibility in the study by the first author 
using the SCID-CV. Following confirmation of diagnosis, participants were shown 
into a secure room at the ADU.  Participants were given an information sheet which 
explained the aims and procedures of the research (refer Appendix E) and written 
consent was obtained (refer Appendix F). Participants were given the opportunity to 
indicate on the consent form whether to participate in the follow up study.  
Next, participants were interviewed by the primary examiner using the SCID. 
Of those referred, only one person was eliminated because the symptoms were more 
consistent with Body Dysmorphic Disorder rather than OCD. One in five of these 
interviews were audio taped and sent to another clinical psychologist to rate in order 
to monitor consistency and reliability of interpretation. There was 100 per cent inter-
rater agreement for all diagnoses. The YBOCS clinician-rated symptom and severity 
checklists were then administered to establish subgroups. After a short ten minute 
break, participants completed the following self report measures in order: BAI, BDI-
II, OBQ-87, and the III (order). The session lasted between 60 to 120 minutes; 
however no time limit was enforced. 
5.2.1.4 Statistical Analysis 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of all 67 participants were 
examined by means of chi-square tests. The formation of OCD subgroups was 
achieved using hierarchical cluster analysis on the YBOCS symptom checklist rating 
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scores. In line with Calamari et al. (1999) study, Ward’s hierarchical agglomerative 
cluster analysis was used to establish initial clusters, as this technique finds groupings 
that have the smallest ratio of within group to between groups, variance (Borgen & 
Barnett, 1987; Calamari et al., 1999). The percentage change in agglomeration and 
introspection of the dendrograms were used to determine the number of clusters for 
the hierarchical solution. As the statistical software required to cross-validate these 
cluster solutions using K means analysis was not available, the means of the 
identified cluster solutions were compared to those obtained by Calamari et al. 
(2004). Whilst it is recognised that this procedure is not subject to the same rigorous 
standards as those of Calamari et al. (1999), the use of comparative analysis provides 
the best option given the aforementioned restrictions.  
The relationship between demographic characteristics and the five subgroups 
were examined by means of chi-square tests. Following this, within group differences 
on the six subscales of the OBQ-87 and 44 were examined using one-way between-
subjects multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Next, a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the subgroups and the OBQ subscales with 
Wilks’ lambda used as the overall test of significance (p < .05). Subgroup differences 
on all five measures were examined with post-hoc HSD Tukey tests using a p value 
of .05. Effect sizes were calculated according to Cohen’s d (1988). Pearson 
correlations were computed between the subgroups and the OBQ-87 and the revised 
44-item version. Partial correlations while controlling for depression (BDI-II) and 
generalised anxiety (BAI) were performed to assess the influence of these variables 
on the results. regression analysis was performed to establish which variables best 
predicted the OCD subtypes. Lastly, the results should be interpreted with caution 
given the limitations associated with multivariate analysis (e.g. inflation of Type I 
error). 




5.2.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
The sample included 67 adults (28 males and 39 females) who met DSM-IV-
TR criteria for OCD (refer Appendix G for sample characteristics). The mean age 
(standard deviations) of the sample was 37 (11.7). The age of onset of OCD27 in the 
sample was evenly split with 54 percent reporting late onset OCD (LOD); 40 percent 
early onset OCD (EOD) and six percent OCD onset post partum. The majority of the 
sample were (a) New Zealand European (87%); (b) attained a secondary level 
education (67%); (c) were employed (55%); (d) were single or divorced (55%); (e) 
receiving Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) antidepressant medication 
(85%); and (f) had a positive a family history of a psychological disorder (75%).   
Consistent with other research (Brown et al., 2001), a high degree of 
comorbidity was observed with Social Phobia (SP; 30%) and Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD; 36%; see Appendix G). The sample varied in terms of symptom 
severity, but all scores were within the clinical ranges (see Table 10).  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Table 10 
Symptom Severity  
Study  Clinical Non-clinical  
(n = 67) sample sample  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Symptom severity         
YBOCS Total: M (SD)  22.3 (7.6) 21.3 (5.3) 28 12.6 (9.3) 
Compulsions    11.4 (4.0) 10.7 (3.3) a 6.0 (5.0) 
Obsessions    11.3 (4.0) 10.6 (2.7) a 6.6 (5.1) 
BDI-II score: M (SD)   18.5 (14.3) 
BAI score: M (SD)   16.4 (12.4) 
Clinical sample = OCD + AC groups; Non-clinical = NAC Group. 
                                                 
 
27 In the present study, early onset OCD (EOD) was defined by symptom development before the age 
of 15 years (Hemmings, Kinnear, Lochner, Niehaus, Knowles, Mool-Smook, Corfield & Stein, 2004) 
and development of clinically significant distress (Cavallini et al., 2002) not onset of OCD 
symptomotology (Rosario-Campos et al., 2001).  
28 Steketee et al., 1996) 
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5.2.2.2 Five subgroup taxonomy 
Fig. 4 displays the dendrogram (tree diagram) derived from cluster analysis of 
obsessive compulsive symptoms assessed by the YBOCS-SC. Consistent with 
previous research (Leckman et al., 1997; Mataix-Cols et al., 1999; 2002; 
Summerfeldt et al., 1999; Calamari et al., 2004), a solution of five clusters was 
obtained through the hierarchical procedure: (a) aggressive obsessions - checking 
compulsions (n = 17); (b) symmetry obsessions – ordering compulsions (n = 16); (c) 
contamination obsessions – cleaning compulsions (n = 16); (d) miscellaneous 
obsessions (sexual, religious, somatic) – miscellaneous compulsions (repeating, 
counting; n = 11); and (e) hoarding obsessions – hoarding compulsions (n = 7). 
Cluster solutions of six or seven did not improve the interpretability of clusters. Table 
11 displays the YBOCS mean scores for this five group arrangement. The cluster 
solutions were consistent with those of the other studies (see Appendix H for a 
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Figure 4: Dendrogram Representing Cluster Analysis of OCD Symptom Categories 
5.2.2.3 Demographic and clinical characteristics of subgroups 
Contrary to previous research (see Geller et al., 1998), the subgroups were 
very similar demographically. As seen in Table 12, despite a higher representation of 
women in the hoarding subgroup, no significant gender differences [χ2 [4, 62] = 6.5, p 
= .16, ns] were found. Likewise, the subgroups did not significantly differ in age (F 
(4, 62) = 1.5, p = .20), marital status [x2 [4, 62] = 9.9, p = .27] or educational level (x2 
[4, 62] = 2.9, p = .56). Contrary to expectation, age-of-onset (x2 [4, 62] = 2.7, p = .95) 
was comparable across subgroups.  
Consistent with other research (see Brown et al., 2001), a high degree of 
comorbidity was observed across the sample. While these differences were not 
significant (x2 [4, 62] = 6.1, p = .64), Social anxiety was higher in the miscellaneous 
group (54%) and most of the participants with comorbid GAD were found in the 
hoarding subgroup (57%). Consistent with previous research (Carter, Pollock, Suvak 
& Paul, 2004), a high degree of comorbid depressive disorders was found, 
particularly in the hoarding subgroup. All participants in the current sample had a 
family history of depression, generalised anxiety or OCD. 
5.2.2.4 Group comparisons of measures of depression and obsessionality  
 Between subgroup differences on depression, anxiety and obsessive–compulsive 
symptomotology measures were then evaluated using multivariate analysis. Table 13 
displays the mean and standard deviations of subgroups across these measures. No 
significant differences emerged between groups on these measures (F (4, 62) = 1.4, 
p<.14). The aggressive and miscellaneous groups tended to exhibit the most 
depressive symptoms, with the lowest depressive scores found in the contamination 
group. Participants in the hoarding subgroup tended to demonstrate less generalised 
anxiety (BAI) than other subgroups, but overall severity of obsessive compulsive 
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symptoms (YBOCS) was equally distributed (F (4, 62) =.79, p = .54 ns). The findings 
regarding OC symptom severity remained constant when controlling for the levels of 
depression (F (4, 62) =1.7, p = .15 ns) and generalised anxiety (F (4, 62) =1.5, p = .12 
ns).  




YBOCS Scale Symptom Rating For Subgroups (n = 5)            
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C) Misc (M)  Hoarding (H)    F (4, 62) Contrastsa 
    (n = 17)   (n = 16)  (n = 16)   (n = 11)  (n = 7)    
Variable   Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD______________________________ 
O, Aggressive  2.0  .00  .38 .5  .56 .51  .73 .65  .14 .38    37.8*** A>(S, C, M, H) 
O, Contamination .65 .49  .31 .48  2.0 .00  .27 .47  .29 .49    45.6*** C> (A, S, M, H) 
O, Hoarding  .29 .47  .13 .34  .06 .25  .00 .00  2.0 .00    56.2*** H> (A, M); S>H>C 
O, Miscellaneous .24 .44  .13 .34  .00 .00  .45 .82  .00 .00    2.2 ns   
O, Religious  .00 .00  .13 .34  .19 .54  .45 .82  .00 .00       1.9 ns 
O, Sexual  .12 .33  .00 .00  .00 .00  1.4 .92  .00 .00    24.6*** M> (A, S, C, H) 
O, Somatic  .24 .44  .06 .25  .25 .45  .18 .60  .00 .00    .82 ns 
O, Symmetry  .47 .62  2.0 .00  .63 .50  .36 .51  .43 .54    30.8*** S> (A, C, M, H) 
C, Checking  1.82 .53  .94 .68  1.0 .52  1.18 .87  .43 .54    7.78*** (C=A)> (S, M, H) 
C, Cleaning  .24 .44  .31 .48  1.88 .34  .45 .69  .29 .49    32.3*** C> (A, S, M, H) 
C, Counting  .53 .72  .56 .81  .38 .62  .00 .00  .29 .49    1.6 ns 
C, Hoarding  .06 .24  .13 .34  .06 .25  .09 .30  2.0 .00    78.8*** H>(A, S, C, M) 
C, Miscellaneous .53 .62  .13 .34  .06 .25  .36 .67  .00 .00    3.1*  A>M 
C, Ordering  .35 .49  1.56 .73  .31 .48  .36 .67  .43 .53    12.9*** S> (A, C, M, H) 
C, Repeating  .53 .72  .38 .50  .31 .60  .55 .93  .14 .38    .64 ns 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05; 1 = Harming; 2 = Symmetry; 3 = Contamination; 4 = Miscellaneous (sexual + religious + somatic obsessions and repeating + 
counting compulsions; 5 = Hoarding (5). O before a category denotes ‘obsessions’ and C denotes to ‘compulsions’. Symptom categories on the 15 YBOCS 
checklist sections were scored 0 (the participant did not endorse any symptoms), 1 (the participant endorsed at least one symptom but the category was not 










Demographic and Clinical Characteristics (%) Of OCD Subgroups            
   
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Misc (M) Hoarding (H)    χ2 (4, 62)  
     (n = 17)   (n = 16)  (n = 16)    (n = 11) (n = 7)    
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Age:  mean (SD)   37 (13)   39 (13)   34 (8)    34 (11)  45 (5)  1.5 ns 
Female: male    9: 8   6: 10   8: 8    5: 6  0: 7  6.5 ns 
Married: cohabitating: divorced 6: 9: 2   7: 6: 3   7: 8: 1    4: 5: 2  1: 2: 4  9.9 ns 
Secondary: tertiary (years)  9: 8   11: 5   8: 8    8: 3  3: 4  2.9 ns 
EOD: LOD: Postpartum  7: 10: 0  6: 9: 1   7: 8: 1    5: 5: 1  2: 4: 1  2.7 ns 
Employed (%)    47%   31%   50%    27%  14%  4.1 ns 
 
Comorbid Axis I disorders29 (%)     
Social Phobia    29%   31%   12.5%    54%  29%  5.5 ns 
Generalised Anxiety   18%   12.5%   6%    18%  28%  2.2 ns 
Major Depressive Disorder  29%   31%   43%    27%  57%  2.6 ns 
 
Positive family history: a                 6.1 ns 
OCD alone    5%   18%   25%    -  28%   
OCD and MDD   60%   44%   50%    55%  42% 
Anxiety and substance abuse  35%   38%   25%    45%  28% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. EOD = early onset OCD; LOD = late onset OCD. YBOCS = Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. 
Miscellaneous category = sexual + religious + somatic obsessions and repeating + counting compulsions. . a DSM-IV-TR Axis I disorder 
 
                                                 
 
 




Subgroup Differences on Measures of Depression, Anxiety and Obsessionality 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Sample  Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C) Misc (M)  Hoarding (H)  F (4, 62) 
  (n = 67)   (n = 17)   (n = 16)  (n = 16)   (n = 11)  (n = 7)    
Variable  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean________________ 
YBOCS: T 22.7 (7.6)  21.7 (7.9)  21.1 (7.7)  25.4  (8.4)  21.9  (6.9)  23.7 (6.0)  .79  
YBOCS: O 11.3 (4.0)  11.5 (3.9)  10.1 (3.9)  12.5  (4.4)  10.5 (4.1)  11.7 (3.1)  .89  
YBOCS: C 11.4 (4.0)  10.1 (4.3)  11.1  (4.3)  12.9  (4.1)  11.4 (3.3)  12.0 (2.9)  1.1  
BAI  16.4 (12.4)  18.7 (12.7)  13.4 (10.3)  16.1 (11.6)  21.2 (17.1)  10.4 (7.2)  1.2  
BDI  18.5 (14.3)  21.2 (15.4)  17.6 (12.8)  15.4 (13.6)  21.3 (15.1)  16.6 (17.5)  .47  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. YBOCS = Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. YBOCS: T = Total score; YBOCS: O = Obsessions score; YBOCS: C = Compulsions score. 
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5.2.2.5 Subgroup differences on measures of cognition (III) 
The five groups (Aggressive, Symmetry, Contamination, Miscellaneous and 
Hoarding) were compared with post hoc comparisons on the six OBQ subscales 
(Table 5). To protect against inflated Type I error, the subgroups were compared on 
all of the variables by means of a MANOVA. The result was significant; F (4, 
62) = 2.2, p < .001. The univariate comparisons for each variable can be seen in Table 
5. Accordingly, Type I error was adequately constrained, and so the post-hoc 
comparisons were conducted at the conventional p < .05 level.  
As seen in Table 14, the OCD subgroups varied substantially across the OBQ 
subscales (see Fig 5), with subgroups’ characterisation on the six subscales (cognitive 
profiles) largely consistent with those reported by Calamari et al. (2004) and current 
literature. Intolerance of uncertainty beliefs were significantly higher in the 
contamination group (F (4, 62) = 3.3, p < .05.) and while not statistically significant, 
the symmetry subgroup was stronger on the perfectionism scale relative to the other 
subgroups. Marginally significant differences were found for the aggressive subgroup 
on the responsibility scale F (4, 62) = 2.2, p =.08 and the miscellaneous group 
demonstrated the highest levels of control and importance of thoughts (TAF) beliefs. 
This finding is to be expected given the high preponderance of religious concerns in 
this group (n = 6).  
Similar to the symmetry group, high levels of perfectionism beliefs were 
found in those with predominantly hoarding concerns. Threat estimation was highest 
in the aggressive and contamination subgroups. Regression analyses, controlling for 
the levels of depression and anxiety, yielded similar results of the MANOVA (F (4, 
62) =2.4, p < .001) with the Intolerance of Uncertainty subscale emerging as a strong 
predictor of contamination concerns R2 = .33, F (4, 61) = 4.9, p < .01). Perfectionism 
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and Responsibility subscales emerged as being marginally predictive of symmetry (R2 
= .08) and aggressive concerns (R2 = .07).  
















































































Figure 5: Mean Scores for the Six Obsessional Belief Questionnaire-87 Subscales 
for the Five Subgroup Taxonomy. 
 
Correlational analysis (Table 15) was conducted to test for the relationship 
between symptom severity and cognitive belief (OBQ-87). The results suggest 
significantly strong correlations between the YBOCS total score and three belief 
domains (Intolerance of Uncertainty (r = .27, p < .05), Threat-estimation (r = .27, p < 
.05), and Control of Thoughts (r = .30, p < .001) but not Responsibility, 
Perfectionism and Importance of Thoughts. As the OBQ subscales were moderately 
correlated with the BAI and BDI (r’s = .32 to .43, p < .001), partial correlations were 
calculated. The correlations between symptom severity and subscales (Intolerance of 
Uncertainty, Threat-estimation and Control of thoughts) lost significance (r’s = .09 to 
.14, ns) when these variables were controlled for.  




Between Subgroup Differences on Measures of Cognition 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C) Misc (M)  Hoarding (H)  F (4, 62) Contrastsa    
(n = 17)   (n = 16)  (n = 16)   (n = 11)  (n = 7)    
Variable   Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)   Mean (SD) ______________________________ 
OBQ 87: U-scale 59.5 (14.2)  57.6 (14.0)  67.6 (10.0)  49.9 (15.5)  63.7 (8.7)  3.3**   (C>A, S, M, H) 
OBQ 87: T-scale 66.4 (19.0)  56.3 (22.3)  66.6 (17.6)  58.6 (20.7)  57.9 (13.0)  .44  
OBQ 87: C-scale 68.8 (13.8)  66.2 (19.1)  72.1 (12.4)  73.9 (14.6)  67.1 (9.8)  .63  
OBQ 87: I-scale 51.2 (17.9)  45.5 (19.3)  50.6 (20.3)  56.1 (20.8)  43.4 (10.3)  .75   
OBQ 87: R-scale 83.1 (15.2)  65.3 (25.6)  79.8 (16.8)  69.3 (22.7)  70.1 (17.9)  2.2   
OBQ 87: P-scale 67.9 (24.7)  80.8 (16.6)  77.4 (17.3)  67.2 (22.4)  79.2 (20.1)  1.4  
OBQ 87: Total 397 (89.6)  371 (104.9)  414 (70.1)  375 (90.1)  381 (63.9)  .61  
OBQ 44: RT  82.6 (16.8)  63.2 (28.9)  79.2 (20.9)  67.4 (24.1)  66.0 (18.0)  2.1, (p = .08) 
OBQ 44: PC   73.8 (22.9)  83.3 (14.4)  84.1 (12.7)  69.9 (22.4)  84.4 (19.4)  1.7  
OBQ 44: ICT   44.9 (15.8)  40.2 (16.7)  43.8 (17.6)  51.8 (18.1)  39.8 (6.2)  .98  
OBQ 44: Total 201 (48.1)  186 (55)  207 (40.3)  189 (49.8)  190 (33.8)  .52    
 
III 31: C-scale  73.6 (21.1)  74.2 (30.4)  74.5 (22.1)  79.0 (25.0)  73.5 (16.1)  .11  
III 31: I-scale  46.5 (25.5)  43.0 (28.9)  46.6 (24.4)  44.0 (24.3)  44.9 (22.0)  .06  
III 31: R-scale  71.2 (19.8)  56.7 (35.4)  70.9 (23.3)  61.2 (31.1)  55.9 (25.7)  1.0  
III 31: Total  191 (61.1)  173 (89.7)  192 (63)  184 (71.4)  174 (52.1)  .21  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; III = Interpretation of Intrusions Questionnaire; OBQ: U-Scale = Intolerance of uncertainty; OBQ; T-Scale = Over-
estimation of threat; OBQ: C-Scale = Over-control of thoughts; OBQ: I-Scale = Importance of thoughts; OBQ: R-Scale = Responsibility; OBQ: P-Scale = 
Perfectionism; OBQ-44: RT-Scale = Responsibility and over-estimate threat; OBQ 44: PC Scale = perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty; OBQ 44: ICT-Scale = 
over-importance and over-control of thoughts; III 31: C-Scale = Over-control of thoughts; III 31: I-Scale = Importance of thoughts; ; III 31: R-Scale = Responsibility; 
**significant at the .01 level (2-tailed);  






Correlation Matrix: Obsessive Compulsive Symptom Severity and OBQ-87 
________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  YBOCS-O  YBOCS-C  YBOCS-T  
________________________________________________________________ 
OBQ 87: U-scale .25*   .29*   .27*  
OBQ 87: T-scale .23*   .29**   .27* 
OBQ 87: C-scale .26*   .31**   .30** 
OBQ 87: I-scale .14   .16   .15   
OBQ 87: R-scale .07   .15   .11  
OBQ 87: P-scale .12   .11   .12 
OBQ 87: Total .21*   .26*   .24* 
_________________________________________________________________ 




Subsequently, group differences were investigated on the three empirically 
derived subscales from the OBQ-44: Responsibility/Threat estimation (RT), 
Perfectionism/Certainty (PC) and Importance/Control of thoughts (IC). The 
subgroups were compared on the OBQ-44 variables by means of a MANOVA with 
significant results; F (4, 62) = 2.6, p < .01. As seen in Table 14, post hoc one-way 
ANOVA’s revealed no statistically significant group differences on the OBQ-44 
scales. To assess whether these findings were attributable to the influence of another 
variable, MANCOVA’s were conducted with the BDI as covariate in the first analysis 
and the BAI in the second. In the first analysis, the removal of the BDI resulted in a 
significant group effect (F (4, 62) = 2.8, p < .001.) on the Perfectionism/Control scale 
(F (4, 62) = 2.8, p < .05). Covarying for the BAI did not change the results.  
Based on the OBQ-87; 44 and III results, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: (a) Responsibility/Threat beliefs were higher in the aggressive-checking and 
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contamination-cleaning subgroups; (b) Perfectionism/Certainty beliefs were higher in 
symmetry-ordering, contamination-washing and hoarding subgroups; and (c) 
Importance/Control beliefs were elevated in the miscellaneous subgroups. While not 

















Figure 6: Cognitive Profiles of the Five OCD Subgroups on the Three Subscales 
of the OBQ-44 
 
Multivariate analysis of subgroup differences on the III also revealed no 
significant differences F (4, 62) = 1.0, p = .41). This finding supports the OCCWG’s 
(2001) earlier argument that the distinction between interpretations of thoughts and 
beliefs may be difficult for people to make using self-report questionnaires. The 
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results remained the same when controlling for depression F (4, 62) = 1.1, p = .33) 
and anxiety F (4, 62) = 1.2, p = .31).  
5.2.3 Discussion 
The present study investigated whether statistically derived subgroups of 
OCD were significantly differentiated on measures of cognition (OBQ and III). 
Overall, the hypothesis that all OCD subtypes would differ significantly on these 
measures was not supported as only one belief domain (intolerance of uncertainty) 
emerged as being statistically significant. Consistent with the only other study in this 
area (Calamari et al., 2004), few differences between subgroups on the OBQ and III 
were found. At first glance, these results tend to suggest that the OBQ beliefs are non-
specific to any type of obsessional concern or compulsive behaviour. However, this 
conclusion may be premature, given the substantial within group variability 
(subgroup trends), and research showing a clear link between some dysfunctional 
beliefs and obsessive compulsive symptoms (refer Chapter 3). The following sections 
discuss the pattern of subgroup responding on the cognitive measures, and where 
possible draw comparisons from research showing that different cognitive models 
may apply to different subtypes of the disorder. 
The five subgroup taxonomy (aggressive obsessions–checking compulsions; 
contamination obsessions–cleaning compulsions; symmetry concerns–
ordering/arranging compulsions; hoarding-hoarding; miscellaneous obsessions –
miscellaneous compulsions) was largely comparable to those studies using a cluster 
analytic approach to subtype OCD (Calamari et al., 2004; Calamari et al., 1999; 
Abramowitz et al., 2003a). The hoarding, symmetry, contamination and aggressive 
clusters were consistent with other studies using the YBOCS-checklist (Baer, 1994; 
Leckman et al., 1997; Hantouche & Lancrenon, 1996; Mataix-Cols, 1999; 2002; 
Summerfeldt et al., 1999). Our miscellaneous subgroup was similar to that found in 
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Calamari et al. (1999) ‘obsessional subgroup’, but was not reported in other studies as 
it was omitted from scoring (Baer, 1994; Leckman et al., 1997; Mataix-Cols, 1999). 
In other studies increased sample sizes (Ns 200-300) allowed for further delineation 
of the miscellaneous symptoms (see Calamari et al., 2004; Summerfeldt et al., 2004). 
These results suggest the five subgroups identified are relatively stable clusters of 
obsessive compulsive phenomena.  
Since the publication of the OBQ and III in 2001, seven studies have used this 
measure to examine various aspects of OCD. Investigations have ranged from 
identifying OCD subgroups defined by differences in the strength of OBQ beliefs 
(Taylor et al., 2006); and the role of OBQ beliefs in Obsessive Compulsive Spectrum 
Disorders (Anholt et al., 2004). Several studies have examined the relationship 
between the OBQ beliefs in cognitive constructs like inferential confusion (Aardema 
et al., 2005); religiosity (Abramowitz et al., 2004); and cultural aspects (Sica et al., 
2004). To the author’s knowledge, the current investigation is only the second to 
examine the specificity of the OBQ beliefs in empirically derived subgroups of OCD 
using the YBOCS checklist. The following sections discuss the subgroup trends on 
the dependent variables (OBQ, III). 
From a theoretical standpoint, the results are generally consistent with other 
studies that emerged while the current study was in progress (OCCWG, 2004; Taylor 
et al., 2005; Calamari et al., 2004; Calamari et al., in press) as the differences in 
means were in the predicted direction. The aggressive and contamination subgroups 
demonstrated the highest mean scores on measures of responsibility and threat 
estimation. These findings are consistent with contemporary cognitive models 
(Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985) and comparable to the OCCWG study (n = 
410) showing the OBQ/Responsibility/Threat Estimations subscale to predict 
harming thoughts and contamination concerns. The result is also consistent with 
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Calamari et al (in press) study showing the contamination/harm subgroup to have the 
highest scores on the responsibility/threat belief domain. 
Contrary to previous research (Thordarson & Shafran, 2002), the 
miscellaneous group demonstrated the strongest relationship with both the importance 
of thoughts subscale (OBQ-87) and the importance and control of thoughts (OBQ-44) 
belief domains rather than the harming subgroup. This result makes intuitive sense 
given the preponderance of religious and somatic obsessions in the miscellaneous 
group which have previously been linked to TAF, a component of importance of 
thoughts domain (see Rassin & Koster, 2003). The discrepancy in results may relate 
to sampling practices and/or assessment methods. However, another possibility could 
be that it is the themes (e.g., morality, standards, punishment and purity) underlying 
the aggressive and religious subgroups rather than thought content that bind these 
constructs with the importance of thoughts domain. 
The contamination subgroup reported significantly stronger beliefs on the 
intolerance of uncertainty subscale compared to the other subgroups. This finding is 
unexpected since research has shown intolerance of uncertainty to significantly 
predict grooming and checking concerns (OCCWG, 2005). However, the results are 
consistent with the Sookman and Pinard (2002) study showing strong intolerance of 
uncertainty beliefs in participants with predominately washing concerns, and by 
extension contamination obsessions. It should also be noted that checking 
compulsions are often performed in response to contamination concerns (e.g., the 
need to check clothes for contaminants). 
It is also possible that the discrepant results regarding the intolerance of 
uncertainty subscale relate to the OCCWG (2005) use of the Padua Inventory-
Washington State University Revision (PI-R; Burns et al., 1996) over the YBOCS. 
Similar to the YBOCS, the PI-R assesses most forms of OCD and has comparable 
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psychometric qualities (see Antony, 2001 for review). However, the PI-R has certain 
restrictions in that some symptom categories (e.g., hoarding and ordering obsessions 
and compulsions, mental rituals and sexual intrusive thoughts) are not well covered 
(see Feske &Chambless, 2000).  
Consistent with the OCCWG validation studies (stage three), there was 
minimal variability across subgroups on the control of thoughts subscale. As 
expected, perfectionism beliefs were higher in the symmetry and hoarding subgroups. 
The association between perfectionism and symmetry concerns is well documented 
(OCCWG, 2001; 2003) and some research has shown a link between perfectionism 
and hoarding (Frost & Gross, 1993). The results on this subscale also tended to 
cluster: high-perfectionism (symmetry, contamination, and hoarding) and low-
perfectionism (aggressive and miscellaneous) with a ten point discrepancy between 
mean clusters. While there has been some debate as to the specificity of this construct 
in OCD, the results suggest that this domain is highly relevant in OCD, but may only 
be specific to certain types (e.g., those characterised by a need for exactness).  
Clinical implications 
The lack of significant findings between subgroups in the current study may 
relate to the effects of an ‘OCD-low belief cluster’ in the sample as considerable 
within-group variability was observed on the cognitive measures. Two recent studies 
by Taylor et al. (2006) and Calamari, Cohen, Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, Riemann and 
Norberg (in press) found that dysfunctional beliefs may not play a role in all cases of 
OCD. In these two large studies (n’s exceeding 300), the differences in the strength of 
OBQ-44 scores across participants (OCD, anxious, students, community controls) 
were cluster analysed to form two distinct clusters: high versus low scores on beliefs 
(high-OCD and low OCD). The results of both studies found that while half of the 
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OCD sample reported high levels of OBQ scores (OCD high), the other half reported 
comparable scores to their anxious (without OCD) counterparts (OCD low).  
Evidently this raises the question as to whether the cognitive theory can 
explain the discrepancy in beliefs between individuals with similar symptomotology. 
Certainly, for many individuals elevations between symptom-based groups and 
dysfunctional beliefs were apparent (e.g., symmetry subgroup was over-represented 
in the PC domain); however, the within-group variance of the sample does suggest 
that these beliefs were not significant in all cases. As participants in the current study 
were matched on age, gender, education and evidenced similar symptomotology it 
could be that there are other important mediating variables which need to be included 
in the cognitive theory of OCD. Subsequently, research examining the impact of 
other variables (e.g., comorbidity) on current symptom-based subtypes of OCD may 
shed some light on this dilemma.  
However, at this stage it seems premature to suggest that different models 
explain a different type of OCD (see Taylor et al., 2006) until more research has been 
conducted using different types of methodology. It may well be the case that the 
current cognitive theory is limited by the method of assessment (e.g., self-report). 
Recent studies have debated whether these appraisals and beliefs are accessible using 
paper-and-pencil self-report questionnaires given the demand characteristics, 
idiosyncratic interpretation (Tolin et al., 2006a; OCCWG, 2003) and accuracy of self-
reports. Consistent with the current study, several other investigations have explored 
this issue by using factor or cluster analyses to assess the differences in beliefs and 
appraisals. However, given the complexity of the constructs and the implications for 
the cognitive theory perhaps a more ecological approach to this issue is required.  
Limitations and future directions 
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Recent investigations have shown that samples in excess of 200 participants 
are required to detect stable subgroups of OCD (Calamari et al., 2004; Waller and 
Meehl, 1998) and as such a sample of 67 should be seen as a limitation. However, as 
the current study demonstrates, the lack of statistical significance is in some cases 
arbitrary as the subgroups pattern of responding was consistent with the literature. It 
is also important to note that while a sample size of 67 is comparatively small, it is 
proportionately quite large given the recruitment pool. The suggestion that extremely 
large samples are required to detect differences has other implications including 
confining research to countries where these numbers are readily accessible.  
Likewise, the suggestion that extremely large samples are required to detect 
group differences does imply that these group differences may be so subtle to be 
perhaps rendered meaningless for treatment purposes. The reliance on large samples 
may potentially limit the growth of understanding, as important trans-cultural aspects 
of OCD may be lost (refer Chapter 3). It is also arguable whether the focus should be 
on statistical versus clinical significance given the theoretical underpinnings of the 
research question.  
Another limitation may relate to our approach to subtyping. In cluster 
analysis, boundaries are drawn around individuals such as each subject is in one 
cluster (Baily, 1994). A categorical approach towards subtyping may be difficult as 
often individuals with OCD present with more than one primary obsessive complaint. 
The reliance on grouping based on relative dominance of symptoms may also be 
problematic as the discrete motivational and affective features that underlie 
symptoms may be overlooked.  While a discussion on categorical versus dimensional 
approaches is beyond the scope of this thesis, the substantial within group variability 
suggests that this issue warrants some discussion (see Wood et al., 2004 for review on 
dimensionality of OBQ beliefs).  
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The issue at hand refers to whether an individual should be assigned to just 
one subtype. The difficulties with this approach can be seen in patients with multiple 
symptoms and/or complex symptomotology. For example, it is also unclear whether a 
person who repeatedly checks the bed for creases until it feels “just right” be classed 
within the same subtype as the individual who orders the bookshelf to protect his or 
her son from being contaminated. This example highlights the issue of whether 
subgroups should be based on the primary obsessional complaint or focus on what 
function the compulsive behaviour serves (e.g., motivation).  
While seminal research by Taylor et al. (2006) and Calamari et al. (in press) 
has attempted to clarify this issue using cluster analysis on patient responses to 
measures of cognition (e.g., OBQ), another alternative is to adopt a more ecologically 
valid approach and assess whether the OCD subgroups differ from one another in 
terms of dysfunctional beliefs under experimental conditions. Experimental 
paradigms have the potential to clarify this issue by manipulating the beliefs and 
examining the effect of this manipulation across the subtypes. The final study of this 
dissertation extends on this research by employing experimental paradigms to test the 



























As reviewed in Chapter 3, recent psychological models of obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD) have emphasized the role of six cognitive beliefs in the 
acquisition, maintenance, and treatment of the disorder (OCCWG, 1997). The beliefs 
in question refer to: (1) inflated responsibility, (2) over-importance of thoughts, (3) 
excessive concern about the importance of controlling one's thoughts, (4) 
overestimation of threat, (5) intolerance of uncertainty and, (6) perfectionism. The 
OCCWG developed two measures to assess these cognitive constructs: the Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-87) and Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (III-31) 
(1997, 2001).  
Initial testing of the OBQ-87 and III-31 scales showed good internal 
consistency, but the scales were found to be highly inter-correlated (see OCCWG, 
2003). In an attempt to improve the empirical standing of these scales, the OBQ 
dimensions were reduced via factor analysis to three empirically based subscales 
(OBQ-44). Unfortunately, the high degree of overlap between scales remained. The 
high degree of overlap between the OBQ scales and III led many researchers to 
question whether these appraisals and beliefs were detectable using self-report 
questionnaire methods as most participants found these concepts confusing and 
difficult to make. Given these findings, it would appear that one of the key issues in 
obtaining support for these beliefs is one of research design.  
Most of the research demonstrating the utility of these beliefs in certain 
symptom presentations is correlational (refer Chapter 3). This body of correlational 
research is restricted by its reliance on subjective accounts of appraisals and beliefs in 
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detecting group differences. These studies are limited insofar as the temporal 
relationship of variables can not be inferred. Thus it would appear that psychometric-
based studies using correlational designs do not adequately address the problem that 
many individuals are unable to detect the difference between beliefs and appraisals 
(OCCWG, 2005). This strengthens the argument that another approach is required. 
Several key researchers (see Rheaume et al., 2000a; Ladouceur et al., 2000b; 
Riskind et al., 2002; Mancini et al., 2004; Coles et al., 2005) have started to employ 
experimental paradigms with promising results. Several studies (e.g., Lopatka and 
Rachman, 1995; Mancini et al., 2004; Shafran, 1997) have shown that direct and 
indirect manipulation of the OCCWG beliefs correspond to changes in OCD 
symptomotology (refer Chapter 3 for a full review of experimental paradigms). Given 
this evidence, the use of experiments may provide the means to explore the interaction 
between motivation for the behaviour (OCD subtype) and dysfunctional belief. 
This approach would also afford the opportunity to examine the efficacy of 
subtyping based on overtly similar ‘behaviours’. While most researchers agree on the 
five group taxonomy (refer study II), this grouping remains problematic as the 
‘classification behaviours’ may serve entirely different purposes for each individual 
(Taylor et al., 2006). For example, compulsive washing is variously motivated by the 
prevention of harm associated from dirt and germs and/or an attempt to remove evil 
(Calamari et al., 2004), efforts to avert illness (Rachman, 1994), or to achieve a sense 
of completeness or perfection (Tallis, 1996). This leads to the diagnostic dilemma as 
to whether this individual should be subtyped as (a) contamination; (b) 
contamination/harming (see Taylor et al., 2006); (c) religious; (d) symmetry/order; or 
(e) miscellaneous. The use of experimental paradigms provides the opportunity to 
assess whether the behaviour (e.g., the basis of the subtype) matches the motivation, 
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as participants’ rationales for these beliefs will be evoked under experimental 
conditions.  
Research incorporating experimental paradigms to examine the six beliefs 
proposed by the OCCWG is relatively sparse and tends to rely on non-clinical 
cohorts. To date, only three studies have used experimental modification of cognitive 
biases in OCD patients (van den Hout & Kindt, 2004; Fisher & Wells, 2005; Hartl & 
Frost, 1999), but no study has experimentally manipulated all six beliefs in 
empirically derived OCD subtypes. To this end, the experimental measures used in 
the current study were derived from research protocols of similar investigations into 
other anxiety disorders (e.g., Generalized Anxiety Disorder). This type of study may 
have important clinical and theoretical implications as identification of subtype-
specific dysfunctional beliefs has the potential to increase the efficacy of cognitive 
therapy, as more specific treatment protocols using the relevant beliefs can be 
developed. 
It is also important to note that the author recognizes that considerable overlap 
exists across the six cognitive domains (OCCWG, 1997); however, for the purpose of 
the current study the domains are conceptualized as distinct constructs. Secondly, the 
author concedes that given the rather ambitious task of manipulating all six beliefs in 
clinical participants, the sample size in this study is relatively small.   
6.2 Study III 
There is a long tradition for the use of experimental manipulations in clinical 
research, and within that tradition, the purpose of the present investigation was 
twofold. Firstly, to elucidate the relationship between the cognitive domains proposed 
by the OCCWG in OCD, and to assess whether these cognitive variables are more 
applicable to certain symptom-based subtypes of OCD rather than OCD as a 
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homogenous disorder. Secondly, the current study sought to provide further empirical 
support for the utility of experimental approaches in clinical OCD research.  
6.2.1 Method 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty individuals fulfilling DSM-IV-TR criteria for OCD (see section 6.2) 
were recruited for this study. These individuals were recruited via a database 
established during the course of the second study (n = 67). Based on the results 
obtained in the prior study, individuals were recruited from the following priori 
groups: Group 1 (contamination; n = 4), Group 2 (aggressive, n = 6), Group 3 
(hoarding, n = 4), and Group 4 (symmetry, n = 6). Once identified, these participants 
were contacted by the primary investigator (PI). As six months had past since the last 
study, the PI assessed each participant for the presence of active OCD 
symptomotology using the YBOCS-severity checklist as a criterion check during a 
telephone conversation. Most of the participants were receiving psychiatric 
medication for OCD and related disorders but met full DSM-IV-TR criteria for OCD. 
Likewise, those participants involved in treatment at the time of testing were not 
excluded provided they remained symptomatic. Participants received a ten dollar food 
voucher for participation.  
6.2.1.2 Inclusion Criteria 
Participants were contacted if they met the following inclusion criterion: (a) 
prior agreement to be contacted for a follow-up study; (b) reported strong cognitive 
tendencies on the OBQ and III; (c) belonged to a particular symptom-based subgroup; 
and (d) were assessed by the PI as demonstrating current OCD symptomotology 
(YBOCS-severity scores). One participant was excluded from analysis because they 
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presented with symptoms consistent with the diagnosis of schizophrenia during the 
testing procedure.  
6.2.1.3 Measures 
6.2.1.3.1 Pre-experiment measures 
When participants arrived at the University of Canterbury, they were given a 
consent form (refer Appendix I) and information sheet (refer Appendix J) detailing 
participant requirements, expectations and information. Following this, participants 
completed two psychometric tests: The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; 
OCCWG, 1997) and the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; 
Goodman, 1989). The psychometric properties of both scales have been reported in 
earlier section and will not be repeated (see section 6.2). 
6.2.1.3.2 Measures used during the study  
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; see Appendix K) was used to measure 
participants’ subjective units of distress (SUD) before and after each experiment. The 
VAS consisted of an A3 sized picture of a thermometer with 0-100 (intermediate 
points marked off in tens) written vertically up the left of the page and the sentence 
“How anxious do you feel right now?” at the top of the page. The bottom of the 
thermometer displayed a 0 (representing no anxiety), in the middle was 50 
(representing moderate anxiety) and at the top 100 (representing severe anxiety). 
Twelve ratings (two/each/task) were obtained per participant.  
Agreement Scale (AS).  
The agreement scale (AS; see Appendix L) was developed to standardise 
participants responses to a series of post-tasks questions. The AS required participants 
to indicate their general level of agreement with specific statements on a on a 7-point 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
198
rating scale, ranging from (1) ‘disagree very much’ to (4) ‘neutral’ to (7) ‘agree very 
much’. After each question, participants were required to choose their general level of 
agreement by pointing to a number on the AS. The AS was displayed on an A3 sized 
picture to the right of each participant on a stand. Participant responses on this scale 
were calculated by summing across their respective items. 
Task specific questions 
Participants were asked a set of questions (between 6 and 8) following each 
task (see Appendix M – R). Each set of questions was developed to capture a specific 
belief construct (similar to the OBQ–87 subscales). For example in the case of 
uncertainty beliefs, one of the questions posed was “how strongly do you agree that 
you have made the correct decision on this task”.  Participants then used the AS to 
rate how strongly they believed they had made the correct decision (0-100).  
6.2.1.3.3 Experimental measures  
Probabilistic Inference Task (PIT) 
The probabilistic inference task (PIT) assesses doubt over decisions (cf. 
Rheaume et al., 2000a; Garety, Hemsley and Wessely, 1991). This task was modified 
to elicit high levels of uncertainty in participants with OCD. The materials included 
two opaque bags each containing 70 marbles (blue and green). The first bag (bag A) 
contained 40 blue marbles and 30 green marbles and the second, (bag B) 30 blue 
marbles and 40 green marbles. A small blue cloth bag was also provided for counting 
purposes. The task was chosen because it presents a high level of ambiguity due to the 
fact that it requires a difficult decision to be made. This task was timed using a stop 
watch and measured using six task-specific questions (see Appendix M). Pre-and-post 
levels of anxiety were obtained using the VAS.  
In this task, participants were told “as you can see, I have two bags in front of 
me each containing 70 marbles. However, one bag contains 30 blue marbles and 40 
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green marbles and the other, has 40 green marbles and 30 blue marbles (participant 
given a bag). Your job is to choose which one of the bags I have given you, is the one 
with more blue marbles or the one with more green marbles. You can take out as 
many marbles as you want before making your decision but this task will be timed. I 
am also going to give you this third bag which you can use to count. However, once 
you place the marbles in this bag you are not allowed to take them out again. (SUD 
rating then taken). The total number of marbles picked, time taken to make the 
decision and method for determining decision is noted. Participants are then informed: 
“Now, keeping in mind the task you have just completed, please use this scale (AS) 
below to answer the following seven questions (see Appendix L by choosing the 
number that best describes how you are currently thinking.” A final SUD rating was 
then obtained and participants were not allowed to proceed onto the next task unless 
the reading was 10 or less. 
Sentence Paradigm 
 This experiment was based on Rachman et al. (1996) and measured thought-
action fusion (TAF). However in contrast to earlier studies, the current study included 
two additional sentences (TAF-Likelihood-Self and TAF-Morality) to assess all 
components of TAF. In this task, participants were required to write three sentences: 
(sentence 1) “I hope that (name of loved one) will soon be in a car accident in the next 
24 hours” (TAF-Likelihood-others); (sentence 2) “I hope that in the next 24 hours 
(insert your name) is in a car accident” (TAF-Likelihood-self); and (sentence 3) “ 
(insert name) has bad thoughts and therefore (insert name) is a bad person” (TAF-
Morality).  
 After each sentence, participants were asked several sentence-specific 
questions (see Appendix N). Pre-and-post anxiety ratings (SUD) were obtained using 
the VAS. If during the experiment, the participant refused to write any of the 
sentences owing to anxiety (SUD exceeding 100) they were asked to think of a less 
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severe accident or an accident involving a more distant relation. If writing the 
sentence did not evoke a SUD rating of 50 or more on the Verbal Analogue Scale, 
participants were asked to think of a more severe accident or an accident involving a 
closer relative. Participants were informed that the person/relative must be alive as 
several participants attempted to choose dead relatives to alleviate their anxiety. SUD 
ratings were returned to baseline between each sentence. 
 Prior to the first sentence, participants were given the following instructions 
“picture a loved one (living person). Do you have that person in your mind? Now, 
keeping that person in your head, I would like you to write out the following sentence 
on this piece of paper, inserting the name of the person in the blank (participant was 
handed an A4 piece of paper to write sentence 1 (TAF-Likelihood-others). After 
copying the sentence with the named friend or relative inserted in the blank, 
participants were asked to “close your eyes and think about the situation for a few 
seconds (place the sentence directly in front of them and obtain SUD rating). “Now 
remembering the task you have just completed, please use this scale (AS) to answer 
the following five questions (see Appendix N, section 1) by choosing the number that 
best describes how you are currently thinking.  
 Prior to the second sentence, participants were told “Now I would like you to 
do the same, but this time I would like you to write your name in the following 
sentence on this piece of paper (participant handed an A4 piece of paper to write 
sentence 2 (TAF-Likelihood-self). After copying the sentence with their name 
inserted in the blank, participants were asked to “close your eyes and think about the 
situation for a few seconds (place the sentence directly in front of them and obtain 
SUD rating). “Now remembering the task you have just completed, please use this 
scale (AS) to answer the following three questions (see Appendix N, section 2) by 
choosing the number that best describes how you are currently thinking”.  
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 In the third sentence, participants were informed “Once again, I would like 
you to follow the same procedure as before, but this time I would like you to write the 
following sentence on this piece of paper” paper (participant handed an A4 piece of 
paper to write sentence 3 (TAF-Morality). After copying the sentence with their name 
inserted in the blank, participants were asked to “close your eyes and think about the 
situation for a few seconds (place the sentence directly in front of them and obtain 
SUD rating). “Now remembering the task you have just completed, please use this 
scale (AS) to answer the following six questions (see Appendix N, section 3)   by 
choosing the number that best describes how you are currently thinking.”  
Following completion of this task, participants were told “Most participants 
feel bad about writing these sentences, and might therefore feel the need to somehow 
make it right, for themselves and/or for the person whose name was filled in. Do you 
need to do anything to neutralise?” (Participants were given the three sentences to 
destroy or take home). A further SUD rating of 10 or less was required before 
participants could proceed to the next task.  
 
Letter Sequencing Task (LST) 
 This experiment was based on Rhéaume et al. (2000a) and measured levels of 
self-focused perfectionism in individuals with OCD.  This task involved a five page 
booklet (see Appendix K). The first page contains the instructions, followed by the 
four trials, one trial per page. In each trial, a series of approximately 200 printed 
letters (‘Times' style, 14 pts) is presented to the participant. A different target letter is 
written at the top of each page. The participant must mark the target letters while 
reading the series from left to right, one line at a time. Each trial must be completed 
within a limited period of time. Consequently, when participants are signalled by the 
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experimenter30, participants’ must immediately turn the page and begin the next trial. 
The presence of markers allows standardization of the execution of the task by 
inducing the same level of pressure for each participant. This task was timed using a 
stop watch and reactions were measured using six task-specific questions (see 
Appendix O). Pre-and-post levels of anxiety were obtained using the VAS. 
Prior to the task, participants were given the following instructions “as you 
can see, there is an A4 booklet in front you. The booklet contains four pages with 200 
printed letters per page. As you can see there is a different target letter (F, S, K, M) 
written at the top of each page. What I would like you to do is circle the target letter 
as many times as it appears in the series of distracting letters. You must mark the 
target letters while reading the series from left to right, one line at a time. Each page 
must be completed within a set period of time. I will give the signal to move onto the 
next page. When I give this signal, you must immediately turn to the next page and 
begin finding the new target letter”. Then the SUD rating was taken via the VAS. 
In order to increase participants’ anxiety, the experimenter walked behind 
participants with a clip board pretending to mark their work. The time taken to 
complete each page (minutes/ seconds) as well as total number correct was measured. 
Participants were also asked what was more important (a) following the instructions; 
(b) achieving the quickest time; and (c) having the most correct. Following 
completion of the task, participants were required to “keep in mind the task you have 
just completed and answer the following eight questions (see Appendix O) by 
choosing the number that best describes how you are currently thinking on this scale 
(AS).” A further SUD rating of 10 or less was required before participants could 
proceed to the next task. 
 
                                                 
 
30 (determined by a marker only visible by the experimenter) 
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Verbal Recordings  
 This task, based on Salkovskis et al.’s (1997) research whereby the perceived 
level of responsibility for one’s thoughts and actions. The materials included a timing 
device sounding at thirty second intervals and seven task-specific questions (see 
Appendix P). Pre-and-post levels of anxiety were obtained using the VAS. The 
experiment included three phases. In the first phase, participants were given the 
following instructions “the purpose of this next exercise is to investigate the nature of 
obsessive thinking. What I would like you to do is describe your most disturbing 
obsession to me” (experimenter writes the obsessive thought down) and the 
experiment begins. 
Phase 1: (low responsibility)  
Participants are instructed “for the next 2 minutes, I want you to think about 
these thoughts intensely (playing it over and over in you mind) - without doing any 
kind of mental or behavioural compulsions. Throughout the 2 minutes you will hear a 
beeping sound (at 30, 60, 90 and seconds). When you hear this sound, I want you to 
say this obsession aloud - still without doing any compulsive behaviour. However, 
after you say the obsession, I want you to immediately transfer all responsibility for 
any negative outcomes that may occur as a result of not performing the ritual to me 
(examiner) e.g, say I blame …”. That way, if anything bad happens as a result of you 
not neutralising the obsession, it will be my fault and not yours.  
Remember, it is vitally important that you don’t attempt to reduce the anxiety 
through any type of compulsive activity (e.g., counting) as it will invalidate the 
results.  After you have said the thought, I will be asking for ratings of how 
uncomfortable it was to say the thought aloud (SUD rating). Participants were asked 
whether they needed to perform any neutralising behaviours before moving onto the 
second phase. A SUD rating of 10 or less was required before participants could 
proceed to the next phase.  
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Phase 2. (High responsibility) 
Participants are given the following instructions “I’m going to ask you to do 
exactly the same as before; I still do not want you to perform any compulsive 
behaviours. However this time when you say the obsession, I want you to just ‘sit with 
the anxiety’. In other words, I want you to take responsibility for the occurrence of 
this thought without doing any compulsive behaviour. I realise that this is 
uncomfortable, but it is only for a short time (2 minutes). I will be asking for ratings 
of how uncomfortable the thought makes you every now and then using the same card 
as before. Participant responses were measured at 0, 30, 60, 90 and 120 seconds 
followed by the question “And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
Participants were asked whether they needed to perform any neutralising behaviours 
and then instructed to “answer the following seven questions (see Appendix P) by 
choosing the number on the scale (AS) that best describes how you are currently 
thinking.” A SUD rating of 10 or less was required before participants could proceed 
to the next task. 
Behavioural Avoidance Test (BAT) 
 The BAT was based on Jones and Menzies’ (1998) research and examines the 
role of threat estimates in OCD. This experiment is designed to assess the effects of 
experimental manipulation of perceived threat in a BAT. The materials included a 
large open-topped garbage bin containing a three kilogram bag of potting soil, 150 
millilitres of baby oil, 250 millilitres of dishwashing liquid, one A4 size plastic bag of 
leaves,  shredded plastic, 150 gram bag of cotton wool,  netting, five medium soft toys 
covered in synthetic feathers, 50 plastic pearls, six small cloth-covered balls filled 
with cotton, 500 gram bag of parrot mix, 15 reams of shredded paper, 2 scouring 
cloths cut into small pieces, and two litres of water. These substances were chosen 
due to the perceived textural similarities with other materials (e.g., raw meat). The 
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contents of the garbage bin were replenished every three days. Additional materials 
included a 30 centimetre ruler, stop watch, and sink. Pre-and-post levels of anxiety 
were obtained using the VAS. The procedure in this study had three phases (pre-BAT; 
BAT; post-BAT).   
 
Pre-Behavioural Avoidance Test 
Participants were informed “The bin in front of you contains potting soil, animal 
hair, food scraps and raw meat. In a moment I am going to ask you some questions 
about this container. As there are no right or wrong answers, I would like you to 
answer these questions as quickly as possible without thinking too much about the 
question” (participants were not informed, at this point, that they would later be asked 
to actually place their hands in the stimulus). Participants were asked the following 
three questions: (a) How anxious would you feel if your hands were placed in the 
rubbish bin? (SUD rating); (b) How long could you tolerate putting your hands in the 
rubbish bin = _____minutes _____ seconds?; and (c) I’d like you to move the chair as 
close to the rubbish bin as you are comfortable with (___________________cm). 
(SUD rating recorded).  
Behavioural Avoidance Test 
Participants were informed “I would like you to place your hands in the 
container up to your wrists and keep them there for _____ (time identified in pre-
condition) minutes. During this time I am going to ask you some questions about this 
experience. Again, there are no right or wrong answers. Each question is designed to 
be answered quickly and is not meant to be thought about too much. If at some point 
during the task you feel completely unable to keep your hands in the bin (maximum 2 
minutes) you may remove them" (SUD rating). If participants were unable to place 
their hands in the container, they were asked to sit as close to the container as they 
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could and then close their eyes. The researcher then instructed participants that an 
unknown slippery object would be placed in their hands.  
The researcher then instructed participants to remove any jewellery and directed 
them to the bin. With their hands in the container (forearm level), ratings from all 
participants were obtained for each of the following variables using a 0 (“not at all 
possible”) to 100 (“certain to occur”) scale31: How certain are you of becoming ill or 
catching a disease from this experiment; The illness will be severe and life 
threatening; Bacteria will get through my skin and infect my blood stream; Even 
though I know this experiment is designed to be safe, I could get ill from this task; I 
will suffer as a result of doing this task. The BAT was terminated either 1) when the 
participant could no longer tolerate hand immersion or 2) when they had completed 
the 2 min task. 
Post-Behavioural Avoidance Test 
Immediately following the BAT, participants were told they could wash their 
hands. The following variables were measured: (a) duration of hand immersion 
(minutes/ seconds); (b) discrepancy between estimated versus actual hand immersion 
(minutes/seconds); and (c) time spent washing (minutes/ seconds). Participants were 
not aware that the duration of time spent washing was being recorded. A SUD rating 
of 10 or less was required before participants could proceed to the next task. 
Focussed Breathing Exercise  
This task was a modified version of the Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) ‘worry 
induction task’ and was developed to assess the paradoxical effects of attempts to 
control one’s intrusive thoughts. The materials included an automated timing device 
set to sound at 30-second intervals and an A4 size booklet containing 15-pages (see 
                                                 
 
31 Participants were informed to stare straight ahead at the 0-100 scale 0 (not at all possible) to 100 
(certain to occur) and to avoid looking into the bin until after the task. 
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Appendix R).  With the exception of page 9 and the title page, each page contained 
the following typed sentence centred at the top “what were you doing at the time the 
beep sounded” (Times Roman 16 font). Participants were then required to choose 
from the following three options (i) completely focussed on my breathing; (ii) 
distracted by an obsessive thought; and (iii) Other (e.g., distracted by something else). 
A SUD rating were required on each page (e.g., “how anxious do you feel right 
now?”). As mentioned, page nine in the booklet differed from the others as 
participants were required to write down four of their most distressing intrusive 
thoughts and/or urges.   
The exercise comprised three phases. Prior to the first phase, participants were 
given a questionnaire packet face down. They were asked not to turn the pages over 
until instructed to do so. Participants were then given the following instructions; “We 
are going to begin with what we call the focused breathing exercise. During this task, 
I am going to ask you to close your eyes for a few minutes and focus all of your 
attention exclusively on your breathing. While you are engaged in this task, you will 
periodically hear a beeping sound (participants shown device). Each time you hear 
the signal, please turn over the next available sheet in front of you and indicate 
whether, at the time of the signal, you were focused on your breathing; distracted by 
obsessive thoughts or “other.” Please circle one response, put the sheet aside, then 
close your eyes and concentrate all of your attention again on your breathing. We’ll 
be doing this focused breathing exercise several times during this task. Do you have 
any questions?”  
Participants were then given a practice round of focused breathing to make 
sure the procedure was clear. Following this, participants were told “in order to 
minimize distractions during the exercise, I (examiner) will not say anything from this 
point until the end of the task. So remember, each time you hear the signal, open your 
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eyes, turn to the next available sheet to make a rating, then close your eyes and focus 
on your breathing until the next signal.”  Phase 1 began and participants were 
signalled six times (at 20 second intervals). In phase 2 (OCD Exercise), participants 
were given the following instructions “In the next phase of this exercise, I am going 
to ask you to select several of your most upsetting intrusive thoughts (not the ones we 
used in previous tasks), then spend several minutes ruminating about them as 
intensely as you can and continue until I ask you to stop32 (in the way you normally 
do). Please take a moment to choose the obsessions you are most worried about. 
When you have selected them, write them down in your booklet (page 9). Now close 
your eyes and think about these thoughts until I tell you to stop (one minute time 
limit). 
In the third phase (distraction exercise), participants were told they were going 
to repeat the focused breathing exercise “Each time you hear the signal, turn over the 
next sheet and make a rating, then close your eyes and concentrate all of your 
attention on your breathing again. Now, please close your eyes and focus all of your 
attention exclusively on your breathing.” Participants were signalled six times (at 20 
second intervals). To ensure that all participants engaged in the task for the same 
length of time, the tape on which the signal was recorded was paused after each 
signal, then restarted after all participants had made a rating and had closed their eyes 
again. Following completion of the task, participants were required to answer the 
seven task-specific questions (see Appendix Q) using the AS scale. Pre-during-post 
anxiety ratings were measured using the aforementioned booklet. 
                                                 
 
32 Borkovec & Ruscio (2004) demonstrated in pilot testing that a 5-minute period was long enough to 
elicit the worries and anxiety associated with a given topic, but not so long as to allow anxiety to 
decline. 
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6.2.1.4 Procedure  
Prior to the study, participants were telephoned and given a suitable time for 
testing and verbal directions to the Psychology Department at the University of 
Canterbury, and informed that testing would be for two and one half hours. 
Participants were met by the primary examiner and escorted to the testing room where 
they were seated at a large table opposite the primary examiner. Following this, each 
participant was given a consent form, information sheet and demographic form to 
complete. Participants completed the following psychometric tests: The Obsessive 
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 1997) and the Yale Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman, 1989) prior to the experiment.  
Participants were informed that the purpose of the experiment was to 
investigate obsessive thoughts through six different tasks. The six tasks were 
administered in the following order: Probabilistic Inference Task (PIT), Sentence 
Paradigm, Letter Sequencing Task; Verbal Recordings; Behavioural Avoidance; and 
the Focussed Breathing Exercise. To ensure consistency, manipulation checks (SUD 
ratings) were performed throughout the study. All experimental material (e.g., 
garbage bin) was hidden until required. All participants were debriefed following the 
experiment. 
6.2.2 Statistical analysis 
The experiment involves both between groups and within-subject repeated 
measures elements. The relationship between demographic characteristics and the 
four subgroups were examined by means of chi-square tests. Following this, between 
groups (OCD type) differences on baseline measures (OBQ-87, OBQ-44 and 
YBOCS) were examined using one-way between-subjects multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA). To examine group differences under experimental conditions, 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA’s) were conducted on all subgroups with 
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Wilks’ lambda used as the overall test of significance (p<.05). If statistically 
significant, subgroup differences were examined with post-hoc HSD Tukey tests 
using a p value of .05. Results were analysed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences-Windows version 12 (SPSS-12). 
6.2.3 Results 
6.2.3.1 Sample Characteristics 
The sample included 20 adults (4 males and 16 females) who met criteria for 
DSM-IV-TR OCD. The mean age (standard deviation) of the sample was 45 years 
(11) and all participants were New Zealand European. The subgroups were not 
significantly different in terms of age of onset of OCD33, with 60 percent reporting 
late onset OCD (LOD) and 40 percent early onset OCD (EOD). The majority of the 
sample was either employed (40%) or looking after children (20%) with only 20 
percent being unemployed. All participants had attained a secondary level education 
(40% 1-4 years; 15% 5-6 years; 5% technical) with 40% achieving tertiary level 
qualifications. The marital status of participants included: single (35%), divorced 
(30%), married (25%) and cohabitating (10%).  
Three quarters of the sample were receiving selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRI) antidepressant medication and 60 percent of participants had a 
positive family history of a psychological disorder.  The sample varied in terms of 
symptom severity, but all scores were within the clinical ranges. A one-way analysis 
of variance revealed no statistically significant differences in age (F (3, 16) = .23, ns) 
or gender differences across the four groups (x2 [3] = .34, ns). Table 16 displays the 
                                                 
 
33 In the present study, early onset OCD (EOD) was defined by symptom development before the age 
of 15 years (Hemmings et al., 2004) and development of clinically significant distress (Cavallini et al., 
2002) not onset of OCD symptomotology (Rosario-Campos et al., 2001). 
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chi-square analysis of the demographic and clinical characteristics of the four 
subgroups. 
6.2.3.2 Pre-experimental measures 
The four subgroups’ were compared on the baseline measures (YBOCS and 
OBQ) using multivariate analysis (MANOVA). No significant differences emerged 
between groups on measures of symptom severity (F (3, 16) = 1.2, ns) or cognition (F 
(3, 16) = 1.4, ns). Table 17 displays the means, standard deviations, univariate 
comparisons (ANOVA) for each subgroup on the OBQ measures. The subgroups’ 
patterns of responding were consistent with the previous study.  
6.2.3.3 Main analysis 
6.2.3.3.1 Manipulation check 
Ratings of anxiety when the experimental task was presented indicate the 
manipulation had the desired effect in increasing participants’ anxiety (see Fig. 7). 
Mean scores and standard deviations for each task are shown in Appendix S. One-
way analysis of variance of anxiety ratings found there was no significant effect of 
group before presentation of each task, i.e. at baseline in anxiety  (F (3, 16) = .61, p = 
.87, ns).   
Multivariate analysis of subgroup differences during the experimental phase 
of each task indicated one significant result in the BAT. The contamination subgroup 
evidenced significantly higher anxiety during the BAT compared to the aggressive (p 
< .01) and symmetry (p < .05) subgroups. No significant group differences in anxiety 
were found in the five remaining tasks.  
 
 




Demographic and Clinical Characteristics OCD Subgroups            
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)     χ2 (3, 16)  
     (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4) 
 
Demographic variables 
Age:  mean (SD)   46.5 (7.2)  41.8 (17.4)  44.5 (9.5)   47.2 (6.9)  .23 ns 
Male: female    1: 5   1: 5   2: 2    0: 4   .34 ns 
Married: cohabitating: divorced 3: 1: 2   1: 1: 4   0: 1: 3    1: 0: 3   .25 ns 
Secondary: tertiary: trade (years) 4: 2:0   4: 2:0   1: 3:0    2: 1:1   .35 ns 
EOD: LOD:    4: 2   2: 4   0: 4    2: 2   .19 ns 
Salary: unemployed: home  3: 1:2   3: 1:2   2: 2:0    4: 0:0   .35 ns 
 
Comorbid Axis I disorders (%)  
Panic Disorder    5%   -   -    -   .48 ns  
Social Phobia     5%   15%   -    5%   .31 ns 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder 15%   -   5%    5%   .26 ns 
Acute Stress Disorder   -   -   -    5%   .24 ns 
Major Depressive Disorder  10%   -   5%    10%   .31 ns 
Major Depressive Episode  5%   -   -    5%   .49 ns 
Trichotillomania   -   -   -    5%   .24 ns 
 
Positive family history: a           
OCD and MDD   5%   10%   5%    5%   .53 ns 
Anxiety NOS and MDD  15%    5%   5%    10%  
No history    10%   15%   10%    5% 
Note. EOD =/ early onset OCD; LOD = late onset OCD. YBOCS = Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. a DSM-IV-TR Axis I disorder; MDD = Major Depressive 
Disorder; Anxiety NOS = Anxiety not otherwise specified. 
 
 




Subgroup Scores on Baseline Measures of Cognition 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Sample  Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)  F (3, 16)  
   (n = 20)  (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4)  
Variable   Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD  ________ _ 
YBOCS: T  17.5 (7.2)  13.5 (3.8)  19.7 (7.6)  15.5 (6.6)   22.0  (9.5)  1.5 ns   
YBOCS: O  8.8 (3.7)  7.5 (2.2)  9.7 (4.3)  7.5 (3.3)   10.8  (4.5)  .90 ns  
YBOCS: C  8.7 (3.9)  6.0 (2.0)  10.0 (4.1)  8.0  (3.3)   11.3  (4.8)  2.1 ns 
 
OBQ 87: U-scale 65.8 (12.0)  61.2  (8.9)  65.3  (13.2)  73.0  (4.9)   66.3  (18.8)  .75 ns  
OBQ 87: T-scale 63.6 (22.1)  71.3  (17.1)  54.0  (22.5)  71.3  (19.7)   58.8  (30.8)  .82 ns  
OBQ 87: C-scale 77.8 (10.7)  72.8  (13.1)  76.5  (11.4)  85.3  (6.2)   79.5  (6.9)  1.2 ns 
OBQ 87: I-scale 54.1 (15.4)  60.8  (16.5)  46.8  (15.6)  54.5  (9.7)   54.5  (18.5)  .81 ns  
OBQ 87: R-scale 83.7 (23.0)  94.7  (10.4)  71.8  (28.3)  85.0  (18.2)   83.8  (31.3)  .99 ns  
OBQ 87: P-scale 73.9 (27.9)  66.3  (25.6)  90.8  (14.0)  51.0  (39.3)   82.5  (21.9)  2.3 ns  
OBQ 87: Total 418.8 (72.3)  427.2  (80.5)  405.3  (76.1)  420.0  (19.3)   425.2  (108)  .09 ns  
 
OBQ 44: RT  80.6 (24.6)  91.5  (14.2)  69.0  (25.8)  84.0  (23.2)   78.0  (36.6)  .86 ns 
OBQ 44: PC   80.7 (24.1)  73.2  (25.0)  96.0  (10.5)  62.5  (30.6)   87.3  (30.0)  2.2 ns  
OBQ 44: ICT   46.9 (12.9)  51.3  (16.0)  42.0  (11.6)  47.8  (10.9)   46.5  (14.1)  .49 ns  
OBQ 44: Total 208.1 (42.3)  216.0  (48.3)  207.0  (41.2)  194.2  (14.7)   211.7  (63.3)  .19 ns  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. YBOCS = Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. YBOCS: T = Total score; YBOCS: O = Obsessions score; YBOCS: C = Compulsions score. 
OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; OBQ: U-Scale = Intolerance of uncertainty; OBQ; T-Scale = Over-estimation of threat; OBQ: C-Scale = Over-
control of thoughts; OBQ: I-Scale = Importance of thoughts; OBQ: R-Scale = Responsibility; OBQ: P-Scale = Perfectionism; OBQ-44: RT-Scale = 
Responsibility and over-estimate threat; OBQ 44: PC Scale = perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty; OBQ 44: ICT-Scale = over-importance and 




























































Figure 7. Manipulation check  
6.2.3.4 Intolerance of uncertainty (Probability Inference Task; PIT) 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of task variables revealed no 
significant group effects in either time taken to complete the task (F (3, 16) = 1.2, ns), 
anxiety during the task (F (3, 16) = .59, ns), or post-task questions (F (3, 16) = .16, 
ns). However, there was a non-significant trend for the contamination (m = 65) and 
hoarding subgroups (m = 62.5) to report higher anxiety during exposure to the task. 
This finding is consistent with the psychometric measures (OBQ-87) which showed 
these two groups to have the highest levels of uncertainty. The task-specific 












Intolerance of Uncertainty Task 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Harming    Symmetry    Contamination Hoarding 
(n = 6)     (n = 6)    (n = 4)   (n = 4)  
Mean SD    Mean   SD     Mean     SD   Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-measure 
OBQ 44- PC Scale 73.2 (25.0)    96.0    (10.5)   62.5    (30.6) 87.3 (30.0) 
OBQ 87- U-Scale 61.2 (8.9)    65.3    (13.2)   73.0     (4.9)  66.3 (18.8)  
 
Mean anxiety 
During   50.0 (28.9)    48.3    (23.2)   65.0     (25.2) 62.5 (15.0) 
 
Time to complete 
Task (min/sec) 1.05 (1.1)    1.30   (.66)    .49     (.39)  1.05 (1.2) 
 
Post-Task Questions 
Total   24.8 (9.1)    23.5    (7.4)    26.2     (10.9) 22.2 (7.4) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); PC-Scale (perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty); U-Scale (Intolerance of Uncertainty subscale). Sum of seven questions (refer Appendix N). 
______________________________________________________________________ 
6.2.4 Thought-Action Fusion (Sentence Paradigm; SP)  
As seen in Table 19, multivariate analysis demonstrated a marginally significant 
group34 effect for TAF-total scores (F (3, 16) = =2.7, p < .07). Post hoc analyses 
revealed the hoarding subgroup (m = 73) to evidence significantly higher TAF scores 
than the contamination group (m = 37). High levels of anxiety were observed across 
groups, the exception being the contamination group. Despite this, no significant 
differences in anxiety were found (F (3, 16) = .58, ns). Most participants found the task 
difficult, particularly TAF-LO with 50 percent of the entire sample (n = 20) unable to 
write the TAF-LO sentence. All participants requested the sentence (paper) be 
destroyed (e.g., ‘did not want to tempt fate’).  
 
                                                 
 
34 For the purpose of the current study an alpha of p <.1 will be referred to as marginally significant as it is highly 
likely these results would be significant if the sample size was increased. Significant results are determined by the 
traditional alpha cut-off of p <.05.' 




6.2.4.1 Thought-Action Fusion-Likelihood-Other 
Chi-square tests revealed significant group differences (χ2 [3, 16] = 8.3, p < 
.05), with none of the hoarding group able to write the TAF sentence when it relates to 
others. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated marginally significant group effects for 
TAF-LO (F (3, 16) = =2.7, p < .08). Post hoc analyses showed the aggressive subgroup 
(m = 26; SD = 9) to evidence higher scores compared to the contamination subgroup (m 
= 12; SD = 12). The contamination subgroup also reported 30 percent less anxiety 
during the TAF-LO task compared to the other subgroups. While not statistically 
significant, this finding is clinically meaningful as the contamination subgroup reported 
comparable anxiety ratings on TAF-M and LS.  Significant correlation was found 
between the OBQ subscale and TAF-LO questions (r = .85,  p< .001).  
6.2.4.2 Thought-Action Fusion-Likelihood-Self and Morality 
No significance differences emerged between those able to write TAF-LS 
sentences. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated significant group differences on TAF-LS, 
(F (3, 16) = 3.3, p < .05). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that the symmetry 
subgroup (m = 10; SD = 5) evidenced significantly higher TAF-LS scores compared to 
the contamination (m = 3; SD = 0) subgroup. This trend continued with the hoarding 
subgroup (m = 10; SD = 5) reporting marginally higher (F (3, 16) = 3.3, p < .08) scores 
than the contamination subgroups. A significant correlation was found between the 
OBQ subscale and TAF-LS questions (r = .85, p < .001). No significance differences 
emerged between those able to write TAF-LS sentence. A one-way ANOVA revealed 
no significance group differences relating to TAF-M.  





Thought-Action Fusion Task 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)  F (3, 16)  Contrasts a    
   (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4)  
Variable      _________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 
Complete: not complete 
TAF-LO (%)  33 : 67     83 : 17      75 : 25    0 : 100 *    H > (A, S, C)  
TAF-LS (%)  83 : 17     100 : 0      100 : 0               50 : 50 
TAF-M  67 : 33     100 : 0      100 : 0        100 : 0  
 
Pre-measure   Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD 
OBQ 44- ICT Scale 51.3 (16.0)     42.0 (11.6)    47.8 (10.9)   46.5 (14.1)     .48 ns 
OBQ 87-I-Scale 60.8 (16.5)     46.8 (15.6)    54.5 (9.7)   54.5 (18.5)  .80 ns    
 
Anxiety  
TAF-LO   80.0 (31.6)     81.6 (22.2)      48.7 (34.7)   85.0 (5.7)  1.7 ns 
TAF-LS  36.6 (34.4)     38.6 (28.0)      32.5 (26.3)   48.7 (27.8)  .22 ns 
TAF-M  39.1 (37.2)     38.3 (20.4)      30.0 (23.1)   32.5 (20.6)  .13 ns 
 
Post-task Questions 
TAF-LO b  26.1 (8.7)     23.1 (8.1)     11.5  (11.6)   27.2 (7.6)  2.6 †  A > C 
TAF-LS c  9.0 (4.1)     10.1 (4.9)     3.0  (0.0)   10.2 (3.5)  3.2 *  S > C; H > C † 
TAF-M  d  31.1 (11.2)     29.8 (9.3)     22.2  (13.1)   35.0 (4.6)  1.1 ns 
TAF Total  66.3 (21.7)    63.1 (16.9)     36.7  (24.2)   72.5 (11.7)  2.7 †   H > C 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05; OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); I-Scale (Importance of Thoughts subscale); OBQ 44- ICT Scale 
(Importance of Thoughts and Control subscale); TAF-LO (Thought-Action Fusion-Likelihood-Others); TAF-LS (Thought-Action Fusion-Likelihood-
Self); TAF-M (Thought-Action Fusion-Morality);b  Sum of five questions (refer appendix N);  c  Sum of three questions (refer appendix N); d  Sum of 
six questions (refer appendix N)  † trend (p < .1);  * Significance level p < .05. 




6.2.5 Perfectionism (Letter Sequencing Task; LST) 
 Task-specific characteristics and anxiety ratings are shown in Table 20. A 
one-way ANOVA demonstrated significant group differences in anxiety during the 
task, (F (3, 16) = 4.1, p < .05). Tukey’s post hoc analysis revealed the symmetry 
subgroup to exhibit significantly higher anxiety than the aggressive group. There was 
also a non-significant trend for the hoarding subgroup to demonstrate higher mean 
anxiety (45) than the contamination (30) and aggressive groups (23). No significant 
time differences emerged, but as seen in Figure 8 the contamination and hoarding 
subgroups consistently required more time to complete each trial.  
Letter Sequencing Task: 
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Figure 8 Subgroups Time Across Trials   
There was a small negative correlation between time and anxiety (r = -.11, ns) 
and the correlation between time and number of correct scores was not significant (r 
= .23 ns). A one-way ANOVA demonstrated significant group differences on overall 
post-task questions, (F (3, 16) = 3.2, p <.05). Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that 
the symmetry subgroup’s score was significantly higher than the contamination group 
overall and on items measuring competitiveness, perfectionism and high standards.  






   Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)  F (3, 16)   Contrastsa   
   (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4)  
Variable   Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD   _________________ _______ 
Pre-measure 
OBQ P-Scale  66.3 (25.6)  90.8  (14.0)  51.0  (39.3)   82.5  (21.9)  2.3 ns     
OBQ 87-PC-Scale 73.2  (25.0)  96.0  (10.5)  62.5  (30.6)   87.3  (30.0)  2.2 ns  
 
Anxiety 
During   22.5 (10.8)  60.0 (21.9)  30.0 (18.2)   45.0 (26.4)  4.1*   S > A 
 
Time 
Total     2.56 (1.1)  2.56 (.58)  4.24 (1.55)   4.12 (1.50)  1.7 ns 
Correct (%)  56/62 (3.4)  55/62 (4.3)  58/62 (1.3)   58/62 (2.5)  .83 ns 
 
Post-task questions  
(1) Importance 6 (.9)  6.3 (.5)  6.0 (.8)   6.0 (.8)  .20 ns 
(2) Competition 5 (2.4)  5 (1.8)  1.3 (1.3)   2.8 (2.2)  3.4 *   S > C 
(3) Mistakes  4.3 (2.0)  6.2 (.98)  3.0 (2.3)   4.8 (2.6)  2.2 ns 
(4) Time  4.7 (2.6)  6.2 (.75)  4.8 (2.6)   7.0 (0.0)  1.7 ns 
(5) Confidence 3.3 (2.3)  3.5 (1.8)  4.5 (1.9)   1.8 (.50)  1.6 ns 
(6) Perfectionism 2.3 (2.0)  5.5 (1.9)  1.3 (.50)   2.5 (1.9)  5.8 **   S > A, C† 
(7) Catastrophe 2.2 (1.9)  5.0 (2.1)  2.3 (1.9)   2.5 (2.4)  2.4 ns 
(8) Standards  4.7 (2.3)  6.5 (.55)  3.3 (2.6)   6.0 (1.2)  3.1 *   S > C 
Total score  32.1 (12.4)  44.1 (4.6)  26.2 (8.8)   33.2 (9.7)  3.2 *   S > C 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05; † trend (p <.1); OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); P-Scale (Perfectionism subscale); PC Scale = perfectionism and 
intolerance of uncertainty (1) It is important to me that I complete this task to the best of my abilities; (2) Being the highest scoring participant on this task is very 
important to me; (3) It doesn’t matter what the task is, it is important to make no mistakes; (4) I would have liked to have more time to complete this task; (5) I will  
e surprised if I failed this task; (6) I will be upset if I made even one mistake on this task; (7) One mistake is as bad as failing completely; (8) High standards of 
achievement are important to me; * Significance level p < .05.
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6.2.5.1 Inflated Responsibility (Verbal Recordings; VR) 
 Table 21 displays the task characteristics and anxiety ratings across 
responsibility conditions. A one-way ANOVA of anxiety ratings (SUD) revealed 
marginally significant group differences in during the task, (F (3, 16) = .29, p < .07).  
Tukey’s post hoc analysis showed the symmetry subgroup to be significantly more 
anxious in the final phase (120 seconds) of the low responsibility (LR) condition than 
the contamination subgroup. As seen in Figure 9, there was a general trend for the 
symmetry subgroup to report higher anxiety during the LR condition. Contrary to 
expectation, no statistically significant group differences were found in the high 
responsibility (HR) condition, (F (3, 16) = 1.1, ns) or post-task questions, (F (3, 16) = 
.29, ns).  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 21 
Inflated Responsibility Task 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Aggressive Symmetry Contamination  Hoarding 
(n = 6)  (n = 6)  (n = 4)   (n = 4)  
Mean SD Mean   SD  Mean     SD   Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-measure 
OBQ R-Scale  94.7 (10.4) 71.8 (28.3) 85.0 (18.2)  83.8    (31.3) 
OBQ-RT  91.5 (14.2) 69.0 (25.8) 84.0 (23.2)  78.0    (36.6) 
Low Responsibility: (SUD 0 - 100) 
Baseline  43.3 (38.2) 58.3 (19.4) 32.5 (35.9)  42.5    (27.5) 
After 30 sec  28.3 (17.2) 51.6 (9.8) 32.5 (22.1)  37.5    (20.6) 
After 60 sec  31.6 (18.3) 50.8 (10.2) 37.5 (20.6)  37.5    (12.5) 
After 90 sec  25.0 (15.0) 43.3 (10.3) 30.0 (14.1)  32.5    (12.5) 
After 120 sec  26.6 (17.5) 43.3 (10.3) 20.0 (14.1)  30.0  (8.1) 
High Responsibility: (SUD 0 - 100) 
Baseline  58.3 (20.4) 70.8 (9.1) 75.0 (31.0)  55.0    (31.0) 
After 30 sec  80.0 (6.3) 78.3 (7.5) 85.0 (19.1)  67.5    (23.6) 
After 60 sec  91.6 (7.5) 80.8 (8.0) 88.7 (13.1)  77.5    (17.0) 
After 90 sec  90.0 (20.0) 85.8 (8.0) 87.5 (9.5)  85.0    (17.3) 
After 120 sec  81.6 (30.6) 82.5 (10.8) 92.5 (9.5)  80.0    (14.1) 
Post-task questions 
(8) Total score  43.1 (5.9) 42.1 (6.2) 44.0 (4.6)  39.0    (14.7) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); R-Scale (Inflated Responsibility subscale). SUD 
(Subjective units of distress) 



































































Figure 9: Anxiety Ratings during the HR and LR Conditions.  
 
6.2.5.2 Threat Estimation (Behavioural Avoidance Test; BAT) 
 Task-specific characteristics are shown in Table 22. Participants’ baseline 
levels of anxiety were measured prior to being informed they were to complete the 
BAT. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of Group by pre-
BAT anxiety, (F (3, 16) = 3.3, p < .05). Tukey’s post hoc analysis revealed 
significantly higher anxiety in the contamination subgroup compared to the aggressive 
subgroup in the imaginary scenario. The second variable included in pre-BAT 
analysis was participants’ willingness to approach and touch the outside of the 
contaminated stimulus. While the contamination subgroup showed the most 
reluctance, no significant differences emerged between those able to approach the 
contaminated stimulus (χ2 [3, 16] = 7.1, ns). The final variable assessed in pre-BAT 
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analysis was participant’s willingness to place their hands in the pseudo contaminant 
(maximum 2 minutes). Univariate analysis of variance revealed a significant group 
effect (F (3, 16) = 3.4, p < .05), with post hoc analysis showing the  symmetry group 
to have the highest rate of compliance (83%), and the contamination group the lowest 
(no compliance). 
During the experimental condition, exposure to the actual contaminant 
(rubbish bin) led to a significant upsurge of anxiety, (F (3, 16) = 3.6, p < .05). Post 
hoc analysis showed the contamination subgroup to experience significantly more 
anxiety compared to the aggressive group. There were significant group differences in 
participants’ willingness to submerge their hands in the rubbish bin, (F (3, 16) = 3.4, 
p < .05). Post hoc analysis revealed the symmetry subgroup to have the highest rate of 
compliance with the request, with the contamination subgroup the lowest compliance.  
Multivariate analysis of variance found a significant group effect for post-task 
questions (F (3, 16) = 3.0, p <.01) with Tukey’s post hoc analysis demonstrating a 
clear difference between the participants in the contamination group compared to the 
other subgroups. A series of one-way ANOVA’s revealed significant Group by 
Question interactions (p < .01) relating to all five questions (refer Table 7). There was 
also a positive correlation between question (total) by anxiety (r = .79, p < .01) 
meaning that high anxiety was associated with high overall scorers. 
Combined analysis of the total score demonstrated a significant group effect 
(F (3, 16) = 9.3, p < .001). Post hoc analysis demonstrated that the contamination 
subgroup evidenced significantly higher scores compared to the other three 
subgroups. There was a non-significant trend for the aggressive subgroup to be higher 
than the symmetry subgroup, and the hoarding subgroup to have the lowest scores, 
particularly items measuring threat. This finding is also consistent with the 
subgroups’ responses to the OBQ-87 prior to the experiment.  




Over-estimation of Threat Task (BAT)  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)  F (3, 16)   Contrastsa   
   (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4)  
Variable   Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD   _________________ ____ 
Pre-measure 
OBQ T-Scale  71.3 (17.1)  54.0 (22.5)  71.3 (19.7)         58.8 (30.8)  .82 ns 
OBQ-RT  91.5 (14.2)  69.0 (25.8)  84.0 (23.2)        78.0 (36.6)  .85 ns 
 
Pseudo BAT a 
(i) Anxiety  35.0 (35.6)  45.0 (32.0)  90.0 (11.5)         50.0 (16.3)  3.2 *   C > A 
(ii) No touch: touch  1: 5   1: 5   3: 1          0: 4   7.1, (p < .06)   
 
BAT b 
Anxiety  35.8 (35.2)  50.0 (37.4)  97.5 (5.0)         50.0 (20.0)  3.5 *   C > A 
Insitu: imagined  5: 1   5: 1   1: 3         4: 0   7.1, (p < .06) 
Insitu (min/sec)  1.36  (.99)  1.67 (.82)  .13 (.25)   1.53 (.95)  3.0 *   C < S 
Washing (mins) c  .19 (.14)  .27 .12  unable          .22 .11  4.6 **   C < S 
 
Post task questions 
(1) Illness  18.3 (31.2)  16.8 (24.0)  92.5 (9.5)         22.5 (22.1)  9.7 ***             C > A, S, H  
(2) Life   21.6 (39.2)  21.0 (30.5)  87.5 (15.0)         0 (0.0)  7.2 **   C > A, S, H  
(3) Bacteria  25.8 (38.2)  16.8 (19.4)  90.0 (11.5)         10 (14.1)  8.8 ***   C > A, S, H  
(4) Estimate  21.6 (39.2)  16.8 (22.3)  85.0 (19.1)         7.5 (9.5)  7.1 **   C > A, S, H  
(5) Threat   20.8 (39.0)  13.5 (17.3)  95.0 (10.0)         5.0 (5.7)  12.0 ***   C > A, S, H  
Total   21.6 (36.9)  17.0 (22.3)  90.0 (11.6)         9.0 (10.1)  9.3 ***   C > A, S, H 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. a Tukey’s HSD, p <.05; OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); T-Scale (Over-estimation of threat subscale); a Participants were unaware they 
were required to place their hands in the contaminant. (i) How anxious would you feel if your hands were placed in the container; (ii) I’d like you to move the chair 
as close to the rubbish bin as you are comfortable with (cm). BAT (Behavioural Avoidance Test); ii Participants instructed to place hands in contaminant.   (1) How 
certain are you of becoming ill or catching a disease from this experiment; (2) the illness will be severe and life threatening; (3) Bacteria will get through my skin 
and infect my blood stream; (4) Even though I know this experiment is designed to be safe, I could get ill from this task; (5) I will suffer as a result of doing this 
task; c   Participants were timed while they washed their hands. * Significance level p < .05; ** Significance level p < .01. *** Significance level p < .001 
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6.2.5.3 Controllability of Thoughts (Focussed Breathing Exercise; FBE) 
Task-specific characteristics are shown in Table 23. Multivariate analysis of 
variance of task variables found there was no significant group effect in anxiety 
ratings pre-task (F (3, 16) = 1.5, ns), anxiety during the task (F (3, 16) = .89, ns), or 
post-task (F (3, 16) = 1.3, ns). No significant group differences were found for post-
task questions (F (3, 16) = 1.1, ns). However, clinically significant group differences 
were obtained for both the controllability of intrusive thoughts and anxiety in the post 
task conditions (distraction phase).  
As seen in Figure 10a, exposure to the intrusive thought led to an increase in 
anxiety (m = 56.2), particularly in the contamination subgroup (SUD = 72.5).  
Following exposure, most groups’ anxiety decreased to moderate levels (SUD < 50) 
within 4 time trials (60 seconds). The exception to this was the hoarding subgroup 
who maintained clinically significant levels of anxiety (SUD > 60) across all time 
trials. This finding was interesting as the hoarding subgroup was the only one to 
exhibit a pattern of increasing anxiety over time trials, as opposed to the expected 
decreases over time. This pattern was also found in the controllability of thoughts, as 
the hoarding subgroup required more time to settle and reported less control (see 
Figure 4a).   
  The analyses of results showed that during the post-exposure phase, all 
subgroups experienced great difficulty controlling their intrusive thoughts in the first 
two trials (40 seconds). As seen in Figure 10b, after the first two trials most subgroups 
(n = 3) were able to control the intrusive thoughts and focus on the task (e.g., 
breathing). Consistent with the previous section, the hoarding subgroup demonstrated 
the greatest degree of difficulty controlling their intrusive thoughts.  
 
 





Controllability of Thoughts Task (SUD Ratings) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Aggressive Symmetry Contamination  Hoarding 
(n = 6)  (n = 6)  (n = 4)   (n = 4)  
Mean SD Mean   SD  Mean     SD   Mean SD 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-measure 
OBQ C-Scale  72.8 (13.1) 76.5 (11.4) 85.3 (6.2)  79.5   (6.9) 
OBQ PC-Scale 73.2 (25.0) 96.0 (10.5) 62.5 (30.6)  87.3   (30.0) 
 
Relaxation task: (SUD ratings 0-100) 
 
Baseline  15.0 (13.7) 10.0 (6.3) 16.2 (9.4)  7.5     (5.0) 
After 20 sec  13.3 (15.0) 30.8 (21.0) 37.5 (22.1)  15.0   (17.3) 
After 40 sec  13.3 (15.0) 32.5 (22.3) 35.0 (23.8)  11.2   (13.1) 
After 60 sec  11.6 (13.2) 33.0 (22.5) 32.5 (26.3)  17.5   (17.0) 
After 80 sec  10.0 (12.6) 31.6 (15.7) 35.0 (19.1)  17.0   (17.3) 
After 100 sec  11.6 (14.7) 29.1 (16.2) 31.2 (16.5)  11.2   (13.1) 
 
 
OCD Exercise: (SUD ratings 0-100) 
 
After 60 sec  78.3 (16.0) 70.0 (10.9) 77.5 (17.0)  62.5   (23.6) 
 
 
Anxiety post-task: (SUD ratings 0-100) 
 
Baseline  46.6 (23.3) 60.8 (22.8) 72.5 (9.5)  47.5   (23.6) 
After 20 sec  40.0 (22.8) 44.1 (30.4) 71.2 (14.3)  56.2   (24.9) 
After 40 sec  18.3 (17.2) 40.0 (29.6) 55.0 (30.0)  52.5   (25.0) 
After 60 sec  18.3 (13.2) 36.6 (32.0) 50.0 (29.4)  57.5   (26.3) 
After 80 sec  14.1 (14.2) 30.0 (31.6) 50.0 (29.4)  55.0   (27.3) 
After 100 sec  14.1 (11.1) 27.5 (30.6) 47.5 (29.8)  55.0   (30.0) 
 
Post-task questions 
Total score  38.5 (9.1) 36.1 (7.4) 37.7 (5.7)  33.7   (2.2) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
OBQ (Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire); C-Scale (Controllability of Thoughts subscale); 
FBE (Focussed Breathing Exercise); DT (Distraction Task);  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 10b: Subgroups’ Percentage of Control Post Provocation  Figure 10a: Subgroups’ Anxiety Levels during the 
Distractibility Task 
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6.2.6 Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to test the strength of association between some 
symptom presentations of OCD and certain cognitive beliefs by manipulating these 
beliefs across the experimental groups. The results of the study are mixed, with some 
support found for the relationship between cognitive belief and OCD symptom-based 
subtype. The study also supports the efficacy of experimental paradigms in detecting 
the OBQ beliefs and appraisals over self-report measures. Contrary to previous 
findings on the OBQ and III, the results of the current study found significant group 
differences on three (TAF, perfectionism, and over-estimation of threat) of the six 
tasks. The present study does provide evidence that some obsessional beliefs are to 
some degree associated with particular symptom subtypes. These findings are 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
Intolerance of uncertainty 
The current study did not support earlier research (e.g., Salkovskis & 
Forrester, 2002) showing intolerance of uncertainty to be an important construct in 
OCD.  In contrast to the second study where the contamination subgroup reported 
significantly stronger beliefs on the intolerance of uncertainty subscale, the current 
study found no significant group differences. While the lack of statistical significance 
was disappointing, there were some interesting clinical observations. The 
contamination subgroup evidenced the highest mean total score on post-task questions 
and highest anxiety during task exposure. Participants in this subgroup also tended to 
become more anxious (SUD >80) during the probability interference task.  
Post-task, many participants reported ‘guessing’ the number of marbles to 
avoid feelings of anxiety associated with uncertainty about their decision. The finding 
that some participants guessed the number of marbles in the bag is consistent with 
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research showing intolerance of uncertainty to be associated with hasty decision 
making (Furnham, 1994; Rassin & Muris, 2005). The effect (tendency to hurry their 
decisions) was also seen in the perfectionism task where participants quickly scanned 
each page to reach the end of the booklet as quickly as possible.  
Also consistent with the second study was the finding of high anxiety during 
task exposure for the hoarding subgroup. This finding makes intuitive sense as both 
the symmetry and hoarding subgroups appear to be motivated by a need for exactness. 
This finding is consistent with Tolin et al. (2003) who found that in addition to 
checking rituals, repeating rituals were associated with intolerance of uncertainty. 
These researchers hypothesized that individuals with checking concerns are motivated 
by urges other than harm, including the impulse to do repeat the action(s) until it is 
performed “just right” (see Summerfeldt, 2004 for review) as well as an  inability to 
tolerate uncertainty leading to repetition of the action (Tolin et al., 2003). Further, Wu 
and Watson (2005) argue that the emphasis on avoiding making a mistake or 
committing errors might link compulsive checkers and hoarders through strong 
feeling of doubt and resultant indecisiveness. 
However, it was also unclear whether our experiment was tapping into 
intolerance of uncertainty beliefs or a mistrust of memory, as many participants who 
performed poorly on this task described a pathological doubting of their memory. For 
example, Mark, a young participant with aggressive obsessions, described how he 
used to compulsively collect newspapers in order to remind himself that he was not in 
the area that a particular crime or accident occurred. Grace, an elderly participant 
described having to blink six times each time she checked an object in the house “to 
be sure that she would remember checking”. Olivia, another participant with 
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symmetry concerns reported that she repetitively writes sentences to herself, like “the 
house is locked” (20 times), because she “needs to know she locked the house”.  
While it is recognised that an inability to tolerate uncertainty could explain 
these behaviours, so too could a mistrust of memory, or deficits in executive 
functioning. It will be important for future studies to include neuropsychological tests 
like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Tests (WCST) or Category B of the Trail Making 
Test (TMT; see reviews by Greisberg & McKay, 2003; Savage, 1998) to better isolate 
whether these subgroups demonstrate neuropsychological difficulties outside of these 
belief domains. Additionally, as this is the first time intolerance of uncertainty beliefs 
have been manipulated in OCD subtypes, further replication studies are required to 
validate these findings.  
Thought-Action Fusion 
This thesis demonstrated high levels of TAF beliefs across all subgroups, 
particularly in the miscellaneous groups. The current study found comparable 
findings, with the exception being the contamination and hoarding subgroups. The 
contamination group showed significantly lower scores on TAF statements and 
evidenced less anxiety during task exposure. In an interesting contrast, the hoarding 
subgroup, who did not strongly endorse the TAF items (OBQ measure) in study two, 
demonstrated the highest TAF total beliefs and appeared to have the most difficulty 
with this task (e.g., unable to complete TAF-sentences). This finding supports 
previous research by Rassin et al. (2001a) showing TAF to be a highly accessible 
cognitive bias, especially under experimental conditions.  
TAF appeared to be particularly tied to superstitious beliefs or magical 
thinking. For example, in the task which required participants write a sentence about a 
loved one being in a car accident, the vast majority of participants refused to 
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participate because “it tempted fate” or “made it more likely to happen”. This type of 
magical thinking was also seen in certain compulsions.  For example, one individual 
said that he could not touch red because it was like blood, green was unlucky and 
white meant death or bodily fluids. Marie, a participant with high TAF levels stated 
that if she sees something red or white (e.g. substance, clothing), she has to cover it 
with sellotape because these colours represent blood and bodily fluids. She stated that 
covering these colours meant she could not be contaminated. 
Other participants with high levels of TAF described ordering compulsions. 
Denis stated that he could not leave the house until all his appliances were facing 
north. He reported that if they were not facing north, something bad would happen. 
Julie, a participant with predominantly religious obsessions, stated that if she did not 
immediately so “no” (aloud) when she experienced an immoral thought, she would be 
punished by God. Patrick, a participant with predominantly religious obsessions, 
stated that when he experienced obsessions against God, he felt compelled to punish 
himself for occurrence of the thought by standing on one leg until he could no longer 
stand the pain. Other times, Patrick would feel compelled to redeem himself in the 
eyes of the Lord by holding his breath, tensing his muscle’s or standing on cracks. 
The reports are again very reminiscent of Rachman (1997) contention that TAF plays 
a central role in these types of obsessions because these obsessions reflect important 
themes of all moral systems. 
The majority of cases that involved high TAF beliefs or magical thinking were 
miscellaneous obsessions and compulsions like swallowing, spitting, certain words 
and/or clapping. In more complex cases, body posturing was employed as seen in the 
following written excerpt “If I don’t think, or do things a certain way, my whole life 
from now will be wrong. My body will feel “wrong”, as though it (body) has been put 
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together wrongly. I control my thoughts by holding my body in a certain way (stand 
on toes for a certain amount of time). By holding my body in a certain way, I hold the 
thoughts in place”. In other cases, the strong presence of magical thinking or rituals 
reflected schizotypal traits. John, a participant concerned with being poisoned by 
mercury, began to think he could see this chemical everywhere (e.g. glasses, plates). 
He began wearing gloves everywhere and was unable to use any appliances because 
he feared he would poison himself. This fear became so bad he was hospitalised. The 
above mentioned examples support previous research of schizotypal traits in OCD 
(Lee, Cougle & Telch, 2003 in press; Roth & Baribeau, 2000) or a schizotypy subtype 
of OCD (Sobin, Blundell, Weiller, Gavignon, Haiman & Karayiorgou, 2000)  in 
atypical subtypes (e.g., religious and somatic obsessions). 
The results of this task support the role of TAF in some types of OCD, but not 
contamination obsessions. However, this finding may not apply to all cases as several 
participants within the contamination subgroup evidenced high levels of TAF. In 
these incidences, the contamination obsessions and compulsions tended to be quite 
unusual and evidence strong magical thinking. For example, Noelle was given $5000 
US by her ex-husband following dissolution of her marriage. She hid this money in a 
large book at her parent’s house. After some time, she went back to her parents to 
retrieve the money. However, over the time the book and the money had gathered 
dust. As a result, Noelle burnt the $5000 in her parents log burner as it was 
contaminated.   
On questioning, Noelle reported that she did not have a choice because 
anything she bought with the money would be contaminated ‘by-proxy’. Noelle could 
not give the money away for the same reasons.  She stated that ‘dust’ had the same 
feeling associated with it as human faeces and the most efficient method for removing 
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contamination is fire. Noelle also admitted to burning her clothes and jewellery, and at 
the time of assessment had reduced her living environment to four items. Lynden was 
another participant who demonstrated contamination obsessions with high levels of 
TAF. Lynden feared that he would be contaminated by bald men, and stated that if he 
saw a bald man, he had to immediately clean himself otherwise he would ‘be 
contaminated with baldness’. At one stage, Lynden’s fear of bald men became so 
severe he barricaded himself in his room for several weeks. As seen, the common 
denominator underlying cases with high TAF appears to be a strong presence of 
magical thinking and superstition. 
Perfectionism 
The current study supports research (Slade & Owens, 1998; Hewitt & Flett, 
1991; Frost & Steketee, 1993; Zohar, Goldman, Calamary & Mashiah, 2005) showing 
a link between perfectionism (e.g concern over mistakes, doubts about actions, 
parental expectations and criticism, and socially prescribed perfectionism) and OCD. 
The OBQ total scores assessing perfectionism were congruent with responses on the 
experimental task assessing the same construct. In the second study, the OBQ 
perfectionism subscale was marginally predictive of symmetry concerns. The current 
study supports this finding as the symmetry subgroup was significantly differentiated 
on anxiety and post-task measures. The current study extends the previous findings 
and is consistent with research (Frost & Gross, 1993; Frost et al., 2002; De Silva & 
Rachman, 1998) showing a strong relationship between perfectionism and hoarding 
subgroup membership. 
Within the sample, there appeared to be two distinct and contrasting 
approaches to completing this task. The first type, as discussed in the intolerance of 
uncertainty section, tends to guess the number of ‘target letters’ per page. This action 
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is performed in an attempt to complete the cancellation test (four page booklet with 
each page displaying a new target letter) as quickly as possible, because each page 
appeared to increase their anxiety. The second type is consistent with Rhéaume et al. 
(2002) research showing those high in perfectionism to take longer to mark target 
letters. Rhéaume et al. reported that some participants would slow down in order to 
maximize their chances of making no errors on the task and tended to be less effective 
during this task because of a search for absolute perfection.  
Those with predominantly symmetry and aggressive concerns tended to 
characterise the former (rapid) group. Individuals in the contamination and hoarding 
subgroups tended to be in the latter (slow) group. Participants in the second group 
were perseverative and consistently required more time to complete the task. Often 
these participants would become so fixated on following the instructions (e.g., ‘left to 
right, one line after the other) that they forgot about identifying the target letters. 
These individuals almost appeared to be just moving their finger across the line and 
displayed obsessional slowness. When asked about this behaviour, the most common 
explanation was that it was “extremely important to follow the instructions” and they 
were “worried they would do it incorrectly and invalidate the results and ruin the 
test”. However, given that the symmetry subgroup recorded the highest scores and the 
quickest time, whereas the hoarding subgroup reported the slowest time, but the 
second highest score, future research is needed to elucidate whether this pattern of 
responding is important to the understanding perfectionism in OCD. 
Perfectionism, symmetry and “not just right experiences” (NJREs) 
Recent investigations have focussed on what is termed “not just right 
experiences” (NJRE; Coles et al., 2003; Leckman, Walker, Goodman, Paul & Cohen, 
1995). The NJREs refer to compulsions aimed at reducing sensations of things not 
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being just right, feelings of incompleteness, or feelings of imperfection (e.g., 
compulsively ordering a bookshelf if he/she feels right; or having all belonging 
surrounding them to ‘feel right’). NJREs have been frequently discussed in relation to 
OCD (Leckman, Walker, Goodman, Pauls, & Cohen, 1994; Rasmussen & Eisen, 
1992). Frost et al. (2002) suggested that these NJREs may constitute a type of 
‘sensory perfectionism’ whereby ordering, symmetry and arranging compulsions are 
attempts to somehow ‘perfect’ one’s experiences.  
In Cole et al.’s (2005) study, 50 undergraduate students participated 
individually in the laboratory experiment. Each participant was brought into a small 
office in which some parts of the room were arranged to be unlikely to elicit NJREs 
whereas other parts were arranged to be more likely to elicit NJREs. The experimental 
stimuli were a dishevelled bookshelf, a neatly arranged bookshelf, a dirty sink, a chair 
missing one armrest, a dishevelled and dirty area rug, a desk with one drawer slightly 
ajar and another drawer missing the handle, a corkboard with a crooked poster and 
disarrayed paperclips tacked onto it, and a plain paper recycle bin with small pieces of 
paper on the floor around it and a plastic bag inside.  
Participants were asked to focus their attention on each of the eight areas of 
the room and to record (1) their discomfort (rated from 0 to 100, with higher ratings 
indicating more discomfort), (2) the extent to which they wanted to do something 
about that part of the room, like change, rearrange, or move things (from 0 to 100, 
with higher ratings indicating stronger urges), and (3) whether they were having 
thoughts that something bad might happen (i.e., a feared consequences, as described 
above). The order of presentation of the eight stimuli was counterbalanced across 
participants. After responding to all eight experimental stimuli, each participant 
completed the battery of self-report measures. The results of this study showed that 
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NJREs may represent a specific form of perfectionism that has a unique relationship 
to OC features. It is possible that the sensory or affective NJRE associated with both 
subtypes are the mediating variable in perfectionist beliefs.  
Clinical observations during the current study supported the relationship 
between NJRE’s, symmetry and perfectionist beliefs. For example, several 
participants reported that unless they entered a building with their left side they would 
experience anxiety with an estimated SUD of 100.  Many of these participants were 
unable to articulate the feared consequences of this obsession, except to say that “it 
just doesn’t feel right”. Pastel, an elderly participant with predominantly symmetry 
concerns, described maintaining an ‘inner equilibrium’ in her brain through the strict 
ordering of her environment. Pastel stated that disruption to this environment resulted 
in her feeling ‘that both sides of her brain were unbalanced’. A different participant, 
Henry, stated that his preoccupation with ‘doing things correctly” meant that 
everything, even doing the dishes, had to be repeated eight times or “until, it felt 
right”. Sonja, a young participant, was preoccupied with preventing “her left foot 
from touching the floor when she was sitting”. If her foot did touch the floor, her 
anxiety would exceed a SUD of 100 and she would feel compelled to perform 
posturing compulsions. She could not explain why it was important that her left foot 
did not touch the ground, except to say “it did not feel right”. 
 NJRE’s and perfectionism beliefs were also evident in many compulsions. 
These compulsions tended to be atypical and included touching, tapping, rubbing and 
posturing compulsions which had to be performed a certain number of times 35 until it 
“felt right”.  Doreen, a middle aged woman stated that she would check the door knob 
                                                 
 
35 This would usually occur up to a predetermined odd or even number. The compulsions tended to be 
in sets of 3, 5 or 9 with a delay of in-between each set. 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
236
five times, but if it did not feel right, she would continue to the next odd number, but 
never an even number. This same individual also discussed having to always leave or 
enter a room with her left foot. If when walking through the door she did not feel 
right, she would rock back and forth until she did. Another participant, Francis 
described a similar problem but reported that he always had to ‘turn right’. When 
asked what would happen if he did not turn right, Francis simply stated that he “would 
not feel balanced”.  
As seen, the NJREs and symmetry concerns appear particularly related when 
discussing the “ordering of the body and mind”. A participant called ‘Scott’ provided 
the following description “My life is set into boundaries. I have to leave my home 
with my left foot, leave work with my left foot……everything also has to be in even 
numbers. If I am about to go through a door I check my watch. If it if 12.47 I have to 
wait until 12.48.  If I am at the supermarket and the cost is $37.30, I will have to buy 
something to increase the cost to $38.00”. Like the above mentioned participants, 
Scott appeared less concerned with the “what ifs” or inflated responsibility beliefs 
about harm befalling others, and more concerned with a need for exactness. It would 
be extremely beneficial for future research to examine the role of NJRE, symmetry 
and perfectionism in OCD. 
Responsibility 
The aggressive and contamination subgroups demonstrated the highest mean 
scores on measures of responsibility (OBQ-87; OBQ-44) in the second study. The 
current study supports research showing a non-specific relationship between 
responsibility and OCD symptomotology (Tolin et al., 2003, 2005) as no significant 
differences emerged between groups. The symmetry subgroup reported higher levels 
of anxiety in the LR condition, but during the HR condition, the groups’ anxiety 
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levels were comparable across time trials. However, the current sample may not be 
representative as some participants within the ‘aggressive’ or ‘contamination’ 
subgroups reported obsessions about their possessions or environments being harmed 
or contaminated, rather than themselves. These participants did experience an inflated 
sense of responsibility, but only for their possessions, outside of those with 
predominantly hoarding concerns.  
For example, a participant called Aaron stated that his most feared obsession 
was that he would damage his furniture and clothes by rubbing petrol or urinating on 
them. Interestingly, his twin sister Tracey, also involved in the study, described a 
preoccupation with protecting her possessions. She stated that her worst obsession 
was that her possessions (DVD player, sofa) would be damaged by a burglar. This 
participant stated that if she had a choice, she would prefer to be physically hurt, 
rather than someone “doing things to her stuff”. This participant used to spend up to 
three hours setting traps and arranging objects in her house so she would know if 
someone had entered her house. Aaron and Tracey equally reported an excessive 
amount of responsibility for the protection of these objects, which as in research by 
Frost and Hartl (1996), appeared to have obtained human-like status. This finding 
may explain why previous research has found a correlation between aggressive, 
contamination and responsibility beliefs, but the current study did not. Clearly, further 
research between the symbiosis of responsibility and variants of compulsive 
behaviour is required. 
Over-estimation of threat 
The results of the BAT (over-estimation of threat) demonstrated significant 
group differences between participants in the contamination group compared to the 
other subgroups on most task variables. This finding was expected and is consistent 
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with the results obtained in the second study regarding the contamination subgroup, 
but not the aggressive subgroup. While the OBQ scores in the current study show both 
contamination and aggressive subgroups to have high levels on the threat subscale, the 
task variables clearly show the contamination subgroup to report highest levels. This 
finding may relate to the content of the task which did tap into contamination 
concerns.  
Importance of controlling ones thoughts 
 In the second study, there were no clear group differences on the control of 
thoughts domain. While the contamination subgroup was slightly higher on the pre-
experimental measure (OBQ-C-Scale), no significant group differences were found in 
the current study. The subgroups reported similar levels of anxiety and comparable 
total scores which would appear to confirm these findings. However, this result might 
be premature as there were large differences between groups in both distractibility and 
the time course of anxiety. Whereas most groups’ anxiety levels decreased after a 
minute, the hoarding subgroup remained unchanged. This finding is important as pre-
experimental analysis found no significant group differences in terms of symptom 
severity. 
The hoarding subgroup also demonstrated the strongest degree of difficulty 
controlling their intrusive thoughts. In three of the five time trials, the hoarding group 
reported at least 20 percent more difficulty in controlling their thoughts compared to 
the other groups. This result tends to suggest that compared to other types of OCD, 
individuals with predominantly hoarding concerns may have greater difficulty 
attending to the task at hand because of the distracting effects of their intrusive 
thoughts. However, it is still unclear whether the hoarding group’s slow recovery is 
due to strong beliefs in the importance of controlling their thoughts, which has the 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
239
rebound effect of increasing the strength of these intrusive thoughts or 
neuropsychological impairments (e.g., executive functioning).  
The hypothesis that the OCCWG beliefs would differ according to 
predominant symptom subtype was investigated using experimental paradigms. The 
pre-experimental measures (OBQ self-reports) were consistent with the findings of 
the second study, but some of the experimental tasks showed a different pattern of 
results. Three of the six profiles established in the earlier study remained constant: 
perfectionism and symmetry; over-estimation of threat and contamination; TAF and 
hoarding concerns, but other profiles were not supported. As seen, the findings 
support research by Taylor et al. (2006) suggesting that some individuals with OCD 
do not show elevated dysfunctional beliefs and different models may apply to 
different types of the disorder.  
Limitations 
There are several strengths and limitations of this experiment. In terms of 
strengths, the study included multiple comparison groups and experimental 
paradigms. The experimental paradigms used an idiographic approach (participants 
wrote in the events of personal concern to them, rather than rating a pre-established 
list of events) which made these tasks personally salient and increased the ecological 
validity (Woods et al., 2000). These tasks proved highly successful in activating many 
of these beliefs as statistically significant findings were found in very small samples. 
The type of methodology also allowed a more thorough examination of the 
empirically derived OCD subgroups. Although all participants identified their primary 
concern as the named subgroup, the large standard deviations within each group on 
task measures suggests the focus of inquiry should be on the motivational or affective 
features that underlie the obsessive symptomotology. While small n studies facilitate 
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more in-depth case analysis (see Wilson & Chambless, 2005), larger studies are also 
needed for corroboration of this issue. 
The present study may have been limited by the environment in which 
participants completed these tasks. While every effort was made to control for 
extraneous variables in the experiment (e.g., presence of experimenter, the use of 
covert neutralisation, standardised questions), these variables may have influenced 
participant responding. For example, several participants in the TAF task attempted to 
name relatives who were deceased rather than living relatives, as a way to reduce their 
anxiety. In other tasks like the BAT, participants attempted to designate a ‘safe hand 
or finger’ to avoid experiencing anxiety. Other participants were observed tapping, 
touching and rubbing in numerical sequence (secondary compulsions) to decrease 
anxiety during tasks. Another limitation may have been the post-task questions which 
were modelled on items in the OBQ-87. These questions (refer appendix) were 
context-specific, and as such, the factor structure of the items may have been 
influenced by the modification. 
It is also possible that some interactions between the task and participant 
precluded accurate results, particularly in the inflated responsibility task. Consistent 
with Rachman’s early observations, many participants admitted to transferring 
responsibility to the primary investigator during task exposure, when instructed not to, 
in order to decrease their anxiety. Consistent with Riskind et al. (2002) who found 
that manipulations of responsibility may be limited in their ecological validity as 
participants may not have related their sense of responsibility to the task at hand in the 
same way as they might in a real life situation, some participants who despite trying 
very hard, could not transfer the responsibility to the investigator because “it is always 
my responsibility”. This effect was non-specific and seemed idiosyncratic to subtype.  




7. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 This series of studies sought to determine the relationship between a 
number of cognitive beliefs and appraisal processes and obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms. The first study investigated the relationship between TAF and inflated 
responsibility beliefs across individuals diagnosed with OCD (OCD), an anxiety 
disorder other than OCD (AC), and a non-anxious control group (NAC). It was 
hypothesized that the OCD group would evidence significantly higher inflated 
responsibility and TAF scores compared to the AC and NAC groups. Based on 
previous research, it was further predicted that significant correlations between TAF 
and inflated responsibility beliefs would emerge. The assessment methods included 
self-report questionnaires tapping into TAF and inflated responsibility constructs.  
The results of study 1 demonstrated that inflated responsibility beliefs, while 
present in other anxiety disorders, were significantly higher in participants with OCD 
even after controlling for depressed mood and TAF levels. Contrary to expectation, no 
group differences were observed between the OCD and anxious groups on measures 
of TAF. Lastly, the results partially supported the hypothesis that TAF serves to 
inflate responsibility appraisals in that depression mediates the relationship between 
TAF and responsibility, with both variables independently correlated with measures 
of obsessionality. It can be concluded that TAF plays a role in inflated responsibility 
beliefs, but does not appear to be crucial for the development of such beliefs.  
In accord with our hypothesis, the first study found evidence to support 
Salkovskis’ cognitive theory (1985, 1989) and the central role of inflated 
responsibility beliefs in OCD. The results of this study are largely consistent with 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
242
previous research showing inflated responsibility beliefs to be significantly higher in 
individuals with OCD (Steketee et al., 1998; Bouchard et al., 1999), and predictive of 
obsessive compulsive symptoms (Freeston et al., 1992; Rheaume et al., 1995) and 
where inconsistent (Tolin et al., 2006a; Rheaume et al., 1992; Frost et al., 1994; 
Rachman et al., 1995; Emmelkamp & Aardema 1999; Wilson & Chambless, 1999) 
probably reflect differences in the conceptualizations of responsibility, measures 
utilized and/or sampling practices.  
The second hypothesis, that TAF is specific to OCD was not supported. These 
results are consistent with research (Hazlett-Stevens et al., 2002; Muris et al., 2001; 
Shafran et al., 1996; Abramowitz et al., 2003; Rassin et al. 2001c) showing TAF to be 
an easily activated cognitive bias in all anxiety disorders, but not other research 
showing a more specific relationship (e.g. Rachman, 1993; Rachman et al., 1995; 
Shafran et al., 1996; Coles et al., 2001). The discrepancy in findings may be related to 
choice of meditating variable, with recent research showing TAF to be related to 
obsessive-compulsive symptomotology via the relationship to magical ideation 
(Einstein & Menzies, 2004), rather than inflated responsibility beliefs. It is also 
possible that in some cases of OCD, TAF is very prominent and does play an 
important role, and in other cases it may not be present at all. 
In contrast to the majority of research (Clark et al., 2000; Clark, 2004; Shafran 
et al., 1996; Abramowitz et al., 2003; Rassin et al. 2001a and Rassin et al., 2001b) 
showing TAF-Likelihood to be strongly associated with obsessionality, the first study 
found more support for the role of TAF-Morality, than TAF-Likelihood in OCD. The 
difference in results may be explained in terms of negative affect. There is some 
research suggesting that TAF-Morality is strongly correlated with depression, and 
TAF-likelihood associated more with anxiety (Abramowitz et al. 2003; Coles et al., 
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2001, Rassin & Koster, 2003). It is likely that TAF-morality was elevated in the first 
study because of the high degree of comorbid depressive disorders. In addition to 
negative affect, and in line with other studies (Rassin & Koster, 2003; Yorulmaz et 
al., 2004; Sica et al., 2002), it could also be argued that TAF-Morality was elevated 
because it is related to some latent structure embedded in the fabric of New Zealand 
culture (e.g. religiosity, urbanisation). 
Rachman (1997, 2003) proposed that TAF, in combination with inflated 
responsibility beliefs, may be especially important in OCD because they serve to 
increase the misinterpretation of significance of the unwanted thoughts. However, the 
first study found the relationship between TAF and inflated responsibility beliefs to be 
highly dependant on the presence of negative affect. This finding is consistent with 
research (Abramowitz et al., 2003, Muris et al., 2001, Rassin et al., 2001b; Rassin et 
al., 2001a) showing significant correlations between TAF and depression, but 
inconsistent with research (Gwilliam et al., 2004, Rachman et al., 1996; Shafran et al., 
1996; Freeston et al., 1996; Rassin et al. 1999; Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001) 
demonstrating moderate positive correlations between measures of responsibility and 
TAF.  It is possible that the lack of a statistically significant relationship between TAF 
and inflated responsibility beliefs relates to the elevated presence of TAF-moral, as 
opposed to TAF-likelihood, which has been shown to be more closely related to 
responsibility (Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Thus, when the present results are added to 
those of previous studies, a pattern emerges suggesting that inflated responsibility 
beliefs may have a more robust relationship with OCD than TAF beliefs, which 
appear to act as a general vulnerability factor occurring along a continuum of anxiety 
disorders (Rassin et al., 1999; Ferrier & Brewin, 2005), rather than specific to OCD 
(Rachman et al., 1995).  
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Prior to the second study, there was no consensus about the extent to which 
maladaptive beliefs proposed by the OCCWG (2001) underlie the different symptom-
based subtypes of OCD. This question was examined by investigating whether the six 
OCCWG beliefs were significantly associated with one or more empirically derived 
OCD subtypes. In line with previous research, it was predicted that the six OCCWG 
belief domains were significantly associated with one or more empirically derived 
OCD subtypes. Scores on the YBOCS-SC were cluster analysed to form five stable 
groups: (i) aggressive obsessions–checking compulsions; (ii) contamination 
obsessions–cleaning compulsions; (iii) symmetry concerns–ordering/arranging 
compulsions; (iv) hoarding obsessions-hoarding compulsions; and (v) miscellaneous 
obsessions –miscellaneous compulsions. These subgroups were then compared on the 
OCCWG self-report questionnaires (e.g. OBQ-87, OBQ-44, and the III) as well as 
measures of generalised anxiety and depression.  
The results found a significant interaction between the contamination 
subgroup and the OBQ-87 intolerance of uncertainty subscale, even when controlling 
for the levels of depression and anxiety. No other significant group differences on 
either the long (87-item) or shortened version (44-item) of the OBQ or III were found. 
Despite the fact these differences failed to reach statistical significance, they were in 
the predicted direction. Responsibility and threat estimation beliefs were higher in the 
aggressive-checking and contamination-cleaning subgroups. Perfectionism beliefs 
were higher in symmetry-ordering and hoarding subgroup.  
Intolerance of uncertainty, while significantly higher in the contamination 
subgroup, was also elevated in the hoarding subgroup. The highest levels of both the 
importance of thoughts and control beliefs were found in the miscellaneous subgroups 
(includes religious, somatic and idiosyncratic concerns). Three of the belief domains 
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(intolerance of uncertainty, threat-estimation and control of thoughts) appeared 
strongly correlated with obsessive severity, as opposed to responsibility, 
perfectionism and importance of thoughts which were not. Unfortunately, the 
correlation lost significance when controlling for depression and generalised anxiety. 
The results are broadly consistent with research that emerged while the current 
study was in progress (Taylor et al. 2006; Calamari et al. 2004; Calamari et al. in 
press). These results regarding uncertainty beliefs are in line with Sookman and 
Pinard (2002) who found strong uncertainty beliefs in participants with predominately 
washing concerns, and by extension contamination obsessions. However, these results 
are not consistent with research by the OCCWG (2005) showing this domain to 
significantly predict grooming and checking concerns. It is also possible that the 
discrepant results relate to assessment measures as the OCCWG (2005) used the 
Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision (PI-R; Burns et al., 1996) 
over the YBOCS. It may also be the case that those with predominantly 
contamination/washing concerns are characterised by memory deficits as evident in 
the excessive doubting, rather than uncertainty or indecisiveness (see Hartl et al., 
2001, 2004). 
The lack of significant findings for responsibility was surprising, given the 
results of the first study and the central role of this construct in many contemporary 
cognitive models (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). However, consistent with other 
research (Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985; Tolin et al., 2006a), 
responsibility/threat estimation were most strongly linked to harming thoughts, and 
where not consistent (Tolin et al., 2003b) the difference probably relates to 
methodological issues in subtyping (e.g. categorical versus dimensional). 
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Perfectionism beliefs were higher in symmetry-ordering (Tolin et al., 2003b) 
and hoarding subgroups (Frost & Gross, 1993; Frost & Hartl, 1996; Frost et al., 2002; 
Steketee et al., 2003).  As seen, this finding was expected, and is in accord with 
research (OCCWG, 2005) showing perfectionism to be significantly predicted by 
ordering. These subgroups are most likely bound to perfectionism beliefs through 
what Coles et al. (2005) terms ‘not just right experiences’ (NJREs). The NJRE’s refer 
to compulsions aimed at reducing feelings of something not being just right or 
sensations of incompleteness (e.g., ordering and collecting). The preoccupation with 
arranging objects “exactly the right way”, (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004a) 
characterized both symmetry and hoarding subgroups. 
The finding that importance of thoughts and control beliefs were the highest in 
the miscellaneous subgroups is consistent with Einstein and Menzies (2004) who 
showed individuals with atypical OCD symptoms to be particularly prone to magical 
ideation (MI). MI is reported to share a close relationship with TAF, a variant of this 
importance of thoughts domain. The most common miscellaneous symptom in the 
current sample was religious obsessions, which has also been shown to correlate with 
control of thoughts (Abramowitz et al., 2004).  
While the lack of significant group differences may reflect differences in 
assessment, sample characteristics or statistical procedure, the results could also be 
explained by a lack of distinction between the OBQ beliefs. Recently, Faull, Joseph, 
Meaden and Lawrence (2004) found that the summed obsessive belief score was 
significantly correlated with all OCD subtypes, even when covarying for depression 
and anxiety.  In order to address whether the type of methodology used in the second 
study precluded accurate results (e.g., self-report and response bias), the final study of 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
247
this thesis employed experimental paradigms to test the validity of the OCD subtypes 
and dysfunctional beliefs. 
In essence, this study was conducted to assess whether the second study was 
limited by the method of assessment (e.g. self-report). This study was the first of its 
kind to evaluate the cognitive correlates of OCD subtypes using experimental 
methods. Twenty of the highest scoring participants from the second study were 
selected to form the following priori groups: Group 1 (contamination; n = 4), Group 2 
(aggressive, n = 6), Group 3 (hoarding, n = 4), and Group 4 (symmetry, n = 6). 
Baseline scores were obtained using self-report questionnaires. Following this, 
participants took part in six experimental cognitive tasks (e.g. BAT) designed to 
reflect one of the six OCCWG beliefs.  
The results found no significant group differences at baseline in either 
symptom severity or cognition prior to the experiment. The study found strong 
support for the use of experimental paradigms over self-report measures as several 
significant interactions between cognitive beliefs and OCD symptom-based subtype 
were found. These cognitive profiles identified included TAF and hoarding concerns; 
perfectionism and symmetry obsessions; and over-estimation of threat and 
contamination obsessions and compulsions. The following sections discuss these 
results in more detail and where applicable, compare these findings to the second 
study. 
Contrary to the second study, no significant group effects were found for 
intolerance of uncertainty beliefs. These findings reflect the confusing state of 
research on intolerance of uncertainty, with some studies considering uncertainty a 
core feature in OCD (Guidano & Liotti 1983; OCCWG, 1997; Reed 1985), and others 
showing this domain is not unique to OCD (Holoway et al., 2006; Ladouceur et al., 
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1999). While there is increasing interest in the role of uncertainty in other 
psychological disorders, like anorexia nervosa (Vitousek & Manke, 1994; Vitousek, 
1996), it is important not to underestimate the role of this belief construct in OCD. It 
is possible that the discrepancy in results relate to methodological and sampling issues 
rather than the incremental value of this belief to understanding OCD. 
TAF was shown to be most applicable to hoarding and aggressive subtypes. 
The hoarding subgroup evidenced significantly higher overall TAF scores compared 
to those in the contamination group. The contamination subgroup was consistently the 
lowest scoring group on all measures of TAF, with these differences being significant. 
Unfortunately, the lack of a miscellaneous group meant the findings could not be 
contrasted with those of the second study. However, the current study’s findings 
regarding hoarding concerns are in contrast to the previous study which found the 
hoarding subgroup displayed the lowest scores on the importance of thoughts domain. 
As the current study found the opposite, it could be argued that TAF is an important 
construct in hoarding concerns, whereas the parent domain, importance of thoughts, 
plays less of a role. It also suggests an affiliation with MI and a tendency towards 
superstition.  
The symmetry subgroup exhibited significantly higher anxiety than the 
aggressive group during the perfectionism task and exhibited significantly higher 
scores on items measuring competitiveness, perfectionism and high standards than the 
contamination group. These findings are largely consistent with those of the second 
study. Previously, perfectionism was thought to be relevant, but not exclusive to OCD 
(OCCWG, 1997; Clark, 2004), however, the current results suggest that when the 
emphasis is on ‘the necessity to do things without a mistake’ (OCCWG, 1997), 
perfectionism appears more specific to OCD than other beliefs, like inflated 
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responsibility. These findings are consistent with research (Frost, Novara & Rheaume, 
2002) showing concern over mistakes to be more specific to OCD, than global 
perfectionism.  
Perfectionism beliefs were also strong in compulsive hoarding. This finding is 
consistent with Kyrios et al. (2002) suggestion that “some objects are seen as having 
intrinsic value or meaning, although they do not have any particular use or emotional 
meaning attached to them, e.g. “they are too perfect to throw away” (p.269). While 
the symmetry and hoarding subgroups were elevated in this domain, it is likely that 
the symmetry group was responding to the “concern about order” aspect of 
perfectionism, whereas the hoarding subgroup may be responding to the ‘concerns 
about making perfect decisions’ (Frost & Gross, 1993). 
The first study found inflated responsibility to be significantly higher in an 
OCD sample, compared to anxious and non-clinical counterparts. The subsequent two 
studies did not find responsibility beliefs to be specific to OCD symptomology. Like 
perfectionism beliefs, one explanation for these findings may lie in the definition. 
Taylor (2002) has argued that some subtypes of responsibility (e.g. responsibility for 
actions committed) may be specifically related to OCD, whereas other components 
may be non-specific. It is possible that Salkovskis (1992) original definition is too 
broad, and only the ‘beliefs concerning consequences of omissions’ (Wroe et al., 
2000) is applicable to OCD. Farrell (2004) demonstrated that inflated responsibility 
beliefs were significantly higher in adolescents and adults with OCD, compared to 
children. This finding is also consistent with Taylor’s hypothesis as it is possible that 
some aspects of responsibility beliefs are intrinsically linked with maturation (e.g. 
responsibility for actions committed) and vary across development. 
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These results regarding the over-estimation of threat are consistent with the 
previous study showing strong links to contamination thoughts. It was surprising that 
the hoarding subgroup did not have highly elevated scores given their predilection to 
perceive the environment as extremely dangerous and their fear of uncertainty 
(Sookman and Pinard, 2002; OCCWG, 1997). This finding may have been affected 
by the very small number of individuals with hoarding concerns. No statistically 
significant group differences were found for controllability of thoughts. This finding 
is consistent with the second study which found minimal variability across subgroups 
on the control of thoughts subscale.  
One interesting finding on this task was the observation that the hoarding 
subgroup required more time to settle after exposure to distressing stimuli and 
reported less control over their thoughts. At this stage, it is unclear which extraneous 
variable (e.g. perseverative behaviour, memory deficits, learning ability or increased 
difficulty controlling their thoughts) impacted on the hoarding group’s performance 
on this task. However, a clear group difference was that the hoarding group was 
predominantly ego-syntonic, whereas the other subgroups tended to be ego-dystonic. 
Purdon (1999) argues that thoughts that are more ego syntonic give rise to less active 
resistance because obsessions or compulsions are viewed as consistent with the self 
and do not require active resistance. As this task was specifically developed to assess 
the strength of resistance/control subgroups had over the thought, it would follow that 
hoarding group would require more time to return to baseline as this was a relatively 
new skill. 
The case of compulsive hoarding does deserve special mention. Based on this 
series of studies, hoarding does appear to be a distinct disorder separate from OCD. 
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This statement is supported by clinical observations36 throughout the studies and other 
research consistently identifying hoarding as a separate factor in statistical analysis 
(Baer, 1994; Calamari et al., 1999; Leckman et al., 1997; Summerfeldt et al., 1997). 
The ineffectiveness of traditional psychological therapies and pharmacotherapy 
(Mataix-Cols, et al., 1999) coupled with clinical differences increases the support for 
conceptualising hoarding as distinct from OCD (Black et al., 1998). It will be 
interestingly to observe whether the revisions of the DSM continue to formulate 
compulsive hoarding in reference to OCD (reference hoarding to OCPD), OCPD 
(reference hoarding to OCPD) or a distinct disorder (Reference hoarding to OCPD), 
especially since the ICD has recently included hoarding as a spectrum disorder. 
Previous research has shown that over-importance of thoughts; importance of 
controlling one’s thoughts; perfectionism; inflated responsibility; overestimation of 
threat and intolerance for uncertainty are relevant constructs in OCD. The series of 
studies support this argument, but as per study I, stress that it is likely these beliefs are 
evident in other anxiety disorders. Previous research suggests that these six 
dysfunctional beliefs and appraisals may be specific to thought content or subgroup. 
This hypothesis is only partially supported, with only four of these beliefs linked to 
symptoms: TAF and hoarding concerns; perfectionism and symmetry obsessions; 
over-estimation of threat and intolerance of uncertainty and contamination obsessions 
and compulsions. Similar to Anholt et al (2006), these results suggest that 
dysfunctional beliefs have no discriminative power with respect to OCD and the 
direct relationship between types of obsessive compulsive symptoms and specific 
dysfunctional beliefs appears questionable. Therefore, one can doubt the specificity of 
                                                 
 
36 Compulsive hoarders tended to be female, older mean age, alcohol or depressive comorbidity, not 
working, unmarried or divorced, longer duration of illness, more severe symptomology and ego-
syntonic obsessions. 
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cognitive theory of OCD to explain specific obsessive compulsive behaviour. At this 
stage it would be premature to claim these beliefs as symptom-specific as these 
associations were not consistently seen throughout and appeared dependent on the 
type of methodology (e.g. self-report versus experimental). Furthermore, these studies 
marked the first of its kind to examine these beliefs under experimental conditions 
and replications are required to validate these findings.  
7.2 Limitations 
The present study has some methodological limitations, notably the small 
sample sizes which influenced the power of the study. The second limitation refers to 
the use of the OCCWG measure, which demonstrates considerable overlap between 
subscales. One of the most significant limitations of these studies relates to the 
conceptualisation of these dysfunctional beliefs as unitary constructs (e.g. OBQ-87), 
when in reality, these beliefs are interactive, multidimensional and overlapping 
(Clark, 2002a). Riskind et al. (2002) have argued that few studies have isolated belief 
domains, either experimentally or by correlational analysis and relatively little is 
known about the validity of defining these beliefs singularly. Another limitation 
relates to the use of experimental paradigms. While every effort was made to base the 
tasks on sound empirical research, some of the task characteristics did appear to be 
more biased towards certain subgroups. The most obvious of which was the over-
estimation of the threat task which may have been biased towards those with 
predominantly contamination concers. Other limitations include the use of a mostly 
female clinical population, especially in the final experiment. Replication with 
predominantly male individuals with OCD will be required before conclusions can be 
generalised to both males and females.  Additionally, it should also be acknowledged 
that the findings may have been influenced by the high presence of depression and 
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comorbid anxiety disorders.   Lastly, the sampling method may have allowed for a 
selection bias as all participants were seeking treatment. 
7.3 Implications of the research 
The present findings have a number of important theoretical and clinical 
implications for the treatment of OCD. These results provide partial support for the 
cognitive theory of OCD, but recognise that this theory cannot account for why there 
is often a discrepancy in beliefs between individuals with similar symptomotology, 
and/or why some of the OCCWG cognitive domains seem applicable and others do 
not.  The results of this research support emerging research (Taylor et al., 2006; 
Calamari, in press) demonstrating that there may be two groups of individuals: one in 
which these beliefs play a causal role (high belief), and one in which these beliefs are 
not required (low belief). A critical issue for future research is why these beliefs do 
not appear to play a causal role in the symptom development of some forms of OCD. 
The identification of OCD-specific dysfunctional beliefs and appraisals may prove 
extremely useful in the prevention of OCD as these beliefs can be addressed earlier in 
life. 
These results have the potential to be clinically very useful for therapeutic 
intervention. As demonstrated, therapy with a strong cognitive component may not be 
appropriate for all cases of OCD as dysfunctional cognitions did not appear to play a 
central role for all OCD groups. Conversely, in cases where these beliefs were highly 
activated, CBT specifically targeting the beliefs in question may increase response 
rates. This may be especially important for those with predominantly hoarding 
concerns, a group fraught with poor response rates to psychological and 
pharmacological treatments (Black et al. 1998). A treatment protocol targeting beliefs 
and assumptions about perfectionism, as well as thought control may improve the 
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treatment for hoarders. Consistent with the unification models, it is also likely that 
these cognitions function in other disorders. While this hypothesis requires further 
testing, these six dysfunctional cognitions may form part of a standard treatment 
protocol used in the future to challenge unrealistic appraisals in a number of mood 
and anxiety disorders.   
7.4       Directions for future research  
It would be useful if future research improved upon the limitations of this 
study, and conceptualize these studies as exploratory, and place an emphasis on 
replication. Firstly, there is a strong need for research in this area to move away from 
a reliance on non-clinical cohorts as often this limits the generalizability of findings. 
Secondly, given that one of the central issues is belief specificity, it is necessary to 
cross validate these findings with other psychiatric samples. This issue is extremely 
important given that the mainstay of the cognitive theory is the specificity of these 
beliefs to OCD. Thirdly, it would be extremely advantageous to continue 
experimenting with alternative methodologies as the majority of research in this area 
is correlational and the direction of causality cannot be determined.  
Fourthly, an interesting area for future research would be to continue work on 
why these beliefs are applicable to some types of OCD, but not others. This question 
may in part be answered by investigating the differences in the acquisition of these 
dysfunctional beliefs. For example, it would be interesting to compare individuals 
with postpartum onset OCD who report inflated responsibility beliefs with those with 
EOD also reporting inflated responsibility beliefs. Fifthly, it would be extremely 
beneficial to replicate this study subtyping OCD based on dimensions, represented on 
a continuum of harm avoidant and prevention of distress (relation to Hollander 
OCSD), rather than the predominant theme. Recent literature suggests that patients 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
255
with harm avoidant compulsions demonstrate better treatment response than patients 
whose only feared consequence is the prevention of distress (Coles et al. 2005). 
Currently, it is unknown whether symptom-based subtypes cluster along certain 
dimensions, and further, whether this would change the associations with the 
OCCWG beliefs.  
Lastly, further research in this area should also continue to focus on other 
beliefs that may be uniquely related to OCD. The concept of NJREs or self-blame 
which were very common in the current studies and warrant investigation. The 
importance and the need to remember information was another belief which remained 
constant throughout the study, particularly in the hoarding subgroup. It will be 
important for future research to evaluate this issue with large clinical samples, 
comparison psychiatric groups and non-clinical controls. It would also be beneficial to 
evaluate the relationship pf these beliefs to other emotional disorders.  
To conclude, the studies presented in this thesis demonstrated novel empirical 
evidence to illustrate that while the cognitive theory of OCD can explain some types 
of OCD, other models are needed to detect clinically meaningful distinctions between 
subtypes. Furthermore, these studies demonstrated the effectiveness of experimental 
paradigms in the assessment of cognitive beliefs and appraisals as these beliefs were 
highly accessible under experimental conditions. Finally, the application of a core 
dimensional approach to conceptualising OCD, specifically evaluating the differing 
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Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between Thought-Action 
Fusion (TAF) and exaggerated responsibility (ER) in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD). TAF refers to the tendency to assume incorrect causal relationships between 
ones own thoughts and the outside world. Whereas, ER refers to the tendency for 
individuals with anxiety disorders to experience an overwhelming sense of 
responsibility regarding their thoughts or actions.  
 
Some researchers believe that TAF and ER are more related to OCD, whereas others 
believe that TAF and ER feature in all anxiety disorders. The motivation for 
conducting this study is two fold. Firstly, the aim of this study is to clarify the 
relationship of TAF and ER in OCD and in other anxiety disorders. We will compare 
responses of forty people from the ADU with a matched group of twenty people 
without any anxiety disorder. Secondly, this study is for the qualification of a Masters 
of Arts which is a requirement in the Clinical Psychology program.  
 
Description of the Research 
Prior to the commencement of the study, the principal investigator will contact you by 
phone to arrange a suitable testing time. If you agree to participate, you will be asked 
to complete five questionnaires over an estimated one-hour period. The administration 
of these questionnaires will be at the Anxiety Disorders Unit or the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Canterbury. This is not a treatment study, and as such 
participants are required for a one session only. 
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On arrival, you will be given an opportunity to ask any questions and then you will be 
asked to sign a consent form (Form C) giving your permission to be involved in the 
study. Participation is voluntary and declining to participate will not affect your health 
care in any way. You will then be asked to fill out an information sheet (Form D) 
which involves general health questions. Once this is completed, you will then be 
given five questionnaires relating to anxiety and mood. There is no interviewing 
component to this meeting as all questionnaires involve paper-pencil tests. 
 
You do not have to answer any questions you don’t want to and you may withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason. If you are tired, you may request a 
break at any time throughout the testing. If throughout the study there are indications 
that you may benefit from further assessment, we may suggest you see your GP or 
another appropriate person. The Human Ethics Committee at the University of 
Canterbury and the Canterbury Ethics Committee have reviewed and approved this 
study. 
 
Potential Harms (Injury, Discomforts or Inconvenience): 
There are no known harms associated with participation in this study. 
 
Potential Benefits 
Participation in this study will be of no direct benefit to you. The results of this study 
may contribute to the greater understanding of people with anxiety disorders. It is 
hoped that the information gathered from this study will develop and provide an 
impetus for further investigation into the complex phenomena of anxiety. 
 
Confidentiality 
Participants can feel assured that all information obtained from this study will be kept 
in a confidential file which will be kept locked at all times. All information will be 
kept as group data. Therefore, all forms will be coded and names removed such that 
you cannot be individually identified. Confidentiality will be respected and no 
information that could identify a participant will be released or published. In cases 
where we are concerned about the safety of a participant or the safety of others, 
confidentiality may need to be breached to ensure their safety. 
 
If you would like, we can send you a summary of the conclusions of the study once 
the analysis is completed. Please note that there will be some delay before all the 
work is done and this report can be sent out. Publication of the results will be in the 
form of a Masters Degree thesis to be submitted to the University of Canterbury. It 
may also be submitted for publication in a scientific journal. 
 
Future Participation 
Depending on the results of this first study, we may wish to contact you at a later date, 
probably next year, to invite you to participate in a second phase of this study. Please 




Participation in this study is entirely voluntary (my choice).  Participants can 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reasons. If you have any 
queries or concerns regarding your rights as a participant in the study, you may wish 
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to contact a Health and Disability services Consumer Advocate, telephone 377 7501 
in Christchurch or 0800 377 766 outside Christchurch. You can also contact Emily 
O’Leary, principal investigator, 03-3512420, should you have any questions or 
concerns about this research. 
 





Emily O’Leary, BA (Hons)  
Principal Investigator   
364-29-87-3400         
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9.2 Appendix B: Study I consent form 
CONSENT FORM  
 
Title of Research project:   
Evaluating how people with Anxiety Disorders think, and how these thinking styles 
contribute to their behavior. 
 
 
Principal Investigator   Emily Marie McHugh O’Leary  
       University of Canterbury 
       Department of Psychology  
        Phone: 03-3512420 (home) 
       364-2987-3400 (work) 
 
Research Supervisors  Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D., C.Psych Lecturer 
and Registered Psychologist at the 
University of Canterbury 
  Phone: 364-2987-7959 
 
Neville Blampied, M.Sc. (Auck),  
F.N.Z.Ps.S 
       Lecturer at the University of Canterbury 
       Phone: 364-2987- 6199 
 
 
“You have been invited to be in this study because you have OCD or another anxiety 
disorder, and you are being treated at the Anxiety disorders Unit. Those participants 




I have read and I understand the information sheet dated    for 
volunteers taking part in the study designed to investigate responsibility attitudes and 
obsessive thinking in young adults. I have had the opportunity to discuss this study 
with the primary investigator (Emily O’Leary). I am satisfied with the answers that I 
have been given. I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) 
and that I may withdraw from the study at any time without giving any reasons. I 
understand that my responses or decision to continue participating in this study will in 
no way affect my future health care. I understand that my participation in this study is 
confidential and that no material, which could identify me individually, will be used 
in any reports in this study. I know whom to contact if I have any questions about this 
study. 
 
I consent to being contacted in the future should there be a further phase of this study. 
I understand that I am able to choose whether to participate in a future phase or not: 
         YES:  NO: 
I wish to receive a summary of the results of the study: 
 
         YES:  NO: 





I give consent for the primary investigator (Emily O’Leary) to have access to my 
assessment information gathered by the Anxiety Disorders Unit. I understand that this 
information will be used solely for the purposes of this study and will be kept in the 
strictest confidence. 
         YES:  NO: 
 
ADU  Volunteers Only 
I also give consent for my information, if useful, to be given to the Anxiety Disorders 
Unit: 
         YES:  NO: 
 
I hereby consent to participate:    YES:  NO: 




Name of Volunteer      Emily O’Leary 




Signature       Signature 
Date:        Date: 
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9.3 Appendix C: Study I exclusion/inclusion sheet 
Participant Details 
 
The information obtained will be used for the purpose of a study into obsessional 
thinking.  Read each question carefully and answer the questions to the best of your 
abilities. There are no right or wrong answers the questions below. The information 









5) Have you in the past been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder? YES: 
 NO: 
(a) Specify diagnosis        Year 
 
6) Do you currently have a psychiatric diagnosis (es)?  YES:   NO: 
(If you answered no, please continue to Question .8.) 
 
7) Circle the appropriate diagnosis(es): 
a. OCD       YES: NO: 
b. Social Phobia      YES: NO: 
c. Specific Phobia     YES: NO: 
d. Agoraphobia      YES:  NO: 
e. Generalised Anxiety Disorder   YES:  NO: 
f. Anxiety Disorder Not Otherwise Specified  YES:  NO: 
g. Depression       YES: NO: 
h. Other 
 
8) Are you currently on any medications?    YES:  NO: 
a) Please specify medication 
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9) Have you ever experienced a head injury?   YES: NO 
(If you answered no, please continue to Question. 12.)   
10) Did you lose consciousness?     YES: NO: 
11) How long were you unconscious? 
12) Please circle how much of the following you would intake on average day: 
Coffee  0 2 -4 cups 4-6 cups 6-8 cups 8-10 cups 
Cigarettes  0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Alcohol  0 2-4 glasses 4-6 6-8  8-10  
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9.4 Appendix D: Study II: Initial sheet 
Initial intake form 
Assessment date:      Date of Birth: 
 
(Please circle the word that best describes you current situation) 
 
SEX:    Male   Female 
 
MARITAL STATUS:  Never married  Married Separated 
    Widow  Cohabitating 
 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: (highest level achieved) 
    Primary  1-4 years high school  
    Trade   5-6 years high school   
    Bachelor Degree Post Graduate 
 
OCCUPATION:  Student  Wage/salary 
    Unemployed  Home responsibilities 
    Retired or not working by choice. 
 
BENEFIT:   No   Yes  Specify ____________ 
 
ETHNICITY:  NZ European  Asian  Maori 
    Pacific Islander European Other 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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9.5 Appendix E: Study II: written description  
 
            
Volunteer Information Sheet 
    
 
Principal Investigator:   Emily O’Leary, BA (Hons) 
       Clinical & PhD student 
       University of Canterbury 
       Department of Psychology 
       Phone: 027 623 9857 
 
Research Supervisors  Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D., C.Psych Senior 
Lecturer and Registered Psychologist at 
the University of Canterbury 
  Department of Psychology 
  Phone: 364-2987-7959 
 
       Neville Blampied, M.Sc. (Auck), 
F.N.Z.Ps.S 
       Psychology Lecturer 
       University of Canterbury 
       Department of Psychology 
       Phone: 03-3667001 ext 6199 
 
“You are invited to take part in a study which looks at the differences between people 
with OCD. You do not have to decide now whether to participate, and it is your right 
to choose whether you want to be involved in this study” 
 
Participant information  
What theory is this Study based on? 
  This study is based on the cognitive theory of OCD which believes that people 
with OCD have “incorrect” or “dysfunctional cognitions”. The word ‘cognitions’ is a 
broad term, but for the purposes of this study it refers to activities like thinking or 
beliefs. The cognitive theory of OCD, basically states that the difference between 
“every-day thoughts’ and “obsessions” is that the belief systems underlying 
obsessions are different. This theory suggests that people with OCD tend to view 
intrusive thoughts (obsessions) as being highly important which results in the 
interpretation that the thought is dangerous. Consequently, people with OCD tend to 
spend a lot of time analyzing whether their thought(s) are true and taking actions 
(compulsions) to decrease the anxiety. 
 
What are the aims of the study? 
The aim of this study is to assess the thinking differences in people with various 
forms or ‘subtypes’ of OCD. I (primary examiner) will discuss any concerns you may 
have regarding the study prior to assessment.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
Title of Research: 
Investigating the different thinking styles in people with various types of Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
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You Have Been Invited To Participate In This Study Because You Have Been 
Diagnosed With OCD By Your GP/Clinical Psychologist.  
 
Why are you doing this study? 
This Study Is A Requirement Of A PhD (Doctorate Of Philosophy).  
 
What will I have to do? 
This is not a treatment study, and as such you will be required for one session only. If 
you agree to participate you can expect the following: 
1. The primary examiner (Emily O’Leary) will contact you to arrange a time for 
testing at the Anxiety Disorders Unit. On the day of your appointment you 
will first be given an opportunity to ask any questions about the study.  
2. You will then be asked to sign the consent form giving your permission to be 
involved in the study. 
3. Following this, the primary examiner will ask you questions relating to OCD 
in an interview.  
4. You do not have to answer all the questions, and you may stop the interview 
at any time. 
5. On average it may take 60-70 minutes to complete the session. 
 
What if I change my mind?   
You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to and you may withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason. If you are tired, you may request a 
break at any time throughout the testing.  
 
Are there any potential harms?  
 In the performance of the tasks and application of the procedures there are no 
known harms or risks associated with involvement in this study. However, in the 
event that you do become distressed because of your involvement in the study, you 
have the opportunity to discuss these concerns with the primary examiner and/or a 
senior clinical psychologist. Participation in this study will be stopped should any 
harmful effects appear, or if your GP/psychologist feels it is not in your best interest 
to continue. If you have any queries or concerns regarding your rights as a participant 
in the study, you may wish to contact a Health and Disability services Consumer 
Advocate, telephone 377 7501 in Christchurch or 0800 377 766 outside Christchurch. 
 
What are the benefits of the study? 
 Participation in this study will be of no direct benefit to you. The results of this 
study may contribute to the greater understanding of people with anxiety disorders. It 
is hoped that the information gathered from this study will develop and provide an 
impetus for further investigation into the complex phenomena of anxiety. However, in 
appreciation for your participation you will receive a ten dollar petrol voucher. 
 
Is it confidential? 
 Participants can feel assured that all information obtained from this study will be 
kept in the strictest of confidence. No material which could personally identify you 
will be used in any reports on this study. All information will be kept locked in a 
secure office at the University of Canterbury at all times, with access granted to only 
the principal researcher and the identified supervisors. Once converted all identifiable 
information will either be stored in a secure location at the University of Canterbury 
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(cc: Department of Psychology policy) or destroyed. The only exception to 
confidentiality is if we (principal researcher and supervisors), become concerned 
about the safety of a participant or the safety of others, confidentiality may need to be 
breached to ensure the safety of all parties involved.  
 
Will the results be published? 
 The results of this project will be published in the form of a Doctorate of 
Philosophy submitted to the University of Canterbury and may also be submitted for 
publication in a scientific journal. However, you are assured of the complete 
confidentiality of the data gathered in this investigation. The following steps will be 
taken to ensure confidentiality and anonymity: All information/data obtained from 
this study will be quickly converted into numerical codes with individual names 
removed (means that no information that could identify you will be released or 
published without your consent).   
  
 If you would like, we can send you a summary of the conclusions of the study 
once the analysis is completed. Please note that there will be some delay before all the 
work is done and this report can be sent out (please indicate your preference on the 
consent form). 
  
Do I have to participate in another study? 
 Please indicate on the consent form whether we may contact you at a later date, 
probably in one to two months, to invite you to participate in a follow-up study. 
Remember, you are under no obligation to consent to being contacted in the future. 
Participation is entirely voluntary (my choice).  
 
Statement of Approval 
This study has received ethical approval from the Human Ethics Committee at the 
University of Canterbury and the Canterbury Ethics Committee. This project is being 
conducted as a requirement for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at the 
University of Canterbury by Emily O’Leary (principal researcher) under the 
supervision of Dr Julia Rucklidge & Mr. Neville Blampied. If you have any concerns 
regarding participation in this project they will be pleased to discuss these with you. 
 
Thank-you for your time 
 
Emily O’Leary, BA (Hons)    Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D., C Psych. 
Principal Investigator    Primary Supervisor   
364-29-87-3400     364-2987-7959  
        Neville Blampied, MA 
        Supervisor    
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9.6 Appendix F: Study II consent form 
CONSENT FORM:  
 
 
REQUEST FOR INTERPRETER 
 
English I wish to have an interpreter. 
 
Yes No 
Maori E hiahia ana ki tetahi kaiwhakamaori/kaiwhaka pakeha korero. 
 
Ae Kao 
Somoan Out e mana’o ia I ai se fa’amatala upu. 
 
Ioe Leai 
Tongan Oku ou fiema’u ha fakatonulea. 
 
Io Ikai 
Cook Island  Ka inangaro au i tetai tangata uri reo. 
 
Ae Kare 
Niuean Fia manako au ke fakaaoga e taha tagata fakahokohoko kupu. 
 
E Nakai 






Principal Investigator   Emily Marie McHugh O’Leary  
       University of Canterbury 
       Department of Psychology  
        Phone: 03-3512420 (home) 
       027 623 9857 (a/h) 
 
Research Supervisors  Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D., C.Psych Lecturer 
and Registered Psychologist at the 
University of Canterbury 
  Phone: 364-2987-7959 
 
Neville Blampied, M.Sc. (Auck),  
F.N.Z.Ps.S 
       Lecturer at the University of Canterbury 





“You have been invited to participate in this study because you have been diagnosed 
with OCD. Please read the following information carefully”: 
 
 
I have read and I understand the information sheet dated __________ for 
volunteers taking part in the study designed to investigate the different types of 
thinking styles associated with OCD. I have had the opportunity to discuss this 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
336
study with the primary investigator (Emily O’Leary). I am satisfied with the 
answers that I have been given. I have had the opportunity to use whanau support 
or a friend to help me ask questions and understand the study. I understand that 
taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and that I may withdraw from 
the study at any time, including withdrawal of any information I have provided. I 
understand that I can discontinue participation without having to give a reason, 
and that this will in no way affect my future or continuing health care. I 
understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no material 
which could identify me will be used in any reports in this study. I have had time 
to consider whether to take part. I know whom to contact if I have any questions 
about this study. 
Please complete the following: 
 
1) I agree to an approved auditor appointed by the University of Canterbury 
Ethics Committee, or the regulatory authority or their approved 
representative, and approved by the Canterbury District Health Board Ethics 
Committee reviewing my relevant medical records for the sole purpose of 
checking the accuracy of the information recorded for the study. The reason 
for including an approved auditor is so an independent person can make sure 
the study complies with New Zealand or international Good Clinical Research 
Practice requirements. 
         YES  NO 
 
2) I agree to the primary investigator (Emily O’Leary) having access to my 
assessment information      YES  NO
  
 
3) I consent to the interview being audiotape   YES  NO 
 
4) I wish to receive a summary of the results of the study – (please be advised 
that there may be a significant delay between the data collection and 
publication of the results)        
        YES  NO 
 
5) Although I do not wish to receive a summary of results, I would like the 
primary researcher to discuss the outcomes of the study with me.  
 
         YES  NO 
 
6) I agree to my GP or other current provider being informed of my participation 
in this study/the results of my participation in this study. YES  NO 
7) I understand that all information obtained will be used solely for the purposes 
of this study and will be kept in the strictest confidence. YES  NO 
 
 
8) I consent to being contacted in the future for a follow-up study.  
        YES  NO 
 
9) I consent to the publication of the results of this study with the understanding 
that anonymity will be preserved. Publication of these results may be in either 
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a (i) thesis (PhD); (ii) conference presentations (paper or poster); (iii) 
presentations to support groups; and/or (iv) journal publications.   
          
        YES  NO 
 
I __________________________ (print full name) have read and understood the 
description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to participate as a 
subject in this study. 




Primary Investigator: Emily O’Leary (contact details on first page) 
Project explained by: _____________ 
Project role: Doctorate of Philosophy 
Signature __________________ 
Date  __________________ 
 
Primary Supervisor: Dr Julia Rucklidge (contact details on first page) 
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9.7 Appendix G:  Study II sample characteristics (n = 67)    
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Demographics 
Age in years: M (SD)  38 (11.7)    
Male: Female   29: 69 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
DSM-IV OCD Onset, n (%)  
EOD     27 (40)   LOD    36 (54)  Post pardem    4 (6) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Education, n (%) 
Secondary:       Tertiary/University:  
1 – 4 years:  20 (30)    1 – 3 years:  23 (34)  
5 – 6 years:  19 (28)    4 – 7 years  3 (5)  Vocational  2 (3) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Employment, n (%) 
 Employed:  37 (55)    Home:   10 (15)  Unemployed  14 (21)   
 Other:    6 (9)    
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Relationship status (%) 
Married  12 (18)    Divorced:   10 (15)  Cohabitating  18 (27)   
 Single:   27 (40) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Familial History, n (%) 
Positive Family History (%) 50 (75)    MDD & OCD: 8 (12)  OCD    2 (3)   
 MDD & anxiety: 17 (25)    MDD   17 (25)  Other:   6 (9)    
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
DSM-IV Comorbidity, n (%) 
PD   2 (4.5)    PTSD   5 (7.5)   MDD  24 (46) 
SP    21 (30; n = 7, % MDE) GAD   10 (15)  SpecP  5 (8) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. MDD (Major Depressive Disorder); MDE (Major Depressive Episode); SP (Social Phobia); (SpecP (Specific Phobia); PTSD (Post-traumatic  
Stress Disorder); GAD (Generalised Anxiety Disorder). 




9.8 Appendix H: Comparison of means with Calamari 2004 study 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Aggressive (A)  Symmetry (S)   Contamination (C)  Misc (M) B   Hoarding (H)     
 M (SD)    M2 a (SD) M (SD)    M2 a (SD) M (SD)    M2 a (SD) M (SD)    M2 a (SD) M (SD)    M2 a (SD) 
 n = 17  n = 20  n = 16  n = 19  n = 16  n = 24  n = 11  n = 20  n = 7  n = 14 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
O, A 2.0 (.00)  1.65 (.59) .38 (.5)  1.11 (.66) .56 (.51) .96 (.80) .73 (.65) 1.0 (.80) .14 (.38) .07 (.27) 
O, C .65 (.49)  .35 (.49) .31 (.48) 1.16 (.50) 2.0 (.00) 1.92 (.41) .27 (.47) .45 (.63) .29 (.49) 1.0 (.96)    
O, H .29 (.47) .30 (.47) .13 (.34) .79 (.54) .06 (.25) .29 (.46) .00 (.00) .21 (.41) 2.0 (.00) 1.79 (.43)   
O, M .24 (.44) .20 (.41) .13 (.34) 1.32 (.48) .00 (.00) .63 (.58) .45 (.82) 1.48 (.57) .00 (.00) .64 (.74) 
O, R .00 (.00) .50 (.69) .13 (.34) .42 (.51) .19 (.54) .21 (.41) .45 (.82) .59 (.68) .00 (.00)    .14 (.36)   
O, Sx. .12 (.33) .10 (.31) .00 (.00) .53 (.61) .00 (.00) .29 (.55) 1.4 (.92) .41 (.62) .00 (.00) .07 (.27) 
O, So  .24 (.44) .05 (.22) .06 (.25) 1.42 (.51) .25 (.45) .50 (.66) .18 (.60) .31 (.54) .00 (.00) .14 (.36)    
O, Sy. .47 (.62) .80 (.77) 2.0 (.00) 1.21 (.79) .63 (.50) .42 (.58) .36 (.51) .52 (.63) .43 (.54) .50 (.65)    
C, Ch. 1.82 (.53) 1.60 (.75) .94 (.68) 1.79 (.42) 1.0 (.52) .92 (.78) 1.18 (.87) 1.0 (.85) .43 (.54) .57 (.65) 
C, Cl. .24 (.44) .25 (.44) .31 (.48) 1.16 (.50) 1.88 (.34) 1.92 (.28) .45 (.69) .28 (.45) .29 (.49) 1.29(.83)    
C, Co. .53 (.72) .25 (.55) .56 (.81) .53 (.51) .38 (.62) .54 (.72) .00 (.00) .38 (.62) .29 (.49) .21 (.43)   
C, H. .06 (.24) .10 (.31) .13 (.34) .58 (.61) .06 (.25) .17 (.38) .09 (.30) .17 (.38) 2.0 (.00) 1.17(.47)   
C, M. .53 (.62) .35 (.49) .13 (.34) 1.0 (.47) .06 (.25) .58 (.50) .36 (.67) 1.38 (.68) .00 (.00) .43 (.51) 
C, O. .35 (.49) .40 (.50) 1.56 (.73) .79 (.63) .31 (.48) .29 (.46) .36 (.67) .38 (.49) .43 (.53) .57 (.51)    
C, R. .53 (.72) .45 (.60) .38 (.50) .95 (.75) .31 (.60) .63 (.58) .55 (.93) .93 (.75) .14 (.38) .79 (.70)  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: aM2 = Scores in bold represent mean scores obtained in Calamari et al (1999) study. O before a category denotes ‘obsessions’ and C denotes to 
‘compulsions’. Symptom categories on the 15 YBOCS checklist sections were scored 0 (the participant did not endorse any symptoms), 1 (the participant 
endorsed at least one symptom but the category was not considered primary) or 2 (symptoms were endorsed and the category was considered a principal 
problem). B Classed as ‘obsessionals’ in 1999 study. O, A = aggressive obsessions; O, C = contamination obsessions; O, H = hoarding obsessions; O, M = 
miscellaneous obsessions; O, R = religious obsessions; O, Sx = sexual obsessions; O, So = somatic obsessions, O, Sy = symmetry obsessions; C, Ch = 
checking compulsions; C, Cl = cleaning compulsions; C, Co = counting compulsions; C, H = hoarding compulsions; C, M = miscellaneous compulsions; C, O 
= ordering compulsions; C, R = repeating compulsions. 
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9.8 Appendix I: Study III Consent form   







REQUEST FOR INTERPRETER 
 
English I wish to have an interpreter. Yes No 
Maori E hiahia ana ki tetahi kaiwhakamaori/kaiwhaka pakeha korero. Ae Kao 
Somoan Out e mana’o ia I ai se fa’amatala upu. Ioe Leai 
Tongan Oku ou fiema’u ha fakatonulea. Io Ikai 
Cook Island  Ka inangaro au i tetai tangata uri reo. Ae Kare 
Niuean Fia manako au ke fakaaoga e taha tagata fakahokohoko kupu. E Nakai 





Principal Investigator   Emily Marie McHugh O’Leary  
       Clinical Psychology and PhD student 
       Department of Psychology  
       University of Canterbury 
       Phone: 03-3512420 (home) 
       027 623 9857 (a/h) 
 
Research Supervisors  Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D., C. 
  Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology 
  Department of Psychology 
  University of Canterbury 
  Phone: 364-2987-7959 
 
Neville Blampied M.Sc. F.N.Z.Ps.S 
       Associate Professor  
       Department of Psychology  
        University of Canterbury 




“You have been selected for the second phase of the study because you have a 
specific subtype of OCD. Please read the following information carefully”: 
 
 
Title of Research: 
An Investigation into the Relationship between Meta-cognitive beliefs and Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD) Subtypes: Part II 
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I have read and I understand the information sheet dated __________ which 
explains that the purpose of this part of the study is to repeat and extend the 
earlier studies of OCD in which I participated. I have had the opportunity to 
discuss this study with the primary investigator (Emily O’Leary). I am satisfied 
with the answers that I have been given. I have had the opportunity to use whanau 
support or a friend to help me ask questions and understand the study. I 
understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and that I may 
withdraw from the study at any time, including withdrawal of any information I 
have provided. I understand that I can discontinue participation without having to 
give a reason, and that this will in no way affect my future or continuing health 
care. I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no 
material which could identify me will be used in any reports in this study. I have 
had time to consider whether to take part. I know whom to contact if I have any 
questions about this study. 
 
Please complete the following: 
 
10) I agree to an approved auditor appointed by the University of Canterbury 
Ethics Committee, or the regulatory authority or their approved 
representative, and approved by the Canterbury District Health Board Ethics 
Committee reviewing my relevant medical records for the sole purpose of 
checking the accuracy of the information recorded for the study. The reason 
for including an approved auditor is so an independent person can make sure 
the study complies with New Zealand or international Good Clinical Research 
Practice requirements. 
         YES  NO 
 
11) I understand that all information obtained will be used solely for the purposes 
of this study and will be kept in the strictest confidence. YES  NO 
 
12) I consent to the publication of the results of this study with the understanding 
that anonymity will be preserved. Publication of these results may be in either 
a (i) thesis (PhD); (ii) conference presentations (paper or poster); (iii) 
presentations to support groups; and/or (iv) journal publications.   
          
 YES  NO 
 
 
I __________________________ (print full name) have read and understood the 
description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to participate as a 
subject in this study. 
Date  __________________ 
Signature __________________ 
 
Primary Investigator: Emily O’Leary (contact details on first page) 
Project explained by: Emily O’Leary_ 
Project role:  Investigating the cognitive processes in OCD  
Signature Emily O’Leary  Date __________________ 
 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
342
9.9 Appendix J: Study III Information sheet  
Volunteer Information Sheet 
    
 
Principal Investigator:   Emily O’Leary, BA (Hons) 
       Clinical & PhD student 
       Department of Psychology  
       University of Canterbury 
       Phone: 027 623 9857 
 
Research Supervisors  Julia Rucklidge, Ph.D.,  
  Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology 
  Department of Psychology 
  University of Canterbury 
  Phone: 364-2987-7959 
 
Neville Blampied, M.Sc. F.N.Z.Ps.S 
       Associate Professor 
       Department of Psychology 
       University of Canterbury 
       Phone: 03-3667001 ext 6199 
 
 
This information sheet serves as a follow-up to our conversation                where 
we discussed your participation in the following study. It is your right to end your 
participation in this study at anytime. If you have decided to discontinue 
participation, please contact the principal investigator (Emily) and discontinue 
reading the following information. 
 
What was the first part of the study?  
 Both parts of the study are thought of as involving the cognitive theory of OCD. 
Broadly speaking, this theory says obsessions develop because of the way the 
individual views the intrusive thought, not the occurrence of the thought itself. The 
viewing of the thought as threatening is believed to arise from several distorted 
beliefs.  The aim of part I of the study was to investigate whether these beliefs 
differed according to the subtype of OCD.  
 
6 Beliefs hypothesized to be most important in OCD (OCCWG, 1997; 2001) 
(a) Beliefs about the Importance of Controlling One’s thoughts: The belief that you 
must control all the thoughts in your head.  
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(b) Perfectionism beliefs: The belief that everything must be perfect and correct. 
(c) Inflated Responsibility: The belief that you are responsible for anything bad that 
happens because of your thoughts. 
(d) Beliefs about the Importance of Thoughts: The belief that thinking about a 
particular thought makes it more likely to happen and means something about you.   
(e) Over-estimation of threat: The belief that bad things are likely, so you must 
always be prepared. 
(f) Intolerance of uncertainty: The belief that you must always be 100% certain 
about everything you do. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Results: Part I study 
 In the first part of the study, 67 individuals diagnosed with OCD were 
interviewed and given a series of psychological tests. The results supported the idea 
that certain types of OCD were more likely to correlate with specific belief constructs. 
For example, it was found that people with predominantly symmetry obsessions were 
higher on responsibility and perfectionism scales than people with other types of 
OCD.  
 
Why is there a second part to the study?  
 Sometimes when a person is filling out a questionnaire they may unconsciously 
do things that can lead to the wrong conclusions being drawn from the results. Some 
of these things can include: 
• Answers the way the think the examiner wants them to answer. 
• Gives any answer because they don’t understand the question. 
• Race through the test because they are tired and want to finish it. 
• Provides neutral 50/50 answers to all questions because they are not sure. 
• Miss out answers they do not know/not want to answer. 
  
 Because these behaviours are quite common in psychology research, I need to re-
test you using methods which don’t involve lots of questionnaires.  
  
What happens now? 
 Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Subtypes    
 
344
 Further to our conversation where you expressed interest in the participating in 
the follow-up part of the study, I have provided the following information for 
discussion in our next telephone call. You will be telephoned soon to discuss the 
following issues:  
• Arrange a suitable time and date for testing. 
• Answer some questions on a questionnaire (baseline measure). 
• Discuss any questions you may have about the study  
• Be given directions to the Department of Psychology, University of 
Canterbury where the study will be held∗ (see attached map for parking 
directions). 
• There will be no follow-up to this study. 
 
What is expected of me? 
 You will be met just outside the Department of Psychology by me (Emily). The 
study will last for an estimated 2 hours, excluding breaks.  You will be accompanied 
by me at all times during testing to minimize any discomfort. Once you arrive you 
will be shown to the room where testing will occur. You will then be asked to sign the 
consent form giving your permission to be involved in the study. Following this, I 
will ask you to complete a series of different tasks. Some of these tasks will involve 
everyday tasks (e.g., writing a sentence and talking) and others will be a bit more fun.  
  You do not have to answer any questions you don’t want to and you may 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. If you are tired, you 
may request a break at any time throughout the testing.  
 
Potential Harms (Injury, Discomforts or Inconvenience): 
 Taxi fares will be paid if required. In the performance of the tasks and application 
of the procedures there no known harms or risks associated with involvement in this 
study. However, in the event that you do become distressed because of your 
involvement in the study, you have the opportunity to discuss these concerns with the 
                                                 
 
∗ The study has to be held within the Psychology Department as it would be very 
inconvenient to attempt to do these tests elsewhere. 
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principal investigator and/or a senior clinical psychologist. Participation in this study 
will be stopped should any harmful effects appear, or if your GP/case manager feels it 
is not in your best interest to continue. If you have any queries or concerns regarding 
your rights as a participant in the study, you may wish to contact a Health and 
Disability services Consumer Advocate, telephone 377 7501 in Christchurch or 0800 
377 766 outside Christchurch 
Potential Benefits 
 Participation in this study will be of no direct benefit to you. The results of this 
study should contribute to the greater understanding of people with anxiety disorders. 




 You are assured that all information obtained from this study will be kept in the 
strictest of confidence. No personal material which could personally identify you will 
be used in any reports on this study. All information will be kept locked in a secure 
office at the University of Canterbury at all times, with access granted to only the 
researchers. If you wish, we can send a summary of your results to your GP. Please 
indicate your preference on the consent form. The only exception to confidentiality is 
that if we (principal investigator and supervisors), become concerned about the safety 
of a participant or the safety of others, confidentiality may need to be breached to 
ensure the safety of all parties involved.  
 
Publication of Results  
 The results of this project will be published in the form of a thesis submitted to 
the University of Canterbury and may also be published in scientific journals or at 
scientific conferences. However, you are assured of complete anonymity concerning 
your participation. The following steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality and 
anonymity: All information/data obtained from this study will be quickly converted 
into numerical codes with individual names removed (this means that no information 
that could identify you will be released or published without your consent).   
 The only person to have access to the initial data containing the individual names 
will be the principal investigator. Once converted all identifiable information will 
either be stored in a secure location at the University of Canterbury (cc: Department 
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of Psychology policy) or destroyed. If you would like, we can send you a summary of 
the conclusions of the study once the analysis is completed. Please note that there will 
be some delay before all the work is done and this report can be sent out (please 
indicate your preference on the consent form). 
 
Statement of Approval 
This study has received ethical approval from the Human Ethics Committee at the 
University of Canterbury and the Canterbury Ethics Committee. This project is being 
conducted as a requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the 
University of Canterbury by Emily O’Leary (principal researcher) under the 
supervision of Dr Julia Rucklidge & Associate Professor Neville Blampied. If you 
have any concerns regarding participation in this project they will be pleased to 
discuss these with you. 
 

































9.10 Appendix K: Study III Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)  
























0% No anxiety at all 
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9.11 Appendix L: Study III Agreement Scale  
 
      1                      2                     3                        4                    5                     6_________7_______                     
disagree disagree disagree neither agree agree  agree  agree 








9.12 Appendix M: Study III Post-task questions: Uncertainty  
Answer form 
Questions: 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Now, keeping in mind the task you have just completed. Please use 
the scale below to answer the following questions by choosing the 
number that best describes how you are currently thinking.  
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
 
1. There is no doubt in my mind that I answered this task correctly ________ 
2. The possibility that this task was a trick never crossed my mind ______ 
3. I believe my answer was organised and excluded all other possibilities 
________ 
4. I will not be surprised by the results of this task ________ 
5. I am sure that my answer is exactly like the other participants ________ 
6. I can stand the uncertainty of knowing whether my answer was correct _______ 
7. I am 100% certain about my decision on this task ________ 
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How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
1. Because this thought is really scary, the chances of it happening are greater ________ 
2. Because I’ve thought about and wrote the sentence about (say name) in a car 
accident, it must mean that deep down I really want it to happen ________ 
3. Because I thought about and wrote the sentence about (say name) being in a car 
accident, I am a bad person ________ 
4. Thinking and writing out the sentence about (say name) in a car accident will 
make it more likely to happen? ________ 
5. I believe that I have just made the accident happen because of thinking about and 





How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
1. Because this thought is really scary, the chances of it happening are greater ________ 
2. Because I’ve thought about and wrote out the sentence about me being in a car 
accident, it must mean that deep down I really want to be in one ________ 
3. I believe that thinking about and writing out the sentence about me being in a car 




How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
 
1. It is morally wrong to think about and write out such a sentence? _________ 
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2. Only really bad people would imagine such accidents happening _________ 
3. It is important to me that this piece of paper is destroyed. _______ 
4. A truly good person would never have such a thought? _______ 
5. Having bad thoughts about someone I love being in a car accident is as bad as 
them actually being in a car accident. _________ 
6. I believe I have jinxed this person, or made something almost magical happen by 
writing out this sentence? _________ 
 
“Most participants feel bad about inserting someone's name in the 
sentence, and might therefore feel the need to somehow make it right, 
for themselves and/or for the person whose name was filled in. Do you 
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9.14 Appendix O: Study III Post-task questions: Perfectionism   
Task 3: Perfectionism 
 
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
As you can see, you have an A4 booklet in front you. The booklet 
contains 5 pages, 200 printed letters per page. As you can see there is 
a different target letter written at the top of each page. What I would 
like you to do is circle the target letter as many times as it appears in 
the series of distracting letters. You must mark the target letters while 
reading the series from left to right, one line at a time. Each page 
must be completed within a limited period of time. I will give the 
signal to move onto the next page (e.g. invisible marker: 3rd line to 
bottom when all A’s have been found). When I give this signal, you 
must immediately turn to the next page and begin finding the new 
target letter.  
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
Stand directly behind participant per trail (invisible signal + heighten anxiety) 
Time taken to complete (F) page 1: ______minutes ______ seconds (18 / 21) 
Time taken to complete (S) page 2: ______minutes ______ seconds (13 / 17) 
Time taken to complete (K) page 3: ______minutes ______ seconds (15 / 24) 
Time taken to complete (M) page 4: ______minutes ______ seconds (16 / 21) 
Answer form 
Questions: 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Now, keeping in mind the task you have just completed. Please use 
the scale below to answer the following questions by choosing the 
number that best describes how you are currently thinking.  
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
1. It is important to me that I complete this task to the best of my abilities? ________ 
 
2. Being the highest scoring participant on this task is very important to me? ______ 
3. It doesn’t matter what the task is, it is important to make no mistakes _______ 
4. I would have liked to have more time to complete this task _______ 
5. I will be surprised if I failed this task ______ 
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6. I will be upset if I made even one mistake on this task _______  
7. One mistake is as bad as failing completely _______ 























9.15 Appendix P: Study III Post-task questions: Responsibility   
Task 4: Responsibility 





How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
The purpose of this next exercise is to investigate the nature of 
obsessive thinking. What I would like you to do is describe your most 
disturbing obsession to me.   
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Phase 1: (low responsibility) 
Now, for the next 2 minutes, I want you to think about these thoughts 
as intensely (playing it over and over in you mind) - without doing 
any kind of mental or behavioural compulsions.  
 
Throughout the 2 minutes you will hear a beeping sound. When you 
hear this sound, I want you to say this obsession aloud - still without 
doing any compulsive behaviour.  
 
However, after you say the obsession, I want you immediately 
transfer all responsibility for any negative outcomes that may occur 
as a result of not performing the ritual to me (examiner) e.g. “I blame 
Emily”. That way, if anything bad that happens as a result of you not 
neutralising the obsession, will be my fault and not yours.  
 
Remember, it is vitally important that you don’t attempt to reduce 
the anxiety through any type compulsive activity (e.g. counting) as it 
will invalidate the results.  
 
After you have said the thought, I will be asking for ratings of how 
uncomfortable it was to say the thought aloud.  
 
VAS ratings at 0 seconds: _______ 
 
VAS ratings at 30 seconds: _______ 
 
VAS ratings at 1 minute: _______ 
 
VAS ratings at 1 minute; 30 seconds: _______ 
 
VAS ratings at 2 minutes: _______ 
Do you need to perform any neutralising behaviours??? 
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
Phase 2. (High responsibility) 
I’m going to ask you to do exactly the same as before; I still do not 
want you to perform any compulsive behaviours.  




However this time when you say the obsession, I want you to just ‘sit 
with the anxiety’. In other words, I want you to take responsibility for 
the occurrence of this thought without doing any compulsive 
behaviours.  
 
I realise that this is uncomfortable, but it is only for a short time (2 
minutes). I will be asking for ratings of how uncomfortable the 
thought makes you every now and then using the same card as before. 
 
VAS ratings at 0 seconds: _______ 
“And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
 
VAS ratings at 30 seconds: _______ 
“And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
 
VAS ratings at 1 minute: _______ 
“And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
 
VAS ratings at 1 minute; 30 seconds: _______ 
“And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
 
VAS ratings at 2 minutes: _______ 
“And you are going to take responsibility for that?” 
 





Now, keeping in mind the tasks you have just completed. Please use 
the scale below to answer the following questions by choosing the 
number that best describes how you are currently thinking.  
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
 
1. I am responsible for the consequences of my obsession ________ 
 
2. When I hear about something similar to my obsession, I start worrying that I am 
responsible in some way ______ 
 
3. I must always be careful that my obsessions do not come true _______ 
 
4. It is my responsibility to make sure that everything is safe _______ 
 
5. I must think through the consequences of even my smallest actions _______ 
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6. Because I did not neutralise the obsession, then I am to blame for any bad 
consequences ______ 
 






















9.16 Appendix Q: Study III Post-task questions: Control   
Task 6: Control 





How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Participants are given a questionnaire packet face down. They are asked not to turn 
the pages over until instructed to do so. 
 
We are going to begin with what we call the focused breathing 
exercise. During this task, I am going to ask you to close your eyes for 
a few minutes and focus all of your attention exclusively on your 
breathing. While you are engaged in this task, I will periodically 
signal you using a beeping sound that is recorded on this tape. Each 
time you hear the signal, please turn over the next available sheet in 
front of you and indicate whether, at the time of the signal, you were 
focused on your breathing; distracted by obsessive thoughts or 
“other.” Please circle one response, put the sheet aside, then close 
your eyes and concentrate all of your attention again on your 
breathing. We’ll be doing this focused breathing exercise several 




Let’s do one practice round of the focused breathing exercise to make 
sure the procedure is clear. Please close your eyes and focus all of 
your attention on your breathing. 
 
[After signal goes off:]   
 
Okay, turn over the top sheet in front of you and rate what you were 
doing when the beeper went off.  
 
Does anyone have any questions? In order to minimize distractions 
during the focused breathing exercise, I will not say anything from 
this point until the end of the task. So remember, each time you hear 
the signal, open your eyes, turn to the next available sheet to make a 
rating, then close your eyes and focus on your breathing until the next 
signal.  
 
Phase A: Focused Breathing Exercise 
 
Let’s begin the breathing task. Please close your eyes as you did 
before and focus all of your attention on your breathing. 
 
[Signal participants six times (20 second intervals)]- Pause after each signal  
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How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Phase B: OCD Exercise 
 
Okay, you have now finished the focused breathing exercise. Our next 
task is called the OCD exercise. During this exercise, I am going to 
ask you to select several of your most upsetting intrusive thoughts (not 
the one we used previously), then spend several minutes ruminating 
about them as intensely as you can in the way you normally do. Please 
take a moment to choose the obsessions you are most worried about. 
When you have selected them, write them down in your booklet 
under ‘obsessions’. Now close your eyes and begin thinking about 
these obsessions. I will let you know when the time is up.   
  
[Stop participants after 1 minute] 
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 
Administer VAS baseline 
 
Phase C: Distraction Exercise 
 
Okay, you have finished the OCD exercise. Now we are going to 
repeat the focused breathing exercise you did earlier. Each time you 
hear the signal, turn over the next sheet and make a rating, then close 
your eyes and concentrate all of your attention on your breathing 
again. Now, please close your eyes and focus all of your attention 
exclusively on your breathing.  
 
[Signal participants six times (20 second intervals)]- Pause after each signal  
 
How anxious do you feel right now? 





Now, keeping in mind the tasks you have just completed. Please use 
the scale below to answer the following questions by choosing the 
number that best describes how you are currently thinking.  
 
1  2  3  4 5         6           7                      
Disagree  Disagree Disagree     neutral Agree a        Agree          Agree 
Strongly moderately a little   a little          moderately     strongly 
 
1. I was difficult to concentrate on the last exercise because of my obsessive thoughts ________ 
2. I had to struggle to get control over my thinking ________ 
3. I have complete control over these obsessive thoughts ________ 
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4. I ruined the experiment because my intrusive thoughts kept distracting me ________ 
5. I should have enough will-power to control these thoughts _______ 
6. I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts ________ 
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G T H C D E U M G H I K L M N F Q S T V W Y B Z X 
E H T S G B I C X N X J P E S L D H U E S V N X S 
X S V H G F H Y T H G N K J C G X L J K H G C X T 
U Y F G R V T H Y V T G U V J H N P E L D Y H F G 
K J R T S M N B F H I J G V G B S T M R F M V H J 
L K R T J H T K L A F J N G T R L K J N Y T B V O 
L K U Y H N T G E R D E S F L O Q W E R T Y U I O 
P J G V G O V F O L E U X J P E S B S T M R P M V 
F A S D G T H J K L Z C V B N M D K O V O L E U X 
J P E S L H I K L M E S L P Q W E R T Y U I O P A 
S K D G T H J K L Z C V B N M N F X J P O P A S D 
F G S W U B L P H L W T H M B H I S W C G A Q K C 
Z M Y T H K H D F C R J G V G B S T F R P M V F B 
G T S W D C V F R E D H P L M J U Y H B G T R D C 
B G T Y U I O G F H K H D E T Y H G C H B N U Y T 
M H Y W A Q P W O E I R I U Y T L A K S K D J D H 
F Z M X N B X C V G T H U T U Y F G R V T H Y H G 
K J R T S M N B H I F J G V G B S T M R P M V F H 
J L K R T J H T K L A J N L K H D P J W Y G K S A  




R L K J N Y S T B V O L K U Y H N T G E R D E S L 
O Q W E R T Y U I O V T G U V J H N P E L D Y G Y 
D S T V W Y B Z X E H T S G B U N H G D T H K I T 
Y N F C F T Z S E X L K J G P O I U Q W E S R M N 
B Z S E H G C B T M Z V F H G F H Y T H G N K J C 
G X L J K H G C X T U Y F G R V T E M A Z S B N V 
N C Z D O K D J B I F S A B G C W Q T H J R F B O 
P I D V G B G T M R G P A F Q I U O R X E H N C F 
R F B V G E N W I P F H Q R E G F Y E B F G J Q R 
H Y V T G U V J H N P E L D Y H F G K J R T S M N 
B H I J G U Y F G R V T H Y H F G K J R T S M N B 
H I J G V G B S T M R P M V F H J L K R T J H T K 
L A J N G T R L V T G U V J S N P E L D Y H F G K 
J R T S M N Y T H K H D F C R F B G T S Z L K M N 
H J N M K U N Y O I D S F J D J H F R E Z K G V G 
K O U Y V F G R T C B F L C K D H Y F T R E G F Y 
E B F G J Q R T S V E G J P T P W I S G F R B G F 
L H R Y G F G K W D C V F R E D H P L M J U Y H G  
E M A Z B N V N C Z D O K D J B I F S A B G C W Q  




T H J R F K O P I D V G B G T M R G P A F Q I U K 
R X E H N C F R F B V G E K W I P F H Q R E G F Y 
E B F K G J Q R T S V E G J P T P W I S G F R B G 
F L H R Y G F G K W D C V F R E D H P L M J U Y H 
B G T R F D C K B G T Y U I O G F H K H F D E T Y 
H G F C H B N U Y T M H Y W A Q P W O E I R I U Y 
V F H G F H Y T H G N K J C G X L J K H G C X T U 
Y F G T L A K S K D J D H F G Z M X N B X C V G T 
H U T U Y F G R V T H Y H F G K J R T S M N B H I 
J G V G B H I J H T S G B U N H G D T H K I T Y N 
F C F T Z S E X L K J G P O I U Q W E D F G H T R 
E S W H C I H Q P Z S E X D R C F T X E H T S G B 
I C X N F X J P E S L Y H G F C H B N U Y T M H Y  
W A  Q P W O E I R I U Y D H U E K V N P K J H N 
B Y T H J K A C B M N B P O Q I U Y T R E L K M J 
N H B V G C F X D Z S A W E B T H N I M Y T H K H 
D K C R F K B G T S W D C V F R E D H P L M J U Y 
H B G T R F D C B G K Y U I O G F H K H F D E T Y 
H G F C H B N U Y T M H Y W A Q P W O E I R I L K  




A K S K D J D H F G Z M X N B X C V G T H U T U Y 
F G M R V T H Y H F G K J R T S M N B H I J G V G 
Y H G F C H B N U Y T M H Y F W A X Q P W O E I R 
I U Y G T H U J N G H D F E G E T C H S K S J P E 
W L E H D M F N C H G S K C D G F T Q U Y A X Z A 
N F K I F H D N X Z K D J U F R V G B F J V M F B 
M C K D L S F B G T S W D C V F R E D H P L M J U 
Y H M G T R F D C B G M Y U J H T K L A J N G T R 
U Y H N T G E R D E S L S Q W E R T Y U I S P J G 
V G O V O L E U X J P E S B S T R P M V F A S D F 
G T H J K L Z C V B N M D K O V O L E U X J P E S 
L H I K L M E S L O Q W E R T Y U I O P A S K D F 
G T H J K L Z C V B N M N F X J P Y P A S D F G S 
W U B L P H L W D T K G H S G S J A L C X M N X B 
V H D M R E B W Y D U P G J I O U V J N S C J B 
H F B D F H X J G D S H T Y U E W O R G C B J N R 
M F G H J F V O F Y P S F D I U Y E M U H J G F C 
B O I U Y F G R M N B H E I J R F Y D B F H O I U 
F R T U I G T H B I Y F M I R B G H F I U Y M G J 
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9.18 Appendix S: Study III Anxiety ratings at baseline, during and post-task (%) 
     Aggressive (A) Symmetry (S)  Contamination (C)  Hoarding (H)   
     (n = 6)   (n = 6)   (n = 4)    (n = 4)  
Task       Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD   Mean SD _____  
Probability inference task 
Baseline    8 4  10 6  8 5   5 6   
During     50 29  48 23  65 25   63 15   
Post-task    15 8  17 14  18 13   25 6   
Sentence paradigm 
Baseline    12 4  15 8  10 0   10 0 
TAF-Likelihood-others   80 32  83 19  49 35   85 6 
TAF-Likelihood-self     37 34  45 22  33 26   49 28 
TAF-Morality     43 34  38 20  30 23   33 21 
Post-task    10 6  16 12  13 15   15 6 
Cancellation task 
Baseline    13 6  13 8  10 0   13 5 
During     32 15  60 22  45 33   58 17 
Post-task    14 7  20 17  15 10   15 10 
Verbal recordings 
Baseline    13 8  13 5  10 0   13 5 
Low responsibility a   31 17  48 9  31 19   36 12 
Baseline    11 8  18 10  19 9   23 5 
High responsibility a   80 11  80 6  84 16   73 19 
Post-task    12 4  25 14  24 8   23 13 
Behavioural avoidance test 
Baseline    13 6  15 5  20 8   15 6 
During     38 33  44 31  100 0   63 13 
Post-task    11 5  18 12  35 17   15 19 
Focussed breathing exercise 
Baseline    12 8  13 5  13 5   15 6 
During     78 16  70 22  78 17   63 24 
Post-task    10 6  13 8  25 17   20 14 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. a mean score (average five 30 second intervals); **significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
